An
Air Force F-35A costs $148 million, each.
A
Marine Corps F-35B costs $251 million.
A
Navy F-35C costs $337 million.
A
"generic" F-35 costs $178 million (the average for the three
models).
These are production costs only; additional expenses for research,
development, test and evaluation are not included. The dollars are 2015
dollars.
Explanation
and elaboration follow.
Find
this piece at Medium.com's War Is Boring at https://medium.com/war-is- boring/how-much-does-an-f-35- actually-cost-21f95d239398 and
below.
How Much Does an F-35 Actually Cost?
The
F-35 is not just the most expensive warplane ever, it's the most expensive
weapons program ever. But to find out exactly how much a single F-35
costs, we analyzed the newest and most authoritative data.
Here's
how much we're paying.
A
single Air Force F-35A costs a whopping $148 million. One Marine Corps F-35B
costs an unbelievable $251 million. A lone Navy F-35C costs a mind-boggling $337
million. Average the three models together, and a "generic" F-35 costs $178
million.
It
gets worse. These are just the production costs. Additional expenses for
research, development, test and evaluation are not included. The dollars are
2015 dollars. This data was just released by the Senate Appropriations Committee
in its report for the Pentagon's
2015 appropriations bill.
Except
for the possibility that the F-35 Joint Program Office might complain that the
F-35A number might be a little too low, these numbers are about as complete,
accurate and authoritative as they can be.
Moreover,
each of the other defense committees on Capitol Hill agree or-with one
exception-think each model will be more expensive. The Pentagon's numbers
for these unit costs-in every case-are higher.
The
methodology for calculating these F-35 unit costs is straightforward. Both the
president's budget and each of four congressional defense committees publish the
amounts to be authorized or appropriated for each model of the F-35, including
the number of aircraft to be bought.
The
rest is simple arithmetic: Divide the total dollars for each model by the
quantity.
Purchase
price
There
are just two things F-35 watchers need to be careful
about.
First,
it's necessary to add the funding from the previous year's appropriation act to
the procurement money the government allocated for 2015. This is "advance
procurement" for 2015 spending, and pays for "long lead" components that take
longer to acquire.
Second,
we have to add the cost of Navy and Air Force
modifications.
For
the F-35, these costs are for fixing mistakes already found in the testing
process. With the aircraft still in its initial testing, the modification costs
to existing aircraft are very low. But the 2015 amounts for modifications are
surrogates for what the costs for this year's buy might be. If anything,
this number can be an under-estimate.
The
Senate Appropriations Committee sent its report to the printer on July 17, and
that data is informed by the latest advice from the Pentagon, which is routinely
consulted for the data the committee is working with. The Pentagon is also given
an opportunity to appeal to change both data and
recommendations.
Accordingly,
of the four congressional defense committees, the Senate Appropriations
Committee numbers are the most up to date. For the most part, these numbers are
also the lowest.
The
data from all four defense committees, the Pentagon's budget request, and the
final 2014 appropriations-all for the F-35 program-are in the table at the end
of this article. This data is the empirical, real-world costs to buy, but not to
test or develop, an F-35 in 2015.
They
should be understood to be the actual purchase price for 2015-what the Pentagon
will have to pay to have an operative F-35.
It's
very simple, and it's also not what program advocates want you to
think.
In
a briefing delivered to reporters on June 9, F-35 developer Lockheed still
advertised the cost of airplanes sans engines. Highly respected
Aviation Week reported on July 22 that taxpayers put up $98 million for each F-35A in
2013.
In
reality, we actually paid $188 million.
Some
of these numbers are for the airframe only. In other cases, you get a "flyaway"
cost. But in fact, those airplanes are incapable of operative flight. They lack
the specialized tools, simulators, logistics computers-and much, much more-to
make the airplane useable. They even lack the fuel to fly
away.
Rising costs
Here's
another curious fact. The unit costs of the Marines' short-takeoff,
vertical-landing B-model and the Navy's aircraft-carrier-capable C-model are
growing.
The
cost of an F-35B grew from $232 million in 2014 to a bulging $251 million by
2015. The cost of the Navy's F35C grew from $273 million in 2014 to a
wallet-busting $337 million by 2015.
The
quantity numbers for the F-35B have not changed, remaining at six per year. The
number of F-35Cs to be produced has slipped from four to two, but surely
learning processes on the F-35 line have not been going so far backward as to
explain a 23 percent, $64 million per unit cost increase.
Something
else is going on.
That
something just might be in the F-35A line. Note the 15 percent decline in
the F-35 unit price from 2014: from $174 million to $148 million. The units
produced increase from 19 to 26, which Bogdan repeatedly explained will bring
cost reductions due to "economy of
scale."
However,
is that what's really occurring in the F-35A line, while F-35B and F-35C costs
are ballooning? Should not some of the benefit in F-35A production
efficiency also show up on the F-35B and F-35C? Lockheed builds all three on the
same assembly line in Fort Worth.
It
could be that the F-35B and F-35C are bearing the overheard-or other costs-of
the F-35A.
Why
else would an F-35B with a stable production rate increase by $19 million per
unit, and how else could the cost to build an F-35C-in production for six
years-increase by $64 million per unit?
Even
those who reject that someone might be cooking the books to make F-35A costs
look as good as possible to Congress-and all-important foreign buyers-there
should be a consensus that the program needs a comprehensive, fully independent
audit.
Surely,
an audit will help Congress and Pentagon leadership better understand why F-35B
and F-35C prices are going up when they were supposed to be going down-and to
ensure there is nothing untoward going on in any part of the
program.
The
defense world is full of price scams, each of them
engineered to come up with the right answer for whoever is doing the
talking.
Next
time an advocate tells you what the current unit cost is for a program, ask:
"What is Congress appropriating for them this year?" And, "How many are we
buying?" Then get out your calculator. The result might surprise
you.
The
aforementioned mentioned table follows:
2015 Congressional Defense Committee and DOD
Recommendations for F-35 Procurement
($Millions, 2015
Dollars)
|
2014
Appropriations
(2014 Dollars)
|
2015 DOD
Request
|
HASC
2015
|
SASC
2015
|
HAC
2015
|
SAC
2015
|
F-35A Procurement
|
(19)
2,889
|
(26)
3,553
|
(26)
3,553
|
(26)
3,553
|
(28)
3,777
|
(26)
3,331
|
Previous Year AP
|
293
|
339
|
339
|
339
|
339
|
339
|
Modification of Aircraft
|
127
|
188
|
188
|
188
|
156
|
188
|
Subtotal $
|
3309
|
4080
|
4080
|
4080
|
4272
|
3858
|
F-35A
Unit
Cost
|
174
|
157
|
157
|
157
|
153
|
148
|
F-35B Procurement
|
(6)
1,176
|
(6)
1,200
|
(6)
1,200
|
(6)
1,200
|
(6)
1,200
|
(6)
1,200
|
Previous Year AP
|
106
|
103
|
103
|
103
|
103
|
103
|
Modification of Aircraft
|
111
|
286
|
286
|
286
|
210
|
205
|
Subtotal $
|
1393
|
1589
|
1589
|
1589
|
1513
|
1508
|
F-35B
Unit
Cost
|
232
|
265
|
265
|
265
|
252
|
251
|
F-35C Procurement
|
(4)
1,028
|
(2)
611
|
(2)
611
|
(2)
611
|
(4)
866
|
(2)
594
|
Previous Year AP
|
33
|
79
|
79
|
79
|
79
|
79
|
Modification of Aircraft
|
30
|
20
|
20
|
20
|
20
|
1
|
Subtotal $
|
1091
|
710
|
710
|
710
|
965
|
674
|
F-35C
Unit
Cost
|
273
|
355
|
355
|
355
|
241
|
337
|
Grand Total $
|
5793
|
6379
|
6379
|
6379
|
6750
|
6040
|
Generic F-35
Unit Cost
|
200
|
188
|
188
|
188
|
178
|
178
|
_______________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
Project On Government Oversight
301 791-2397 (home office)
301 221-3897 (cell)
winslowwheeler@msn.com
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
Project On Government Oversight
301 791-2397 (home office)
301 221-3897 (cell)
winslowwheeler@msn.com
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