IRAN: THE SUPREME LEADER DRAWS THE LINE

IRAN: THE SUPREME LEADER DRAWS THE LINE

Summary
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei spoke to the Iranian people during
Friday prayers June 19, siding with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and
ordering protesters to end their demonstrations. Khamenei has decided that using
force to suppress the uprising is worth the risk, even if it leads to greater
infighting among the power brokers of the system. It remains unclear if
Ahmadinejad's opponents will stage a showdown, but the protests have grown
enough in size and energy to take on a life of their own.

Analysis

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei delivered a rare but critical
Friday sermon prayer June 19 in which he addressed the continuing public unrest
in the wake of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's victory in the June 12
presidential election, as well as the schism among the country's political
leadership. As expected, he took a clear position in favor of the president,
rejecting accusations of electoral fraud and framing the conflict in terms of
foreign powers exploiting the Islamic republic's internal troubles. More
importantly, he warned both the protesters and their leaders to halt the
demonstrations and that they would be responsible for any bloodshed.

Khamenei has clearly opted for the forcible suppression of the uprising.
STRATFOR had pointed out in a previous report that the country's elite
ideological military force, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) has taken
command of domestic law enforcement in Tehran. Consequently, from today forward,
we can expect to see security forces crush protests. That the two main defeated
challengers of Ahamdinejad, former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi and former
speaker of parliament Mehdi Karroubi did not attend the prayer session shows
that they are not about to accept the verdict.

At the same time, Mousavi and Karroubi cannot be perceived as openly defying the
supreme leader and they have an interest in the preservation of the cleric-led
political system. Furthermore, their supporters on the streets are far more
radical than they are because Mousavi and Karroubi are part and parcel of the
system (something which Khamenei pointed out when he said that that all four
candidates in the recent presidential election belonged to Iran's Islamic
establishment). Therefore, they will have a hard time balancing between the need
to sustain their opposition to the results of the election and controlling the
protesters on the streets, especially during a major security crackdown.
Regardless of whether the opposition leaders choose to take charge of the
demonstrations, the protests have swelled enough in size and energy to take on a
life of their own.

Khamenei's speech also telegraphed to Ahmadinejad's opponents that he is fully
behind the president. He said, "Differences of opinion do exist between
officials which is natural. But it does not mean there is a rift in the system.
Ever since the last presidential election there existed differences of opinion
between Ahmadinejad and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the second most powerful
cleric in the state). Of course my outlook is closer to that of Ahmadinejad in
domestic and foreign policy." Khamenei also spoke of the difference between him
and Rafsanjani, but also praised him as being "close" to the revolution.

This puts Rafsanjani and his pragmatic conservative allies -- including the
powerful speaker of parliament, Ali Larijani and former IRGC chief and
presidential candidate, Mohsen Rezaie -- in a difficult spot. On one hand, they
cannot accept Ahmadinejad because he is a threat to their political interests.
On the other, they cannot openly defy Khamenei as that could lead to the
unraveling of the regime. This would explain why Larijani, along with Judiciary
Chief Shahroudi and Tehran’s mayor Mohammed Baqer Ghalibaf -- who are all key
pragmatic conservatives who oppose the president -- attended the sermon along
with the president and his cabinet. Rezaie did not attend the sermon, but wrote
a letter to Khamenei, signaling that he wanted to resolve the issues amicably
under the leadership of Khamenei.

Rafsanjani is therefore likely to face great difficulties in his efforts to
build a consensus among the clerics against the president because now it is no
longer simply about Ahmadinejad. Instead, his moves will be seen as facing off
against the supreme leader. As the head of the Assembly of Experts, the most
powerful institution in the country, which has the power to remove the supreme
leader, he can make a move against Khamenei. That has never been done in the
history of the Islamic republic. Therefore, it is unclear whether Rafsanjani is
ready to escalate matters to such a level. The split amongst the political
leadership is also manifesting itself in the country's security apparatus with
reports of arrests of several IRGC commanders who do not agree with Ahmadinejad.


The stage is now set for a major confrontation, but it is unclear who will
emerge victorious. Regardless of which political faction wins, Khamenei has
decided that it is worth the risk to bring in the IRGC. Though the Iranian state
security apparatus is adept at extinguishing protests, it is still a risky
gamble that will further fuel the fire of discontent.


Copyright 2009 Stratfor.