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Tuesday, February 3, 2026
Monday, February 2, 2026
[Salon] ISIS unleashed - ArabDigest.org Guest Post by Sirwan Kajjo
ISIS unleashed
Summary: with the US choosing to throw in its lot with the al-Sharaa regime, it was only a matter of time before Syria’s Kurds and their fighting arm the SDF were defeated. Last month's rout of Kurdish forces in Northeast Syria has allowed the escape of ISIS fighters and the release of their families into a chaotic situation that could see a resurgence of terrorism in the region and beyond.
Today’s newsletter focusses on comments about the Islamic State made by the Kurdish-American journalist Sirwan Kajjo in our 28 January podcast. You can find the podcast here.
The SDF was the crucial element in the battle to defeat ISIS and it was heavily backed by the United States over several years. What happened to the US support for the SDF?
Since the arrival of al-Sharaa in Damascus, the United States decided to support this new government. It was a meeting back in May 2025 between President Donald Trump and the interim president of Syria, Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh, that basically changed things for everyone in Syria, including the SDF. And later on, in November of the same year, al-Sharaa came to the White House, had another meeting, and then joined the anti-ISIS global coalition. The United States decided that in Syria there's only one group that we can work with. While they continued their partnership with the SDF, they made it very clear that in the future, if there is any way for the SDF to continue the partnership, it would have to be through their integration into the Syrian government and the Syrian state writ large. But recently, after the outbreak of the violence in Aleppo and later on in eastern Syria, the United States made it even more clear that it's over for the SDF. If they do want to join the Syrian military and the Syrian state, then they should do so by joining individually, not as an intact force which has for a long time been a major demand for the Kurdish-led forces and also a major point of contention between Damascus and the SDF. So it's become clear that the United States no longer supports the SDF at least in the way it did in the past decade and in the framework of the fight against ISIS.
Following the Syrian Army offensive, an ISIS flag was raised at the entrance to Al-Karamah, Al-Raqqah, Syria. The video is not from the ISIS period as the wheat monument (circled in blue) was built after the town was liberated in 2017.
It would appear to me that the Syrian Kurds have been betrayed. Is that how you see it?
Well, I should say the United States, since the beginning of this partnership with the SDF a decade ago, has been very consistent in terms of defining the relationship with the Kurdish-led forces, that this was a transactional partnership. This was not meant to be a strategic partnership in the context of giving an opportunity for the Kurds to establish a lasting autonomy in the Northeast. And this was reiterated recently by US Special Envoy to Syria, Tom Barrack, that it was meant to be in the context of fighting ISIS and he basically said that that partnership had expired. And so many Kurds would like to call this a betrayal, but from a US perspective, everything was clear from the get go, from the minute the United States, under the Obama administration, decided to support the Kurds directly in the fight against ISIS. It's remained in that context, even though that partnership has allowed the Kurds to expand territory and build institutions that function in a de facto capacity in the Northeast and so, yes, from a Kurdish perspective, Kurds have been a loyal partner to the United States and other Western powers and in return they expected more assertive support in the post-Assad era.
Washington is the key here. And Tom Barrack made it very clear: ‘this is it, our support is finished. We're walking away from you. We're supporting al-Sharaa’.
That's basically what happened. The United States still maintains about 1000 troops in the region, although some of them have been moved around given the changing dynamics in the Northeast. So, there is still a US military presence. I don't know how much effect that will have given that the Syrian government forces have taken over much of the territory that was controlled by the SDF. And so, yes, if there is any support for the Kurds in the future it will probably be in terms of forcing them to continue this integration process. The United States remains determined that any integration of the SDF into the Syrian state will have to be by terms dictated by Damascus.
There are people listening to the podcast thinking, well, ISIS was defeated. It's no longer a threat. But Sirwan, you and I both know that's far from the case. What has happened with the prisons and the camps holding ISIS fighters and their families now that the SDF has been defeated?
They were immediately taken over by the al-Sharaa forces, including the al-Hol camp which is the largest camp, holding thousands of families of ISIS militants including many foreign citizens. Now, it's a chaotic situation in certain prisons, like in al-Shaddadi, which is located in the southern part of Hasakah province where a prison break happened and many ISIS prisoners were able to escape. Some of them were captured by the Syrian forces, others remain at large, so those would eventually pose a threat and not only to the Kurdish region but also to areas under al-Sharaa’s control. And you also have these other thousands of families, including women and children, that have been held in these camps, most of them still hold an ISIS extremist ideology, so they do pose a direct threat to the security of the region and to regional security as a whole. Some of them have been moved to Iraq. The US said that the Iraqis have initiated a process of taking as much as 7000 individuals from al-Hol camp. Now, that's major but we also hear some opposition voices within Iraq basically saying it's not a good idea even though Iraqi officials say this is a temporary arrangement until there is a process where these individuals are repatriated to their home countries. All in all, it's a very chaotic situation because, yes, ISIS was defeated territorially. Militarily, it no longer held territory but they've been very active since 2019. And in the Syrian desert known as al-Badia, we have seen an uptick of ISIS activity in those areas, especially after the collapse of the Assad regime. I'm not trying to be hyperbolic here but the threat is very real given that the Syrian government has shown it doesn't have the capacity to counter ISIS, not least because some members of the Syrian military are former ISIS or former al-Qaeda, and some still hold that extremist ideology. So, it's dangerous in that sense as well. We will see how the US and its Western allies will deal with this situation but it's certainly one of great significance in the long run.
Yes, and you mentioned that there are former ISIS fighters - who may not be former, when I think about it - in the Syrian armed forces. I'm also told that in the security services, there are ISIS sympathisers, fellow travellers, whatever you want to call them. So there is the threat, of course, to Iraq, to Syria, but also beyond those borders. I'm thinking about Europe. ISIS lost the caliphate but the ideology has not been defeated, has it?
No, it has only seen a resurgence in the past few months, for these reasons that you mentioned. The official ISIS narrative opposes the al-Sharaa government. They think it's an apostate regime, a puppet regime that is loyal to the West and many within ISIS, as well as people who sympathise with the group, still believe this is a chance to try to have a resurgence in many parts of Syria. And we see that online. I saw some reporting on camps holding ISIS families celebrating the fact that their brothers are coming for us, things like that. So, there is a sense of victory among people including those who are still in Kurdish custody. This is definitely something that Western officials should consider if they are concerned about their own security. In Europe in particular, given that many of these individuals do come from European backgrounds.
Sunday, February 1, 2026
Pope Leo XIV urges youth politics rooted in peace
Pope Leo XIV urges youth politics rooted in peace
The Pope urged young leaders to take courage, reminding them that their efforts toward fraternity are shared across cultures and faiths.
Pope Leo XIV addressed young political leaders from around the world at the “One Humanity, One Planet” conference on Saturday, urging them to ground political life in peace, justice, and care for the most vulnerable.
Speaking in the Clementine Hall, the Pope praised the participants’ commitment to the common good and highlighted their diversity as a strength rather than a challenge. Their approach, he said, embodies synodality — a way of proceeding marked by listening, shared discernment, and respect for complexity.
“Your way of proceeding is not incidental,” he told them. “It serves as the essential lens through which you observe the world.” In a global climate shaped by polarization and conflict, the Pope framed synodality as a practical tool for political engagement, one capable of seeking truth without fear and collaboration without erasing differences.
The address repeatedly returned to peace, which the Pope described as a gift received, a covenant shared, and a promise yet to be fulfilled. Peacebuilding, he insisted, does not begin on the world stage but in daily settings: universities, workplaces, civic groups, and political parties. Without harmony in those spaces, global peace remains an abstraction.
Saturday, January 31, 2026
Iran Says It Will Not Negotiate With US on Ballistic Missiles
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https://www.ft.com/content/44c4094b-09a6-47ce-a28a-81c2f18f1cb9
Friday, January 30, 2026
Thursday, January 29, 2026
[Salon] Welcome to the Jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace goes global - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Welcome to the Jungle: Trump’s Board of Peace goes global
Summary: the US president’s Board of Peace has less to do with peace, in Gaza or elsewhere, and more to do with enforcing a new, transactional global order. Welcome to the America-First Trumpian world.
We thank Hugh Lovatt for today’s newsletter, an edited version of his article first published on the European Council on Foreign Relation’s website. Hugh is a senior policy fellow with the Middle East and North Africa programme at the ECFR and chairman of the Brussels-based European Middle East Project (EuMEP). @h_lovatt on X
President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace (BoP) is not much of a peace mechanism. Look no further than its logo—a US-first western hemisphere flanked by rip-off UN olive branches burnished in Trumpian gold—to see the BoP for what it really is: a top-down project to assert Trump’s control over global affairs.
At its Davos inauguration, the US president delivered a rambling speech to the 19 countries present, hailing them “the most powerful people in the world.” Belarus’s autocratic leader and an early BoP signatory, Aleksandr Lukashenko, was unable to attend due to European sanctions over human rights abuses. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, was also absent, facing an International Criminal Court arrest warrant over alleged war crimes in Gaza.
The Guardian cartoon on Donald Trump and his ‘Board of Peace’
After Trump’s “top leaders” were presented, Jared Kushner unveiled a $30bn “Trump development plan” for “New Gaza.” Complete with a skyscraper-crammed coastline, the vision would see the wholesale bulldozing of the Strip to create a newly engineered society and economy under BoP supervision. Judging by the Arabic spelling mistakes in the PowerPoint presentation, no Palestinians were consulted on their “prosperous future”.
What began with a mandate to implement Washington’s Gaza ceasefire plan, as enshrined in UN Security Council resolution 2803, has morphed into a personal vehicle for a Trumpist world order. The BoP’s charter omits any reference to Gaza and echoes Trump’s criticism of the UN, calling for “courage to depart from…institutions that have often failed” by establishing “a more nimble and effective international peace-building body”.
European leaders broadly backed resolution 2803, but have avoided the BoP (bar Hungary and Bulgaria), expressing concerns over its mandate, legality and challenge to the UN. They are right to stay away: the board’s purpose, governance and financial entanglements risk legitimising a system in which loyalty and money outweigh international law. Joining such a body would dilute Europe’s voice and erode what remains of the multilateral rules-based system.
How the Board of Peace works
BoP can be thought of as a Trump-owned US company, with the US president as permanent chairman and majority shareholder. According to the board’s charter, all decisions and power emanate from Trump as he selects and presides over a subordinate governing board of member states.
Board members will serve three-year terms, renewable at the chairman’s discretion. Out of the 50-60 countries invited, 21 have so far joined. Many no doubt value the opportunity of a closer, more transactional US relationship. Others share Trump’s hostility to the UN-sponsored liberal order. Together, they will vote on the BoP’s budget, international agreements and “peace-building initiatives”, with only a simple majority—and the approval of the chairman—required.
While the charter describes funding as voluntary, Trump’s track record suggests he will press members to “pay up”, with big payers likely to have the most influence. (Those paying $1bn will be given permanent membership.)
Below the board is an Executive Board and CEO appointed by Trump. This is where the power lies, tasked with day-to-day running of the board and the managing of funds. It also has the mandate to set the agenda for each board meeting, further reducing member-state autonomy.
Among its members are senior US officials and businessmen: Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and founder of Affinity Partners, an American investment firm with close ties to Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds; Marc Rowan, CEO of asset management firm Apollo Global Management which invests in private equity and real estate; and Ajay Banga, another business executive and president of the World Bank Group.
The mixture of private investment funds with American power and geopolitics, combined with likely opaque decision-making and financial expenditure is a recipe for kleptocratic oligarchy. Already, the Guardian is reporting that Albania joined the BoP just as Kushner gained approval from the Albanian government to build a $1.4bn luxury resort on Sazan Island. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s outgoing prime minister, Rosen Zhelyazkov, reportedly joined the BoP at the urging of a Bulgarian oligarch sanctioned by the US for corruption.
What this means for Gaza
The BoP has several subsidiary entities focused on Gaza, which Trump has “exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve.” First is the Gaza Executive Board to oversee the implementation of Trump’s 20-point plan, including a Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG). Composed of 15 members led by Ali Shaath and charged with Gaza’s day-to-day management, the NCAG sits at the bottom of the hierarchy with little influence or agency. So far, Israel has not even let members into the war-torn Strip.
As per the 20-point plan, the BoP will also establish a Gaza International Stabilisation Force (ISF) led by American General Jasper Jeffers, though it is not clear who in the BoP he will report to. Questions similarly remain over the scope of the ISF’s mandate to enforce the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza.
In addition, Trump has appointed two White House advisors, Aryeh Lightstone and Josh Gruenbaum, as senior BoP advisors. They will be enforcers of Trump’s writ. Lightstone’s background should be cause for concern: he was an advisor to former US ambassador David Friedman and is a “staunch defender” of Israel’s settlement project. He was also reportedly involved in establishing the disastrous Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (which caused the deaths of numerous Gazan aid seekers) and is now working through the Gaza Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) to develop US plans for post-conflict Gaza.
Having long asserted that the US will “take over” and “own” Gaza, Trump now wields near-total control of the Strip through the BoP. The involvement of private investment funds, many with real-estate interests, reinforces his vision of a US-backed, corporate-built “Gazan Riviera” as showcased in Davos.
A week earlier, the CMCC had already moved in this direction, reportedly presenting plans for a “Gaza First Planned Community” designed to house up to 25,000 Palestinians in a residential neighbourhood built on the ruins of Rafah. The scheme appears to revive Israeli plans for “humanitarian bubbles” of “Hamas-free” areas secured by foreign contractors, with residents subject to relentless external vetting and biometric checks. Such an approach would deepen Gaza’s territorial and societal fragmentation and do little to counter Hamas, which remains deeply imbedded in Palestinian politics and society.
The main checks on Trump’s “Gazan Riveria” vision will be Hamas’s continued control on the ground but also the extent to which Arab members of the BoP can push back internally and condition their funding on a more holistic reconstruction, predicated on Israel’s full withdrawal from Gaza and the return of the Palestinian Authority.
What Europeans can do
Outside the Trump-controlled BoP, European states have significant influence. They should engage directly with the Gaza Executive Committee which is more in line with UNSCR 2803 and where there is strong European representation through Nikolay Mladenov, Tony Blair and Sigrid Kaag. Arab partners such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia who are represented on both the Board and Gaza Executive Committee are also indispensable partners in shaping BoP actions from the inside.
Being relevant on Gaza does not mean toeing the US-line. It means making commitments to empower the Palestinian National Committee as it comes under tremendous pressure to follow the US and potentially sign murky real estate development deals. Such deals might generate profits for the BoP’s investment fund, but will do little to support ordinary Gazans who want to rebuild their homes and communities in safety and unlock economic re-development (which requires an end to Israel’s decades-long siege of the Strip).
European states should also look for ways to support the ISF once concerns over its mandate and command and control structure are addressed. This could include funding, technical support, and even limited troop contributions (as they have done in other peacekeeping missions). By being proactive, Europeans would strengthen their hand with Trump, who remains the best hope of pressing Netanyahu into a full withdrawal from Gaza and broader Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
European countries are stronger when they hold the line together in defence of European interests. On Greenland, for example, their collective pushback forced Trump to climb down—at least for the time being. With this in mind, Europeans should engage with the BoP on specific issues from the outside and work with partners on the inside. The goal should be to shape BoP engagement in line with Europe’s vision for peace in Ukraine, Israel-Palestine and the broader Middle East where renewed US strikes on Iran risk renewed regional convulsion.
But Europeans should also be aware of the dangers of short-term transactionalism. By buying into the BoP, they would risk legitimising a Trumpian order centred on the president and his reversion to 19th century geopolitics where might is right and territorial conquest by great powers is legitimate. With the rules-based order already in trouble before Trump’s return to the White House, Europe will have to look to itself to secure its interests.
How tradition carries the gift of love across generations
How tradition carries the gift of love across generations
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In an age dominated by individualism, tradition draws our focus outward, grounding us in a shared history and collective responsibility.
The word “tradition” originates from the Latin tradere, meaning “to hand over” or “to deliver.” It evokes the image of passing on something precious — knowledge, culture, and faith — from one generation to the next. Tradition is a collection of customs or rituals. But it is also a profound act of communion that binds us to the past, roots us in the present, and prepares us for the future.
Tradition reminds us that the world we inhabit was not built in isolation. It was crafted by countless hands and minds, many of whom we will never know. The homes we live in, the roads we walk, and the prayers we say are gifts we’ve received from others — evidence of their lives, hopes, and wisdom. This heritage is not ours to hoard or disregard; it is a shared responsibility.
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches, “Tradition is to be distinguished from the various theological, disciplinary, liturgical, or devotional traditions, born in the local churches over time. These are the particular forms, adapted to different places and times, in which the great Tradition is expressed” (CCC 83).
This underscores tradition’s dynamic nature: while its core truths remain unchanging, its expressions adapt to meet the needs of every age.
"Procession in Naples" (Detail) by Franz Richard Unterberger, c. 1878
Procession in Naples (Detail) by Franz Richard Unterberger, c. 1878
Wikimedia Commons | Public Domain
Fostering a shared life
More than continuity, tradition fosters conviviality — a shared life that transcends the boundaries of the living and the dead. When we engage with tradition, we participate in a dialogue with those who came before us and those who will follow. We experience this vividly in the Eucharist, where the faithful across time and space are united in Christ. Similarly, cultural and familial traditions remind us that our lives are not isolated but are part of a much larger story.
This perspective reshapes how we understand community. In an age dominated by individualism, tradition draws our focus outward, grounding us in a shared history and collective responsibility. It invites us to care for what we’ve been given—not as museum keepers preserving relics, but as stewards who nurture and enhance these gifts for future generations. G.K. Chesterton captured this well, describing tradition as “the democracy of the dead,” a way of giving a voice to our ancestors in shaping the present.
Procession through the streets of contemporary Naples
A procession through the streets of contemporary Naples
Imma Gambardella | Shutterstock
Preserving tradition doesn’t mean resisting change. It means transforming what we’ve inherited with care and integrity, ensuring its values endure while addressing contemporary realities. In this sense, tradition is both a gift and a task. It demands humility to recognize that we are part of something greater than ourselves and courage to discern when transformation is necessary.
Tradition is a living chain that connects us to those who came before us, to one another, to those who will come after us and, ultimately, to God. It reminds us that we belong to a community far larger than ourselves — one that spans generations and points toward eternity. By embracing, preserving, and enriching what we’ve received, we affirm that the world is not ours alone; it is a gift meant to be shared and handed on.
Wednesday, January 28, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Third Sunday in Ordinary Time -
I once read a story about tourists visiting the famous Carlsbad Caverns in New Mexico. While they were deep below the surface in the giant cavern, the lights suddenly went out. Among those trapped in the darkness were two children: an 8-year-old boy and his 5-year-old sister.
It was a frightening moment for everyone, especially the children. The little girl began to cry, but her brother stayed calm. “Don’t worry,” he whispered. “There’s a man up there who knows how to turn the lights on again.”
That story beautifully captures the prophecy of Isaiah in today’s first reading – the same prophecy Matthew applies to Jesus in the Gospel: “The people who live in darkness have seen a great light; upon those who dwelt in the land of gloom, a light has shone.”
Before Jesus came, the world was dark and full of fear, much like that cavern when the lights went out. Yet into that darkness came Isaiah’s reassuring voice, promising that a great light would soon shine and scatter the shadows. That promise was fulfilled in Jesus, the Light of the World.
Spiritual writers often tell us that what happened to Israel as a nation happens to each of us personally. We all experience times when the lights seem to go out – moments of confusion, fear, or loss. And just like those children in the Caverns, we need to know that Someone above us knows how to turn the lights back on.
Bethany Hamilton, the professional surfer, learned this firsthand. Surfing since childhood, she was already competing professionally by age 10. But at 13, she lost her left arm when she was attacked by a tiger shark.
For a time, she wondered if she would ever surf again. But through determination and deep faith in God, she returned to the water with a redesigned board that allowed her to continue her career. She has often said that her faith in God gave her strength, purpose and resilience – and her story even inspired a major film.
For Bethany, the lights went out, but they soon came back on. And I’ve heard similar stories from countless people who have walked through darkness. The lights always return.
We all face moments that throw us into darkness: the loss of someone we love, a devastating diagnosis, a broken marriage, a shattered dream, the loss of a job. Any of these can leave us feeling as if we are stumbling in the dark.
But when those moments come, remember Isaiah’s promise: “The people who live in darkness will see a great light.”
The dark times in life do not have to be the end. They can be the beginning. And when the lights return, they often shine brighter and more radiantly than before.
And if you need one more assurance, my friends, remember today’s psalm: “The Lord is my light and my salvation.”
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, January 27, 2026
[Salon] Yemen: the Internationally Recognized Government escapes a crisis - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Yemen: the IRG escapes a crisis
Summary: the quick collapse of the STC’s breakaway movement has ruptured relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and created an opening for fresh dialogue that could possibly lead to peace but many obstacles remain.
We thank our regular contributor Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.
The crisis within Yemen’s internationally recognised government [IRG] looks to be easing. A new Prime Minister, the former Foreign Minister Shaye al Zindani, is expected to announce his new government in coming days and the Saudi-sponsored southern dialogue is likely to take place in the coming weeks. So what is the outcome of two months of acute crisis within the IRG?
A quick reminder of the facts: in early December last year with, at the very least UAE complicity, the Southern Transitional Council [STC] under the leadership of Aidarous al-Zubaydi sent its forces to take over the northern part of Hadhramaut governorate and al Mahra governorate, the two parts of the territory of the former PDRY which it did not already control. Summoned to withdraw by Rashad al-Alimi the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council [PLC] and by the Saudis, the STC refused and instead moved further north towards the Saudi border. On 30 December, the IRG terminated its defence agreement with the UAE, giving it 24 hours to get out of the country. On the same day the Saudis launched air attacks on Hadhramaut’s capital Mukalla which struck and damaged two Emirati ships arriving from Fujairah loaded with military equipment for the STC.
The reversal of the STC conquests rapidly spread, with pro-IRG forces taking over military positions throughout the southern governorates and reaching Aden by 6 January. With the rout clear to all, former senior STC officials were quick to declare support for the IRG and the Saudis. Two of the more prominent to switch sides were the Governor of Shabwa Abdul Rahman al Muharrami, head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces and a former deputy of al-Zubaydi and Tariq Saleh, a non-separatist PLC member who had backed the STC only a few weeks earlier. Both men publicised their meetings with Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi Minister of Defence on 4 January.
MBS’s younger brother and Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman posted a photo on his X account of him meeting the Vice President of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) and head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces Abu Zaraa al-Mahrami where Prince Khalid said they discussed the latest developments “by the spirit of brotherhood and understanding.”
Instead of going to Riyadh to join the proposed southern dialogue, al-Zubaydi escaped to Abu Dhabi thanks to UAE logistics. His call for uprisings were ignored and the STC was formally dissolved by leaders busy preparing the southern dialogue. On 7 January he was charged with high treason. Al-Zubaydi’s remaining support is primarily from people originally from his home area, a few districts of Lahej, Abyan and al Dhali’, north of Aden. However his statements supporting the establishment of relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords and his publicised corruption certainly reduced his popularity, alongside President al Alimi’s wisdom in appointing senior officials from that same area.
By 8 January, forces loyal to the IRG, including those who until recently were part of the STC, had taken control of the temporary capital Aden, promptly followed by a delegation of senior Saudi military officers. The new military committee is focusing on removing army camps from Aden in anticipation of bringing the newly formed government back to the city.
A few pointers in the coming weeks/months:
The Huthis have barely figured in this saga. They have not been involved in a crisis that has shaken the IRG to its core. The prospect of a more effective and united IRG is bad news for them. Such an entity, particularly if deeply supported by the Saudis, might well build military forces to confront the Huthis more effectively than in the past. Whether this is likely to increase or decrease the likelihood of their reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia is open to debate. The UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg is continuing exchanges with the IRG and international parties, and there may be an opening for his efforts in coming months, particularly if the Huthis consider that the time has come to end the fundamental conflict.
How stable will the new IRG be? Having one international sponsor, rather than two rival ones, will enable it to confront the multiple problems of administering the parts of Yemen it controls. Composition of the new government will be an indicator of the likelihood of success. PLC stability has improved as both al-Zubaydi and Faraj al-Bahsani a former governor of Hadhramaut have been removed and replaced by southerners who support the leadership: Mahmoud al Subayhi, former Defence Minister who was detained by the Huthis for 7 years and Salem al-Khanbashi the new governor of Hadhramaut. However, there are still significant differences and competition within the PLC, with some of its members’ loyalty to Saudi Arabia’s strategy doubtful.
How successful the IRG is likely to be partly depends on the outcome of the southern dialogue. There are a multiplicity of southern political ambitions and many southern separatist organisations with the now-disbanded STC being only one of them. There are also supporters of Yemeni unity. In Hadhramaut, people are divided between supporters of Hadhrami autonomy or even independence and those who would be satisfied with a distant relationship with the capital, whether Aden or Sana’a. Long established political and economic relations between Hadhramaut and Saudi Arabia are important but they do not mean that Hadhramis are subservient. Overall, it would be wise for the Saudis to manage this dialogue in a way which enables Yemenis to reach solutions that are in the interests of the country as a whole.
Who will control Yemen? There is little doubt that the main decision makers will be the Saudis directly involved with Yemen, namely Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman [brother of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] and the Saudi ambassador Mohammed al Jaber. The financial dependence of the IRG on Saudi Arabia for everything from fuel to operate power stations to funds for development and rehabilitation activities give Riyadh unprecedented power. The extent to which the IRG will be able to develop autonomous policies addressing the needs and priorities of the Yemeni people is unclear. Certainly the Saudis care little about millions of poor and hungry Yemenis, nor is their neo-liberal philosophy likely to establish equitable social policies at a time when it is removing them at home. On the other hand, continued unrest in Yemen is not a desirable situation, so some degree of compromise and some investment in public services is to be expected.
What is the likely future involvement of the UAE? The expulsion of the Emiratis from Yemen has been covered extensively by world media with the word ‘humiliating’ featuring prominently. This is certainly embarrassing for the regime in Abu Dhabi, alongside the blame it has received for its support for the genocidal RSF in Sudan, let alone its increasingly close relationship with Israel. In Yemen, it will most likely continue to undermine the rule of the IRG via its remaining contacts, mainly those elements still loyal to al-Zubaydi. In the past, collusion with al Qaeda has been suspected and may well be another mechanism used to sustain instability in coming months. The UAE leadership’s disruptive capacity should not be underestimated in the new regional context where its competition with the Saudi regime has turned into open rivalry. The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland, alongside Israel’s recent unique recognition of that state can reasonably be perceived as threatening to the very security of Saudi Arabia, worsening what is already a serious rift and leading the Saudis to consolidate their relationship with opponents of the UAE.
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