Reflections from news and commentary of the day
Subscribe To
Posts
All Comments
Tuesday, October 27, 2026
Monday, October 26, 2026
Sunday, October 25, 2026
Saturday, October 24, 2026
Friday, October 23, 2026
Thursday, October 22, 2026
[Salon] The Suffocation of Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech in Norway Guest Post by Glenn Diesen
Date: Thu, Oct 22, 2026
Subject: Statement by Glenn Diesen
The very public execution of my professorship and reputation continues in Norway. Today’s media article about me makes three claims that are misleading and/or false.
1) The article dismisses my claim that my research is being criminalized as the journalists merely cite the dismissive comments from the university - no arguments are apparently required. It is not possible for an academic anymore to analyse the policies of rival powers by assessing their security concerns, as it will be smeared by the government, the government’s NGOs and the media as “legitimizing” the enemy and supporting their narratives. The current Defence Minister singled me out with the accusation of spreading propaganda and criticised two podcasters for even speaking with me (as I have already been cancelled by the media in Norway). How was this accusation by the Defence Minister substantiated? I had argued that NATO expansion triggered the war in Ukraine, which the Defence Minister denounce as dangerous “Russian propaganda”, with no need to substantiate his vile accusation. I can cite a sea of evidence and also refer to statements by American and European political leaders, ambassadors, intelligence chiefs, and others to make my case. However, the purpose is not to engage in debate, but to smear, censor, and cancel. By going after an individual academic for challenging official truths, the government has already claimed a monopoly on the truth. Academics should have their arguments scrutinised and criticised, but these are severe personal attacks from the government without the possibility of even defending myself. How is this not criminalising the research of an academic?
I cannot even speak at any events in Norway without the event being cancelled. The last event I agreed to speak at was because I shared the stage with the former CIA officer John Kiriakou. A newspaper had the event at a church cancelled, and when the backup location did not also cancel, the journalist simply printed in the paper that it had been cancelled so people would not show up. Is this normal? I must use my allotted holiday days to attend conferences because any event I attend can be presented as “controversial,” and then the NGOs and journalists will go after the reputation of the university. Is this normal? Every newspaper article about me merely refers to me as “controversial” or “pro-Russian” without ever assigning meaning to these labels or presenting my argument.
I have argued, much like former CIA director Burns, that if the West attempts to pull Ukraine into the NATO orbit, then there would be war and Ukraine would be destroyed. This is considered a “pro-Russian” argument. Arguing that we should respect the will of most Ukrainians who want negotiations to end the war is also considered a “pro-Russian” argument, while in contrast, boycotting diplomacy, deporting Ukrainian refugees, and calling for the conscription of Ukrainian women is “pro-Ukrainian”.
2) To avoid addressing any of my arguments, the journalists go on to uncritically cite personal attacks against me, pointing out that I have been called a propagandist by the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. This is a “non-governmental organisation” financed by the government and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which was set up by Reagan and the CIA director in 1983 to manipulate the civil society of other states. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee has been relentless in its smears on social media to have me fired, writing hit pieces in the media, pushing to cancel my speaking events, writing a letter to my university, and even posting a picture of my house on social media. This is a governmental "human rights organisation" that cites human rights concerns to build the case for war.
3) Lastly, to further avoid addressing my actual arguments, they simply cite the fact that arguments I made at a debate last year have been “wholly or partially debunked” by a fact-check. The state-run media (NRK) invited the state-run military defence institute (FFI) to fact-check three of my claims. What claims did they "debunk"?
My first claim was that only 20% of Ukrainians wanted NATO membership between 1991 and the regime change in February 2014. The fact-checker argued that the number went up by the middle of 2014 (after Russia responded by seizing Crimea), which is a completely meaningless comment intended to muddy the waters, as my argument was about the previous era.
My second claim was that Zelensky had argued in an interview with The Economist in March 2022 that there were some Western countries that would like a long war with Russia to weaken a strategic rival, even if it would result in the destruction of Ukraine. The fact-checker argued that not all Western countries wanted a long war and that it was not an official policy. I never claimed it was an official policy, as it was primarily the US and UK pushing for a long war.
My third claim was that the US and UK sabotaged the Istanbul peace agreement in April 2022. The fact-checker claimed this was incorrect and suggested that it could only be based on one statement by David Arakhamia. The fact-checker did not want to mention that both mediators also confirmed it: Turkey’s foreign minister and the former Israeli prime minister both said that Russia and Ukraine were close to a deal, but the US and UK saw an opportunity to weaken Russia by fighting with Ukrainians. Zelensky’s former adviser Arestovych confirmed it, and the Ukrainian ambassador Chaly, who participated in the negotiations, confirmed that Putin was willing to do almost anything to end the war. The former head of the German armed forces confirmed that Boris Johnson sabotaged it, and Boris Johnson himself wrote articles warning about a “bad peace” and arguing for “strategic patience.” I am being fact-checked by war propagandists.
Unfortunately, none of my arguments matter because in Norway there is no debate and no interest in any arguments. Reality means nothing anymore as war narratives must be defended against inconvenient truths. I used to be naïve and think that the endless smears were caused by misunderstanding, as I had simply not been able to convey my arguments properly. However, the endless articles with smears and labels are deliberate lies and deceptions.
[Salon] Does Sisi go or does he stay past 2030? - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Does Sisi go or does he stay past 2030?
Summary: President Sisi’s musings on what happens when his current term ends in 2030 reveal unease within the ranks of regime loyalists and concern that the economic crisis engendered by his government could produce a spontaneous explosion of popular anger.
We thank Hossam el-Hamalawy for today’s newsletter, an edited version of his Egypt Security Sector Report. Hossam is a journalist and scholar-activist currently based in Germany. He was involved in the Egyptian labour movement and was one of the organisers of the 2011 revolution. The Egypt Security Sector Report is available on 3Arabawy. Hossam is the author of Counterrevolution in Egypt: Sisi’s New Republic published by Verso. Follow his writings on Substack and X.
On 14 October, President Sisi insisted nobody would touch the constitution, apparently ruling out another extension of his presidency beyond 2030. Was he reassuring the public, or addressing growing unease within the ruling establishment?
The confusion was visible almost immediately. Several news websites deleted reports that quoted Sisi’s remarks regarding the constitution. This was roughly around 5 pm. They republished them only after the presidential spokesperson released his speech at 7 pm, roughly two hours before its television broadcast.
Further confusion emerged when the presidential spokesperson, within minutes of publishing a statement on 15 October, quietly deleted a reference to Sisi remaining in office until 2030, replacing it with the open-ended assurance that he would continue working until his last day in power. The original wording remains visible in the post’s edit history on Facebook.
Meanwhile, the MOI’s Homeland Security-backed Nation’s Future Party and the Military Intelligence-backed Homeland Defenders Party remained silent. The parties issued no statements on the constitutional remarks. Such hesitation hardly suggests a ruling establishment confidently following a settled succession strategy.
Mada Masr quoted an anonymous parliamentary source claiming Sisi had privately declared: “I won’t wait for the defense minister to tell me to go to Sharm el-Sheikh,” invoking Hosni Mubarak’s downfall in 2011. Meanwhile, regime loyalist Mortada Mansour interpreted Sisi’s constitutional remarks as a definitive commitment to leave office, while other supporters demanded he remain.
An apparently bogus campaign promoting Sisi’s son Mahmoud, which pro-regime presenter Ahmed Moussa blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood without substantiating the allegation, further muddied the waters.
The confusion continued on 17 October, when Sisi delivered an extraordinary speech at the Military Academy graduation ceremony. He revealed that pro-regime broadcasters Nashat al-Deehi and Mostafa Bakry had questioned him about what would happen after his current term. This time, he was explicit: “In 2030, my term as president will end, if I live that long. This is completely settled and will not be discussed.” He also disclosed that Bakry had urged him against discussing the succession question publicly.
The optics of fear: Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi among the populace in 2012, contrasted with Sisi’s isolated motorcade on a deserted boulevard. As Sisi contemplates a military-vetted succession plan for 2030, his daily security measures reveal the paranoia of a regime fearing a sudden explosion of public discontent.
Sisi then outlined a proposed mechanism for preparing future leaders, including potential presidential candidates, under the supervision of the Egyptian Military Academy. With approximately 43 months remaining before 2030, he suggested selecting hundreds of candidates, principally holders of advanced university degrees, aged between 40 and 50, for a 30-month training program. The Speaker of Parliament, politicians and the Ministers of Higher Education and Justice would put together the selection mechanism. The armed forces would finance the training. Egyptians could subsequently elect their leaders from this pool of military-trained candidates, although Sisi said participation would not formally exclude others. The initiative would also produce future ministers, governors and senior officials.
The Military Academy has already become an instrument for militarising the civilian bureaucracy, screening recruits and subjecting teachers, diplomats, civil servants and other professionals to military training and ideological indoctrination. Sisi is now proposing to extend this model to the political leadership itself. He explicitly denied preparing a family member or relative to succeed him, rejecting suggestions of hereditary succession. He insisted that Egypt could produce leaders considerably better than himself, provided they underwent “appropriate preparation.”
More revealingly, Sisi invoked Article 200 of the constitution, assigning the armed forces responsibility for safeguarding the constitution, democracy and the state’s fundamental institutions. He claimed he had insisted on including this provision when the constitution was drafted in 2014, although the relevant language was actually introduced through amendments in 2019. Basically, this means a military institution is empowered to determine who is qualified to govern. “Not just anyone who can string two sentences together” should be allowed to lead the state, the president warned.
Such an arrangement is reminiscent of Türkiye’s pre-Erdoğan political order—where the military appointed itself guardian of the constitutional system and repeatedly intervened whenever civilian politics were deemed to have crossed certain red lines. Sisi appears to be contemplating a similar guardianship arrangement, with the Military Academy preparing an approved political elite and the armed forces retaining a decisive role in safeguarding the system.
Finally, Sisi made a striking overture to his Gulf sponsors. Recalling the financial and material assistance provided by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait following the 2013 coup, he ordered troops participating in the ceremony to perform a military salute honouring those countries. He then declared that Egypt was prepared to take whatever measures were necessary to defend Saudi Arabia. He called for an emergency parliamentary session to authorise military action if such assistance were requested, stressing that any intervention would be defensive. No deployment was announced. Nevertheless, the demonstration of loyalty to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies is worth noting amid the ongoing uncertainty over Sisi’s future.
The timing was also telling. Just a day before Sisi’s extravagant declarations of Gulf solidarity, Asharq Bloomberg reported that Cairo was negotiating with Riyadh to renew US$5.3 billion in Saudi deposits at the Central Bank, falling due in October.
In my book, Counterrevolution in Egypt, I argued that Sisi had unified the repressive apparatus for the first time since 1952. Yet this unprecedented unity was never guaranteed to last. The 2025 parliamentary elections already exposed tensions among security agencies, while the deepening economic crisis places the entire ruling coalition under increasing strain.
I find it hard to believe Sisi willingly intends to relinquish power. What seems less certain is how he can engineer another extension without destabilising the very coalition sustaining his rule. It is still unclear which forces, if any, within the state apparatus oppose his continuation. His frantic appeals for unity, though, and the conflicting signals from regime loyalists, suggest a rift or at least confusion about what lies ahead.
The present level of socio-political dissent remains insufficient to trigger a serious rupture at the top, despite the slow, incremental rise in industrial actions. Yet the security agencies monitoring public sentiment must surely recognise how deeply hated Sisi has become for a long list of reasons, most importantly the economic deterioration that his government has presided over. A spontaneous explosion of popular anger is not inconceivable.
Finally, what do Saudi Arabia and the UAE—the regime’s most important sponsors—think? Are they OK with Sisi remaining in office beyond 2030? The answer is still unclear, but Sisi can no longer take for granted the support Saudi Arabia and the UAE gave him during the 2013 coup and its aftermath.
Wednesday, October 21, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Twenty-Ninth Sunday in Ordinary Time - Guest Post
If you visit the Manchester Museum in England, you will find an exhibit containing Roman coins from the time of Jesus. Among them is a small, silver coin called a denarius.
If you could hold that ancient coin in your hand and turn it over, you might find yourself transported back to the world of the Gospels. A coin very much like it appears at the center of today’s Gospel, when the Pharisees and the followers of Herod attempt to trap Jesus with a question about taxes.
On one side of the coin is the image of Tiberius Caesar, the Roman emperor who ruled during Jesus’ ministry. He is the same Caesar mentioned by Luke in connection with the time of John the Baptist’s preaching at the Jordan River. On the reverse side is Livia, Tiberius’ mother, seated and holding an olive branch.
The question posed to Jesus seems simple enough: “Is it lawful to pay the census tax to Caesar or not?”
But there was nothing simple about the question.
Why did they ask it?
Jesus reveals their intentions when He responds, “Why are you putting Me to the test?” Those questioning Him were divided. The followers of Herod generally supported Rome and accepted its authority to collect taxes. The Pharisees, meanwhile, opposed the tax on religious and political grounds, although they paid it to avoid conflict with Rome.
It was a carefully constructed trap. No matter how Jesus answered, they believed He would offend one side or the other.
Then Jesus asks them to produce a coin.
The silver denarius, stamped with Caesar’s image, provides Jesus with the perfect way to answer. He asks them whose image appears on the coin. When they answer, “Caesar’s,” Jesus responds, “Then repay to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God.”
In a sense, Jesus leads them to answer their own question. The coin bears Caesar’s image, so it belongs within the realm of Caesar.
But Jesus’ final words take us somewhere much deeper.
We, too, have a kind of dual citizenship. We are citizens of this world, but we are also citizens of Heaven. Most of the time, those two identities can peacefully coexist. But there are moments when the demands of this world conflict with the demands of God.
Consider the life of St. Thomas More, the English martyr.
King Henry VIII wanted his marriage annulled, but Rome refused. The king then took matters into his own hands and married again. He ordered his friends and officials to sign a document affirming that he had acted lawfully. Many agreed. Thomas More refused.
More understood that there was a limit to what he could give to an earthly king. When the demands of the world came into conflict with his conscience and his loyalty to God, he chose faithfulness to God – even at the cost of his life.
That is the deeper lesson of today’s Gospel.
Yes, the Roman coin may have been stamped with the image of Caesar. But we are stamped with the image of God.
And while we may have responsibilities to this world, our ultimate allegiance belongs to the One whose image is written upon our hearts.
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A. Headshot
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, October 20, 2026
Monday, October 19, 2026
Sunday, October 18, 2026
Saturday, October 17, 2026
Friday, October 16, 2026
[Salon] "Stateless by decree: Kuwait’s mass denaturalisation campaign" - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Stateless by decree: Kuwait’s mass denaturalisation campaign
Summary: Kuwait’s amir has ruthlessly pursued a policy of mass citizenship stripping with tens of thousands denaturalised and with a dissolved parliament and a climate of fear leaving no recourse for those affected.
We thank Andrew McIntosh for today’s newsletter. Andrew is the Director of Research at the NGO SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights. His specialty fields are media analysis, sectarianism and statelessness in Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria.
Since 2024, Kuwait has undergone an unprecedented political and social transformation. The appointment of the new Amir, Sheikh Mishal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, was followed by the suspension of the Parliament. During Al-Sabah’s consolidation of power, he has placed the state under his sole direction and stripped an estimated 40,000-70,000, most of them women and children, of their citizenship, with up to 300,000 people affected, including descendants and dependants. SALAM DHR together with seven other human rights organisations has released “Stateless by Decree: End Kuwait’s Citizenship Stripping Crisis” a report documenting the country’s grim milestone: overseeing the largest mass denaturalisation of the 21st century, with critics abroad and international students now being caught up in the Al-Sabah campaign.
In 2026, the denaturalisation has accelerated now targeting Kuwaitis abroad, sometimes without explanation. These acts of public shaming, detentions, deportations and civic death have gutted civil society and silenced dissent, with most afraid to speak out, lest they share the fate of those targeted.
Kuwait has stood, along with Bahrain, as one of the only nominally functional democracies in the Gulf. However, Kuwait’s representative politics have always been limited by the Amir’s ability to dissolve parliament. After ascending to the throne in December 2023, Al-Sabah instrumentalised denaturalisation and the dissolution of parliament to purge potential rivals and to further autocratise the state.
A pickup truck crowded with Bidoon families travels toward Jahra and Salmi - the historic epicentre of Kuwait’s long-standing stateless community, whose disenfranchisement is now mirrored by tens of thousands of newly denaturalised citizens.
In May 2024, citing political gridlock, the Amir announced via a televised speech that he was dissolving parliament and seven articles of the Kuwait Constitution for up to four years. During this extraordinary period, the Amir and his hand-picked Council of Ministers have assumed all legislative and executive powers. The Bidoon, those without nationality in Kuwait, have since the country’s independence in 1961 been a simmering and unresolved issue. However Al-Sabah has used his unchecked authority to accelerate a hyper-nationalist campaign of mass revocations that are designed, in his words, to achieve “national purification” of a country “hijacked” by other nationalities that he accused of obtaining Kuwaiti citizenship by marriage or by fraud.
The result has been that between 2024 and 2026, tens of thousands of Kuwaitis have been denaturalised on the grounds that they are: women formerly married to Kuwaitis; deemed to have multiple citizenships; deemed a “security risk” or “undesirable.” Even those granted citizenship for services to Kuwait – such as serving in the military or being exceptional artists have had their citizenship removed. However, most of those affected are experiencing collective punishment, that is their citizenships retroactively cancelled because their fathers or grandfathers were stripped of nationality, even if they are no longer alive. Others, such as the influential Islamic scholar Tareq al-Suwaidan, were provided no official reason.
From 2024 through 2025, the government published vast lists of newly denaturalised people on social media and in state-controlled newspapers, without directly informing those targeted. On 16 February 2025, more than 9,000 people were denaturalised in a single day. During these public mass citizenship strippings, the Kuwaiti government took measures to suppress civil society. Talk shows are now banned. Diwaniyas—Kuwait’s historic democratic discussion forums—have been shuttered. Restrictions on the media currently extend to WhatsApp groups of three or more. Municipal elections, and even student elections at universities, have been cancelled.
Although Kuwaiti authorities claim that they target criminals such as those who acquired citizenship through fraud, forgery or misrepresentation, in practice the campaign overlaps with measures meant to restrict freedom of expression and opinion, with Article 13 of Kuwait’s revised Nationality Law stating that citizens can be denaturalised where the “supreme interest of the State or its external security so requires”. In Kuwait, matters on nationality have no court oversight, and under the newly passed Decree Law 158/2024, revocation decisions are “not subject to appeal under any circumstances”, leaving those affected with no legal remedy.
Targeted by royal decrees or “administrative decisions” that Kuwaiti courts cannot challenge, those affected have little to no recourse. Regardless of the official reasoning, the effects are devastating for those targeted. Deprived of their Kuwaiti nationality, individuals lose their right to attend public schools, access free state health care, work for the government or at all or receive their state pension. In addition, they can no longer own property, hold a valid driving licence or hold a Kuwaiti bank account, credit cards are cancelled, making a normal life in the country impossible. Given that holding multiple nationalities is already illegal in Kuwait, most of these people have been rendered stateless and left to their own devices on how to acquire another nationality.
Newly stateless Kuwaitis who have tried to draw attention to the lack of oversight in these decisions and the hardships occasioned have been subjected to harassment, arrest and deportation by Kuwaiti authorities. One individual interviewed claimed that after posting about her citizenship revocation on social media, she was assailed by anonymous accounts. Shortly afterwards, she was summoned to the local police station, where she was strip-searched, accused of “challenging the state” by authorities and threatened to be hung by her legs. She was later deported to Egypt without a valid passport and without her children.
Public fear of being denaturalised or facing further abuse from authorities has left victims isolated, even those who have been targeted outside Kuwait. In September 2026, numerous Kuwaiti international students were stripped of their citizenship and scholarships by the Kuwaiti government. Although the full impact of this decision remains unclear, the campaign appears to be wide-reaching, affecting Kuwaiti students across the world. Many have had little choice but to suspend their studies and request asylum.
Despite being left stateless and stranded in their country of study, most fear criticising the Kuwaiti government, claiming they won’t be believed or will be shunned. One recently denaturalised student reflected on the irony that: “We had our ambassador at the UN saying Kuwait rejects all forms of racism. [Yet Kuwaiti] people still view [citizenship stripping] as fair, and the government is very firm.” With authorities publicly claiming that they are “Continuing to Purge Impurities from Citizenship Records”, speaking out remains dangerous.
Both within Kuwait and abroad, those stripped of their citizenship have expressed shock and despair, both at the removal of everything that made their lives stable and at the silence of the international community. Within Kuwait, stateless individuals who cannot pay their bills face prosecution and possible imprisonment under Decree-Law No. 59 of 2025, also known as the Debtor’s Law. Unable to access their bank accounts and with their properties forfeited, most face the dilemma of relying on friends and family while either making themselves invisible in Kuwaiti society or taking a nationality in countries they barely know. “I was a business owner. I’ve lost everything. Now they want to prosecute me for debts I’m not allowed to pay. All because I was born in Lebanon and moved to Kuwait when I was one year old.”
For those made stateless outside Kuwait, there is the thought that their situation can give them a new life and the possibility to advocate for others like them, both in Kuwait and in exile. There is hope too that Kuwait’s allies in the West will take up their cause. “Obviously there’s no going back. It’s a massive change…. There is no room to breathe… .We will not feel fully supported until we have everyone’s attention.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)