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Friday, April 24, 2026
[Salon] Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Strong pro-Israel bias among BBC bosses, new data indicates
Summary: BBC executives met nine times with pro-Israel Jewish groups and just once with pro-Palestinians in 14 months of genocide, Freedom of Information shows.
We thank the investigative journalist Dania Akkad and Declassified UK for permission to republish an edited version of Dania’s 16 April article. The full version of the article is here. Dania is a regular contributor to the Arab Digest podcast. You can find her most recent podcast here.
BBC’s executive committee met nine times with Jewish community groups and only once with a pro-Palestinian organisation during the first year of the Gaza genocide, a Freedom of Information request has revealed.
The FOI request, filed by the UK-based Campaign Against Misrepresentation in Public Affairs, Information and News (CAMPAIN) asked how many times members of the committee met with a specific list of major Jewish and pro-Palestinian organisations in the UK.
The organisations listed in the FOI were the same ones which the BBC described as “representative groups” in parliamentary committee evidence last year about its Gaza coverage
Between 1 November 2023 and 31 December 2024, the BBC said that the committee held nine meetings with Jewish community groups and only one with a group advocating for Palestinians.
Although Britain’s Jewish community has a diverse range of views on Israel-Palestine, the groups listed as meeting with the BBC are all strongly sympathetic to the Israeli cause.
BBC committee members, who are in charge of the broadcaster’s day-to-day operations, met twice each with the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the Chief Rabbi and the Campaign Against Antisemitism.
Three meetings were held with the Community Security Trust, the FOI shows.
Only one meeting was held with a pro-Palestinian group, the Council for Arab-British Understanding (CAABU), during the same time period.
Chris Doyle, CAABU’s director, said the tally of meetings “exposes the way [BBC’s management] are far more concerned with the complaints and concerns of the pro-Netanyahu lobby than they are with those who believe in the rights of Palestinians”.
“This is also borne out by the absence of reference to international legal issues, the fewer numbers of Palestinians who get on the BBC, the way in which people who raise the issue of genocide frequently get shut down – all of these and more show why BBC management has failed,” he said.
“They still see the story as a balance between one side says this and one side says the other, not an occupier perpetrating a genocide.”
The BBC is a mouthpiece for Israeli propaganda, using its position to deceive the British public and manufacture consent for Israel's genocide in Palestine and Lebanon.
Courting controversy
The FOI response sheds new light on meetings held by senior BBC executives during the conflict, which has seen at least 72,265 Palestinians killed.
Declassified has previously revealed that the BBC’s director of news content, along with editors of The Guardian and the Financial Times, met with a top former Israeli military officer weeks after the Gaza bombing began.
In evidence to parliament last year, the BBC said that executive committee members had met with Jewish community groups seven times between January and November 2025. During the same period, executives held four meetings with groups representing the Palestinian community.
“If you add up the total of these two time periods, there were 14 meetings with Zionist groups and five with pro-Palestinians,” Professor David Mond, a member of CAMPAIN’s executive committee, told Declassified. “But the disproportion was most extreme in the first period that set the tone for subsequent BBC reporting of the war.” He added: “How can the BBC claim to be even-handed if it consults with pressure groups from one side and ignores those from the other?”
Asked for comment, a BBC spokesperson said: “The BBC engages with a broad range of organisations as part of its routine external engagement, including in meetings not captured within the limited scope of this analysis, such as a meeting with the Head of the Palestinian Mission one day outside of the FOI timeframe.
“The BBC is fully committed to reporting the Israel-Gaza conflict impartiality and has produced powerful coverage from the region. Alongside breaking news, analysis and investigations, we have produced award winning documentaries such as Life and Death in Gaza, and Gaza 101.”
The BBC also highlighted that the FOI request did not capture meetings between the executive committee and other organisations that weren’t listed, like the Centre for Media Monitoring (CfMM) at the Muslim Council of Britain, nor those held between senior figures not serving on the committee.
However, emails between CAMPAIN and the BBC show that they originally asked for meetings between all groups and other senior staff, but were told that the request had to be narrowed in order not to exceed the cost limits of FOI requests.
In addition to the FOI, CAMPAIN – which maintains a database of links to online sources on BBC bias – surveyed nearly a dozen organisations with pro-Palestinian stances, including the CfMM. None of the groups said they had met with the executive committee, nor had they asked for meetings with the BBC during the FOI time period.
Jewish groups sympathetic to the Palestinians, such as Jewish Voice for Liberation and Jews for Justice for Palestinians, said they had never been contacted by the BBC. In contrast, the Board of Deputies proposed quarterly meetings with the BBC in August 2024.
“Given the close fit between the interests of the BoD, Chief Rabbi and CST, it seems they got more or less what they asked for,” Professor Mond said.
“The BBC’s charter requires it to consult in an even-handed way. So its failure to match its meetings with pro-Zionist groups with meetings with pro-Palestinian groups violates this charter requirement.”
‘Tick-box exercise’
But even pro-Palestinian organisations that met with the committee said that they had felt let down by their outcomes. Doyle said of CAABU’s meeting with Tim Davie, then BBC general director, and several other high level executives: “It felt like a tick box exercise because there was no real follow up. It’s just unbelievably disappointing.” “I don’t believe it changed a thing,” he added.
Dr Zena Agha, interim director of the British Palestinian Committee, said her organisation asked the BBC for a meeting which happened in May 2025, also with Davie and two of his associates.
“The BBC agreed to meet after the chaotic fall-out from the Gaza documentaries as well as other campaigning,” she said. During the meeting, she said Davie “indicated that they had met with pro-Israeli representatives and seemed to approach this as a ‘both sides’ issue where we were but one perspective, as opposed to (being) a group who were there to demand better reporting on genocide”.
“Indeed one of our party had lost scores of family members and spoke about his experience as a Gazan and as a poorly-treated guest on the BBC.” She concluded: “It was the first and last of its kind and it wasn’t a productive meeting. I don’t think the BBC improved its coverage of the genocide as a result of our meeting.”
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Thursday, April 23, 2026
[Salon] Yemen: a very bad situation made worse - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Yemen: a very bad situation made worse
Summary: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has caused fuel and cooking gas prices to rocket with a hugely damaging impact on tens of millions of Yemenis already made extremely vulnerable by massive cuts to international humanitarian aid.
We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war: what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here.
Following the US counter-blockade of the Hormuz Strait, the Iranian authorities have threatened to blockade the other major strait enclosing the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab al Mandab, reflecting the close alliance with the Yemeni Huthis who would implement such a threat. Although its immediate vicinity in Yemen is within the area managed by Tareq Saleh’s anti-Huthi forces, the Huthis control access to the Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal at one end and the Bab al Mandab at the other. Following 178 attacks on ships and the sinking of four during their two year operations starting in late 2023, none have been carried out since May 2025 following the ‘ceasefire’ agreed last year between the US and the Huthis in the wake of the 52 day US bombing campaign on Yemen. Although it still holds, concern about renewed attacks in the current conflict surely contributed to the US decision to ensure the USS Bush aircraft carrier travelled around Africa rather than through the Red Sea to reach its Gulf destination. The Iranian threat on the Bab al Mandab also acknowledges the close alliance between its regime and the Huthis who have confirmed their full solidarity with Iran, despite only carrying out three minor ballistic missile attacks on Israel between February this year and the ceasefire in April.
Regardless of this largely symbolic support, the Iran war has already had a major impact on living conditions throughout Yemen, worsening an already disastrous humanitarian situation. In her briefing to the UNSC on 14 April, Edem Worsonu a senior OCHA official noted that the current crisis has already increases fuel prices by 20 percent and cooking gas by 26 percent, reminding her audience that Yemen imports 90 percent of its wheat, a staple for most Yemenis. This sudden additional inflation burden will spread throughout the value chains of all basic commodities at a time when Yemenis are already suffering extreme deprivation.
Geopolitical tension is exacerbating a dire humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where a combination of record-low international funding, 90% reliance on imports, and extreme inflation is leaving over 20 million people in desperate need of aid.
Last year, the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan [HRP] was financed at a mere 29% of the US$ 2.5 billion required, a record low of an already reduced amount. With an appeal for US$ 2.16 billion, this year’s call is even lower despite the fact that both the total population and the needs have increased. As usual, the gap is vast between those in need [22.3mllion], those ‘targeted’ [12 million] and those ‘prioritized [9.4 million]. In plain English, although more than 22 million people are expected to suffer hunger, lack of water and sanitation, absence or inadequate education and medical services, only 9.4 million will be given priority for the limited funds made available by the international community. As of mid-April, i.e. more than a quarter of the year through, only 10% of this funding has materialised. Therefore fewer than 1 million of the 22 million people in need have received any support since the beginning of the year, in the midst of worsening local and international crises, leaving more than 20 million Yemenis in increased desperation.
Humanitarian support has steadily declined since its height in 2018 [US$ 5.2 billlion], with systematic decline since the 2022 formal truce between the Huthis and the internationally recognised government [IRG]. From US$ 3.4 billion in 2022, it shrank to its lowest level in 2025 when only US$ 1.4 billion was disbursed. This suggests a link between active military clashes contributing to increased humanitarian funding as fighting between the two opposing sides has remained at a very low level since the truce of 2022. (The correlation should be treated with some caution as the greatest fall in funding worldwide took place in 2025 with the abolition of USAID immediately following Trump’s accession to the US presidency and most global north states reducing their international aid while increasing military spending.)
The billions of dollars that have been slashed are not abstractions, they represent real suffering for children, women and men, none of whom are responsible for the crisis inflicted on them. While abysmal in Yemen, it is also worth remembering that the world’s other worst crises, Sudan and Gaza to name just two, experience similar lack of funding and support, and millions there are also suffering and dying. In Yemen, the situation is worse in the Huthi-controlled areas where two-thirds of the country’s population live. There the World Food Programme, the main provider of emergency food, completely ceased all distributions in early 2025, as negotiations had failed to bring about the liberation of the 70 UN humanitarian staff some of whom have been held in detention by the Huthis for years. Operational conditions have become unmanageable and all UN institutions have transferred their offices out of Sana’a.
Although the truce has enable fighting to become a marginal issue for most Yemenis, there are many other factors which explain why poverty and deprivation are increasing. A major daily problem remains the division of the country between the areas controlled by the Huthis on the one hand, and the multiple and rival authorities in the IRG area. This has a direct impact on prices of basic goods, preventing producers from transporting and marketing their agricultural produce to the nearest markets across front lines, as each side prevents the crossing of people and goods to retain control of the income. With worsening inflation and high fuel prices, traders are forced to sell their produce in far more distant markets at a time when customers can least afford it. Most Yemenis depend on imported staples [wheat, rice, sugar, tea, etc.] and the increase of world prices of these basic foods, combined with inflation, additional transport costs due to the fuel crisis and the insurance premiums for shipping, all contribute to the dramatic price rises making these basics unaffordable for millions.
The currency crisis in the IRG area is another factor: people’s ability to cope has diminished despite improvements in the exchange rate last year. There is a shortage of local currency in a society where cash overwhelmingly dominates exchanges. Delayed salary payments is a major issue throughout the country, with little improvement on the horizon. Financial problems explain both the Huthis’ determination to try and reach some agreement with the Saudis and the separate situation in the IRG areas where cash shortages are also worsening despite recent efforts by the government to pay salaries.
Adding more problems, recent weeks have seen yet more major environmental problems: ruinous floods are killing people, wrecking houses and damaging agricultural areas, with landslides destroying fields on a long-term basis, thus affecting future production.
In this context, regardless of who is in control anywhere in the country, the last thing Yemenis need is the renewal of conflict in the Red Sea which would almost certainly bring about further death and destruction from Israeli and US attacks should the Bab al Mandab be closed.
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
[Salon] Oil: higher for longer - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Oil: higher for longer
Summary: a clear lack of understanding among key policymakers in Washington over how commodity markets really work stands to make the war-induced energy crisis even worse than would otherwise have been the case.
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast (with Jim Krane) here.
The futures price is giving those in charge a false sense of security. The real price of oil is the price refiners and sellers are transacting at and that they will ultimately pass through to consumers.
Amrita Sen, Financial Times, 14 April 2026
One of the peculiarities of markets which is not widely understood is that commodities have two prices, i.e. the futures price, which is what we all see in the headlines and the spot price. Both are contracts between a buyer and a seller but they differ over the timing of the transaction and the delivery date of the commodity. The former, as the name implies, applies to a deal which is going to happen at some point in the future. The latter refers to a transaction to be executed immediately.
In the oil market, current spot prices in Europe and Asia strongly suggest that even the elevated futures prices we have been seeing these past weeks (i.e. around US$100 per barrel for Brent crude) could yet be topped by a considerable margin. As oil expert Amrita Sen spelled out in her FT op-ed from which the quote above is taken, spot prices in Europe have been ranging towards US$150pb. Worse still, once the price of shipping is added, physical cargoes are being offloaded in Asia at anything between US$150 and US$170pb.
This is not to say that I am firmly predicting that futures will be around US$150pb in two months time (i.e. the normal length of an oil futures contract). Nevertheless, BP’s former chief economist Spencer Dale has estimated that the demand globally needs to fall by about ten million barrels per day (bpd) to accommodate the ongoing supply side shock. This implies a rise in the spot price of around 100 percent compared to ‘just’ 60 percent to date in Europe. With a double blockade of the Strait of Hormuz still in place and Iran and the US reportedly “still far” from an agreement (Donald Trump’s unsubstantiated claims to the contrary notwithstanding), it would take something truly tectonic to stave off further price rises — perhaps ‘the grandmother of all Tacos’!
A significant disconnect between relatively stable oil futures prices and much higher physical spot prices, which are being driven upward by supply shocks and geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, means the U.S. may resort to dramatic market interventions, such as an export ban, to lower domestic gasoline prices ahead of the upcoming midterm elections.
All this being said, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) latest monthly Oil Market Report does offer a glimmer of hope in that it is still forecasting that, overall, supply will exceed demand through the year — albeit only by 410,000bpd compared to the 2.46mbpd predicted in its March report. But this is predicated on a price-driven drop in demand of 1.5mbpd in 2026Q2 rooted in a supply shortfall of 10.1mbpd in March (i.e. consistent with Mr Dale’s calculations), rising to 13mbpd this month. Furthermore, even this mixed picture hinges on an IEA base case in which ‘normal’ flows of oil and gas through the Strait of Hormuz resume by mid-year, albeit at something below pre-28 February levels. And its alternative scenario paints a picture of longer-term supply disruptions and associated price hikes which cause demand to fall by 5mbpd year-on-year by 31 December.
Irrespective of which scenario unfolds, what happens when there is seemingly no longer any risk of attacks on shipping looking to pass through the Strait? In an 8 April analysis headlined ‘The third Gulf war will scar energy markets for a long time yet’, The Economist noted that it was two months after the Huthis stopped attacking ships in the Red Sea in October of last year before Maersk dared risk one of its container ships in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait; and that traffic in that waterway has still not returned to normal. Thus, and even putting the question of tolls to one side (a marginal additional cost if, that is, one considers it purely in monetary terms rather than as a matter of principle) as The Economist points out:
When shipping companies do test the strait [or Hormuz], their insurers will charge hefty premiums. So the resumption of regular traffic is likely to take weeks, and to cost much more than before the war.
Furthermore, once the 187 tankers and 15 LNG carriers currently trapped in the Gulf have managed to get out (after which it will take at least three weeks for them to reach markets),“owners of the most valuable vessels, such as LNG carriers, may decide to dodge [the] risk [of making the return journey] altogether”… at least for some time to come.
As if this were not all bad enough, even in the unlikely (in my view) event of Iran and the US finalising a deal this week it may not be soon enough to prevent Mr Trump from making matters worse still. His periodic efforts to talk down the oil price confirm that he follows it closely. But I strongly suspect that he is among “those in charge” believed by Dr Sen to be getting “a false sense of security’’ from the futures price. And with America’s driving season starting around ten weeks from now he simply does not have until the midterms in November to get the price of gasoline back anywhere close to its pre-war level of two bucks/gallon.
In Arab Digest’s 8 April podcast I touched on the possibility of Washington imposing an export ban. With US oil exports to Asia, already unusually high in response to the war, set to double to 2mbpd this month, Dr Sen believes that “to avoid shortages in the US, policymakers will have to accept a higher price or consider dramatic market interventions like restricting exports”.
(NB: according to the marine analytics firm Kpler 71 Very Large Crude Carriers are currently sailing to the US to take on cargo compared with an average of 27 on any given day last year.)
Even if the Republicans were not already facing a ‘blue wave’ election where affordability is the key issue, I simply cannot see Mr ‘America First’ Trump opting for protracted higher gasoline prices when there is an alternative available irrespective of its negative impact on the rest of the world.
Coupling this prediction with the title of this Newsletter, I shall draw a line on forecasting oil for now!
Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website.
Wednesday, April 22, 2026
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Third Sunday of Easter - Guest Post
The story of the Road to Emmaus is one of the great and most beautiful accounts in the New Testament. Interestingly, biblical scholars and archaeologists have never been able to locate this small town with certainty. We only know it was several miles west of Jerusalem. Perhaps that uncertainty is fitting, because the story is less about geography and more about the ordinary human journey.
In the Gospel, two followers of Jesus Christ leave Jerusalem after His death. We are not told exactly why. Maybe they simply needed to get away. Many of us know that feeling. For us, “Emmaus” might mean shopping, going to the movies, spending time with friends, keeping busy, or even throwing ourselves into work or our routine. Emmaus becomes whatever we do to distract ourselves when life feels overwhelming.
The disciples were trying to make sense of what they believed was humanity’s greatest tragedy. As they walk along the dusty road, they hear footsteps behind them. A stranger joins them, listens to their sorrow and speaks with them. Yet, they do not recognize Him. Only later, when they invite Him to stay and share a meal, does everything change. He takes bread, blesses it, breaks it and suddenly their eyes are opened. They realize it is the risen Lord, who has been walking beside them all along.
That same experience continues in our own time. Consider the story of a young medical student traveling from Ithaca to New York City to take his final exams, while his father lay seriously ill. His father, a devoted doctor who had served many people, urged his son to go forward and complete his studies. Though heavy-hearted, the young man obeyed.
During the trip, his bus stopped at a small Greyhound station. Sitting at the counter, clearly distressed, he caught the attention of an older woman across from him. She gently asked what was wrong. As he spoke about his father, his fears and his uncertainty, she listened with warmth and compassion. She reassured him that he was honoring his father by continuing the path he had begun.
Before leaving, she ordered a donut, broke it in half, handed him a piece and promised to pray for him and his father. Then she quietly departed and boarded her bus. Only afterward did he realize something extraordinary: in that simple act of kindness – the listening, the reassurance, the breaking of the donut – he had encountered the presence of Christ.
That is where the Emmaus story still lives today. The risen Lord often comes quietly: in compassion from a stranger, in words that steady us, in moments when someone helps carry our burden. He rarely forces His way in. Like the stranger on the road, He waits to be invited.
So, when life feels confusing, when disappointment or grief makes us want to escape to our own “Emmaus,” remember this: you are not walking alone. Christ is already on the road beside you. And often, it is in the simple breaking of bread, the shared tear, the offered kindness, that our eyes finally open – and we recognize Him.
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, April 21, 2026
Monday, April 20, 2026
[Salon] Bahrain divided by the Iran war - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Bahrain divided by the Iran war
Summary: the death of a Bahraini activist in detention and mass arrests amid a government crackdown exposes political divides and a climate of fear in the small Gulf island kingdom.
We thank Andrew McIntosh for today’s newsletter. Andrew is the Director of Research at the NGO SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights. His specialty fields are media analysis, sectarianism and statelessness in Bahrain, Kuwait and Syria.
The Iran war has reopened political and sectarian wounds in Bahrain. Seven weeks of conflict have not only damaged Bahrain’s economy but have also torn the island nation’s already frayed social fabric. Iranian drone strikes have set people on edge at the same time that protests have erupted in support of Iran leading to accusations of espionage resulting in severe restrictions on freedoms and civil space.
Bahrain has been securitised to a level not seen since the aftermath of mass protests during the Arab Spring. The result is a society more divided than it has been since those protests were violently suppressed in 2011, leaving many Bahrainis angry and fearful. In a country where the US is unpopular there is growing opposition to the presence of American bases including the US Fifth Fleet headquartered in the capital Manama. Others fear the potential existence of pro-Iranian cells. These fears and tensions have been exacerbated by the recent death of a Shi’a activist in custody, accused by the authorities of collaborating with Iran.
On 16 March, Sayed Mohammed al-Mousawi was arrested by Bahraini security forces with five others while stopped at a checkpoint near the city of Muharraq. Al-Mousawi, a Bahraini Shi’a Muslim photographer who had been vocal about his opposition to the war and his support for the Axis of Resistance was reportedly taken into custody over pro-Iranian content found on his phone. He disappeared for five days, with his family unable to reach him. On 21 March, the family was instructed by authorities to come to a military hospital, where they were led to the morgue to identify their son’s body. The body, deeply bruised, lacerated and bloodied, bore clear signs of severe torture.
Large crowds gathered for the funeral of Sayed Mohammed Al-Mousawi, the 32-year-old tortured to death by Bahraini security forces following his arrest in a crackdown on those opposed to the US-Israeli war on Iran.
For members of Bahrain’s banned opposition movements, al-Mousawi’s death is a harsh reminder of the brutality dissenters have faced at the hands of the Bahraini state. The ruling Sunni Muslim Al-Khalifa crushed the 2011 uprising declaring martial law, killing protesters in the streets and in detention and using torture systematically. In the country’s politicised courts opposition leaders were sentenced to long prison terms and in some cases to life. Having silenced any dissent the Bahraini government made considerable efforts to reassure the international community it was engaged in meaningful efforts to improve human rights and institute democratic reforms. Al-Mousawi’s killing undoes all of that, confirming the worst fears of Bahraini dissidents and human rights advocates. His funeral was attended by civilians and prominent Bahraini activists, who transformed the event into a peaceful protest that authorities attempted to contain.
On 16 April the authorities announced they were charging an officer with the National Security Agency with assault leading to death of an individual in custody. The victim was not named though it is clear that it was al-Mousawi.
Regardless of the outcome of the case against the officer, within the Shi’a community there is little belief that in Bahrain’s highly politicised courts justice will prevail. Al-Mousawi has become a symbol of martyrdom under state oppression: a young Shi’a who was persecuted and ultimately killed for his beliefs.
However for government loyalists, he was seen as a dangerous pro-Iranian agent who had been previously imprisoned for 12 years on terrorism charges. They accept the government narrative that he had colluded with Iran in a war where military and civilian infrastructure has been attacked by the Iranians, killing two and injuring over fifty.
The Bahraini government has amplified such narratives, building on longstanding fears from pro-government Bahrainis that Iran seeks to undermine or annex the country. Although the Ministry of Interior has promised an investigation into al-Mousawi’s death, it also highlighted the accusation against him of collaborating with the IRGC and claimed that pictures of his body were “inaccurate”. These official interventions from the state, including state media sharing the names and faces of individuals accused of espionage before they are officially charged and tried, reveal deep institutional bias where authorities are quick to name and intimidate anyone they suspect of undermining the authority of the Al-Khalifa.
Allegations include taking pictures of drone impacts, criticising Bahrain’s alliance with the US and Israel and showing support for Palestine. Bahraini human rights activists claim that attempts to depict Al-Mousawi and others arrested as part of a treasonous clique ignore systemic inequalities in Bahraini law, drawing attention to the fact that the country’s definition of terrorism is incredibly broad and has been historically used to prosecute peaceful dissenters. One former Bahraini politician who did not want to be named explains, “The charge of terrorism can be brought against anyone who publicly opposes the government. Whether it’s criticising the [Bahraini] government online, throwing a firebomb or colluding with a foreign entity, the charge is the same.” Moreover, the manner of Al-Mousawi’s death has revived memories of similar killings in custody further damaging trust among many Shi’a.
Since the war began, over 230 individuals have been arrested in Bahrain. Many face serious charges for engaging in marches or filming drone impacts. The charges include espionage for which they could face “death for treason” as Bahrain's state-controlled media puts it. Some have remarked that the torture and death of al-Mousawi was intended as an implicit threat, meant to silence other would-be protesters in the country. With the five other individuals arrested alongside him still missing, the threat feels very real. It has already had chilling effects. Al-Mousawi’s father complained that the Ministry of Interior told him to cease making public remarks about his son's death. Other Bahrainis have recently fled the country: “I have left Bahrain for now. I’ve been very active online, and the government is calling me and telling me to stop. I don’t know when I’ll be going back.”
Activists abroad have found themselves subjected to renewed harassment campaigns online, while those on the ground fear that the Bahraini government could embark on a new campaign of mass citizenship stripping when hostilities end. Following the uprising in 2011, at least 985 Bahrainis were stripped of their nationalities, with many rendered stateless as a consequence.
Facing discrimination at home, some Bahrainis believe Iran acts as a counterweight to the Al-Khalifa, enabling Shi’a to hang on to what limited rights they have while attempting to push for more. Despite Iran having an incredibly poor human rights record, Iranian and pro-Iranian media regularly cover human rights abuses and sectarian discrimination in Bahrain, a topic mostly ignored in Western media. One Shi’a Bahraini , requesting anonymity, claimed “If Iran loses the war, the [Bahraini] government can do whatever it wants to us.” However, that same belief exposes them to further accusations of treason from pro-government commentators.
With the outcome of the ceasefire between Iran and the US remaining uncertain, Bahrain is likely to suffer persistent instability further damaging its economy as well as denting the international image of security and prosperity the regime has meticulously worked to construct. For the Shi’a community and for many Sunnis, it is a bleak reminder that an inability for society to heal from 2011 has left Bahrainis once again divided and anxious, not only fearful for their freedom and security but also dreading that the country can never truly move forward.
[Salon] Markets prematurely may celebrate, but the next phase likely will be more, bigger war - Guest Post
https://strategic-culture.su/news/2026/04/20/markets-prematurely-may-celebrate-but-the-next-phase-likely-will-be-more-bigger-war/
Alastair Crooke, 4/20/26
Markets prematurely may celebrate, but the next phase likely will be more, bigger war
Trump’s tariff war will be seen in retrospect to be peanuts to the threatened strike on China’s supply lines.
We are entering upon a new stage to this war on Iran. It may not be what many expect (especially in financial markets). Yesterday Trump said inter alia that Hormuz was open and that Iran had agreed never to close Hormuz again; that Iran, with the help of the U.S., has removed, or is removing, all sea mines, and that U.S. and Iran would work together to extract Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU). Trump wrote:
“We’re going to get it together. We’re going to go in with Iran, at a nice leisurely pace, and go down and start excavating with big machinery … We’ll bring it back to the United States very soon”.
The President said earlier on Friday that Iran had agreed to hand over Iran’s HEU stockpile.
None of these claims were true. Either Trump was confabulating (holding to fantasies, albeit believing them to be true); or he was manipulating markets. If the latter – it was a success. Oil fell and markets soared. Reportedly, 20 minutes before the claim that the Strait of Hormuz was open and would never close again, a $760 million short on oil was placed… Someone ‘made a pile’.
All this turbulence created much confusion. Trump also said a new round of talks and an likely agreement with Iran would happen very soon — even during this weekend. The likelihood of talks is false. Iran’s Tasnim News Agency reports that “the American side has been informed via the Pakistani mediator that we [Iran] do not agree to a second round [of talks]”.
From the beginning of the mooted Pakistani-mediated ceasefire, Iran was supposed to allow the daily passage of a limited number of ships. However, this was always subject to Iranian conditions for transit passage.
The net result of Trump’s manipulations has been to make Iran re-assert its existing conditions on Hormuz, on its stocks of HEU, and on its ‘right to enrich’ in tighter, less flexible definition.
The Islamabad talks had already showed Iran that its 10-point framework — initially affirmed by Trump to form a “workable basis” for beginning of direct negotiations with Iran — was no such thing. The Iranian framework was brushed aside towards the end of the day, as the U.S. pivoted to its key touchstones for its intended victory roll: Iran abandoning uranium enrichment in perpetuity; relinquishing to the U.S. its stock of 430kg of 60% enriched uranium, and the opening of Hormuz — free of tolls.
In short, the U.S. position was simply a continuation of Israel’s long-established demands. This added experience of Friday’s U.S. deceit will only have served to confirm Iran’s conviction to be continually on their guard and to view the contrived confusion as a possible U.S. diversion from planned military escalation.
Iran, in refusing these key demands, triggered the U.S.’ sudden, end of day, pulling of the plug on Islamabad, and thus pointed up the pivotal context behind the U.S. ‘walk out’: Netanyahu was frustrated. Very frustrated. “As [Netanyahu] tells it, ‘the media’, that convenient all-purpose ‘villain’, has managed to cement the narrative that Israel lost the [Iran] war”, Ravit Hecht has written in Haaretz:
“Not many people understand the power of short, sharp and unequivocal messaging – better than Netanyahu … With time running short and his international standing eroding – Netanyahu is desperate to deliver at least one unequivocal success story from the ambitious goals he proclaimed in the first week of the war – when hubris and adrenaline still seeped into every government briefing”.
“Regime change in Tehran? No longer on the table. The vague goal of “creating conditions” for such a change has evaporated. Ending Iran’s ballistic missile program now seems wildly unrealistic; Netanyahu’s ministers acknowledge that as well. As for Iran’s network of regional proxies, its influence may become subtler, but few believe it can be dismantled altogether”.
“That leaves one card still in play: uranium”.
“Netanyahu’s circle hopes that, as in past crises, mounting pressure might compel Iran to export its enriched uranium stockpile. Netanyahu is staking everything on that outcome – or, on the possibility that renewed war could still destabilise the regime”.
This is why Vice-President Vance — who was almost hourly taking instruction from the White House or Tel Aviv— wound up the talks prematurely. A short sharp victory messaging on which Netanyahu’s future depends clearly was not about to emerge from the talks.
U.S. Constitutional U.S. lawyer, Robert Barnes (who is a friend of Vance), reports in an interview that:
“Trump began exhibiting signs of early dementia in September 2025 … He frequently confabulates, he routinely loses his temper and unleashes screaming rants and he is incapable of doing critical thinking. And – according to Barnes, in this state – Trump genuinely believes that the U.S. has vanquished Iran and does not comprehend the massive economic damage that the closure of the Strait of Hormuz is doing to the global economy”.
In short, Barnes says that Trump’s delirium that Iran is at the point of capitulation reflects his impaired mental state — an impairment of understanding ‘reality’ (a panglossian interpretation that Secretary Pete Hegseth does his best to reinforce).
Like Netanyahu, Trump likely believes too, that pressure and more pressure on Iran could yield the triumphant Victory trophy of (figuratively) waving aloft 430 Kg of enriched uranium — either compelled to be given up by economic pressure, or alternatively dramatically seized on the ground by U.S. forces.
In the face of this crisis at the heart of the White House, Vice-President Vance reportedly (Barnes again) has been working feverishly behind the scenes to arrange a new meeting with Iran in Islamabad – despite the political process being deliberately impaired through massive Israeli air and ground attacks in Lebanon killing and injuring up to 1,000 persons (almost all civilians) during the ceasefire negotiations, as well as continued attacks since Trumpsupposedly “prohibited” Israel from attacking Lebanon at the start of the Lebanon ceasefire two days ago.
However, after much toing-and-froing by Pakistan, with messages flowing in many directions, “last night, an Iranian military official said that Tehran had issued a final ultimatum to the U.S. that Iran was within an hour of starting a military operation and missiles strikes on Israeli forces attacking Lebanon, which [finally] forced Trump to declare a ceasefire in Lebanon”,albeit to great anger in Israel. Israeli officials were livid, complaining that they were only informed post hoc.
It is not at all clear whether Israel will abide by it (they have already violated the ceasefire). Netanyahu, all Israel’s opposition leaders and a large majority of the Israeli public are untied in their desire for continued war.
The Islamabad talks failed firstly, because the gaps between the two sides were unbridgeable in a single session; and secondly, because the parties held different, and contradictory visions of the ground reality. The U.S., seemingly entered negotiations from the ‘hypothesis’ that the other party already was militarily destroyed and desperate.
Iran, by contrast, entered the talks with the conviction that it had emerged stronger than after the 12-day war. In their reading, this meant that the effect of the control of Hormuz and the Red Sea had not yet reached the stage at which the balance of pain could be said to be decisively in Iran’s favour — and certainly had not reached the point at which significant concessions from Iran might be appropriate.
What is likely to be the next stage? Well — more war. Bigger kinetic war with the focus likely to be on another massive series of missile strikes on mostly Iran’s civil infrastructure (since the Israeli/U.S. target bank was never intended to outlast a few days of strikes).
On 14 April, Russia’s Security Council warned that “ceasefire negotiations could be a cover used by Washington to prepare for a ground war [too] … The United States and Israel can use the peace talks to prepare for a ground operation against Iran, as the Pentagon continues to increase U.S. troop numbers in the region”.
Trump has now added a new front, intended to further maximize economic pain on Iran viasanctions and blockades. China is the primary target because, as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent avers, China has been Iran’s biggest customer for discounted oil. Bessent claims the new dimension to be the financial equivalent to the earlier U.S./Israeli kinetic (military) strikes on Iran. He called it part of “Operation Economic Fury” — aimed at cutting off Iran’s revenue streams, especially from illicit oil sales and smuggling networks.
Bessent also said that the U.S. would impose secondary sanctions on any countries, companies, or financial institutions that continue buying Iranian oil or that allow Iranian money to flow through their accounts. He described this as a “very stern measure”. Bessent explicitly warned that if Iranian funds are proven to be moving through any bank’s accounts, the U.S. will apply secondary sanctions.
If this announcement is intended to coerce China into strong-arming Iran to capitulate to Israel and the U.S., then it constitutes an egregious misreading of the ground in both Iran and China. It will likely backfire on Trump.
This will constitute another economic front in the war — and extend the economic war to a global level.
Is it likely that China and Russia will not understand this statement as anything other than another U.S. attempt (after the Venezuela blockade) to squeeze China’s energy supply lines. Hormuz still remains open to Chinese vessels. Trump’s blockade attempt was the initial squeeze — and now he threatens to sanction Chinese banks and trade.
Sunday, April 19, 2026
Saturday, April 18, 2026
Colorado River projected to deliver one-fifth of normal water to Lake Powell after ‘astonishing’ March heatwave: The record-hot March conditions that led to a rapid melt-off of the snowpack in Colorado were echoed across the seven-state #ColoradoRiver Basin — The #Aspen Times #COriver #aridification – Coyote Gulch
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