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Saturday, October 3, 2026
Friday, October 2, 2026
Atomic Prime - From Heatmap
Atomic Prime - micheletkearney@gmail.com - Gmail
Another hyperscaler invests in large existing nuclear
Almost exactly two years ago, nuclear energy had its Big Tech glow-up. Amazon took an equity stake in X-energy, a developer of helium-cooled small modular reactors. Google invested in Kairos Power, another fourth-generation SMR designer that uses molten salt as a coolant. Microsoft, meanwhile, agreed to pay $16 billion to restart the functioning reactor at Constellation Energy’s Crane Clean Energy Center, formerly known as Three Mile Island. With electricity demand now surging, however, hyperscalers are increasingly following the more conservative Microsoft playbook. Google, as I previously told you, backed plans to bring Iowa’s lone nuclear plant, NextEra Energy’s Duane Arnold station, online again. Facebook-owner Meta — in addition to investments in two next-generation reactor companies, Oklo and TerraPower — inked a deal to buy nuclear electricity from two of utility Vistra’s plants in Ohio and Pennsylvania for the next 20 years.
Now Amazon is securing itself a chunk of the nation’s existing nuclear fleet. This week, the retail and web-hosting giant signed its own 20-year deal to buy power from Constellation’s Calvert Cliffs Clean Energy Center in Maryland, committing more than $3 billion in investments to upgrade the two-reactor facility that will allow the operators to squeeze out another 190 megawatts of capacity on top of the existing 1.8 gigawatts. “This agreement demonstrates how private investment can strengthen critical energy infrastructure,” Constellation CEO Joe Dominguez said in a statement. “Amazon’s commitment supports the long-term operation of Calvert Cliffs for generations to come.”
Thursday, October 1, 2026
[Salon] Saudi Arabia’s ‘Suez Moment’ - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Saudi Arabia’s ‘Suez Moment’
Summary: recent events have forced a recognition that the US hegemony in the Middle East is over. How the inevitable vacuum will be filled remains far from clear. But it is hard to be optimistic in the short to medium-term even though there is surely an opportunity for “a new beginning.”
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast “Energy and a hard winter ahead” here.
I think this is a moment when Saudi and other Gulf countries will be looking at the United States and reconsidering just how much dependence and reliance they want to put in that country now.
Dr Elisabeth Kendall, Al Jazeera TV, 24 September 2026
In the 10 September Newsletter, I set out a scenario in which the US hegemony in the Middle East came to a rapid end. Thanks in significant part to Donald Trump’s refusal to join the Saudis in striking the Huthis in Yemen — the moment to which Dr Kendall was referring — that the end is nigh has suddenly become the conventional wisdom.
Leading the charge is the latest edition of The Economist, carrying a front cover which read "When America Walks Away" and a first leader which argued that, however the war with Iran ends, it will mark “…the moment when America pulls back from the region — in the sense that it relinquishes its hegemony there.”
In its Insider webinar released at the same time, Deputy Editor Edward Carr described this as “a bold prediction.” It is, of course, easy to be wise after the event but I would describe it as belated rather than bold. After all, the last time the US successfully intervened militarily in the region is 36 years ago. Since then, we have seen a succession of failures to achieve objectives or even, on occasion, to act at all (including in support of allies in the region.)
Thus, the writing has been on the wall at least since Barack Obama told Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak to step down (2011), formally announced the ‘pivot to Asia (2012) and, most signally, failed to enforce his ‘red line’ in Syria (2013). One might also point to Mr Trump’s not coming to Saudi Arabia’s aid after Huthis missiles struck the Abqaiq and Khurais refineries in 2019; or his failure to forewarn, let alone adequately forearm, Gulf allies in advance of the Israel/US attack on Iran earlier this year. However (and acknowledging that the ‘parallel’ is not exact), I think The Economist was correct to imply that the Saudis’ ‘Suez moment’ was the deal which the US struck with the Huthis behind Riyadh's back to protect its own ships, i.e. “…when a superpower does deals with an insurgent militia, everyone understands it wants to cut its commitments.”
Nevertheless, the realisation is one thing. Determining what best to do next is another altogether, as the divergent paths taken by France and the UK after the Suez crisis underline.
Riyadh's "Suez moment" arrives as Washington scales back its commitments, leaving the Gulf states to face regional rivals without an American shield.
If there is good-ish news it is that not only Riyadh but also the other GCC members have time to weigh options — individually if not (hopefully but improbably) collectively. Quite how long is far from clear. But we almost certainly will not see a retrenchment of US forces from bases in the Gulf before some sort of agreement has been reached between Washington and Tehran. And even then a complete pull-out in the short-term is unlikely, even though the experts at The Economist may be underestimating the possibility of the US seriously ratcheting back its support for Israel between now and the end of the decade irrespective of the outcome of the next US presidential election.
Related, Israel correspondent Anshel Pfeffer spoke very guardedly on the Insider webinar about prospects for the three non-Arab powers in the region — i.e. Iran, Israel and Türkiye — working together even though they had been “strategic allies” in the past. Middle East correspondent Greg Carlstrom added that Israel sees Türkiye and its increasing influence in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq as a major threat, strongly implying that even a change of prime minister in Israel was unlikely to see a major change of policy. And Middle East editor Josie Delap summed up as follows:
This is an opportunity for the region, America stepping back arguably giving the countries space…to take ownership of their region, of the security of their region, of the stability of their region. …but it feels like the triumph of hope over experience to imagine that they are going to do that anytime soon.”
Specifically on the GCC, Mr Carlstrom added as follows:
I wouldn’t bet on this being a moment of unity…. Take something foundational — integrating your defences…. They didn’t do it either because they didn’t take the threat seriously from Iran or because they didn’t trust each other…. They haven’t been able to do this most basic thing to ensure their security.
Reverting briefly to The Economist magazine its main article concluded as follows:
Even if Mr Trump had not rashly broken it, what America built over the past 35 years was not durable at all: too many of the region’s states were weak, divided or failed ones. Without their longtime guarantor to fall back on, perhaps they will now have to build something better themselves.
However, I agree with Ms Delap that, for starters, Saudi/UAE rivalry remains a huge barrier to overcome. As things stand it seems that, irrespective of what Riyadh does, Abu Dhabi is committed to a UK-like response of trying to hug the US — and Israel — ever closer, thereby potentially making an already bad situation even worse irrespective of how much, or little, substance there is to Saudi Arabia’s recently signed security pact with Pakistan and Türkiye.
After what The Economist’s leader described as the first time since the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire that “the Middle East’s overarching order will no longer be imposed from afar”, it is, perhaps, understandable that 50 percent of respondents to a survey thought that the end of the US hegemony would be ‘a good thing’. Maybe this will prove to be the case. But, to borrow Mr Carr’s words from the question he posed at the start of the webinar — and consistent with geopolitical theory around the end of a hegemony — a ‘best case’ scenario could all to easily be “an orgy of score-settling and violence” before we get to “a new beginning.”
Wednesday, September 30, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Twenty-Second Sunday in Ordinary Time - Guest Post
Many years ago, there was a young boy named Eugene Orowitz. He disliked his name and, by most accounts, didn't seem destined for greatness. As a skinny, 100-pound sophomore in high school, he certainly didn't look like an athlete.
One afternoon in gym class, the teacher gathered the students on the track to demonstrate how to throw the javelin. Afterward, he invited the students to give it a try.
When Eugene stepped forward, his classmates laughed. "Can you even lift it?" they teased. "Be careful – you might hurt yourself."
Ignoring their ridicule, Eugene imagined himself as a warrior preparing for battle. He raised the javelin over his head, took six quick steps and let it fly.
The javelin sailed more than 50 feet before crashing into the empty bleachers. His throw traveled twice as far as anyone else's – and hit the metal seats with such force that it bent the javelin beyond repair. The gym teacher simply handed it to Eugene and said, "Take it home. The school can't use it anymore."
That summer, Eugene practiced endlessly. By his senior year, he could throw the javelin 211 feet, farther than any high school athlete in the country. He earned a scholarship to the University of Southern California and began dreaming of competing in the Olympics.
Then everything changed.
He suffered a severe shoulder injury that tore a ligament beyond repair. His athletic career ended overnight. His scholarship disappeared, and with it, his Olympic dream. It seemed as though years of hard work had been lost in an instant.
After leaving college, Eugene took a job in a warehouse. His story raises a question many of us have asked: Why does God allow suffering? Why do our hopes sometimes seem to crumble?
Jesus offers an answer in today's Gospel: "Whoever loses his life for My sake will find it."
Those words can sound confusing at first. But Jesus is reminding us that when we place our lives – even our disappointments and hardships – in God's hands, He can bring about something greater than we could ever imagine.
That promise isn't only about eternal life. God is also at work here and now, transforming our setbacks into new beginnings, if we allow Him.
While working in that warehouse, Eugene met a struggling actor who asked him to help rehearse some lines. The experience sparked an interest in acting, and Eugene enrolled in acting school.
Before long, he landed the role of "Little Joe" Cartwright on “Bonanza,” one of television's most beloved westerns. The series ran for 14 years. He later starred in another television classic, “Little House on the Prairie.”
By then, Eugene Orowitz had become known to the world as Michael Landon.
Before his death in 1991, Landon said the best thing that ever happened to him was tearing the ligament in his shoulder. What had seemed like the end of his dreams became the beginning of a life far richer than the one he had planned.
We all experience broken dreams. We all know disappointment, loss and suffering – some more than others.
But today's Gospel reminds us not to lose hope. Trust the Lord. He sees possibilities where we see dead ends. When we surrender our lives to Him, He can transform even our deepest wounds into unexpected blessings.
My friends, sometimes, the hardest thing to do is also the holiest: “To let go ... and let God.”
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A. Headshot
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, September 29, 2026
[Salon] Iraqi Kurds Will Face Narrowing Options After US Troops Leave - Arab Digest.org Guest Post
Iraqi Kurds Will Face Narrowing Options After US Troops Leave
Summary: as regional insecurity grows the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq has placed Iraqi Kurdistan in a difficult and challenging position.
We thank Sirwan Kajjo for today’s newsletter. Sirwan, a regular contributor to the AD podcast, is a Kurdish American journalist based in Washington D.C. He focusses on Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, extremism and conflict in West Asia and beyond. Sirwan is the author of Nothing But Soot a novel about a twenty-something Kurdish man whose quest for a permanent home never ends. You can find his latest podcast Syrian Kurds face an uncertain future here.
On September 26, Bakhtiar Sadiq, the secretary-general of the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq announced that the US-led international coalition had ended its financial support for the Kurdish Peshmerga forces. On the same day, Masrour Barzani, Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), described the withdrawal as “shameful,” arguing that it would leave the semi-autonomous region vulnerable to Iranian attacks. These statements came just days before the anticipated September 30 deadline for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region.
Barzani’s concerns are real. The Kurdistan Region’s security has depended heavily on US military support, particularly since the war against the Islamic State began in 2014. The Kurdish Peshmerga played a crucial role in the US-led campaign against the terrorist group. Over the years, Iraqi Kurdish leadership has maintained a strong relationship with Washington, at times pursuing ties that went beyond what Baghdad was comfortable with. Now that American troops are set to leave Iraq, it remains unclear whether any US military advisers will remain in the Kurdistan Region.
The Kurds have calculations that differ from those of the central government in Baghdad. While Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi hopes that the US pullout will strengthen his efforts to disarm Shiite militias, the KRG fears that the withdrawal will leave the Kurdistan Region more exposed to attacks by Iran and its Iraqi proxies. Since the start of the US-Israeli war against Iran in February 2026, the Kurdistan Region has been hit more than 1,000 times by missile and drone attacks launched by Iranian forces and their affiliated armed groups in Iraq.
American servicemen on parade in Iraq. The departure of coalition forces marks a dramatic recalculation for Erbil, forcing the KRG to balance ties between Baghdad and Washington without its historic military shield.
A logical explanation would suggest that the departure of US forces from Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, would reduce attacks by Iranian-backed groups, since the American military presence has often been cited as a justification for such attacks. In reality, however, many of these attacks have targeted Peshmerga headquarters, Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the Kurdistan Region and civilian infrastructure. This is due in no small part to Tehran’s fears that Iranian Kurds and wider Kurdish aspirations for an independent homeland pose an existential threat to its theocracy.
There is therefore no guarantee that these attacks will stop after September 30. Some of the most hardline Iranian-backed groups, including Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, have refused to lay down their arms. The threat of continued attacks against the Kurdistan Region is likely to persist even after US troops formally leave.
In a final effort to persuade Washington that the Kurdistan Region can be a more capable partner, the KRG recently announced the unification of the region’s divided Kurdish forces, a process that had remained stalled for years. By presenting a unified Peshmerga as a more cohesive and reliable force, the KRG sought to signal its willingness to address one of Washington’s longstanding demands and in turn persuade the United States to remain engaged militarily in the Kurdistan Region.
The changing regional dynamics are another factor driving Iraqi Kurdish concerns about the lack of a US military presence in the Kurdistan Region. Under pressure from Washington and Ankara, Syrian Kurds’ 12-year de facto autonomy came to an end as their region was brought under the control of the central government in Damascus. Türkiye and Iran also appear to be working closely to exploit every opportunity to undermine prospects for Kurdish self-rule across the region. Iraqi Kurds are taking notice.
The Iraqi Kurdistan leadership recognises a broader shift in US policy, particularly among its regional diplomats, toward strengthening ties with central governments rather than working directly with local entities, as Washington has done with Iraqi and Syrian Kurds over the past 13 years. While the United States has formally ended its direct partnership with the Kurds in Syria, Iraqi Kurds hope that their federal status and the continued presence of the US diplomatic mission in Erbil will help preserve a strong relationship with Washington, even as the broader trend in US policy appears to be moving in a different direction.
For Iraqi Kurds, the US withdrawal is not simply the end of a military mission; it marks a significant shift in their strategic environment. Their options are increasingly limited: they must rely more heavily on their own forces, seek greater security cooperation with Baghdad and preserve their diplomatic and military ties with Washington without the leverage that a US military presence once provided. As the United States moves away from a direct military role in Iraq, Erbil will have to navigate a more difficult balance between Baghdad and Washington while facing an increasingly complex regional security environment.
Monday, September 28, 2026
Sunday, September 27, 2026
[Salon] Why Simon Schama is wrong to claim blood libel - Arab Digest.org Guest Post
Why Simon Schama is wrong to claim blood libel
Summary: a distinguished historian says there is no genocide in Gaza and that to say there is is a blood libel; in doing so he ignores the words and actions of Holocaust survivors who speak against the genocide Israel is committing.
At a recent Holocaust Education Trust (HET) gathering the historian and commentator Sir Simon Schama claimed that those who call what the IDF is doing in Gaza a genocide are committing a blood libel against Jews:
We, the victims of the greatest genocide the world has ever seen, are being called perpetrators of genocide.This is a profound lie….We will not have our job done until anybody uttering the notion that Israel is committing genocide is made to be ashamed for doing so.
He added that “we are in the business of facts in this room.”
Let then the facts speak. Sir Simon as an historian of note must surely be aware of the conclusion reached by members of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) who voted on a resolution in September of last year that Israel is committing genocide.
He may point out that less than a third of the members voted, albeit of those who did 86% were in support. He may want to ignore that the IAGS is considered the world leader in genocide scholarship.
What then of a resolution signed by 32 Holocaust survivors, 77 children of survivors and 132 grandchildren, great grandchildren and other relatives denouncing Israel’s actions?
As Jewish survivors and descendants of survivors of the Nazi genocide we unequivocally condemn the massacre of Palestinians in Gaza and the ongoing occupation and colonization of historic Palestine. We further condemn the United States for providing Israel with the funding to carry out the attack, and Western states more generally for using their diplomatic muscle to protect Israel from condemnation. Genocide begins with the silence of the world.
Although denying the Nazi genocide is criminal in over a dozen countries Sir Simon Schama - who denies Israel’s genocide of the Palestinians - is a BBC presenter whose documentary “The Road to Auschwitz / The Holocaust, 80 Years On” won the 2026 BAFTA Television Award for Best Specialist Factual programme.
In his address Sir Simon spoke collectively of “we, the greatest victims of genocide.” Yet his claim of a blood libel ignores the words and actions of actual survivors of the Holocaust one of whom is the architect Stephen Kapos. Unlike Sir Simon who was born in London in 1945 to British born Jews Stephen Kapos was separated from his parents in Budapest by the Nazis. He, his mother and his father who was incarcerated in Belsen and Theresienstadt survived but 15 members of his family did not.
Kapos has been active in support of ending the Gaza war, marching frequently with other protesters in London. Wearing a sign that reads “This holocaust survivor says stop the genocide in Gaza” he told Mehdi Hasan he protests in support of Palestine and to challenge the lie that the marches are anti-Semitic ‘hate marches’ and ‘no go areas for Jews.’
Kapos speaking as a holocaust survivor is very clear about how the savagery perpetuated on Europe’s Jews by the Nazis has been weaponised to justify the genocide ongoing in Gaza and the settler terrorism and ethnic cleansing in East Jerusalem and the Occupied West Bank:
The Holocaust has been used by Israel and not only Israel (but by) Zionist forces the world over as a justification for impunity that because of that great suffering they somehow feel justified to inflict similar suffering to others.
Though Sir Simon can brush aside the ICC arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant and dismiss the UN enquiry that has determined Israel is committing genocide by claiming as Netanyahu and his government have repeatedly done that these institutions are biased against Israel, he surely cannot so summarily dismiss the words and actions of Holocaust survivors.
Doing so, it could be argued, is the true blood libel: Sir Simon diminishes survivors and justifies genocide using the Holocaust to do so.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Saturday, September 26, 2026
[Salon] In a US-China world, Asean must do more than avoid choosing sides - Guest Post
Simon Tay
In a US-China world, Asean must do more than avoid choosing sides
Following the uneasy truce at the Xi-Trump summit, Asean must go beyond passive hedging and forge middle-power partnerships to secure its autonomy
SCMP
Simon Tay is a public intellectual as well as an adviser to major corporations and policymakers.
Published: 8:30pm, 25 Sep 2026
The good news is, when US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Washington this week, neither chose confrontation. Amid the high pomp and ceremony, what China has called “constructive strategic stability” continues.
Even an uneasy truce in great power relations can be useful. Both recognise the considerable incentive to prevent their economic rivalry from spiralling out of control. Even limited understandings can reduce risks in artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and many will look for mechanisms that can stabilise the relationship.
But that does not mean an end to competition. Washington and Beijing continue to differ over technology, industrial policy, security and the shape of the international order, while Iran and Taiwan remain fraught topics. They have moved away from the broad tariff war waged last year, but targeted restrictions and industrial measures continue.
The contest will play out in efforts to win influence and support across our region. As the Xi-Trump summit ends, and Asean leaders prepare for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in the Philippines, the familiar question arises again: must the region choose between the two?
For many years, the answer has been no. Seeking good relations with both and not being drawn too closely into either camp has been the common response. Yet by itself, hedging is no longer sufficient. The challenge for Asean and the wider region is to preserve the ability to make our own choices.
There are obvious pressures to align. Security concerns push some countries towards the United States. Economic geography, trade and investment bring others closer to China. Technology restrictions, tariffs, supply-chain policies and defence arrangements can increasingly turn seemingly separate decisions into strategic choices.
China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Prak Sokhonn and Cambodia’s Defence Minister General Tea Seiha meeting on April 22 in Phnom Penh. Photo: Handout / Agence Kampuchea Press / AFP)
China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Prak Sokhonn and Cambodia’s Defence Minister General Tea Seiha meeting on April 22 in Phnom Penh. Photo: Handout / Agence Kampuchea Press / AFP)
Picking a side also carries costs. Consider Cambodia, which has an exceptionally close relationship with China. Yet during Cambodia’s border conflict with Thailand last year, Beijing treated both countries as friends, stressing its impartiality. That was understandable for China, as Thailand matters greatly too. But there is a lesson to draw. A close relationship does not necessarily mean a major power will support you when interests diverge.
Similarly, consider the Korean peninsula. South Korea is a formal US treaty. Yet Trump’s renewed interest in diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un led to substantial cuts in the US-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises. Seoul has not been abandoned, but it is a reminder that great powers will do what great powers do. Alignment is no guarantee that interests will coincide when it matters.
Yet not choosing is not enough. Nor does this concern only security.
US restrictions on advanced semiconductors and other technologies are directed primarily at competition with China, but increasingly affect third countries. Rules of origin and tariffs put Chinese investment and manufacturing throughout Southeast Asia under scrutiny even as China’s presence in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and digital systems deepens. Decisions about technology, investment and manufacturing therefore acquire geopolitical significance.
Simply hedging and refusing to choose does not preserve autonomy. Countries need to create more choices with other powers to exercise autonomy in what I call a “Minus 2” world.
From time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together. The possibilities are considerable
A Minus 2 world does not mean excluding the US and China. Nor should middle and smaller powers organise a third bloc. The proposition is more modest: from time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together.
The possibilities are considerable. Japan has deep technological and industrial capabilities. South Korea is important in semiconductors, batteries and advanced manufacturing. India has scale and a growing technological base. Europe offers investment, markets and green technologies. Australia has resources, education and security capabilities.
Their interests are not identical. Some are US allies. Asean members are diversely oriented. But almost all share one important interest: they do not want every consequential decision to be defined by US-China rivalry.
Diversification is often valued in economic terms. Countries and companies diversify markets and suppliers to become more resilient. But there is today a strategic dimension to diversification. A Minus 2 mindset can give smaller countries more choices and agency, and foster more centres of influence. The more either great power pressures others to choose sides, the stronger the incentive for these others to work with one another in a genuinely multipolar world.
US President Donald Trump with Asean leaders at the 13th Asean-US summit during the 47th Asean summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 26, 2025. Photo: AFP
US President Donald Trump with Asean leaders at the 13th Asean-US summit during the 47th Asean summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 26, 2025. Photo: AFP
The coming Asean summit brings that into focus. Of course, this is a platform to engage the US and China. But it should also strengthen relationships that give Asean members greater room for manoeuvre. Many other partners will already be around the table, offering a practical application of how Asean thinks about “centrality”.
The group must go beyond merely convening meetings at which the two great powers compete for attention. Asean centrality can connect a wider range of countries with one another and advance practical cooperation. There is already an agenda to build on: concluding the Asean Digital Economy Framework Agreement, advancing the Asean power grid and cross-border electricity trading, and strengthening regional supply chains and investment.
These are some projects already making progress. They can also provide platforms for deeper partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Europe and others, including in AI and digital technologies, green finance and advanced manufacturing.
The Xi-Trump truce may give breathing room. But the initiative must be taken by others in Asia, using that space to deepen connections among themselves.
Strategic autonomy is not secured simply by refusing to choose. It grows from having more choices and a Minus 2 perspective. The Asean summit is an opportunity to show the region has agency.
Simon Tay
Simon Tay is a public intellectual as well as an adviser to major corporations and policymakers. He is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, an
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Friday, September 25, 2026
Thursday, September 24, 2026
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