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Thursday, April 30, 2026
[Salon] Iraq moves forward on naming a prime minister - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Iraq moves forward on naming a prime minister
Summary: months after parliamentary elections Iraq appears to have finally resolved who will be the country’s next prime minister.
We thank Winthrop Rodgers for today’s newsletter. A journalist and analyst who spent several years in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, he focuses on politics, human rights and economics and is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. @wrodgers2
Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) has nominated a new prime minister after more than five months of delay and multiple rounds of difficult negotiations. On April 27, the SCF announced that it had tapped businessman Ali al-Zaidi, who has never held high government or partisan office, as its choice. The decision was greeted positively across the political spectrum, mostly in relief that a decision had been taken and the process of government formation can now quickly resolve itself. There were worries that the US may object to the SCF’s choice, but Washington has signalled its acceptance.
Zaidi is primarily known an owner of al-Janoob Islamic Bank. Notably, it was banned from participating in US dollar auctions by the Central Bank of Iraq in February 2024 along with seven other financial institutions as part of crackdown on Iraqi banks smuggling US dollars to Iran. Beyond that, his business portfolio includes Taawon Hypermarkets. He is also the CEO of Dijlah TV, one of Iraq’s largest television channels, and is chairman on the board of a private university. He once held a minor position in the Ministry of Trade involving the ration card system.
As a result, Zaidi carries little of the political experience of other candidates who had been floated for the position. By contrast, current Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani had held numerous governorate-level and ministerial posts before he was nominated. It also means that Zaidi carries little of the political baggage of other potential prime ministerial nominees.
The Iraq Shia Coordination Framework has nominated businessman Ali al-Zaidi as the new prime minister, a choice seen as a move to break a five-month deadlock with a politically inexperienced candidate who won't overshadow established party leaders.
For example, the Trump administration dramatically declared on January 27 that it would not support State of Law leader Nouri al-Maliki, who had been the SCF’s first choice. Washington viewed the former two-term prime minister as too close to Iran, a determination that was made before the current war began a month later. Since then, the SCF has vacillated over its strategy, veering between a defiant stance of sticking by Maliki, renominating Sudani or searching for a new candidate entirely. In the end, they opted for the third route.
Zaidi’s nomination is an extreme version of the approach that the Shia bloc has taken since Maliki left office in 2014. Every prime minister since then has been plucked from relative obscurity, rather than being one of the country’s top politicians. This maintains balance between the various parties within the SCF by not raising any one above the others, but it also allows the party leaders to manage up and exert control over the prime minister. Of course, each of the prime ministers has tried to expand their power base once in office, but with limited success. As a non-politician, Zaidi fits in this model and will be extremely unlikely to overshadow the power of party leaders.
However, one big winner from the nomination seems to be Faiq Zaidan, president of the Supreme Judicial Council, who has progressively become more influential in Iraqi politics in recent years and is said to be close to Zaidi. The judge’s position provides him with decisive power to weigh in on political disputes, while also being an influential backroom player. However, there are some accusations that Zaidan personally benefitted from Zaidi’s legal and corrupt business activities.
Zaidi’s selection was welcomed by figures across the political spectrum, including non-Shia blocs. Speaker of Parliament Haibet al-Halbousi, who is Sunni, praised the pick in a statement. In the Kurdistan Region, the leaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) — who cannot seem to agree on the colour of the sky these days — both congratulated Zaidi. However, since the Sunni or Kurdish blocs are not responsible for selecting the prime minster, there was probably not much to be gained from actively opposing the Shia pick.
Initially, the choice raised questions among analysts about whether this is a serious pick or whether it is merely a play for time. Abu Mithaq al-Masari, an Iraqi political observer, suggested in a Facebook post that Zaidi may be a “burnt card,” who is offered up while negotiations continue in the background to select a real candidate who will subsequently attempt to form a government. This however seems unlikely given that President Nizar Amedi has officially asked him to move forward with naming a cabinet and Zaidi’s acceptance by the other blocs.
Another major question was whether Zaidi will win approval from the Trump administration. The fact that his bank was banned from the US dollar auction seemed at first blush to be automatically disqualifying, given the criteria applied to Maliki. However, pressure had been growing both domestically and from foreign partners like Washington to complete the government formation process in the interests of stability.
In this end, the US Embassy in Baghdad posted on social media on April 29 that it “extends its best wishes to Prime Minister-Designate Ali al-Zaidi as he works to form a government capable of fulfilling the hopes of all Iraqis for a brighter and more peaceful future.” Its close allies also signalled approval. UK Ambassador to Iraq Irfan Siddiq wrote on social media that London “welcomes the nomination of a new Prime Minister in Iraq” and wished Zaidi “success in swiftly forming a new government.” French Ambassador Patrick Durel similarly congratulated the prime minister designate.
Iraq is experiencing a substantial security and economic crisis as a result of the war between its two main allies, the US and Iran. Facing it without a permanent government would be foolish. In that sense, Zaidi’s nomination is a positive step forward. Still, his ability to run a government is entirely untested and is therefore a major risk. Matters are rarely clear or predictable when it comes to Iraqi politics and this unusual choice only reinforces that tendency.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Wednesday, April 29, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Fourth Sunday of Easter - Guest Post
Laura Bell was not a typical college graduate. After finishing school, instead of pursuing a business career or following a conventional path, she took a job in Wyoming as a sheep herder. Some of her friends thought she was crazy. But Laura wanted a real challenge, and she certainly found one.
She worked nearly 18 hours a day, seven days a week. Her day began before sunrise and often ended long after sunset. Most of that time she was completely alone, accompanied only by her dog, her horse and roughly 2,000 sheep. Once a week, someone rode out to deliver mail, food and essentials. Her responsibility was simple but demanding: keep the flock together, move them to food and water and protect them from predators.
Laura once explained, “When you’re out there all alone, there is no one to correct your mistakes. So, you stay extra alert for dangers, like rattlesnakes. You don’t do foolish things with your horse.”
She also said one of her greatest joys – and biggest challenges – was the weather. It determined everything about the sheep’s behavior. One day, a portion of the flock wandered off. She spent hours tracking them down, only to be caught in a sudden thunderstorm once she found them. Soaked and exhausted, she spent the night wrapped in wet blankets, shivering beside the flock she was protecting.
Laura’s experience gives us a glimpse into how demanding shepherding still is today. In ancient times, however, it was even more difficult. Shepherds had no modern equipment, no reliable protection; often not even animals to assist them. They relied on vigilance, courage and sheer endurance.
That helps us understand the confidence of David in the Book of Samuel, when he volunteers to fight the giant Philistine, Goliath. King Saul doubts him, but David explains that while tending his father’s sheep, he fought off lions and bears to protect the flock. That experience prepared him for the battle he would eventually win.
Because shepherds risked so much for their flocks, biblical writers often used the image of a shepherd to describe God’s care. The familiar words, “The Lord is my shepherd; there is nothing I shall want,” express trust in a God who guides, protects and provides.
This imagery reaches its fullest meaning in Jesus Christ, whom Christians recognize as the Good Shepherd – especially reflected upon each year on this very day, Good Shepherd Sunday, during the Easter season.
So how do we respond to all this? First, with gratitude. Christ tells us He is the gate for the sheep, the one who leads us to life. Through His death and resurrection, we believe we are offered freedom from sin and the promise of eternal life.
Second, we respond with openness. The Good Shepherd is not a distant figure from the past; He continues to seek the lost, strengthen the weak and call each of us by name. His voice is often heard in Scripture, in prayer, in the kindness of others and in those quiet moments when we sense guidance and peace.
The message is both comforting and challenging: we are never abandoned. The Good Shepherd who laid down His life for us continues to walk with us, guide us and share His risen life – but only if we are willing to listen and follow.
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, April 28, 2026
[Salon] Trump Courting Disaster With New Trade War On China -
https://meaninginhistory.substack.com/p/trump-courting-disaster-with-new
[Salon] America quits Syria - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
America quits Syria
Summary: America’s withdrawal of its last remaining forces in Northeast Syria is a significant moment for Syria, one that rivals Türkiye and Israel will see as an opportunity to exploit. Further risks to the country’s fragile stability may also come from a re-emerging ISIS.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
Amid the American whiplash in the Middle East in the last few months, one might have missed that the last US convoy left its major bases in Syria in mid-April. Yet the moment is consequential. It reflects a convergence of opportunities and constraints. The evacuation of the last U.S. bases ends more than a decade of American military presence and signals a shift in military posture, as well as political strategy.
US forces first entered Syria in 2014 to combat the Islamic State, partnering with Kurdish-led forces that would become the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At its height, this partnership enabled the SDF to control nearly a third of Syrian territory, backed by roughly 2,000 U.S. troops and extensive airpower, intelligence, and logistical support. Over time, however, the mission narrowed, and US President Donald Trump had sought to leave Syria since his first term. With ISIS territorially defeated and regional priorities shifting, the rationale for maintaining dispersed ground positions weakened.
The mechanics of the withdrawal are striking in their speed and scope. Since February, US forces have vacated a chain of key installations. These included the strategic tri-border garrison at al-Tanf and the al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah. On April 16, U.S. and Syrian officials said that forces completed their withdrawal from Qasak air base. Troops relocated to Jordan rather than Iraq due to security concerns.
The United States military withdrawal from Syria allows Damascus to consolidate territorial control over lucrative resources but marginalizes Kurdish autonomy and risks renewed instability from the Islamic State and regional tensions involving Turkey and Israel.
Despite starting a new war, President Trump can now say he ended the U.S. military presence in Syria. The U.S. military will now shift from permanent posts to military cooperation and training with Syrian security forces. US Central Command said “US forces continue to support partner-led counterterrorism efforts, which are essential to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and strengthening regional security.” This reflects a broader US shift in the Middle East, especially after Syria last year joined the coalition against the Islamic State.
This represents a major win for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in his desire to soon claim complete territorial consolidation after the country’s protracted civil war. The U.S. military exit removes a major constraint for Damascus’s reach into the country’s northeast, which contains lucrative oil fields and border crossings. It also reflects a broader development in U.S.-Syria relations, with both sides entering what appears to be a tentative period of engagement focused on security coordination and potential economic cooperation. Al-Sharaa visited President Trump at the White House in November, the first such visit by any Syrian head of state. There is also apparently an American plan to turn Syria into an oil transit hub.
Still, this extension of al-Sharaa’s power comes with risk. While degraded, the Islamic State retains the capacity to exploit gaps in control. In December a gunman who the Syrian government claim to be affiliated with the Islamic State killed two US soldiers as well as a civilian American interpreter. In February the US transferred over 5,000 Islamic State detainees to Iraq ahead of their withdrawal, an effort to reduce exposure to any potential volatility once US troops pulled out. Without a US stabilising presence, the burden shifts to Syrian forces whose cohesion and capacity remain uneven.
For Kurds in Syria, the consequences are more acute. The Trump administration’s withdrawal effectively ends the strategic partnership that underpinned the SDF’s autonomy. The US presence had functioned as both a deterrent against Turkish incursions and a mediator in tensions with Damascus. The removal of American troops accelerates a forced integration of the SDF into Syrian state structures and the transfer of border controls to the central government. Without US backing, the SDF has lost its autonomy and will become more of a subordinate actor amid Damascus’s consolidation. Kurdish forces—particularly the core People’s Defence Units (YPG)—remain capable, but their leverage has diminished significantly.
Türkiye, by contrast, stands to gain. Ankara has long opposed US support for Kurdish forces along its southern border, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan has called “terror groups.” The American exit removes a major source of anxiety and opens space for expanded Turkish influence, either directly or through coordination with Damascus. But, without U.S. mediation, there is an increased risk of miscalculation along contested areas between the Syrian government and a weakened but still armed Kurdish presence, conditions for renewed instability that could draw Turkish forces into the fray. The Islamic State may also be able to exploit the situation, which could lead to attacks near or inside Türkiye as well.
Israel has sought to keep Syria divided, previously stoking tensions between Damascus and the country’s ethnic minority groups that remain suspicious of al-Sharaa. Further, Israel is concerned over the loss of the US presence at al-Tanf, long seen as a barrier to Iranian and Iraqi militias. While the withdrawal does raise concerns about a more permissive corridor linking Tehran to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Washington is less concerned, given Syria’s shift away from Iran. However Israel with its forces ensconced in Syria south of Damascus may still use this as justification to conduct airstrikes to try to keep its northern neighbour weak.
America’s exit does not end its involvement in Syria but it does change its form toward indirect influence and selective engagement. While Washington’s reduced presence will likely be insufficient to manage the risks that remain, there also appears to be a reckoning with the constraints that there is less ability or appetite to control the vacuum it leaves behind.
You can find more analysis on the US withdrawal on our 22 April podcast with the Syrian analyst Malik al-Abdeh.
Monday, April 27, 2026
Sunday, April 26, 2026
Saturday, April 25, 2026
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - Guest Post from RSIS Commentary Series
[Salon] The Desired Global Order from Beijing’s Perspective - micheletkearney@gmail.com - Gmail
RSIS Commentary is a platform to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy-relevant commentary and analysis of topical and contemporary issues. The authors’ views are their own and do not represent the official position of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due credit to the author(s) and RSIS. Please email to Editor RSIS Commentary at RSISPublications@ntu.edu.sg.
No. 090/2026 dated 24 April 2026
The Desired Global Order from
Beijing’s Perspective
By Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng
SYNOPSIS
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances. It aims to promote a global political order that applies varying standards in evaluating the legitimacy of governing models. Meanwhile, it seeks to return to an open global economic order, opposing the policies aimed at decoupling and breaking chains.
COMMENTARY
Since the 2020s, Beijing’s view of the global order has shifted from optimism to pessimism. In 2024, Beijing publicly acknowledged that China was being harmed by the changing global order, in which “regional conflicts and disturbances keep cropping up, global issues are becoming more acute, and external attempts to suppress and contain China are escalating.
The report at the 4th Plenum of the 20th CPC Central Committee in October 2025 reaffirmed this view. It also argued that China’s development presents both strategic opportunities and risks and challenges, while uncertainties and unforeseeable circumstances continue to rise. Beijing’s growing disappointment with the counter-globalisation trend of recent years has motivated its leadership to foster a more favourable global order.
The aim of this essay is to present Beijing’s views on the desired global order, as set out in its four initiatives – the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Civilisation Initiative and the Global Governance Initiative – which suggests that Beijing envisions a global order comprising three key aspects: security, politics, and the economy.
A Security Order Without Alliances
Beijing advocates a global security order without military alliances and opposes one in which the US dominates over security issues through its alliance system. Before the war in Ukraine, Beijing focused on resisting Washington’s efforts to establish multilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, such as AUKUS with Australia and the UK in 2021 and the QUAD with Japan, Australia, and India in 2022.
As NATO’s hostility towards China increased with the escalation of the war in Ukraine, Beijing’s efforts shifted towards opposing its policy. Beijing was especially enraged in 2023 by NATO’s Vilnius Summit Communiqué, which stated: "The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.” In response, Beijing accused NATO of having a Cold War mentality and urged it to stop its groundless accusations and provocative rhetoric against China.
At the same time, Beijing promoted non-alliance partnerships among major powers as a new model for global security. It stated, “The China-Russia relationship is based on no alliance, no-confrontation, and no-targeting of any third party…This is fundamentally different from the exclusive groupings and bloc confrontation practised by some NATO countries.”
Besides the new approach for relations among big countries, Beijing also recognises the importance of the United Nations – particularly, the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and relevant UN committees – as well as regional security institutions – such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the “China + Central Asia” mechanism, and East Asia cooperation mechanisms, among others – in establishing a favourable and stable security order. Within these global and regional frameworks, Beijing is committed to maintaining global peace through its active involvement in both traditional and non-traditional security cooperation.
A Political Order of Diversification
Beijing intends to promote a global political order that uses varying standards rather than universal ones when evaluating the legitimacy of political institutions or governing models. According to Beijing, there is no common criterion by which to judge the worth of political systems and governing models, as universal values have never existed. With China’s achievements in modernisation and development, Beijing now positions itself as the global advocate for non-Western modernisation. It seeks to legitimise alternative approaches to modernisation across different countries, believing that its modernisation model is appealing to most states in the Global South.
Although there are doubts, both foreign and domestic, about whether the Chinese model can be applied to other developing countries, especially those that gained independence from European colonial rule, Beijing believes that its own proven success will attract followers. Consequently, it has a strong ambition to lead global governance. To this end, China has sought to secure the support of both developed and developing countries. In December 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met his German counterpart and said, “Both China and Germany support, champion, and practise multilateralism; the two sides should strengthen solidarity and cooperation to make the global governance system more just and equitable.”
Additionally, Beijing aims to reshape the global understanding of human rights. Frequently criticised by Western governments, Beijing’s stance emphasises that developing countries should prioritise the right to economic development over civil and political liberties. It argues that civil and political liberties are secondary to the right to essential resources. A citizen’s priority is to achieve freedom from poverty, such as reliable access to food and shelter. Developing countries should first focus on lifting their citizens out of poverty before worrying about civil liberties. There is considerable overlap between Beijing’s view of human rights and that of many developing countries
An Economic Order of Re-globalisation
Beijing seeks to restore the global economic order of the post-Cold War era, during which China was one of its main beneficiaries. However, Beijing believes that technological decoupling and trade protectionism by major Western economies, such as the US, Japan, and the EU, are hurting the open global economic order
Beijing, therefore, opposes Washington’s “small yards and high fences” policy, the EU’s derisking policy, and the policies of other major economies aimed at decoupling and breaking supply chains. In April 2024, Wang Yi criticised Washington for its efforts to contain and suppress China.
Beijing also emphasises the importance of taking concrete action to maintain an open global economic order. As Chinese Premier Li Qiang emphasised in July 2023, “China will not close the door of its opening-up policy but will open it wider. This is our own strategic selection, which also conforms to the historical laws of economic globalisation.” Even if US President Donald Trump adopts a tougher stance on China by imposing higher tariffs, China will still adhere to its opening-up policy. This is evident in the expansion of unilateral visa-free travel policies. Li Qiang reiterated that “China is willing to work with the US in undertaking their responsibilities as major countries, jointly upholding international trade rules, and ensuring the stability of global industry and supply chains.”
In multilateral economic cooperation, Beijing is considering discussing free trade agreements with more countries of the Global South, supporting the WTO’s Aid for Trade initiative, and renewing its contributions to the WTO’s China Programme. Beijing also aims to reinforce the G20’s collaborative framework to counter economic decoupling attempts by major Western economic entities as much as possible, while promoting the view that consensus should be a prerequisite for collective action to tackle global economic and financial challenges. This approach is intended to counteract unilateral US financial policies that could harm other members.
Conclusion
Frustrated by the counter-globalisation trend of recent years, Beijing is set on creating a more favourable global order, as illustrated by the “four initiatives”: the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, the Global Culture Initiative, and the Global Governance Initiative. However, Beijing does not intend to replace Washington as a global leader in the foreseeable future, given the substantial gap in material capabilities between China and the US.
Unlike Moscow during the Cold War, which sought to change the international system established by the US, Beijing is concerned only with reforming the order it shares with the US. Beijing remains committed to the principle of multipolarity and refuses to accept a G2 model comprising China and the United States.
In March 2026, Wang Yi stated that "China will never take the beaten path of seeking hegemony as its strength grows, nor do we subscribe to the logic that the world can be run by major countries.” Beijing’s impact on the global order will therefore be new and unfamiliar to Washington. This does not mean that Beijing will have a larger impact on the world than Washington in the coming decade. Neither does it mean that Beijing’s growing influence is guaranteed to mould the global order to fit its desires.
Yan Xuetong is a Distinguished Professor, and Sun Xuefeng a Professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. Professor Sun was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), in February 2026. Professor Yan is scheduled to visit RSIS as the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professor of International Relations in October 2026.
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Friday, April 24, 2026
[Salon] Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates
Summary: BBC executives met nine times with pro-Israel Jewish groups and just once with pro-Palestinians in 14 months of genocide, Freedom of Information shows.
We thank the investigative journalist Dania Akkad and Declassified UK for permission to republish an edited version of Dania’s 16 April article. The full version of the article is here. Dania is a regular contributor to the Arab Digest podcast. You can find her most recent podcast here.
BBC’s executive committee met nine times with Jewish community groups and only once with a pro-Palestinian organisation during the first year of the Gaza genocide, a Freedom of Information request has revealed.
The FOI request, filed by the UK-based Campaign Against Misrepresentation in Public Affairs, Information and News (CAMPAIN) asked how many times members of the committee met with a specific list of major Jewish and pro-Palestinian organisations in the UK.
The organisations listed in the FOI were the same ones which the BBC described as “representative groups” in parliamentary committee evidence last year about its Gaza coverage
Between 1 November 2023 and 31 December 2024, the BBC said that the committee held nine meetings with Jewish community groups and only one with a group advocating for Palestinians.
Although Britain’s Jewish community has a diverse range of views on Israel-Palestine, the groups listed as meeting with the BBC are all strongly sympathetic to the Israeli cause.
BBC committee members, who are in charge of the broadcaster’s day-to-day operations, met twice each with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Chief Rabbi and the Campaign Against Antisemitism.
Three meetings were held with the Community Security Trust, the FOI shows.
Only one meeting was held with a pro-Palestinian group, the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), during the same time period.
Chris Doyle, CAABU’s director, said the tally of meetings “exposes the way [BBC’s management] are far more concerned with the complaints and concerns of the pro-Netanyahu lobby than they are with those who believe in the rights of Palestinians”.
“This is also borne out by the absence of reference to international legal issues, the fewer numbers of Palestinians who get on the BBC, the way in which people who raise the issue of genocide frequently get shut down – all of these and more show why BBC management has failed,” he said.
“They still see the story as a balance between one side says this and one side says the other, not an occupier perpetrating a genocide.”
The BBC is a mouthpiece for Israeli propaganda, using its position to deceive the British public and manufacture consent for Israel's genocide in Palestine and Lebanon.
Courting controversy
The FOI response sheds new light on meetings held by senior BBC executives during the conflict, which has seen at least 72,265 Palestinians killed.
Declassified has previously revealed that the BBC’s director of news content, along with editors of The Guardian and the Financial Times, met with a top former Israeli military officer weeks after the Gaza bombing began.
In evidence to parliament last year, the BBC said that executive committee members had met with Jewish community groups seven times between January and November 2025. During the same period, executives held four meetings with groups representing the Palestinian community.
“If you add up the total of these two time periods, there were 14 meetings with Zionist groups and five with pro-Palestinians,” Professor David Mond, a member of CAMPAIN’s executive committee, told Declassified. “But the disproportion was most extreme in the first period that set the tone for subsequent BBC reporting of the war.” He added: “How can the BBC claim to be even-handed if it consults with pressure groups from one side and ignores those from the other?”
Asked for comment, a BBC spokesperson said: “The BBC engages with a broad range of organisations as part of its routine external engagement, including in meetings not captured within the limited scope of this analysis, such as a meeting with the Head of the Palestinian Mission one day outside of the FOI timeframe.
“The BBC is fully committed to reporting the Israel-Gaza conflict impartiality and has produced powerful coverage from the region. Alongside breaking news, analysis and investigations, we have produced award winning documentaries such as Life and Death in Gaza, and Gaza 101.”
The BBC also highlighted that the FOI request did not capture meetings between the executive committee and other organisations that weren’t listed, like the Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) at the Muslim Council of Britain, nor those held between senior figures not serving on the committee.
However, emails between CAMPAIN and the BBC show that they originally asked for meetings between all groups and other senior staff, but were told that the request had to be narrowed in order not to exceed the cost limits of FOI requests.
In addition to the FOI, CAMPAIN – which maintains a database of links to online sources on BBC bias – surveyed nearly a dozen organisations with pro-Palestinian stances, including the CfMM. None of the groups said they had met with the executive committee, nor had they asked for meetings with the BBC during the FOI time period.
Jewish groups sympathetic to the Palestinians, such as Jewish Voice for Liberation and Jews for Justice for Palestinians, said they had never been contacted by the BBC. In contrast, the Board of Deputies proposed quarterly meetings with the BBC in August 2024.
“Given the close fit between the interests of the BoD, Chief Rabbi and CST, it seems they got more or less what they asked for,” Professor Mond said.
“The BBC’s charter requires it to consult in an even-handed way. So its failure to match its meetings with pro-Zionist groups with meetings with pro-Palestinian groups violates this charter requirement.”
‘Tick-box exercise’
But even pro-Palestinian organisations that met with the committee said that they had felt let down by their outcomes. Doyle said of CAABU’s meeting with Tim Davie, then BBC general director, and several other high level executives: “It felt like a tick box exercise because there was no real follow up. It’s just unbelievably disappointing.” “I don’t believe it changed a thing,” he added.
Dr Zena Agha, interim director of the British Palestinian Committee, said her organisation asked the BBC for a meeting which happened in May 2025, also with Davie and two of his associates.
“The BBC agreed to meet after the chaotic fall-out from the Gaza documentaries as well as other campaigning,” she said. During the meeting, she said Davie “indicated that they had met with pro-Israeli representatives and seemed to approach this as a ‘both sides’ issue where we were but one perspective, as opposed to (being) a group who were there to demand better reporting on genocide”.
“Indeed one of our party had lost scores of family members and spoke about his experience as a Gazan and as a poorly-treated guest on the BBC.” She concluded: “It was the first and last of its kind and it wasn’t a productive meeting. I don’t think the BBC improved its coverage of the genocide as a result of our meeting.”
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