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Saturday, May 2, 2026
[Salon] The Emiratis, OPEC and peak oil - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
The Emiratis, OPEC and peak oil
Summary: by quitting OPEC, the UAE has stolen a march on its neighbours in responding to the high probability that the third Gulf war has brought forward ‘peak oil’. The cartel will almost certainly survive the Emiratis’ departure for now but it is surely in permanent decline.
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast (with Jim Krane) here.
…divisions [in Opec] will become even clearer as the shift towards a greener economy accelerates. Opec’s latest tiff won’t be its last.
The Economist, 8 July 2021
The UAE’s seemingly sudden decision earlier this week to quit OPEC with effect from 1 May has spawned a whole industry of speculation among the commentariat over the ‘why?’ — up to and including the idea that the US has effectively ‘bought’ the Emiratis out by all but agreeing to their request for a swap line. (Couple the fact that the UAE holds billions in US Treasuries and had Forex reserves in excess of US$250bn with its mulling publicly about pricing some oil in yuan and it becomes clear that, if anyone is playing anyone, Abu Dhabi, wisely seeking a safety net in these straitened times, is playing Washington.) In reality, the simple explanation is the correct one, i.e. although the war in the Gulf has played a key part in determining timing, far from being sudden the UAE has done what it has been threatening to do for years over its desire to get as much of its oil out of the ground and to market as possible before the oil age ends.
It is at least as long ago as 2021 that the Emiratis signalled that their remaining an OPEC member was dependent upon them being allowed to boost their oil production majorly, as I wrote in the 12 July 2021 Newsletter which also referenced the quote above. This was followed by more UAE brinkmanship a couple of years later, the subject of our 14 June 2023 podcast and the 11 July 2023 Newsletter. As I wrote in the latter, Riyadh’s efforts to keep the UAE in the fold amounted to “papering over the cracks” and would most likely result in “no more than a temporary reprieve.” This remained the case until this week, contributing significantly to the continuing decline in Saudi/UAE relations.
The UAE’s decision to exit OPEC stems from a long-standing desire to maximize oil production and revenue before the global transition to green energy permanently devalues its reserves.
As has been widely reported in the press, differences of view within the GCC over how to respond to the war have further soured relations. A 16 April essay by the Carnegie Endowment’s Andrew Leber and Sam Worby laid out three scenarios for the Gulf states after the Iran war. At that time the authors favoured something close to the status quo, their second, as the most likely. I suspect that if they were writing today they would opt instead for their third — and “cautionary” — scenario in which…
…fractures might emerge along three lines: pre-existing economic competition, divergent assessments of Israel, or differing calculations on accommodating US versus Iranian demands.
Acknowledging all three of their ‘lines’ as valid, we should be in no doubt that by far the most important is economic — both short and long-term.
In the short-term, although not as badly affected as Qatar (let alone Iran), the UAE faces a sizeable bill for making good war damage to oil-related and other infrastructure — with the cost to the region as a whole now being put as high as US$58bn by Rystad Energy. To Abu Dhabi’s share of these costs, we can reasonably add the following:
Accelerating the already planned expansion of oil output to reach five million barrels per day next year (with, I think, more to follow);
A major upgrade of the Fujairah pipeline and terminals, bypassing the Strait of Hormuz;
Significant additional defence-related expenditure; and
A possible economic bail-out of Dubai which could go beyond the US$10bn stumped up by Abu Dhabi in 2009.
In the longer-term, the UAE (in common with its Gulf neighbours) now has two major challenges staring it in the face.
First, despite proposals for multiple new pipelines to neutralise the Strait of Hormuz as a choke point, the war has raised serious questions over the reliability of the Gulf region as a source of hydrocarbons. In consequence, net energy consuming countries are already turning elsewhere for oil and gas as the recent sharp rise in tankers heading to the United States highlights. Outside OPEC, Abu Dhabi can look to counter this to an extent at least by offering discounts on its oil which, with a balanced budget price for Brent crude estimated at US$55 per barrel (pb), it can reasonably afford — and especially if it can get more oil to market. It is not at all clear what, if anything, Riyadh would be able to do to prevent this; and, with their balanced budget price at around US$90pb, the Saudis could not reasonably accommodate oil at anything close to this level for a protracted period, their recent (ongoing?) attempted — and now seemingly futile — ‘squeeze’ of the US shale sector notwithstanding.
Second, and much more profound in its implications, there is the probability that the war has brought forward ‘peak oil’. Indeed, the writing is already on the wall. According to energy think tank Ember, China’s already impressive exports of solar technology doubled in March, with batteries and electric vehicles also hitting record highs. To date, the biggest market growth has been in African and Asian emerging markets, i.e, the hardest hit by the energy crisis. However, developed economies are looking to accelerate their move away from hydrocarbons too. As the United Kingdom’s energy minister Ed Miliband asserted earlier this week:
As we face the second fossil fuel shock in less than five years, the lesson for our country is clear: the era of fossil fuel security is over, and the era of clean energy security must come of age.
Granted that the UAE still faces daunting challenges, by quitting OPEC it has strengthened its hand in addressing them. As for whether it has weakened the cartel, it has! But more important still is the fact that the war has further eroded OPEC’s already declining leverage, making being the first to find the exit, as the UAE has done, all the more imperative.
Friday, May 1, 2026
Thursday, April 30, 2026
[Salon] Iraq moves forward on naming a prime minister - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Iraq moves forward on naming a prime minister
Summary: months after parliamentary elections Iraq appears to have finally resolved who will be the country’s next prime minister.
We thank Winthrop Rodgers for today’s newsletter. A journalist and analyst who spent several years in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, he focuses on politics, human rights and economics and is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. @wrodgers2
Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) has nominated a new prime minister after more than five months of delay and multiple rounds of difficult negotiations. On April 27, the SCF announced that it had tapped businessman Ali al-Zaidi, who has never held high government or partisan office, as its choice. The decision was greeted positively across the political spectrum, mostly in relief that a decision had been taken and the process of government formation can now quickly resolve itself. There were worries that the US may object to the SCF’s choice, but Washington has signalled its acceptance.
Zaidi is primarily known an owner of al-Janoob Islamic Bank. Notably, it was banned from participating in US dollar auctions by the Central Bank of Iraq in February 2024 along with seven other financial institutions as part of crackdown on Iraqi banks smuggling US dollars to Iran. Beyond that, his business portfolio includes Taawon Hypermarkets. He is also the CEO of Dijlah TV, one of Iraq’s largest television channels, and is chairman on the board of a private university. He once held a minor position in the Ministry of Trade involving the ration card system.
As a result, Zaidi carries little of the political experience of other candidates who had been floated for the position. By contrast, current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani had held numerous governorate-level and ministerial posts before he was nominated. It also means that Zaidi carries little of the political baggage of other potential prime ministerial nominees.
The Iraq Shia Coordination Framework has nominated businessman Ali al-Zaidi as the new prime minister, a choice seen as a move to break a five-month deadlock with a politically inexperienced candidate who won't overshadow established party leaders.
For example, the Trump administration dramatically declared on January 27 that it would not support State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki, who had been the SCF’s first choice. Washington viewed the former two-term prime minister as too close to Iran, a determination that was made before the current war began a month later. Since then, the SCF has vacillated over its strategy, veering between a defiant stance of sticking by Maliki, renominating Sudani or searching for a new candidate entirely. In the end, they opted for the third route.
Zaidi’s nomination is an extreme version of the approach that the Shia bloc has taken since Maliki left office in 2014. Every prime minister since then has been plucked from relative obscurity, rather than being one of the country’s top politicians. This maintains balance between the various parties within the SCF by not raising any one above the others, but it also allows the party leaders to manage up and exert control over the prime minister. Of course, each of the prime ministers has tried to expand their power base once in office, but with limited success. As a non-politician, Zaidi fits in this model and will be extremely unlikely to overshadow the power of party leaders.
However, one big winner from the nomination seems to be Faiq Zaidan, president of the Supreme Judicial Council, who has progressively become more influential in Iraqi politics in recent years and is said to be close to Zaidi. The judge’s position provides him with decisive power to weigh in on political disputes, while also being an influential backroom player. However, there are some accusations that Zaidan personally benefitted from Zaidi’s legal and corrupt business activities.
Zaidi’s selection was welcomed by figures across the political spectrum, including non-Shia blocs. Speaker of Parliament Haibet al-Halbousi, who is Sunni, praised the pick in a statement. In the Kurdistan Region, the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — who cannot seem to agree on the colour of the sky these days — both congratulated Zaidi. However, since the Sunni or Kurdish blocs are not responsible for selecting the prime minster, there was probably not much to be gained from actively opposing the Shia pick.
Initially, the choice raised questions among analysts about whether this is a serious pick or whether it is merely a play for time. Abu Mithaq al-Masari, an Iraqi political observer, suggested in a Facebook post that Zaidi may be a “burnt card,” who is offered up while negotiations continue in the background to select a real candidate who will subsequently attempt to form a government. This however seems unlikely given that President Nizar Amedi has officially asked him to move forward with naming a cabinet and Zaidi’s acceptance by the other blocs.
Another major question was whether Zaidi will win approval from the Trump administration. The fact that his bank was banned from the US dollar auction seemed at first blush to be automatically disqualifying, given the criteria applied to Maliki. However, pressure had been growing both domestically and from foreign partners like Washington to complete the government formation process in the interests of stability.
In this end, the US Embassy in Baghdad posted on social media on April 29 that it “extends its best wishes to Prime Minister-Designate Ali al-Zaidi as he works to form a government capable of fulfilling the hopes of all Iraqis for a brighter and more peaceful future.” Its close allies also signalled approval. UK Ambassador to Iraq Irfan Siddiq wrote on social media that London “welcomes the nomination of a new Prime Minister in Iraq” and wished Zaidi “success in swiftly forming a new government.” French Ambassador Patrick Durel similarly congratulated the prime minister designate.
Iraq is experiencing a substantial security and economic crisis as a result of the war between its two main allies, the US and Iran. Facing it without a permanent government would be foolish. In that sense, Zaidi’s nomination is a positive step forward. Still, his ability to run a government is entirely untested and is therefore a major risk. Matters are rarely clear or predictable when it comes to Iraqi politics and this unusual choice only reinforces that tendency.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Wednesday, April 29, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Fourth Sunday of Easter - Guest Post
Laura Bell was not a typical college graduate. After finishing school, instead of pursuing a business career or following a conventional path, she took a job in Wyoming as a sheep herder. Some of her friends thought she was crazy. But Laura wanted a real challenge, and she certainly found one.
She worked nearly 18 hours a day, seven days a week. Her day began before sunrise and often ended long after sunset. Most of that time she was completely alone, accompanied only by her dog, her horse and roughly 2,000 sheep. Once a week, someone rode out to deliver mail, food and essentials. Her responsibility was simple but demanding: keep the flock together, move them to food and water and protect them from predators.
Laura once explained, “When you’re out there all alone, there is no one to correct your mistakes. So, you stay extra alert for dangers, like rattlesnakes. You don’t do foolish things with your horse.”
She also said one of her greatest joys – and biggest challenges – was the weather. It determined everything about the sheep’s behavior. One day, a portion of the flock wandered off. She spent hours tracking them down, only to be caught in a sudden thunderstorm once she found them. Soaked and exhausted, she spent the night wrapped in wet blankets, shivering beside the flock she was protecting.
Laura’s experience gives us a glimpse into how demanding shepherding still is today. In ancient times, however, it was even more difficult. Shepherds had no modern equipment, no reliable protection; often not even animals to assist them. They relied on vigilance, courage and sheer endurance.
That helps us understand the confidence of David in the Book of Samuel, when he volunteers to fight the giant Philistine, Goliath. King Saul doubts him, but David explains that while tending his father’s sheep, he fought off lions and bears to protect the flock. That experience prepared him for the battle he would eventually win.
Because shepherds risked so much for their flocks, biblical writers often used the image of a shepherd to describe God’s care. The familiar words, “The Lord is my shepherd; there is nothing I shall want,” express trust in a God who guides, protects and provides.
This imagery reaches its fullest meaning in Jesus Christ, whom Christians recognize as the Good Shepherd – especially reflected upon each year on this very day, Good Shepherd Sunday, during the Easter season.
So how do we respond to all this? First, with gratitude. Christ tells us He is the gate for the sheep, the one who leads us to life. Through His death and resurrection, we believe we are offered freedom from sin and the promise of eternal life.
Second, we respond with openness. The Good Shepherd is not a distant figure from the past; He continues to seek the lost, strengthen the weak and call each of us by name. His voice is often heard in Scripture, in prayer, in the kindness of others and in those quiet moments when we sense guidance and peace.
The message is both comforting and challenging: we are never abandoned. The Good Shepherd who laid down His life for us continues to walk with us, guide us and share His risen life – but only if we are willing to listen and follow.
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, April 28, 2026
[Salon] Trump Courting Disaster With New Trade War On China -
https://meaninginhistory.substack.com/p/trump-courting-disaster-with-new
[Salon] America quits Syria - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
America quits Syria
Summary: America’s withdrawal of its last remaining forces in Northeast Syria is a significant moment for Syria, one that rivals Türkiye and Israel will see as an opportunity to exploit. Further risks to the country’s fragile stability may also come from a re-emerging ISIS.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
Amid the American whiplash in the Middle East in the last few months, one might have missed that the last US convoy left its major bases in Syria in mid-April. Yet the moment is consequential. It reflects a convergence of opportunities and constraints. The evacuation of the last U.S. bases ends more than a decade of American military presence and signals a shift in military posture, as well as political strategy.
US forces first entered Syria in 2014 to combat the Islamic State, partnering with Kurdish-led forces that would become the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At its height, this partnership enabled the SDF to control nearly a third of Syrian territory, backed by roughly 2,000 U.S. troops and extensive airpower, intelligence, and logistical support. Over time, however, the mission narrowed, and US President Donald Trump had sought to leave Syria since his first term. With ISIS territorially defeated and regional priorities shifting, the rationale for maintaining dispersed ground positions weakened.
The mechanics of the withdrawal are striking in their speed and scope. Since February, US forces have vacated a chain of key installations. These included the strategic tri-border garrison at al-Tanf and the al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah. On April 16, U.S. and Syrian officials said that forces completed their withdrawal from Qasak air base. Troops relocated to Jordan rather than Iraq due to security concerns.
The United States military withdrawal from Syria allows Damascus to consolidate territorial control over lucrative resources but marginalizes Kurdish autonomy and risks renewed instability from the Islamic State and regional tensions involving Turkey and Israel.
Despite starting a new war, President Trump can now say he ended the U.S. military presence in Syria. The U.S. military will now shift from permanent posts to military cooperation and training with Syrian security forces. US Central Command said “US forces continue to support partner-led counterterrorism efforts, which are essential to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and strengthening regional security.” This reflects a broader US shift in the Middle East, especially after Syria last year joined the coalition against the Islamic State.
This represents a major win for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in his desire to soon claim complete territorial consolidation after the country’s protracted civil war. The U.S. military exit removes a major constraint for Damascus’s reach into the country’s northeast, which contains lucrative oil fields and border crossings. It also reflects a broader development in U.S.-Syria relations, with both sides entering what appears to be a tentative period of engagement focused on security coordination and potential economic cooperation. Al-Sharaa visited President Trump at the White House in November, the first such visit by any Syrian head of state. There is also apparently an American plan to turn Syria into an oil transit hub.
Still, this extension of al-Sharaa’s power comes with risk. While degraded, the Islamic State retains the capacity to exploit gaps in control. In December a gunman who the Syrian government claim to be affiliated with the Islamic State killed two US soldiers as well as a civilian American interpreter. In February the US transferred over 5,000 Islamic State detainees to Iraq ahead of their withdrawal, an effort to reduce exposure to any potential volatility once US troops pulled out. Without a US stabilising presence, the burden shifts to Syrian forces whose cohesion and capacity remain uneven.
For Kurds in Syria, the consequences are more acute. The Trump administration’s withdrawal effectively ends the strategic partnership that underpinned the SDF’s autonomy. The US presence had functioned as both a deterrent against Turkish incursions and a mediator in tensions with Damascus. The removal of American troops accelerates a forced integration of the SDF into Syrian state structures and the transfer of border controls to the central government. Without US backing, the SDF has lost its autonomy and will become more of a subordinate actor amid Damascus’s consolidation. Kurdish forces—particularly the core People’s Defence Units (YPG)—remain capable, but their leverage has diminished significantly.
Türkiye, by contrast, stands to gain. Ankara has long opposed US support for Kurdish forces along its southern border, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan has called “terror groups.” The American exit removes a major source of anxiety and opens space for expanded Turkish influence, either directly or through coordination with Damascus. But, without U.S. mediation, there is an increased risk of miscalculation along contested areas between the Syrian government and a weakened but still armed Kurdish presence, conditions for renewed instability that could draw Turkish forces into the fray. The Islamic State may also be able to exploit the situation, which could lead to attacks near or inside Türkiye as well.
Israel has sought to keep Syria divided, previously stoking tensions between Damascus and the country’s ethnic minority groups that remain suspicious of al-Sharaa. Further, Israel is concerned over the loss of the US presence at al-Tanf, long seen as a barrier to Iranian and Iraqi militias. While the withdrawal does raise concerns about a more permissive corridor linking Tehran to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Washington is less concerned, given Syria’s shift away from Iran. However Israel with its forces ensconced in Syria south of Damascus may still use this as justification to conduct airstrikes to try to keep its northern neighbour weak.
America’s exit does not end its involvement in Syria but it does change its form toward indirect influence and selective engagement. While Washington’s reduced presence will likely be insufficient to manage the risks that remain, there also appears to be a reckoning with the constraints that there is less ability or appetite to control the vacuum it leaves behind.
You can find more analysis on the US withdrawal on our 22 April podcast with the Syrian analyst Malik al-Abdeh.
Monday, April 27, 2026
Sunday, April 26, 2026
Saturday, April 25, 2026
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - Guest Post from RSIS Commentary Series
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - micheletkearney@gmail.com - Gmail
RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg.
No. 090/2026 dated 24 April 2026
The Desired Global Order from
Beijing’s Perspective
By Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng
SYNOPSIS
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances. It aims to promote a global political order that applies varying standards in evaluating the legitimacy of governing models. Meanwhile, it seeks to return to an open global economic order, opposing the policies aimed at decoupling and breaking chains.
COMMENTARY
Since the 2020s, Beijing’s view of the global order has shifted from optimism to pessimism. In 2024, Beijing publicly acknowledged that China was being harmed by the changing global order, in which “regional conflicts and disturbances keep cropping up, global issues are becoming more acute, and external attempts to suppress and contain China are escalating.
The report at the 4th Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee in October 2025 reaffirmed this view. It also argued that China’s development presents both strategic opportunities and risks and challenges, while uncertainties and unforeseeable circumstances continue to rise. Beijing’s growing disappointment with the counter-globalisation trend of recent years has motivated its leadership to foster a more favourable global order.
The aim of this essay is to present Beijing’s views on the desired global order, as set out in its four initiatives – the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilisation Initiative and the Global Governance Initiative – which suggests that Beijing envisions a global order comprising three key aspects: security, politics, and the economy.
A Security Order Without Alliances
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances and opposes one in which the US dominates over security issues through its alliance system. Before the war in Ukraine, Beijing focused on resisting Washington’s efforts to establish multilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, such as AUKUS with Australia and the UK in 2021 and the QUAD with Japan, Australia, and India in 2022.
As NATO’s hostility towards China increased with the escalation of the war in Ukraine, Beijing’s efforts shifted towards opposing its policy. Beijing was especially enraged in 2023 by NATO’s Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which stated: "The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” In response, Beijing accused NATO of having a Cold War mentality and urged it to stop its groundless accusations and provocative rhetoric against China.
At the same time, Beijing promoted non-alliance partnerships among major powers as a new model for global security. It stated, “The China-Russia relationship is based on no alliance, no-confrontation, and no-targeting of any third party…This is fundamentally different from the exclusive groupings and bloc confrontation practised by some NATO countries.”
Besides the new approach for relations among big countries, Beijing also recognises the importance of the United Nations – particularly, the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and relevant UN committees – as well as regional security institutions – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the “China + Central Asia” mechanism, and East Asia cooperation mechanisms, among others – in establishing a favourable and stable security order. Within these global and regional frameworks, Beijing is committed to maintaining global peace through its active involvement in both traditional and non-traditional security cooperation.
A Political Order of Diversification
Beijing intends to promote a global political order that uses varying standards rather than universal ones when evaluating the legitimacy of political institutions or governing models. According to Beijing, there is no common criterion by which to judge the worth of political systems and governing models, as universal values have never existed. With China’s achievements in modernisation and development, Beijing now positions itself as the global advocate for non-Western modernisation. It seeks to legitimise alternative approaches to modernisation across different countries, believing that its modernisation model is appealing to most states in the Global South.
Although there are doubts, both foreign and domestic, about whether the Chinese model can be applied to other developing countries, especially those that gained independence from European colonial rule, Beijing believes that its own proven success will attract followers. Consequently, it has a strong ambition to lead global governance. To this end, China has sought to secure the support of both developed and developing countries. In December 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his German counterpart and said, “Both China and Germany support, champion, and practise multilateralism; the two sides should strengthen solidarity and cooperation to make the global governance system more just and equitable.”
Additionally, Beijing aims to reshape the global understanding of human rights. Frequently criticised by Western governments, Beijing’s stance emphasises that developing countries should prioritise the right to economic development over civil and political liberties. It argues that civil and political liberties are secondary to the right to essential resources. A citizen’s priority is to achieve freedom from poverty, such as reliable access to food and shelter. Developing countries should first focus on lifting their citizens out of poverty before worrying about civil liberties. There is considerable overlap between Beijing’s view of human rights and that of many developing countries
An Economic Order of Re-globalisation
Beijing seeks to restore the global economic order of the post-Cold War era, during which China was one of its main beneficiaries. However, Beijing believes that technological decoupling and trade protectionism by major Western economies, such as the US, Japan, and the EU, are hurting the open global economic order
Beijing, therefore, opposes Washington’s “small yards and high fences” policy, the EU’s derisking policy, and the policies of other major economies aimed at decoupling and breaking supply chains. In April 2024, Wang Yi criticised Washington for its efforts to contain and suppress China.
Beijing also emphasises the importance of taking concrete action to maintain an open global economic order. As Chinese Premier Li Qiang emphasised in July 2023, “China will not close the door of its opening-up policy but will open it wider. This is our own strategic selection, which also conforms to the historical laws of economic globalisation.” Even if US President Donald Trump adopts a tougher stance on China by imposing higher tariffs, China will still adhere to its opening-up policy. This is evident in the expansion of unilateral visa-free travel policies. Li Qiang reiterated that “China is willing to work with the US in undertaking their responsibilities as major countries, jointly upholding international trade rules, and ensuring the stability of global industry and supply chains.”
In multilateral economic cooperation, Beijing is considering discussing free trade agreements with more countries of the Global South, supporting the WTO’s Aid for Trade initiative, and renewing its contributions to the WTO’s China Programme. Beijing also aims to reinforce the G20’s collaborative framework to counter economic decoupling attempts by major Western economic entities as much as possible, while promoting the view that consensus should be a prerequisite for collective action to tackle global economic and financial challenges. This approach is intended to counteract unilateral US financial policies that could harm other members.
Conclusion
Frustrated by the counter-globalisation trend of recent years, Beijing is set on creating a more favourable global order, as illustrated by the “four initiatives”: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Culture Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. However, Beijing does not intend to replace Washington as a global leader in the foreseeable future, given the substantial gap in material capabilities between China and the US.
Unlike Moscow during the Cold War, which sought to change the international system established by the US, Beijing is concerned only with reforming the order it shares with the US. Beijing remains committed to the principle of multipolarity and refuses to accept a G2 model comprising China and the United States.
In March 2026, Wang Yi stated that "China will never take the beaten path of seeking hegemony as its strength grows, nor do we subscribe to the logic that the world can be run by major countries.” Beijing’s impact on the global order will therefore be new and unfamiliar to Washington. This does not mean that Beijing will have a larger impact on the world than Washington in the coming decade. Neither does it mean that Beijing’s growing influence is guaranteed to mould the global order to fit its desires.
Yan Xuetong is a Distinguished Professor, and Sun Xuefeng a Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Professor Sun was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), in February 2026. Professor Yan is scheduled to visit RSIS as the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professor of International Relations in October 2026.
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