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Tuesday, April 28, 2026
[Salon] Trump Courting Disaster With New Trade War On China -
https://meaninginhistory.substack.com/p/trump-courting-disaster-with-new
[Salon] America quits Syria - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
America quits Syria
Summary: America’s withdrawal of its last remaining forces in Northeast Syria is a significant moment for Syria, one that rivals Türkiye and Israel will see as an opportunity to exploit. Further risks to the country’s fragile stability may also come from a re-emerging ISIS.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
Amid the American whiplash in the Middle East in the last few months, one might have missed that the last US convoy left its major bases in Syria in mid-April. Yet the moment is consequential. It reflects a convergence of opportunities and constraints. The evacuation of the last U.S. bases ends more than a decade of American military presence and signals a shift in military posture, as well as political strategy.
US forces first entered Syria in 2014 to combat the Islamic State, partnering with Kurdish-led forces that would become the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At its height, this partnership enabled the SDF to control nearly a third of Syrian territory, backed by roughly 2,000 U.S. troops and extensive airpower, intelligence, and logistical support. Over time, however, the mission narrowed, and US President Donald Trump had sought to leave Syria since his first term. With ISIS territorially defeated and regional priorities shifting, the rationale for maintaining dispersed ground positions weakened.
The mechanics of the withdrawal are striking in their speed and scope. Since February, US forces have vacated a chain of key installations. These included the strategic tri-border garrison at al-Tanf and the al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah. On April 16, U.S. and Syrian officials said that forces completed their withdrawal from Qasak air base. Troops relocated to Jordan rather than Iraq due to security concerns.
The United States military withdrawal from Syria allows Damascus to consolidate territorial control over lucrative resources but marginalizes Kurdish autonomy and risks renewed instability from the Islamic State and regional tensions involving Turkey and Israel.
Despite starting a new war, President Trump can now say he ended the U.S. military presence in Syria. The U.S. military will now shift from permanent posts to military cooperation and training with Syrian security forces. US Central Command said “US forces continue to support partner-led counterterrorism efforts, which are essential to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and strengthening regional security.” This reflects a broader US shift in the Middle East, especially after Syria last year joined the coalition against the Islamic State.
This represents a major win for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in his desire to soon claim complete territorial consolidation after the country’s protracted civil war. The U.S. military exit removes a major constraint for Damascus’s reach into the country’s northeast, which contains lucrative oil fields and border crossings. It also reflects a broader development in U.S.-Syria relations, with both sides entering what appears to be a tentative period of engagement focused on security coordination and potential economic cooperation. Al-Sharaa visited President Trump at the White House in November, the first such visit by any Syrian head of state. There is also apparently an American plan to turn Syria into an oil transit hub.
Still, this extension of al-Sharaa’s power comes with risk. While degraded, the Islamic State retains the capacity to exploit gaps in control. In December a gunman who the Syrian government claim to be affiliated with the Islamic State killed two US soldiers as well as a civilian American interpreter. In February the US transferred over 5,000 Islamic State detainees to Iraq ahead of their withdrawal, an effort to reduce exposure to any potential volatility once US troops pulled out. Without a US stabilising presence, the burden shifts to Syrian forces whose cohesion and capacity remain uneven.
For Kurds in Syria, the consequences are more acute. The Trump administration’s withdrawal effectively ends the strategic partnership that underpinned the SDF’s autonomy. The US presence had functioned as both a deterrent against Turkish incursions and a mediator in tensions with Damascus. The removal of American troops accelerates a forced integration of the SDF into Syrian state structures and the transfer of border controls to the central government. Without US backing, the SDF has lost its autonomy and will become more of a subordinate actor amid Damascus’s consolidation. Kurdish forces—particularly the core People’s Defence Units (YPG)—remain capable, but their leverage has diminished significantly.
Türkiye, by contrast, stands to gain. Ankara has long opposed US support for Kurdish forces along its southern border, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called “terror groups.” The American exit removes a major source of anxiety and opens space for expanded Turkish influence, either directly or through coordination with Damascus. But, without U.S. mediation, there is an increased risk of miscalculation along contested areas between the Syrian government and a weakened but still armed Kurdish presence, conditions for renewed instability that could draw Turkish forces into the fray. The Islamic State may also be able to exploit the situation, which could lead to attacks near or inside Türkiye as well.
Israel has sought to keep Syria divided, previously stoking tensions between Damascus and the country’s ethnic minority groups that remain suspicious of al-Sharaa. Further, Israel is concerned over the loss of the US presence at al-Tanf, long seen as a barrier to Iranian and Iraqi militias. While the withdrawal does raise concerns about a more permissive corridor linking Tehran to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Washington is less concerned, given Syria’s shift away from Iran. However Israel with its forces ensconced in Syria south of Damascus may still use this as justification to conduct airstrikes to try to keep its northern neighbour weak.
America’s exit does not end its involvement in Syria but it does change its form toward indirect influence and selective engagement. While Washington’s reduced presence will likely be insufficient to manage the risks that remain, there also appears to be a reckoning with the constraints that there is less ability or appetite to control the vacuum it leaves behind.
You can find more analysis on the US withdrawal on our 22 April podcast with the Syrian analyst Malik al-Abdeh.
Monday, April 27, 2026
Sunday, April 26, 2026
Saturday, April 25, 2026
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - Guest Post from RSIS Commentary Series
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - micheletkearney@gmail.com - Gmail
RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg.
No. 090/2026 dated 24 April 2026
The Desired Global Order from
Beijing’s Perspective
By Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng
SYNOPSIS
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances. It aims to promote a global political order that applies varying standards in evaluating the legitimacy of governing models. Meanwhile, it seeks to return to an open global economic order, opposing the policies aimed at decoupling and breaking chains.
COMMENTARY
Since the 2020s, Beijing’s view of the global order has shifted from optimism to pessimism. In 2024, Beijing publicly acknowledged that China was being harmed by the changing global order, in which “regional conflicts and disturbances keep cropping up, global issues are becoming more acute, and external attempts to suppress and contain China are escalating.
The report at the 4th Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee in October 2025 reaffirmed this view. It also argued that China’s development presents both strategic opportunities and risks and challenges, while uncertainties and unforeseeable circumstances continue to rise. Beijing’s growing disappointment with the counter-globalisation trend of recent years has motivated its leadership to foster a more favourable global order.
The aim of this essay is to present Beijing’s views on the desired global order, as set out in its four initiatives – the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilisation Initiative and the Global Governance Initiative – which suggests that Beijing envisions a global order comprising three key aspects: security, politics, and the economy.
A Security Order Without Alliances
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances and opposes one in which the US dominates over security issues through its alliance system. Before the war in Ukraine, Beijing focused on resisting Washington’s efforts to establish multilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, such as AUKUS with Australia and the UK in 2021 and the QUAD with Japan, Australia, and India in 2022.
As NATO’s hostility towards China increased with the escalation of the war in Ukraine, Beijing’s efforts shifted towards opposing its policy. Beijing was especially enraged in 2023 by NATO’s Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which stated: "The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” In response, Beijing accused NATO of having a Cold War mentality and urged it to stop its groundless accusations and provocative rhetoric against China.
At the same time, Beijing promoted non-alliance partnerships among major powers as a new model for global security. It stated, “The China-Russia relationship is based on no alliance, no-confrontation, and no-targeting of any third party…This is fundamentally different from the exclusive groupings and bloc confrontation practised by some NATO countries.”
Besides the new approach for relations among big countries, Beijing also recognises the importance of the United Nations – particularly, the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and relevant UN committees – as well as regional security institutions – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the “China + Central Asia” mechanism, and East Asia cooperation mechanisms, among others – in establishing a favourable and stable security order. Within these global and regional frameworks, Beijing is committed to maintaining global peace through its active involvement in both traditional and non-traditional security cooperation.
A Political Order of Diversification
Beijing intends to promote a global political order that uses varying standards rather than universal ones when evaluating the legitimacy of political institutions or governing models. According to Beijing, there is no common criterion by which to judge the worth of political systems and governing models, as universal values have never existed. With China’s achievements in modernisation and development, Beijing now positions itself as the global advocate for non-Western modernisation. It seeks to legitimise alternative approaches to modernisation across different countries, believing that its modernisation model is appealing to most states in the Global South.
Although there are doubts, both foreign and domestic, about whether the Chinese model can be applied to other developing countries, especially those that gained independence from European colonial rule, Beijing believes that its own proven success will attract followers. Consequently, it has a strong ambition to lead global governance. To this end, China has sought to secure the support of both developed and developing countries. In December 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his German counterpart and said, “Both China and Germany support, champion, and practise multilateralism; the two sides should strengthen solidarity and cooperation to make the global governance system more just and equitable.”
Additionally, Beijing aims to reshape the global understanding of human rights. Frequently criticised by Western governments, Beijing’s stance emphasises that developing countries should prioritise the right to economic development over civil and political liberties. It argues that civil and political liberties are secondary to the right to essential resources. A citizen’s priority is to achieve freedom from poverty, such as reliable access to food and shelter. Developing countries should first focus on lifting their citizens out of poverty before worrying about civil liberties. There is considerable overlap between Beijing’s view of human rights and that of many developing countries
An Economic Order of Re-globalisation
Beijing seeks to restore the global economic order of the post-Cold War era, during which China was one of its main beneficiaries. However, Beijing believes that technological decoupling and trade protectionism by major Western economies, such as the US, Japan, and the EU, are hurting the open global economic order
Beijing, therefore, opposes Washington’s “small yards and high fences” policy, the EU’s derisking policy, and the policies of other major economies aimed at decoupling and breaking supply chains. In April 2024, Wang Yi criticised Washington for its efforts to contain and suppress China.
Beijing also emphasises the importance of taking concrete action to maintain an open global economic order. As Chinese Premier Li Qiang emphasised in July 2023, “China will not close the door of its opening-up policy but will open it wider. This is our own strategic selection, which also conforms to the historical laws of economic globalisation.” Even if US President Donald Trump adopts a tougher stance on China by imposing higher tariffs, China will still adhere to its opening-up policy. This is evident in the expansion of unilateral visa-free travel policies. Li Qiang reiterated that “China is willing to work with the US in undertaking their responsibilities as major countries, jointly upholding international trade rules, and ensuring the stability of global industry and supply chains.”
In multilateral economic cooperation, Beijing is considering discussing free trade agreements with more countries of the Global South, supporting the WTO’s Aid for Trade initiative, and renewing its contributions to the WTO’s China Programme. Beijing also aims to reinforce the G20’s collaborative framework to counter economic decoupling attempts by major Western economic entities as much as possible, while promoting the view that consensus should be a prerequisite for collective action to tackle global economic and financial challenges. This approach is intended to counteract unilateral US financial policies that could harm other members.
Conclusion
Frustrated by the counter-globalisation trend of recent years, Beijing is set on creating a more favourable global order, as illustrated by the “four initiatives”: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Culture Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. However, Beijing does not intend to replace Washington as a global leader in the foreseeable future, given the substantial gap in material capabilities between China and the US.
Unlike Moscow during the Cold War, which sought to change the international system established by the US, Beijing is concerned only with reforming the order it shares with the US. Beijing remains committed to the principle of multipolarity and refuses to accept a G2 model comprising China and the United States.
In March 2026, Wang Yi stated that "China will never take the beaten path of seeking hegemony as its strength grows, nor do we subscribe to the logic that the world can be run by major countries.” Beijing’s impact on the global order will therefore be new and unfamiliar to Washington. This does not mean that Beijing will have a larger impact on the world than Washington in the coming decade. Neither does it mean that Beijing’s growing influence is guaranteed to mould the global order to fit its desires.
Yan Xuetong is a Distinguished Professor, and Sun Xuefeng a Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Professor Sun was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), in February 2026. Professor Yan is scheduled to visit RSIS as the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professor of International Relations in October 2026.
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Friday, April 24, 2026
[Salon] Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates
Summary: BBC executives met nine times with pro-Israel Jewish groups and just once with pro-Palestinians in 14 months of genocide, Freedom of Information shows.
We thank the investigative journalist Dania Akkad and Declassified UK for permission to republish an edited version of Dania’s 16 April article. The full version of the article is here. Dania is a regular contributor to the Arab Digest podcast. You can find her most recent podcast here.
BBC’s executive committee met nine times with Jewish community groups and only once with a pro-Palestinian organisation during the first year of the Gaza genocide, a Freedom of Information request has revealed.
The FOI request, filed by the UK-based Campaign Against Misrepresentation in Public Affairs, Information and News (CAMPAIN) asked how many times members of the committee met with a specific list of major Jewish and pro-Palestinian organisations in the UK.
The organisations listed in the FOI were the same ones which the BBC described as “representative groups” in parliamentary committee evidence last year about its Gaza coverage
Between 1 November 2023 and 31 December 2024, the BBC said that the committee held nine meetings with Jewish community groups and only one with a group advocating for Palestinians.
Although Britain’s Jewish community has a diverse range of views on Israel-Palestine, the groups listed as meeting with the BBC are all strongly sympathetic to the Israeli cause.
BBC committee members, who are in charge of the broadcaster’s day-to-day operations, met twice each with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Chief Rabbi and the Campaign Against Antisemitism.
Three meetings were held with the Community Security Trust, the FOI shows.
Only one meeting was held with a pro-Palestinian group, the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), during the same time period.
Chris Doyle, CAABU’s director, said the tally of meetings “exposes the way [BBC’s management] are far more concerned with the complaints and concerns of the pro-Netanyahu lobby than they are with those who believe in the rights of Palestinians”.
“This is also borne out by the absence of reference to international legal issues, the fewer numbers of Palestinians who get on the BBC, the way in which people who raise the issue of genocide frequently get shut down – all of these and more show why BBC management has failed,” he said.
“They still see the story as a balance between one side says this and one side says the other, not an occupier perpetrating a genocide.”
The BBC is a mouthpiece for Israeli propaganda, using its position to deceive the British public and manufacture consent for Israel's genocide in Palestine and Lebanon.
Courting controversy
The FOI response sheds new light on meetings held by senior BBC executives during the conflict, which has seen at least 72,265 Palestinians killed.
Declassified has previously revealed that the BBC’s director of news content, along with editors of The Guardian and the Financial Times, met with a top former Israeli military officer weeks after the Gaza bombing began.
In evidence to parliament last year, the BBC said that executive committee members had met with Jewish community groups seven times between January and November 2025. During the same period, executives held four meetings with groups representing the Palestinian community.
“If you add up the total of these two time periods, there were 14 meetings with Zionist groups and five with pro-Palestinians,” Professor David Mond, a member of CAMPAIN’s executive committee, told Declassified. “But the disproportion was most extreme in the first period that set the tone for subsequent BBC reporting of the war.” He added: “How can the BBC claim to be even-handed if it consults with pressure groups from one side and ignores those from the other?”
Asked for comment, a BBC spokesperson said: “The BBC engages with a broad range of organisations as part of its routine external engagement, including in meetings not captured within the limited scope of this analysis, such as a meeting with the Head of the Palestinian Mission one day outside of the FOI timeframe.
“The BBC is fully committed to reporting the Israel-Gaza conflict impartiality and has produced powerful coverage from the region. Alongside breaking news, analysis and investigations, we have produced award winning documentaries such as Life and Death in Gaza, and Gaza 101.”
The BBC also highlighted that the FOI request did not capture meetings between the executive committee and other organisations that weren’t listed, like the Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) at the Muslim Council of Britain, nor those held between senior figures not serving on the committee.
However, emails between CAMPAIN and the BBC show that they originally asked for meetings between all groups and other senior staff, but were told that the request had to be narrowed in order not to exceed the cost limits of FOI requests.
In addition to the FOI, CAMPAIN – which maintains a database of links to online sources on BBC bias – surveyed nearly a dozen organisations with pro-Palestinian stances, including the CfMM. None of the groups said they had met with the executive committee, nor had they asked for meetings with the BBC during the FOI time period.
Jewish groups sympathetic to the Palestinians, such as Jewish Voice for Liberation and Jews for Justice for Palestinians, said they had never been contacted by the BBC. In contrast, the Board of Deputies proposed quarterly meetings with the BBC in August 2024.
“Given the close fit between the interests of the BoD, Chief Rabbi and CST, it seems they got more or less what they asked for,” Professor Mond said.
“The BBC’s charter requires it to consult in an even-handed way. So its failure to match its meetings with pro-Zionist groups with meetings with pro-Palestinian groups violates this charter requirement.”
‘Tick-box exercise’
But even pro-Palestinian organisations that met with the committee said that they had felt let down by their outcomes. Doyle said of CAABU’s meeting with Tim Davie, then BBC general director, and several other high level executives: “It felt like a tick box exercise because there was no real follow up. It’s just unbelievably disappointing.” “I don’t believe it changed a thing,” he added.
Dr Zena Agha, interim director of the British Palestinian Committee, said her organisation asked the BBC for a meeting which happened in May 2025, also with Davie and two of his associates.
“The BBC agreed to meet after the chaotic fall-out from the Gaza documentaries as well as other campaigning,” she said. During the meeting, she said Davie “indicated that they had met with pro-Israeli representatives and seemed to approach this as a ‘both sides’ issue where we were but one perspective, as opposed to (being) a group who were there to demand better reporting on genocide”.
“Indeed one of our party had lost scores of family members and spoke about his experience as a Gazan and as a poorly-treated guest on the BBC.” She concluded: “It was the first and last of its kind and it wasn’t a productive meeting. I don’t think the BBC improved its coverage of the genocide as a result of our meeting.”
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Thursday, April 23, 2026
[Salon] Yemen: a very bad situation made worse - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Yemen: a very bad situation made worse
Summary: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has caused fuel and cooking gas prices to rocket with a hugely damaging impact on tens of millions of Yemenis already made extremely vulnerable by massive cuts to international humanitarian aid.
We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war: what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.
Following the US counter-blockade of the Hormuz Strait, the Iranian authorities have threatened to blockade the other major strait enclosing the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab al Mandab, reflecting the close alliance with the Yemeni Huthis who would implement such a threat. Although its immediate vicinity in Yemen is within the area managed by Tareq Saleh’s anti-Huthi forces, the Huthis control access to the Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal at one end and the Bab al Mandab at the other. Following 178 attacks on ships and the sinking of four during their two year operations starting in late 2023, none have been carried out since May 2025 following the ‘ceasefire’ agreed last year between the US and the Huthis in the wake of the 52 day US bombing campaign on Yemen. Although it still holds, concern about renewed attacks in the current conflict surely contributed to the US decision to ensure the USS Bush aircraft carrier travelled around Africa rather than through the Red Sea to reach its Gulf destination. The Iranian threat on the Bab al Mandab also acknowledges the close alliance between its regime and the Huthis who have confirmed their full solidarity with Iran, despite only carrying out three minor ballistic missile attacks on Israel between February this year and the ceasefire in April.
Regardless of this largely symbolic support, the Iran war has already had a major impact on living conditions throughout Yemen, worsening an already disastrous humanitarian situation. In her briefing to the UNSC on 14 April, Edem Worsonu a senior OCHA official noted that the current crisis has already increases fuel prices by 20 percent and cooking gas by 26 percent, reminding her audience that Yemen imports 90 percent of its wheat, a staple for most Yemenis. This sudden additional inflation burden will spread throughout the value chains of all basic commodities at a time when Yemenis are already suffering extreme deprivation.
Geopolitical tension is exacerbating a dire humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where a combination of record-low international funding, 90% reliance on imports, and extreme inflation is leaving over 20 million people in desperate need of aid.
Last year, the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan [HRP] was financed at a mere 29% of the US$ 2.5 billion required, a record low of an already reduced amount. With an appeal for US$ 2.16 billion, this year’s call is even lower despite the fact that both the total population and the needs have increased. As usual, the gap is vast between those in need [22.3mllion], those ‘targeted’ [12 million] and those ‘prioritized [9.4 million]. In plain English, although more than 22 million people are expected to suffer hunger, lack of water and sanitation, absence or inadequate education and medical services, only 9.4 million will be given priority for the limited funds made available by the international community. As of mid-April, i.e. more than a quarter of the year through, only 10% of this funding has materialised. Therefore fewer than 1 million of the 22 million people in need have received any support since the beginning of the year, in the midst of worsening local and international crises, leaving more than 20 million Yemenis in increased desperation.
Humanitarian support has steadily declined since its height in 2018 [US$ 5.2 billlion], with systematic decline since the 2022 formal truce between the Huthis and the internationally recognised government [IRG]. From US$ 3.4 billion in 2022, it shrank to its lowest level in 2025 when only US$ 1.4 billion was disbursed. This suggests a link between active military clashes contributing to increased humanitarian funding as fighting between the two opposing sides has remained at a very low level since the truce of 2022. (The correlation should be treated with some caution as the greatest fall in funding worldwide took place in 2025 with the abolition of USAID immediately following Trump’s accession to the US presidency and most global north states reducing their international aid while increasing military spending.)
The billions of dollars that have been slashed are not abstractions, they represent real suffering for children, women and men, none of whom are responsible for the crisis inflicted on them. While abysmal in Yemen, it is also worth remembering that the world’s other worst crises, Sudan and Gaza to name just two, experience similar lack of funding and support, and millions there are also suffering and dying. In Yemen, the situation is worse in the Huthi-controlled areas where two-thirds of the country’s population live. There the World Food Programme, the main provider of emergency food, completely ceased all distributions in early 2025, as negotiations had failed to bring about the liberation of the 70 UN humanitarian staff some of whom have been held in detention by the Huthis for years. Operational conditions have become unmanageable and all UN institutions have transferred their offices out of Sana’a.
Although the truce has enable fighting to become a marginal issue for most Yemenis, there are many other factors which explain why poverty and deprivation are increasing. A major daily problem remains the division of the country between the areas controlled by the Huthis on the one hand, and the multiple and rival authorities in the IRG area. This has a direct impact on prices of basic goods, preventing producers from transporting and marketing their agricultural produce to the nearest markets across front lines, as each side prevents the crossing of people and goods to retain control of the income. With worsening inflation and high fuel prices, traders are forced to sell their produce in far more distant markets at a time when customers can least afford it. Most Yemenis depend on imported staples [wheat, rice, sugar, tea, etc.] and the increase of world prices of these basic foods, combined with inflation, additional transport costs due to the fuel crisis and the insurance premiums for shipping, all contribute to the dramatic price rises making these basics unaffordable for millions.
The currency crisis in the IRG area is another factor: people’s ability to cope has diminished despite improvements in the exchange rate last year. There is a shortage of local currency in a society where cash overwhelmingly dominates exchanges. Delayed salary payments is a major issue throughout the country, with little improvement on the horizon. Financial problems explain both the Huthis’ determination to try and reach some agreement with the Saudis and the separate situation in the IRG areas where cash shortages are also worsening despite recent efforts by the government to pay salaries.
Adding more problems, recent weeks have seen yet more major environmental problems: ruinous floods are killing people, wrecking houses and damaging agricultural areas, with landslides destroying fields on a long-term basis, thus affecting future production.
In this context, regardless of who is in control anywhere in the country, the last thing Yemenis need is the renewal of conflict in the Red Sea which would almost certainly bring about further death and destruction from Israeli and US attacks should the Bab al Mandab be closed.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
[Salon] Oil: higher for longer - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Oil: higher for longer
Summary: a clear lack of understanding among key policymakers in Washington over how commodity markets really work stands to make the war-induced energy crisis even worse than would otherwise have been the case.
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast (with Jim Krane) here.
The futures price is giving those in charge a false sense of security. The real price of oil is the price refiners and sellers are transacting at and that they will ultimately pass through to consumers.
Amrita Sen, Financial Times, 14 April 2026
One of the peculiarities of markets which is not widely understood is that commodities have two prices, i.e. the futures price, which is what we all see in the headlines and the spot price. Both are contracts between a buyer and a seller but they differ over the timing of the transaction and the delivery date of the commodity. The former, as the name implies, applies to a deal which is going to happen at some point in the future. The latter refers to a transaction to be executed immediately.
In the oil market, current spot prices in Europe and Asia strongly suggest that even the elevated futures prices we have been seeing these past weeks (i.e. around US$100 per barrel for Brent crude) could yet be topped by a considerable margin. As oil expert Amrita Sen spelled out in her FT op-ed from which the quote above is taken, spot prices in Europe have been ranging towards US$150pb. Worse still, once the price of shipping is added, physical cargoes are being offloaded in Asia at anything between US$150 and US$170pb.
This is not to say that I am firmly predicting that futures will be around US$150pb in two months time (i.e. the normal length of an oil futures contract). Nevertheless, BP’s former chief economist Spencer Dale has estimated that the demand globally needs to fall by about ten million barrels per day (bpd) to accommodate the ongoing supply side shock. This implies a rise in the spot price of around 100 percent compared to ‘just’ 60 percent to date in Europe. With a double blockade of the Strait of Hormuz still in place and Iran and the US reportedly “still far” from an agreement (Donald Trump’s unsubstantiated claims to the contrary notwithstanding), it would take something truly tectonic to stave off further price rises — perhaps ‘the grandmother of all Tacos’!
A significant disconnect between relatively stable oil futures prices and much higher physical spot prices, which are being driven upward by supply shocks and geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, means the U.S. may resort to dramatic market interventions, such as an export ban, to lower domestic gasoline prices ahead of the upcoming midterm elections.
All this being said, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) latest monthly Oil Market Report does offer a glimmer of hope in that it is still forecasting that, overall, supply will exceed demand through the year — albeit only by 410,000bpd compared to the 2.46mbpd predicted in its March report. But this is predicated on a price-driven drop in demand of 1.5mbpd in 2026Q2 rooted in a supply shortfall of 10.1mbpd in March (i.e. consistent with Mr Dale’s calculations), rising to 13mbpd this month. Furthermore, even this mixed picture hinges on an IEA base case in which ‘normal’ flows of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz resume by mid-year, albeit at something below pre-28 February levels. And its alternative scenario paints a picture of longer-term supply disruptions and associated price hikes which cause demand to fall by 5mbpd year-on-year by 31 December.
Irrespective of which scenario unfolds, what happens when there is seemingly no longer any risk of attacks on shipping looking to pass through the Strait? In an 8 April analysis headlined ‘The third Gulf war will scar energy markets for a long time yet’, The Economist noted that it was two months after the Huthis stopped attacking ships in the Red Sea in October of last year before Maersk dared risk one of its container ships in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait; and that traffic in that waterway has still not returned to normal. Thus, and even putting the question of tolls to one side (a marginal additional cost if, that is, one considers it purely in monetary terms rather than as a matter of principle) as The Economist points out:
When shipping companies do test the strait [or Hormuz], their insurers will charge hefty premiums. So the resumption of regular traffic is likely to take weeks, and to cost much more than before the war.
Furthermore, once the 187 tankers and 15 LNG carriers currently trapped in the Gulf have managed to get out (after which it will take at least three weeks for them to reach markets),“owners of the most valuable vessels, such as LNG carriers, may decide to dodge [the] risk [of making the return journey] altogether”… at least for some time to come.
As if this were not all bad enough, even in the unlikely (in my view) event of Iran and the US finalising a deal this week it may not be soon enough to prevent Mr Trump from making matters worse still. His periodic efforts to talk down the oil price confirm that he follows it closely. But I strongly suspect that he is among “those in charge” believed by Dr Sen to be getting “a false sense of security’’ from the futures price. And with America’s driving season starting around ten weeks from now he simply does not have until the midterms in November to get the price of gasoline back anywhere close to its pre-war level of two bucks/gallon.
In Arab Digest’s 8 April podcast I touched on the possibility of Washington imposing an export ban. With US oil exports to Asia, already unusually high in response to the war, set to double to 2mbpd this month, Dr Sen believes that “to avoid shortages in the US, policymakers will have to accept a higher price or consider dramatic market interventions like restricting exports”.
(NB: according to the marine analytics firm Kpler 71 Very Large Crude Carriers are currently sailing to the US to take on cargo compared with an average of 27 on any given day last year.)
Even if the Republicans were not already facing a ‘blue wave’ election where affordability is the key issue, I simply cannot see Mr ‘America First’ Trump opting for protracted higher gasoline prices when there is an alternative available irrespective of its negative impact on the rest of the world.
Coupling this prediction with the title of this Newsletter, I shall draw a line on forecasting oil for now!
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Wednesday, April 22, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Third Sunday of Easter - Guest Post
The story of the Road to Emmaus is one of the great and most beautiful accounts in the New Testament. Interestingly, biblical scholars and archaeologists have never been able to locate this small town with certainty. We only know it was several miles west of Jerusalem. Perhaps that uncertainty is fitting, because the story is less about geography and more about the ordinary human journey.
In the Gospel, two followers of Jesus Christ leave Jerusalem after His death. We are not told exactly why. Maybe they simply needed to get away. Many of us know that feeling. For us, “Emmaus” might mean shopping, going to the movies, spending time with friends, keeping busy, or even throwing ourselves into work or our routine. Emmaus becomes whatever we do to distract ourselves when life feels overwhelming.
The disciples were trying to make sense of what they believed was humanity’s greatest tragedy. As they walk along the dusty road, they hear footsteps behind them. A stranger joins them, listens to their sorrow and speaks with them. Yet, they do not recognize Him. Only later, when they invite Him to stay and share a meal, does everything change. He takes bread, blesses it, breaks it and suddenly their eyes are opened. They realize it is the risen Lord, who has been walking beside them all along.
That same experience continues in our own time. Consider the story of a young medical student traveling from Ithaca to New York City to take his final exams, while his father lay seriously ill. His father, a devoted doctor who had served many people, urged his son to go forward and complete his studies. Though heavy-hearted, the young man obeyed.
During the trip, his bus stopped at a small Greyhound station. Sitting at the counter, clearly distressed, he caught the attention of an older woman across from him. She gently asked what was wrong. As he spoke about his father, his fears and his uncertainty, she listened with warmth and compassion. She reassured him that he was honoring his father by continuing the path he had begun.
Before leaving, she ordered a donut, broke it in half, handed him a piece and promised to pray for him and his father. Then she quietly departed and boarded her bus. Only afterward did he realize something extraordinary: in that simple act of kindness – the listening, the reassurance, the breaking of the donut – he had encountered the presence of Christ.
That is where the Emmaus story still lives today. The risen Lord often comes quietly: in compassion from a stranger, in words that steady us, in moments when someone helps carry our burden. He rarely forces His way in. Like the stranger on the road, He waits to be invited.
So, when life feels confusing, when disappointment or grief makes us want to escape to our own “Emmaus,” remember this: you are not walking alone. Christ is already on the road beside you. And often, it is in the simple breaking of bread, the shared tear, the offered kindness, that our eyes finally open – and we recognize Him.
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
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