ANALYSIS
"In promoting a rapprochement between Russia and the West over the Islamic State, Mr. Putin hopes to rehabilitate himself,
just as he did after Sept. 11. Back then, Mr. Putin convinced the West
that the threat it faced in Afghanistan and elsewhere was the same as
Russia faced in Chechnya. By doing so, Russia’s president was able to
tamp down Western criticism of Russia’s brutality in Chechnya. The
Kremlin saw the West's enthusiasm for cooperation as weakness. It led
Mr. Putin to believe that he could act however he liked in Russia, and
get away with it. That belief still prevails—but no longer applies only
to Russia," writes Andrew Foxall in the New York Times.
"There
is now little hope of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria, unless
Washington wants to be in the business of shooting down Russian
aircraft. From a broader perspective, U.S. efforts to arm the opposition
to Assad mean fighting a proxy war
with Moscow, either by trying to down the Russian planes or helping
Syrian opposition forces kill Russian combat troops on the ground. That
seems a much tougher task than fighting a proxy war with Iran and
Hezbollah," writes Jeffrey Lewis in Foreign Policy.
"But
the UN route can and must be tried again. The nuclear pact between Iran
and the Security Council’s five permanent members (the US, China,
France, Russia, and the UK) plus Germany, has just provided a powerful
demonstration of the Council’s capacity to lead. It can lead in Syria as
well, if the US will set aside its unilateral demand for regime change
and work with the rest of the Council, including China and Russia, on a
common approach. In Syria, only multilateralism can succeed.
The UN remains the world’s best—indeed its only—hope to stop the Syrian
bloodbath and halt the flood of refugees to Europe," writes Jeffrey D.
Sachs in Project Syndicate. | 
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