Some might be interested in some of my sources for the Battleland Navy
series and/or for specific page citations; the material available at
Battleland (above) provides live links in the text; however, if you are
interested in the page citations from many of those sources, I am providing
below the original text which I sent to Mark Thompson at Battleland for his
excellent and professional editing; this version includes endnotes with links
and many specific page citations in the longer source materials, such as CRS,
CBO and DOT&E reports. That endnoted text follows for any interested to get
more background.
Troubled Waters: the US Navy
Faces the Consequences of Its Own Decisions
Part 1: If More Money Buys a
Smaller Fleet, What Will Less Money Buy?
During the third debate of the
presidential elections, Barack Obama hammered Mitt Romney with a clever retort
when Romney pointed out-accurately-that the US Navy had become "the smallest
since 1917:"
"We also have fewer
horses.the nature of our military's changed.
We have these things called aircraft
carriers.."
[1]
Romney appeared to have been caught flat-footed and had no rebuttal nor even an
explanation of what he meant with his numerical comparison of today's navy with
that of 1917.
All over the internet I read
comments about how foolish Romney was to not understand that the 2012 navy could
easily sink the one we had in 1917; he clearly did not understand-they said-that
today's navy was infinitely more capable:
It may have been shrinking in numbers of
ships in recent history, but each one is more effective-not only compared to any
1917 museum pieces but also to what is being replaced now. Moreover, no foreign
navy can even begin to compare, they say: we have more aircraft carriers and
at-sea strike aircraft than the rest of the world combined; we can deliver
infinitely more precision guided weapons than the US Navy of Operation Desert
Storm in 1991, and, as one widely respected analyst put it, "the more than 8,000
missile launchers on our surface fleet give it missile firepower greater than
the next 20 navies combined..in all cases exceeding or greatly exceeding the
rest of the world's fleet's combined."
[2]
Just like Romney's "smallest
since 1917," the data portions of these statements may be technically accurate,
but they also are irrelevant, if not misinforming: the threats we face at sea
are neither from the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet nor from anyone seeking to mirror
image the US force. The threats our
navy faces, just like the rest of our armed forces-come from known and unknown
enemies who study us and are developing-more accurately, already have
developed-potential ways to defeat us. Against those real threats, we are in
terrible shape-possibly worse than we were in 1917 relative to the naval threat
from the Kaiser. And, if we proceed
with business as usual, the threats loom only larger.
Shrinking Numbers
If numbers mean anything, and
they do, we are headed in the wrong direction. Even if it is not President Obama's
conscious plan to shrink the Navy from its current number of 284 "battleforce"
ships to 250, as Romney and his surrogates disingenuously charged, that
shrinkage-perhaps more-is what is very likely to happen.
Keep in mind that since 2001,
the Navy's "base" budget (not including the additional amounts to fight the wars
in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere) increased dramatically.
However, since 2001 the size of the
Navy's battlefleet shrank.
According to the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), during the George W. Bush years (2001-2008), the fleet
shrank 11 percent (from 316 ships to 282)
[3]
as the Navy's "base" (non-war) budget grew 51 percent in inflation-adjusted
("constant") dollars.
[4] With continuing budget increases,
President Obama has managed to increase the fleet since 2008 by a grand total of
two ships, to 284.
These trends are
longstanding: for decades, the unit cost of ships growing at a rate higher than
the budget has meant more money buys fewer ships.
Recent analysis from the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) shows that the prospects for the Navy's
growing in the future are quite dim.
CBO estimates that to implement the Navy's current 30 year shipbuilding
plan (to increase the fleet from 284 to the projected 310 to 316 warships) will
require average annual spending of $22 billion per year,
[5]
not the $17 billion per year the Navy estimates.
However, even the Navy's unrealistically
low projection is well above the $11 billion for shipbuilding in the Navy's 2013
budget or the $12 billion it plans to seek, on average, for the next five
years.
[6] It is completely unrealistic to
anticipate even the Navy's low-ball future spending levels:
No one is anticipating the kind of
Pentagon spending increases these higher shipbuilding figures will require, and
for naval shipbuilding even to retain its current level of spending, let alone
increase, will require it to "eat" spending elsewhere in the Navy's budget or in
one of the other military services' budgets.
Neither is particularly
likely. The Navy also seeks
increases in other parts of its own budget, especially in other forms of
procurement, specifically for the F-35C fighter-bomber (which will cost
multiples to buy and operate compared to existing F-18 aircraft). As the Pentagon's and the Navy's budgets
shrink in the foreseeable future, the money for an expanded Navy is simply not
there.
In October 2012, the Vice Chief
of Naval Operations testified to the inevitable naval force reductions; he
estimated that the budget levels contemplated by the Budget Control Act's
sequestration-i.e. spending levels just nine percent below currently projected
spending levels-could result in a fleet somewhere between 230-235 ships in about
ten years.
[7]
It is possible that President
Obama's current budget negotiations with the Republicans on Capitol Hill may end
up with a Pentagon budget not at low as that mandated by sequestration-at least
for the short term-but spending levels even lower-over the longer term-are also
highly possible.
In any case, the
major increases needed for achieving the Navy's current shipbuilding plan are
not going to materialize.
The Effect of Unaffordable Ships
and Planning Gimmicks
CBO has testified that a
realistic long term inventory is somewhere between 170 and 270 ships, depending
on the type of ships that the Navy seeks to buy.
[8]
Considering the Navy's strong preference for high end ships, the potential for
further cost growth and CBO's substantially higher re-estimates, the number of
actual ships is likely to be in the mid to lower parts of the 170-270
range.
For example, CBO estimates the
new generation aircraft carrier, CVN-78, to cost $14.2 billion, not the $13.1
billion the Navy projects; CBO projects the "Flight III"
DDG-51 to cost $2.4 billion, not $2.2
billion,
[9]
and
another study found that CBO
estimate may be $1.2 billion too low.
[10] Also, CBO estimates the existing
Littoral Combat Ships to cost $770-800 million and the for total program average
to be $500 million per ship; meanwhile the Navy projects a $440 million unit
cost (all in constant dollars).
[11] The Navy's habitual under-estimating its
own costs simply means that still more money in the future can buy only fewer
ships, and if costs are even higher than CBO's estimate, which CBO says may
happen,
[12]
it all gets worse.
None of this is helped by the
way the Navy bureaucracy games its own shipbuilding plans. For example, although
the Navy reduced the number of ships in the 2013 30 year ship building plan,
compared to the 2012 plan, the cost of the new-smaller-plan is actually higher
(again in constant dollars): the Navy removed many lower cost ships and added
higher cost ones, while reducing the total number only marginally.
In doing so it also dropped
24 logistics ships which it knows will
have to be added back in later on, thereby insuring that the funds projected to
complete the fleet are even more inadequate,
[13] and proving CBO was right to say that
its own estimates may be too low.
In addition, the Navy
arbitrarily assumed ships, such as destroyers, would have a lifespan of 40
years, rather than the 30 years that such combatants have typically served.
[14] Recently, the Navy has attempted to
retire some ships even before 30 years.
Finally, to achieve its
increased fleet, the Navy's immediate plan is to decrease the number of ships
built each year: with a plan that requires an average of nine ships to be built
each year, the Navy plans to reduce the number of ships procured to seven in
2014 and eight in 2015.
[15]
In as much as it is the near term budgets that are the ones that actually occur,
the short term plan to reduce shipbuilding should be taken as prologue for the
most likely budget future.
Put simply, the Navy's
under-estimates of its own costs, unrealistic projections of what money will be
available, and shipbuilding plan gimmicks all add up to a fleet that will be
declining in numbers, even with increased funding. In the likely event of less, not more,
money, the negative trends will accelerate. The precise size of the future fleet is
unknown, but it is unreasonable to expect it to retain its current size. The shrinkage will be exacerbated if the
Navy retains its multiple shipbuilding psychoses: the number of battleforce
ships may tend toward the lesser numbers (approaching 170) that CBO has
testified to.
Troubled Waters: the US Navy
Faces the Consequences of Its Own Decisions
Part 2: It Is More than Numbers
That Could Be Sinking
The shrinking size of the fleet
is just one variable in considering its adequacy: the ability to perform
assigned missions, especially after withstanding whatever threats may exist, is
a far better measure than mere numbers.
As described by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), a core mission
is to influence "events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military
forces of potential regional threats.including improved Chinese military forces
and non-state terrorist organizations."
[16]
This is similar to the mission
described by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: "to enhance.overall
posture and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region" with "numbers, speed, and
agility to operate in shallow waters."
[17] Whether or not these sentiments are only
passing conventional wisdom or profound insight, they represent the current
mission.
Unfortunately, it is
precisely those areas of operation where the mismatch between capabilities and
threats is most disconcerting.
The Diesel-Electric Submarine
Threat
To put it simply, if naval
exercises in the last two decades involving foreign-nation diesel-electric
submarines had been actual combat, most if not all, US aircraft carriers would
be at the bottom of the oceans:
[18] As many as ten US aircraft carriers have
been reported "sunk" in these exercises.
[19]
The analytically conservative Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was alarmed
enough to officially report "Some analysts argue that the Navy is not very good
at locating diesel-electric submarines, especially in noisy, shallower waters
near coastal areas.
Exercises with
allied navies that use diesel-electric submarines confirm that problem.. [For
example,]Israeli diesel-electric submarines, which until recently were
relatively old, are said to always 'sink' some of the large and powerful
warships of the US Sixth Fleet in exercises.
And most recently, an Australian Collins
class submarine penetrated a U.S. carrier battlegroup and was in a position to
sink an aircraft carrier during exercises off Hawaii in May 2000."
[20] There have been many such exercise
"sinkings" since then, including aircraft carriers
Reagan and
Lincoln.
[21]
Moreover, the problem stems not
just from the latest, twenty-first
century diesel-electric submarine technology from the West, it occurs in
the form of various earlier technology submarines built in Russia,
[22]
operated by China,
[23]
and/or available to various lesser navies, such as Peru's
[24]
and throughout the world.
[25]
The latter navies include North Korea's
[26]
and Iran's.
[27] The problem was dramatically
demonstrated when a Chinese Song class submarine surfaced-previously
undetected-in the middle of a US carrier battlegroup much too close for comfort
to the
USS Kittyhawk in 2006.
[28]
Nor is this problem new. When the US Navy still possessed
diesel-electric submarines (until 1990), aircraft carrier and major surface
combatants were routinely "sunk" in exercises-unless carrier advocates had the
exercise ruling reversed for the sake of appearances. Indeed, the Navy was so neurotic about
the repetitive success of this bureaucratically disfavored submarine technology
that in the 1980s it declared classified an analysis of exercises demonstrating
their high degree of success written by a congressional staffer in the office of
Senator Gary Hart (D-Colo.) on the Senate Armed Services Committee based on open
source materials. I came across the
memo in a classified-materials safe while working at the General Accounting
Office and was informed the Navy insisted that any public record of the analysis
be suppressed via classification.
In the mid-2000s, the US Navy
was finally rattled enough to start a Diesel-Electric Submarine Initiative
(DESI) with allied navies, such as those of Peru, Columbia, Chile and Brazil,
[29]
to train in anti-submarine warfare and to even lease for two years-complete with
crew-a modern Swedish Gotland class submarine to participate in US Navy
exercises.
[30] The Swedish sub and crew promptly
demonstrated their proficiency by "sinking" a Nimitz class carrier, among other
ships and submarines.
The lease
appears not to have been renewed, even though the Navy continued to have extreme
difficulty in finding the Swedish sub at sea.
[31]
The non-solution of the problem would appear to have been described in 2008 by
the to-be Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert, who demurely
stated "We are not satisfied with [our progress] right now."
[32]
Subsequent to that time, I have
found no public reports of the results of exercises with diesel electric
submarines-suggesting that either the exercises have stopped or the results have
been suppressed.
However, there is
some indirect evidence that the exercises continue,
[33]
as well as indications of
continuing difficulties in locating diesel-electric subs.
[34]
This very serious problem
apparently remains very
unsolved.
The Mine Threat
Diesel electric submarines are
not the US Navy's only undersea problem: in the post-World War Two era 19 US
Navy ships have been sunk or seriously damaged, 15 of them by sea mines.
[35] In the 1980s "tanker war" in the Persian
Gulf, the guided-missile frigate
Samuel
B. Roberts struck a 1908-design Russian mine and was kept afloat only after
heroic damage control efforts by the crew.
In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, the Aegis cruiser
Princeton and the amphibious warship
Tripoli were both seriously damaged by
mines.
The Navy became sufficiently
intimidated by the mine threat laid by Iraq that the Marines cancelled plans for
an amphibious assault against Kuwait city.
[36] Things have not improved since then: in
2012 the Navy conducted join anti-mine exercises with 34 allies in the Persian
Gulf; over 11 days, 24 ships (including eight of the US Navy's paltry fleet of
14 minesweepers
[37])
with 3,000 sailors found only half of the 29 simulated mines laid for the
exercises.
[38]
The Navy asserts that retiring
and not replacing the specialized Avenger class of US mine hunting ships will
result in an increase in anti-mine capabilities with 24 mine-warfare modules
added, at times, to Littoral Combat Ships.
That the capability may increase is entirely theoretical; the LCS mine
countermeasures module has proven extremely problematic,
[39]
and operational testing of it will not even start until 2014.
[40]
It is a real question whether ships not primarily designed for mine hunting with
organic crews that have little to no experience in such specialized tasks (but
augmented by 38 mine specialists
[41])
can outperform the specialized capability-albeit quite limited
[42]-being
retired with the Avenger class.
While the US Navy has ignored
mine warfare, allowing capability to remain inadequate, others have not: China
reportedly has 80,000 sea mines;
[43] Iran has from 2,000 to 3,000, and
worldwide 50 nations have an inventory of 250,000.
[44]
Just as primitive land mines (euphemistically called Improvised Explosive
Devices) made an unpleasant surprise from the start of the Iraq war continuing
to this very day in Afghanistan, sea mines, even primitive ones, constitute a
threat to the US Navy that it has not demonstrated an ability to deal with
effectively.
However, the US Navy is
threatened not just from below the sea, but also from above.
The Air Threat
The first evaluation I was given
when I joined the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the late 1980s
focused on the performance of the Aegis air defense system against anti-ship
cruise missiles.
We found that in
highly
unrealistic, that is to say obliging, tests Aegis generally
performed at a mediocre level against its own criteria, and even though the Navy
classified all but the vaguest and most mundane parts of our assessment,
[45]
it is possible to say, unclassified, that against the more stressful targets in
terms of speed and altitude, the Aegis system performed well below that.
Against the most difficult targets going
at supersonic speeds at very low, sea-skimming altitudes, the test results
were-to put it mildly-depressing:
in tests using surrogates that were both
slower and higher than the Mach 2 Soviet SS-N-22 Sunburn missile,
[46]
it was clear that the Aegis system could not be relied on for an effective
defense of itself or aircraft carriers it was escorting.
Both China and Iran now possess
that missile.
[47]
Moreover, the Sunburn has been
supplanted by the significantly faster and even lower SS-N-27 Sizzler, also now
in the possession of China and Iran.
[48]
More than one Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in the
Pentagon has expressed serious concern that the Navy has not even been able to
replicate the Sizzler in tests.
[49] Worse, Russian arms dealers are now
marketing a version of this missile that can be deployed and used from shipping
containers on merchant ships or littoral craft.
[50]
To make matters still worse, the
Chinese are now developing an additional but very different anti-ship
technology, an anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D. It is also very
problematic to defend against: so problematic that in February 2012, the current
DOT&E reported "No Navy target exists that adequately represents an
anti-ship ballistic missile's trajectory..[the Navy] has not budgeted for any
study, development, acquisition or production" of a DF-21D target.
[51]
Apparently, we do not even know how good or poor our defenses are against this
newer threat; however, previous Aegis performance against high angle, high speed
targets suggests this is a serious problem awaiting solution.
If these very high and very low
altitude, high speed missiles work as intended-and that is always a legitimate
question-the US Navy has a very long way to go to demonstrate that it has the
ability to intercept existing threats.
The threats from these missiles,
sea mines and diesel-electric submarines have all been real and existing for
decades. They have also been
without an effective response from the Navy, which very much seems more
interested in high visibility, high cost show-the-flag forces that are best
usable against enemies like Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq that have little, if
anything, to use against us, and scant will and proficiency to use what they do
have.
Our contemporary wars have
amounted to little more than "clubbing baby seals"
[52]
at sea.
We have been lucky in the
past and escaped with only a few ship casualties; can we expect our luck to
continue?
One would hope that the
Navy is effectively redressing these vulnerabilities, but instead there is
evidence its capability to do so is decreasing.
Troubled Waters: the US Navy
Faces the Consequences of Its Own Decisions
Part 3: Is the Navy's Capability Increasing or
Decreasing?
The prevailing conventional
wisdom holds that America's smaller fleet is more capable due to higher
capability on individual ships. It is a perilous assumption.
Less Able to Fight than Ten
Years Ago
To its credit, in 2010 the Navy
completed
a study of
the surface fleet's manning, training,
and equipment readiness.
The
Balisle Report
[53]
was a brutal assessment:
[54]
ship maintenance went underfunded for years;
[55]
one fifth of the fleet cannot pass inspections; aircraft and ships had junk as
equipment and/or insufficient spare parts;
[56]
fewer than one half of deployed combat aircraft are fully mission capable at any
given time;
[57]
training throughout the surface fleet has been inadequate; ships are
undermanned, and returning ships are canabalized for parts to keep others
running.
[58]
The fleet was in substantially worse shape than it was in 2001. A less
comprehensive report from GAO
[59]
also identified some of these problems and trends.
The prospects for finding the
future funding to address all this are bleak: the Navy plans to put its budget
emphasis on new hardware, not maintenance,
[60]
and is not even certain that the limited funds it does seek for maintenance will
be available.
[61]
In 2012 the Navy claimed it had
made progress in addressing the deficiencies, but one of its biggest defenders
in Congress, Congressman Randy Forbes, R-VA, retorted "The Readiness trends for
full mission capability rates suggest less than satisfactory performance,"
[62]
and Vice Admiral William Burke admitted as much, saying "I am concerned that we
will not properly fund maintenance in the future."
[63] Such worries will only be exacerbated as
maintenance and training are further stressed with continued expanded
deployments in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea and increased operations in the
Pacific.
[64]
The Navy's plans for future
ships may exacerbate the negative readiness trends even further.
In the face of insufficient qualified
sailors for required maintenance at sea,
[65]
the Navy plans to address this kind of problem with "smart ships," such as the
LCS and CVN-78, where technology, not people, provide the maintenance.
The plan is to save money for doing this
by deploying smaller crews, but it may all be very unrealistic: Admiral James J.
Shannon, commander of the Naval Surface Warfare Center told National Defense
magazine, "We realized we went too far [with 'smart ships']. We need more
sailors. We can't handle maintenance, or watch standing.. We are going to
wrestle with that throughout my lifetime and the next generation."
[66]
There is also a survivability
problem with these depleted crews in "smart ships." If one considers the higher
manpower needs of ships in combat for damage control, there may be yet another
area where capability is going backwards.
The question is not when the
Navy will catch up with its readiness problems? It is, will they get even
worse?
Are New Ships More
Capable?
One needs to consider what
additional capability individual new ships, even theoretically, bring to the
fleet. In some respects, there may
be no increase; in others there may be declines.
For example, both Navy
[67]
and public sources estimate the number of aircraft and helicopters carried by
both the older Nimitz
[68]
and the new Ford class
[69]
of aircraft carriers to be from 60 to 90, depending on what is or is not
counted.
Their complement of strike
aircraft is commonly described as up to 60 aircraft.
Clearly, the new (twice as expensive)
Ford class brings no dramatic improvement in the major measure of merit for
aircraft carriers: combat aircraft on board.
However, the new Ford class is
said to be able to generate more sorties of aircraft per hour with its new
electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS),
[70]
but it is not entirely clear it will work as designed when at sea, an issue of
some concern to DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
[71]
However, there is a problem even if EMALS does work and provides the marginal
advantage of launching the same number of aircraft at a faster
rate.
Stealth aircraft are notoriously
bad at generating sorties.
The F-117 was unable to fly more than 0.7 sorties per day in Operation
Desert Storm, on average.
[72] The B-2 was reported to fly only once
every five to seven days in the 1999 Kosovo air war, and while it has never seen
combat, the F-22 flew less than eight hours per month, on average, in 2011.
[73] Even if the "stealthy" F-35C, the Navy's
version of the new Joint Strike Fighter, can improve on the F-22 for
availability, it is highly unlikely to be able to fly more than once every other
day in any sustained combat.
The
ability of the CVN-78 to generate sorties with the F-35 is likely to be less
than that today generated by Nimitz-class carriers with F-18s.
With the F-35's inability to bring any
significant improvement in terms of range, payload and maneuverability,
[74]
the F-35 is unlikely to produce any increase in per sortie capability
[75]
to compensate for its inability to get into the air.
Worse appears to be the case for
the Littoral Combat Ship.
It
clearly offers diminished capability compared to some other navies' frigates,
corvettes and even fast attack boats,
[76]
and it may be a step backward from the US Navy's own FFG-7 frigates.
[77] Indeed, multiple
[78]
news articles
[79]
present a depressing picture of what the LCS is and is not.
[80] DOD's Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation repeatedly termed the LCS and its systems "deficient" in his most
recent assessment, which not coincidentally also reported "LCS is not expected
to be survivable in a hostile combat environment."
[81]
The new high cost aircraft
carriers, Flight III DDG-51 destroyers and Littoral Combat Ships represent the
Navy's vision of its future. It is
an apparition that is unaffordable, unlikely to meet real threats at sea, and
unable to dominate regional powers as thoroughly as some seem to assume in the
"shallow waters" that former Secretary Gates described.
While there are halting
efforts
[82]
in the Navy to produce the riverine and coastal patrol combatants that are also
badly needed for the littorals and could address some of the deficiencies, such
programs do not even rate mention in official shipbuilding plans or commanders'
descriptions of the Navy's future.
Indeed, when the budget pinches harder, they are likely to disappear
altogether.
Conclusion
As pointed out in part 1 of this
series, the Navy is engaging in an unacknowledged program to shrink its own
fleet, and as argued in part 2, it is not effectively addressing existing
serious threats to its own ships.
Current plans for the future do not redress these problems. Even theoretically, there is little if
any improvement to be found in new ships like the CVN-78 and the LCS-even at
added expense. Given the additional
factor of still-declining material readiness in the existing surface fleet, the
future prospect is for general deterioration.
There no visible likelihood of
needed change coming from the top.
Much has been made in Washington about a strategic "pivot" to Asia. The
thinking is exemplified in an essay in
Foreign Affairs magazine, "Strategy in a
Time of Austerity,"
[83] by Col. Andrew F. Krepinevich.
The article is remarkable for its
pervasive expectation of an era of open hostility with China and a virtual
second Cold War becoming the justification for a panoply of high cost naval and
air systems.
A second article in
Foreign Policy magazine, "Sea Change:
The Navy Pivots to Asia,"
[84]
by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert offers some specifics
about the kind of naval systems the "pivot" advocates seek.
Four top priorities are listed for "new
capabilities focused on Asia-Pacific challenges," but they all amount to
business as usual for shipbuilding, complemented by new bases and unmanned
drones.
Threats from anti-ship
missiles are addressed as if they were fully in hand with little real
adjustment, and diesel-electric submarines, mines and riverine and coastal
combatants are not even mentioned.
The "pivot" emerges as little more than a fulcrum to leverage more
spending for business as usual.
If there is, indeed, to be an
era of open hostility with China, the conventional wisdom to address it means an
inadequate-but very expensive-Navy. If the "pivot" is actually just a device
to prompt more spending for favored systems, the Navy will remain vulnerable to
other threats that do exist-at very high cost. In either case, the Navy is on
the wrong track.
When failed presidential
candidate Mitt Romney attacked President Obama for permitting the fleet to
decline to its 1917 size and when Obama and his surrogates retorted that modern
capability more than compensates for the smaller numbers, they all failed to
acknowledge extremely disturbing trends inside the Navy.
Those trends (shrinking, inadequate
forces at unaffordable prices) are replicated in our other military services.
[85] Our political and military leaders are
ignoring these problems.
In fact,
their plan is to make them worse.
[32]
Dan
Taylor, "Antisubmarine Warfare 'No. 1' Priority; Greenert: Navy 'Not Satisfied'
With Progress In
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