Maybe North Korea wants to get bombed

Maybe North Korea wants to get bombed


After a Japanese newspaper reported last week that the North Korean government is planning a July 4th launch of a Taepodong-2 intercontinental ballistic missile at Hawaii, the U.S. government was then pressed to explain its response to this possibility. At a Pentagon news conference, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that the ground-based mid-course interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska stand ready, a mobile THAAD battery has deployed to Hawaii, and the sea-based X-band radar platform has sailed. For his part, President Obama assured a reporter that "the T's are crossed and the I's are dotted in terms of what might happen."

The Wall Street Journal sent an intrepid reporter to a beach on Kauai to get some thoughts from the locals about the prospect of ICBM bombardment.

President Obama and his national security staff will have to ponder more than just their defensive preparations. Should North Korea make even a failed attempt to strike a Hawaiian island, what practical and political pressures will the President face to retaliate against North Korea?

John Pike of Globalsecurity plotted North Korea's April 2009 Taepodong-2 test on this graphic. This launch was intended to achieve low earth orbit, with a trajectory in the general direction of Hawaii. The flight failed to achieve orbit and impacted at sea not even half way to Hawaii.

As President Obama and his advisers contemplate how to respond to a possible North Korean missile attack on Hawaii, they must first try to understand North Korea's motives. Why would the North Korean leadership risk or even attempt to incite U.S. retaliation?

In a military crisis, which side perceives itself to have "escalation dominance"? Which side believes that its position will improve the more the military crisis escalates?

From a conventional military perspective, it would seem that the U.S.-South Korean side possesses escalation dominance. U.S. air and naval power would finally get an opportunity to bash North Korea's known and suspected nuclear and missile installations. If it came to ground combat, North Korea's undertrained and undersupplied forces likely would not last long. True, North Korean tube and rocket artillery holds part of Seoul hostage. But South Korea can partially mitigate this threat through civil defense preparation and counter-battery fire. And should North Korea actually make good on this threat, the regime must know that that would be the end for them.

Thus even a failed North Korean missile strike on Hawaii would seem to be a gross miscalculation. It would offer the U.S. a chance to stop the North Korean proliferation threat for good.

But maybe the North Korean leadership doesn't see it this way. First, based on past experience North Korea's leaders may believe that they possess escalation dominance. From their perspective, previous crises have resulted in diplomatic flurries, the arrival of emissaries, negotiations, and, very frequently, payments to North Korea.

Second, North Korea may be looking for a way to patch up fraying relations with China and Russia. North Korea's leaders may see a threatened or actual U.S. attack on North Korea as a very effective way of renewing North Korea's security relationships with China and Russia.

Finally, an ICBM launch directed at Hawaii would be a good way of collecting data on the U.S. missile defense system, a procedure that perhaps the Chinese and Russians are quietly encouraging. Russian and Chinese intelligence-gathering ships, aircraft, and satellites would welcome a chance to observe the U.S. turning on its missile defense radars and communications systems.

Unless the U.S. absolutely has to attempt an intercept of an incoming ICBM, President Obama's likely preference would be to simply ignore North Korea's antics. With this course, he would preserve his flexibility and enhance his diplomatic advantage.

However, such a course may not be politically or practically feasible. In addition to the possible North Korean ICBM shot is the journey of the Kang Nam, a North Korean freighter suspected of carrying missile components prohibited by UN Security Council resolutions. USS John S. McCain is following the freighter which may be headed for a port in Myanmar.

The U.S. will not get any cooperation from Myanmar authorities regarding an inspection of the Kang Nam. Should the Obama administration fail to respond to both the Kang Nam and a North Korean missile shot aimed at Hawaii, it risks coming under stern criticism for having a feckless policy toward North Korea. At a practical level, U.S. allies in Asia will have new questions about the value of U.S. security guarantees. And bolder challenges to the Obama administration (not just from North Korea) would be inevitable.

If both sides in a conflict believe they possess escalation dominance, escalation becomes likely. But both sides can't be right. Wars are typically the result of miscalculation. It is remarkable that miscalculation over North Korean brinkmanship has not already occurred.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/06/m...a-wants-to-get/