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Monday, March 9, 2026
[Salon] The Iran war lays bare Bahrain’s fault lines - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
The Iran war lays bare Bahrain’s fault lines
Summary: the joint US and Israel attack on Iran has re-ignited tensions between Bahrain’s ruling Sunni family and the majority of its Shi’a citizens.
We thank Andrew McIntosh for today’s newsletter. Andrew is the Director of Research at the NGO SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights. His specialty fields are media analysis, sectarianism and statelessness in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Syria.
In the Gulf, the unthinkable has happened. In what was an oasis of calm in a tumultuous region, high rise skylines in the GCC are now marred by Iranian drone strikes on US military assets and civilian infrastructure. These attacks have taken on a unique character in Bahrain, as the small island kingdom - with a majority indigenous Shi’a population ruled by a Sunni royal family - struggles with domestic unrest. Following the US and Israeli forces’ assassination of Ayatollah Khamenei, both a head of state and an international Shi’a clerical leader, Bahraini civilians have taken to the streets in protest. A minority have clashed with security forces, and dozens have been arrested.
The crackdown involves civilians arrested for filming drone strikes and then publicly shamed by pro-government media. Authorities detained Bahraini Shi’a for engaging in peaceful mourning processions for Khamenei while pro-regime media levelled accusations against protestors for “sympathising with the Iranian aggression.” This follows a longstanding pattern of sectarian domestic suppression, which has now erupted in a highly polarised society with the estimated 55-70% of Bahraini citizens who are Shi’a denied democratic representation in a context where both civic space and participation in public life are highly restricted. As the Iran war continues Bahrain once again faces a significant crisis.
As angry protests sweep many Bahraini cities and villages, some joke the US and Israel regime change war in Iran might have sparked regime change in Bahrain instead
Since 2011, when protests were violently crushed by a Saudi-led military intervention, the Bahraini Government has failed to make reforms addressing the social and political inequalities that caused the unrest. These issues include an empowered parliament, limitations on the King's powers, the implementation of rights guaranteed by the Bahraini constitution and social and cultural rights for the Shi’a population. Instead, the Bahraini state has severely limited freedom of speech, press and expression over the past fifteen years, worsening social and political resentments.
Although Bahrain currently has the only functional parliament in the Gulf (Kuwait’s parliament was dissolved in 2024), the country’s opposition parties are banned, with their leaders imprisoned or in exile. Moreover, 6,000-11,000 citizens were stripped of their right to participate in politics under Law 26/2018, also known as the “Political Isolation Laws”, which bars key dissidents from running for political office, heading a civil society organisation, being on the board of a company or even running a sports club. Within the kingdom, the media is tightly regulated by the state. Individual acts such as posts criticising the government can result in arrest and torture. Politicians are no exception. In August 2024, MP Mohammed Al-Husseini was stripped of his parliamentary position after he publicly called for the release of political prisoners in parliament.
These heavy constraints maintain a system that concentrates wealth and power within the ruling Al-Khalifa family, Sunni elites and the urban classes. Despite representing more than half the citizenry, Bahraini Shi’a have limited cultural representation in the country and minimal presence in domestic media. Official history, including museums and tourist attractions, almost exclusively showcases and amplifies Sunni Arab culture.
The modern high rises and elegant garden villas in and around Manama are within miles of neglected, run-down, Shi’a-majority villages, which experience high unemployment, poor infrastructure and intense scrutiny from the police and government security forces. These segregated areas are sites of low-intensity, usually peaceful protests. Despite Bahrain being roughly half the size of Greater London, these two worlds rarely interact.
In a recent survey Shi’a Bahrainis said that while most believe in democracy, 81.1% do not feel their elected representatives reflect a fair representation of the Bahraini citizenry and 86% feel alienated from Bahraini politics, believing they have little to no agency.
These divisions are significant when measured against Bahrain’s foreign policy initiatives. 76% of Bahrainis disapprove of Bahrain joining the Abraham Accords which saw normalisation of relations with Israel in 2020. Support for the US has also declined, with only 12% of Bahrainis now considering it a friendly country. The poll, though it was taken before the US Fifth Fleet in Manama was attacked by Iran, is still significant. It reflects dissatisfaction with America’s backing of Israel in the Gaza war that began in October 2023 further cementing opposition to the government’s normalisation decision. While these opinions cross sectarian lines, they are arguably felt most acutely among many Bahraini Shi’a.
Since 2023, prominent Shi’a imams and reciters have been summoned to police stations or arrested for voicing opposition to normalisation with Israel or for calling for the release of political prisoners. Significant religious events, such as Ashura, were subjected to harsher restrictions, including travel bans on key clerics and the arrests of other Shi’a religious figures for making statements critical of the Bahraini government. In October 2024, Imam Al-Saddiq Mosque, Bahrain’s largest Shi’a Mosque, was closed indefinitely following repeated sermons condemning Israel and criticising the US for arming the IDF in its wars in Gaza and Lebanon, leading to altercations between security forces and Shi’a civilians as the mosque was shuttered.
In November 2025, Ebrahim Sharif, the former leader of the banned opposition party Wa’ad, was arrested and sentenced to six months in prison for “making offensive remarks against sister Arab states and their leaders" after he publicly condemned normalisation between Bahrain and Israel during an interview in Lebanon. His arrest and conviction has further inflamed political tensions as it occurred alongside sustained, small-scale protests to release political prisoners and demands for better access to unemployment benefits. The kingdom was already a tinderbox of political divisions and resentments; the US and Israeli war on Iran and Iranian retaliatory attacks attacks on Bahrain and other Gulf states has now dramatically heightened those tensions.
Faced with an unprecedented geopolitical crisis in its neighbourhood, the Bahraini government’s options are limited. The ruling Al Khalifa family has continuously ignored public opinion and imposed draconian policies to maintain control. Yet, in the face of a regional war, these protests show the limitations and diminishing returns of that strategy. Social and political marginalisation is increasing the risk of radicalisation and violence as Bahrain remains in a downward spiral of unrest where repression breeds resentment and leads to further crackdowns. Although the government is currently at no risk of collapse, its inability or unwillingness to engage in political reconciliation or pluralism means the country continues to lurch from one polarising crisis to another. Foregoing state-led dialogue and social inclusion ensures that alienation and anger among Shi’a communities, heightened by the Iran war, will continue and likely led to further unrest, harsh security crackdowns and wider fractures in an already divided Kingdom.
Sunday, March 8, 2026
Saturday, March 7, 2026
Friday, March 6, 2026
Thursday, March 5, 2026
[Salon] Israel's strategy of chaos - ArabDigest.org
Israel's strategy of chaos
Summary: Arab Digest editor William Law's guest this week is the defence and security analyst and Gulf specialist Andreas Krieg.
The US/Israel war against Iran is upending security in the Gulf states and creating global anxiety and uncertainty. Donald Trump entered the war with no exit strategy. Now he and his administration are wavering. However, Benjamin Netanyahu has an end game: to create chaos in the neighbourhood believing it will give Israel security at home and dominance in the region.
You can listen to today's podcast by clicking here.
The widening US-Israeli war on Iran is also generating direct economic shocks for Egypt. To keep up with the latest developments there, besides today's podcast we are circulating below an edited version of Hossam el-Hamalawy's latest Egypt Security Sector Report. Hossam is a journalist and scholar-activist, currently based in Germany. He was involved in the Egyptian labour movement and was one of the organisers of the 2011 revolution. Follow his writings on Substack and X.
The most immediate impact on Egypt has come through energy. Israel’s suspension of natural gas exports, invoked under “force majeure” following the strikes on Iran, abruptly removed roughly 1.1 billion cubic feet per day from Egypt’s supply system. With domestic production standing near 4.1 billion cubic feet per day against demand exceeding 6 billion, authorities have moved to reschedule LNG cargoes and sharply increase fuel oil use in electricity generation, with consumption of the low quality heavy fuel oil mazut rising more than threefold in a bid to maintain grid stability and avoid renewed load shedding.
An Israeli gas platform off the coast of Gaza appeared to be on fire after Israel and the United States attacked Iran on Saturday
Egypt, meanwhile, suspended the export of roughly 100 million cubic feet of natural gas per day to Syria and Lebanon via the Arab Gas Pipeline following the halt of supplies from Israel’s Tamar and Leviathan offshore fields, a government official told Asharq Business.
The escalation is also reshaping Egypt’s border environment. Israel’s closure of the Rafah Crossing after the strikes on Iran has halted humanitarian and medical transit between Gaza and Egypt, constraining Cairo’s role as the enclave’s main relief corridor and increasing pressure along its northeastern frontier.
At the same time, war risk is spilling into global shipping lanes. Major container operators such as Maersk and CMA CGM have suspended transit through the Suez Canal and rerouted vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, an early indicator of how insurers and shipping companies price regional instability. Any sustained diversion threatens canal revenues, one of Egypt’s primary sources of hard currency, compounding pressure on an already fragile balance of payments.
The risks were publicly acknowledged during an iftar with senior military, police, GIS, and government officials 1 March where Sisi warned that escalation could disrupt oil flows and further erode Suez Canal revenues if the Strait of Hormuz were affected while at the same time attempting to calm domestic audiences by insisting: “Rest assured about Egypt… no one can come close to this country.”
In addition to the stock market slump, the tourism industry is expected to take a strong hit as rising regional instability typically triggers immediate travel advisories and booking cancellations across Red Sea destinations. Tour operators and insurers tend to treat the wider Middle East as a single risk environment meaning escalation far beyond Egypt’s borders can rapidly translate into falling arrivals and reduced foreign currency inflows.
As external shocks mount across energy supply and Suez Canal revenues, Cairo’s room for manoeuvre narrows further reflecting Egypt’s diminished position as a regional power in decline. President Sisi has already moved to contact Gulf sponsors whose financial backing underwrites Egypt’s fragile economy, underscoring how regional escalation rapidly translates into renewed dependence on its principal creditors.
Wednesday, March 4, 2026
Careful With That Wild-Caught Tuna - Heatmap News
Careful With That Wild-Caught Tuna - Heatmap News
The Trump administration’s rollback of coal plant emissions standards means that mercury is on the menu again.
[Salon] Can Iraq Really Claim Neutrality in the US/Israel-Iran War? - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Can Iraq Really Claim Neutrality in the US/Israel-Iran War?
Summary: Iraq finds itself caught between Iran and the US with its interim government struggling to hold to a neutral path; as the war accelerates Baghdad will need to take a firmer stand or risk being pulled into the widening conflict.
We thank Sirwan Kajjo for today’s newsletter. Sirwan, a regular contributor to the AD podcast, is a Kurdish American journalist based in Washington D.C. focusing on Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, extremism, and conflict in the Middle East and beyond. He is the author of Nothing But Soot about a twentysomething Kurdish man whose quest for a permanent home never ends. You can find his latest podcast here.
Iraq faces a delicate dilemma as the US and Israel continue strikes against the Iranian regime. With the conflict escalating by the hour, Baghdad finds itself in an increasingly precarious position, both politically and on the security front.
On the one hand, Iraq values its partnership with the United States and seeks to maintain it now more than ever. On the other, it has deep political and economic ties with Iran, as well as strong connections of Shiite armed forces with Tehran that constitute a significant portion of Iran’s regional proxy network.
Iraq also shares a roughly 1,000-mile border with Iran, stretching from the Zagros Mountain in the Kurdistan Region in the north down to the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the south, parts of which could be porous, particularly in an escalating conflict such as the one unfolding.
Given these pressures, it is understandable that the Iraqi government, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, aims to maintain some degree of neutrality in the conflict. Yet achieving this will require bold, decisive and immediate action without which Baghdad risks being drawn further into the regional confrontation.
A suicide drone intercepted near Bahirka district, Erbil province on Monday [photo credit: Rudaw]
It would be an illusion for Iraq to hope for complete insulation from this war. The country has already felt the impact of the ongoing violence. Since the war broke out on 28 February, Erbil – the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region, which hosts a US base – has been targeted by a wave of missile and drone attacks carried out by Iran and its proxies operating inside Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein confirmed that more than 70 missiles and drones have struck the regional Kurdish capital.
The Iraqi government declared three days of official mourning after the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a US-Israel strike at the outset of the war and senior Iraqi officials, including figures from the Kurdistan Region, issued statements of condolence commemorating Khamenei as a “martyr.”
These conflicting situations make it exceedingly difficult for Iraq to maintain neutrality or shield itself from the conflict, especially as other regional actors, including Gulf states that have been directly targeted by Iranian strikes and are increasingly asserting their right to self-defense recalibrate their positions amid a spreading war.
Yet Iraq still has some options that, if exercised decisively, could prevent the country from becoming further entangled in the war. First, ruling Shiite elites must rein in pro-Iran factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi). Beyond launching attacks against the Kurdistan Region as well as on US troops at Baghdad’s airport there have been reports of Shiite militiamen moving across the border into Iran to support the Iranian regime. Such actions expose Iraq to the danger of retaliatory US or Israeli strikes.
If these armed groups are not effectively restrained, Iraq could quickly become a direct theatre of confrontation. For Israel in particular, Iran’s network of regional proxies is part of an interconnected front. Attacks by the Lebanese Hezbollah on Israel, and Israel’s subsequent response, demonstrate how quickly states with pro-Iranian non-state actors can be drawn into this conflict.
It is evident that the central government has no control over many of these armed groups but influential figures within the dominant Shiite Coordination Framework coalition do. Their inaction, if not outright encouragement, towards the militias risks further destabilising the already fragile political order in Baghdad which has failed to form a government since the November 2025 elections.
From a US perspective, at a minimum, the Iraqi government should prevent Iranian-backed groups from launching attacks against American assets and partners on Iraqi soil as well as ensuring that Iraq does not become a logistical support base for an isolated Iranian regime.
The Iraqi government has a legitimate basis for taking a firm stance against violations of its sovereignty. With Iran striking Iraqi Kurdistan, a formal condemnation from Baghdad would have international support. Such a move could also help bridge longstanding grievances with the Kurds who have often complained that Baghdad has been too hesitant in condemning cross-border violations against Iraqi Kurdistan by Iranian or Turkish forces.
The other measure Iraq must take immediately is to stand in solidarity with its Arab neighbours. With Iran actively violating the sovereignty of Gulf states, Baghdad cannot afford strategic ambiguity. Aligning itself more clearly with regional norms of sovereignty and noninterference would strengthen Iraq’s own claim to having its sovereignty respected and reinforce its position within the Arab fold, especially if this war drags on longer than expected.
Iraq has often found itself in an awkward position during previous confrontations between the United States and Iran. This time, however, the scale and intensity of the conflict carry the potential to reshape the broader regional order. Therefore, the choices Iraq makes now may not only determine internal stability but also where the country will stand in the future.
Fr. Bob's Reflection for the Second Sunday in Lent - Guest Post
We have all heard the phrase, “The honeymoon is over.” It can describe newly married couples or newly elected officials. It describes any situation when initial excitement gives way to reality. Only the immature or naïve believe that the happy, feel-good season of life can last forever.
Yet the temptation to live in that fantasy is real. We dream of staying forever young and admired, of clinging to our 15 minutes of fame. The advertising industry feeds that illusion, endlessly promising to erase pain, wrinkles, sorrow, hard choices, aging and even death itself.
In today’s Gospel, Peter falls into that same temptation. Overwhelmed by the Transfiguration, dazzled by the glory of Jesus, Moses and Elijah, he essentially says, “Let’s stay here. Let’s make this moment last forever.”
But it cannot – and it must not.
Almost immediately, the vision fades. God the Father’s voice from the cloud is gone. The brilliant light disappears. Moses and Elijah vanish. Suddenly, Peter, James and John find themselves alone with Jesus. And as they come down the mountain, Jesus begins to speak to them about suffering and death. The mountaintop moment has ended. The honeymoon is over.
History gives us another mountaintop story. On May 29, 1953, Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay became the first to reach the summit of Mount Everest. They stood, quite literally, on top of the world. Hillary became an international celebrity, with fame, fortune and opportunity at his fingertips.
But he understood that life could not be lived on the summit. Instead of clinging to acclaim, he spent the rest of his life serving the Sherpa people of Nepal – building schools, hospitals, clinics, bridges and airfields. His name may no longer dominate headlines, like Sylvester Stallone or Dolly Parton, but it lives on in the transformed lives of countless people.
Peter, James and John – and Edmund Hillary – all learned the same truth: we cannot remain on the mountaintop. But if we allow those moments to change us, they prepare us for the work that awaits below.
That is the purpose of every holy encounter. We come to the mountain not to escape the world, but to be transformed for it.
I see that same transformation in the men who leave St. Christopher’s Inn on this Holy Mountain of Graymoor; men who cannot stay here forever, but who go forth changed, carrying what they have received into the valleys of everyday life, where God now calls them to live, serve and love.
My friends, the temptation to perpetually remain in the “honeymoon” can easily take hold of us. But always remember this: God leads us up the mountain not so that we may stay there, but so that we may be transformed and sent back into the world to proclaim the Gospel and to do His will.
Yours in Christ,
Fr. Robert Warren, S.A.
Spiritual Director
Tuesday, March 3, 2026
[Salon] Lebanon at risk - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Lebanon at risk
Summary: with the attack by Hezbollah and Israel’s response the Iran war is pulling Lebanon into its vortex at a point when the country was beginning to show recovery from an economic crisis that had lasted for over five years.
As the war continues into day four the widening escalation threatens every country in the region but none more so than Lebanon. Late Sunday night Hezbollah launched a rocket and drone attack towards a military base south of Haifa in northern Israel in response to the killing of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The IDF said the weaponry fell short of its intended target and responded with an immediate reprisal attack.
31 people were killed and nearly 150 injured in air strikes on a southern suburb of Beirut and in the south of Lebanon. The Israeli defence minister Israel Katz declared that the Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem was “a marked target for assassination.” Katz added with the sort of hyperbolic language that is now the norm “anyone who follows Khamenei’s path will soon find himself in the depths of hell with all the thwarted members of the axis of evil.”
Hezbollah though seriously degraded both militarily and politically remains a powerful player in Lebanon’s fractured world of sectarian politics. Still the Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam denounced the Hezbollah action as “irresponsible” and one that “jeopardises Lebanon’s security and safety and provides Israel with pretexts to continue its aggression.” President Joseph Aoun while condemning the Israeli strikes decried what Hezbollah had done. In a statement he said “Using Lebanese territory as a platform for military operations unrelated to Lebanon will not be allowed to happen again.”
It may be that it will be Hezbollah and not the government that will decide to stand down from any further strikes bearing in mind that much of their weapons stocks have been destroyed by the Israelis. Iran even if it were able to supply more is in no position to do so. However the fragility of the Lebanese government is underscored by Monday’s events.
The Iran war comes at a point where the economy was showing modest signs of recovery from what has been described as one of the most severe economic crises globally since the nineteenth century. A crisis that began in 2019 and condemned the Lebanese to rampant inflation, runaway unemployment and the degradation of infrastructure and state services was on 22 January this year described by the World Bank as being at “the start of a modest recovery following years of severe contraction.”
The World Bank stated:
Looking ahead, Lebanon’s economic momentum is forecast to continue, with real GDP growth projected at 4% in 2026 provided reform efforts persist, modest reconstruction inflows materialize, and political stability is maintained. Remittances and tourism will remain critical growth drivers, but risks including delay on critical reforms and regional instability—threaten the fragile recovery.
People in Beirut have been fleeing their homes after Israel began striking what it says are Hezbollah targets in the city, in response to an attack by the Iran-backed group
The World Bank’s section on “Outlook and Risks” makes no mention of the threat of a war on Iran launched by Israel and the US something that many observers had been saying over many months was a question of not if but when. President Trump had for several months been mixing threats with cajolery but as protests against economic conditions in Iran were escalating so too was his rhetoric. The war when it came came as no surprise.
What is quite extraordinary is the fact that Lebanon had achieved any level of economic and political stability at all. Following the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and many other senior Hezbollah officials by the Israelis a ceasefire had been in place since November 2024. As documented by the UN Israel in one year had violated the ceasefire 10,000 times. The war Israel has conducted in the midst of the “ceasefire” has emptied out communities in southern Lebanon leaving hundreds of thousands in need of government assistance putting further strain on already well overstretched resources. After Israel’s latest attacks thousands more are fleeing Beirut’s southern suburbs and the capital itself.
Responding to the crisis engulfing the country Prime Minister Salam issued a statement that said in part: “we announce a ban on Hezbollah’s military activities and restrict its role to the political sphere.” That may not be enough for the IDF who for the more than two years since the ceasefire was announced have coupled ground and air strikes with forced evacuations of southern communities, a tactic that is now being applied to the suburbs of Beirut where Hezbollah still holds sway.
With the Iran war having already smashed through so many red lines it will be a challenge for the government to enforce a ban and keep Hezbollah in check. But clearly it is something that must somehow be achieved in order that the fragile rebound of Lebanon’s economy is not snuffed out.
[Salon] Trump and the trampling of international law - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Trump and the trampling of international law
Summary: in violation of international law the US and Israel have launched a devastating air war on Iran and the consequences are being felt across the region and the world.
When in the early hours of Saturday the US and Israel launched a joint attack on Iran none of their allies in the region or beyond had been given the courtesy of advanced warning. Indeed the Omani foreign minister had arrived in Washington on Friday 27 February bearing news that he believed a deal with Iran was close to being achieved.
On Tuesday evening last week Trump in his State of the Union address had said he was waiting for Iran to say “those secret words ‘we will never have a nuclear weapon’”, curious given what followed a little more than 72 hours later. Though the Israelis and the Americans accused Iran of playing for time while having no intention to follow through on a deal it was the case, as ever with Trump, that the opposite was the truth. The US had no intention of doing a deal and it was Trump’s ploy to play for time.
Trump emboldened by his Venezuela adventure and urged on by Benjamin Netanyahu was convinced that this was as Jeremy Bowen put it “an opportunity not to be missed.” The assassination of the Supreme Leader together with members of his household as well as reportedly the head of the IRGC and a top security official in the first hours of the war was a significant achievement. Israel also claims to have killed 40 senior military leaders and heavily degraded Iran’s missile launch and defence systems.
However the question that cooler heads are asking is a simple one. What happens next? Trump seems to think that with Ayatollah Khamenei out of the way regime change is just a matter of the Iranian people coming into the streets. Somehow the deeply entrenched structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its IRGC and its military will melt away. And though tens of millions of Iranians detest the regime, there are still many millions who support it. Couple that with the fact that any country under attack will see its people coalesce against the attackers and it is clear that Trump’s facile assumption is an exercise in ignorance.
A satellite image shows black smoke rising and heavy damage at the compound of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei [photo credit: Airbus]
Emily Thornberry the chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee got it right speaking to the BBC on Sunday morning:
The Americans and the Israelis have gone into this without a plan as to what is going to happen next. We know the regime is very deeply rooted and it is not a question of the one man in charge, get rid of him and everything will change….The concern is that in the next few days, weeks and months the country might descend into chaos.
The other equally crucial point she makes is that this latest war against Iran has been launched without any legal justification or even an attempt at such:
I think to see international law undermined in this way is a matter that should concern us all because without some form of structure, without some form of agreed laws under which we all operate it becomes the law of the jungle…. This is not a matter of self-defence and there is no legal justification.
Trump in his “war of choice” ignored not just international law but his own Congress. That will cause him no small amount of grief from the Democrats and even a Republican or two. His MAGA base is also showing some fracturing which will widen if the war continues over several weeks or months. After all in his two successful presidential campaigns he committed to ending America’s “never ending wars” in countries his supporters know little about and care even less for.
And it is not just the Iranians who are paying a price. Ayatollah Khamenei had warned on 1 February that if Iran was attacked a regional war would follow. That is exactly what is transpiring with numerous US allies in the Middle East coming under assault from Iran. The Iranians say their targets are Israel and US military facilities in the Gulf. However civilians are bearing the brunt of missile and drone attacks in Dubai, Doha, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Kuwait. Even Oman, the key player in negotiations, has been hit with a drone attack on the port facility of Duqm. Iraq and Jordan have also been attacked by Iran. In Israel at least nine have been killed and more than 2 dozen wounded. In Iran the civilian toll is well over 200 with at least four times that number wounded.
As a Saudi commentator put it a few hours after the war commenced: “this is the nightmare scenario; diplomacy has been abandoned and (we) are on the frontline of a war involving three other nations.” At the time of writing the death toll of civilians in the Gulf had risen to four with dozens more injured. The commercial impact is already being felt with air spaces closed and flights disrupted and cancelled. Maritime routes and most particularly the Strait of Hormuz through which 20% of the world’s oil transits are under threat. Should the Iranians retain the ability to block the Strait the implications for the global economy may be profound with predictions that the price of oil could skyrocket.
For now however we remain in the realm of speculation, a dangerous and uncertain place to be. Trump wants a quick result. It is not at all clear that he will get it. Netanyahu wants to destroy the threat of an armed and hostile Iran but bear in mind that after more than three years of intense fighting and the IDF holding an enormous weapons and tactical advantage Hamas remains undefeated. Iran, or rather its theocratic regime, wants to survive. In the medium to long term it may not. For now it could well do so but if and when the regime falls chaos - with all the consequences that holds for the region and the world - is the more likely and most disturbing outcome.
Monday, March 2, 2026
Sunday, March 1, 2026
Saturday, February 28, 2026
Friday, February 27, 2026
[Salon] The growing Saudi-Emirati rift - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
The growing Saudi-Emirati rift
Summary: Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may not yet be at daggers drawn but tensions between the two are increasing as the UAE flexes its muscles in Africa and together with Israel challenges Saudi Arabia’s stake in the Red Sea.
We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter.
Amid the crowded field of conflicts across the Middle East, the growing divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has drawn comparatively little attention. While it has not turned violent, this strategic drift between two cash-rich Gulf monarchies could carry far-reaching consequences from Yemen to the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has increasingly sought to bolster regional governments and prioritise stability, while Abu Dhabi, under UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), has continued to take risks, cultivating local partners to maximise access to resources and influence. At stake is not merely tactical disagreement but rather two competing modes of regional power projection.
The fault line first became visible in Yemen. Both countries entered the war in 2015 with the stated aim of restoring the internationally recognised government and rolling back Huthi gains, which were seen as a dangerous extension of Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula. But as the war dragged on, Saudi Arabia, bearing the brunt, shifted toward deescalation and a frozen conflict aimed at securing its border and extracting itself from a costly war. Conversely, the UAE developed relationships with southern separatists, embedding itself in port infrastructure and maritime networks along Yemen’s coast and in the strategically important islands of Socotra in order to project power into eastern Africa.
In late December, this fracture turned into an earthquake. Saudi Arabia reportedly struck a weapons shipment linked to UAE-backed factions amid accusations that the UAE was empowering southern separatists to seize territory, thus threatening Saudi security. The UAE was compelled to withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are increasingly at odds as they pursue competing strategies for regional power, with Riyadh prioritising economic stability and de-escalation while Abu Dhabi utilises subnational actors to expand its maritime and commercial influence
For MbS, the logic is economic. Several giga project timelines have been delayed or scaled back as with low oil prices his Vision 2030 faces fiscal and implementation constraints. Regional stability is required to attract investment and tourism. The crown prince has sought to deescalate tensions with Iran, enhance relations with Türkiye and focus on economic growth. His decision to push the Emiratis out of Yemen, and since work to neutralise their influence across the region, is recognition that MbZ’s expansionist foreign policy seriously disrupts those efforts.
The UAE has taken a different path. Its foreign policy relies on cultivating networks of subnational actors and establishing and developing commercial footholds. From southern Yemen to Somaliland and Sudan, Abu Dhabi has demonstrated a willingness to gamble in pursuit of access to trade and political leverage. This approach has expanded Emirati influence but it has also generated instability and insecurity.
Nowhere is this seen more than in Sudan, where a conflict in its third year has led to famine and the world's largest displacement crisis. Multiple investigations and UN findings have alleged that the UAE has armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its fight against the Sudanese Armed Forces. UN reporting came out last week that has linked the RSF to mass atrocities, including “hallmarks of genocide” in Darfur. Prolonged chaos in Sudan is bad for business in the eyes of Riyadh, seeing instability along the Red Sea corridor as threatening plans for trade and coastal tourism and port developments. In November, on a trip to the United States, to the chagrin of the Emiratis MbS requested that President Trump intervene in the ongoing war in Sudan.
Another diplomatic row came in late December when Israel became the first UN member state to recognise the independence of Somaliland, a breakaway region from Somalia, in return for joining the Abraham Accords. Earlier this week Israel formally welcomed the appointment of Mohamed Haji as Somaliland’s ambassador causing further unease in Riyadh.This controversy connects to Emirati port investments and their close security relationship with Israel, along with their multilayered relationships with both Somalia’s federal government and its semi-autonomous regions. Convinced that the Emiratis had helped facilitate Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Mogadishu moved to end its long-standing partnership with the UAE, announcing the cancellation of all port management and security cooperation agreements. As far as Riyadh is concerned, the episode reinforced concerns that Emirati activism could further destabilise already fragile states and create new flashpoints. This concern is intertwined with the potential of an Emirati-Israeli foothold near Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic chokehold between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa.
Amid these regional dynamics, Saudi Arabia has partnered closer ties with Türkiye, Egypt and other countries to try to counterbalance the UAE’s assertiveness. Riyadh has deepened defence coordination with Pakistan and Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan each visited Ethiopia this month to persuade the government not to recognise Somaliland. The visits came amid reports alleging Emirati financing of an RSF-linked facility in Ethiopia, the first direct evidence of Addis Ababa’s involvement in Sudan’s ever expanding war.
As a new Middle East takes shape, one now marked by growing Saudi-Emirati competition, Washington has so far avoided direct mediation. President Trump appears more interested on deciding whether to start yet another war with Iran which will only further exacerbate the situation. He appears reluctant to engage in the intra-Gulf dispute, choosing to prioritise economic ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as he seeks to secure investments into the American economy as well as into his own family businesses. Yet Trump’s fence-sitting carries serious risks.
In the past two months the competition between MbS and MbZ - two assertive cash-flush royals each with ambitions to secure regional hegemony - has become increasingly bitter. If left unmanaged, these tensions will only grow and further exacerbate proxy dynamics in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and other fragile states, with the potential to disrupt and reshape the political landscape of the Red Sea and beyond.
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