ABBAS' SHOCK TREATMENT by Robert Dreyfuss The Nation

ABBAS' SHOCK TREATMENT
by Robert Dreyfuss
The Nation
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/dreyfuss/495650/abbas_shock_treatment

The crisis in US diplomacy with Israel and Palestine was the subject
of an important discussion yesterday at the annual conference of the
Middle East Institute. And the mood was decidedly pessimistic.

Khalil Shikaki, a Brandeis University professor who has conducted more
than 100 polls among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, focused
on the decision by Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian
Authority, not to run for reelection in 2010. The decision by Abbas,
which stunned the political universe in the Middle East, is a sign
that the Obama administration’s Middle East diplomacy has run out of
gas. It’s a surface indicator of the deep anger and unhappiness that
is brewing throughout the Arab world over the administration’s seeming
unwillingness or inability to force Israel to the table with serious
concessions.

Shikaki said that the Abbas’ decision not to run is a “major turning
point” in Palestinian history. “He decided to destabilize the
situation as a way of moving forward,” he said.

For the past several years, said Shikaki, Abbas has scored important
successes, but it was those very successes that, in face of Israeli
intransigence, did him in. First, Abbas achieved important stability
in the institutions of the PA, providing good financial management,
strong institutions, and an end to the virtual anarchy that prevailed
from 2000 until 2006. In 2006, he said, polls showed that just 25
percent of Palestinians felt safe and secure on the West Bank, while
in 2009 more than 60 percent felt secure.

In regard to security, the Abbas administration terminated the freedom
of various Palestinian warlords to operate with impunity, established
an effective military and police chain of command, created a
professional trained class of officers, and brought all of the PA’s
security forces under civilian control. He also improved the justice
system, cracked down on Fatah militants, eliminated the Fatah militia
that operated outside of the PA’s control, and cracked down on Hamas
militants. This latter action was not taken because of Israeli demands
about Hamas, but because of feelings among PA and Fatah officials that
Hamas is a rogue organization. Shikaki’s polls at the recent Fatah
conference revealed that fully 95 percent of Fatah delegates
identified Hamas as a “violent, coup-prone movement.” (Correctly, in
my view.)

In addition, Abbas restored and improved U.S.-Palestinian relations.
Most Palestinians looked favorably on the U.S. role in Israeli-
Palestinian peace talks.

And, said Shikaki, Abbas renewed Fatah itself, casting out much of the
Old Guard at the recently concluded 6th Congress. It was, he said, a
“major transition in Palestinian politics.” Abbas brought back and
reorganized the Fatah central committee and the Fatah Revolutionary
Council as leadership bodies. And he made all of Fatah’s institutions
stronger and better organized, with much more democratic
accountability.

But after all that, Abbas discovered that it wasn’t enough. Indeed, by
refusing to budge, Israel turned all of Abbas’ achievements into dust,
making it seem like the PA was no longer a nationalist, liberation
movement but – as co-panelist Daniel Levy, a former Israeli negotiator
said – turning Fatah into an “occupation-maintenance” organization.

Particularly the coming to power of ultrahardline Bibi Netanyahu in
2009 forced Abbas’ hand. Recently, Abbas made the stunning revelation
public for the first time that in 2008 he had come very close to a
deal with former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Those talks, held in
secret, included the exchange of maps from each side concerning the
final borders of a Palestinian state. But with Netanyahu, none of that
meant anything.

So Abbas has decided to blow everything up. By deciding not to run,
he’s changed his game plan to “destabilization,” Shikaki said.
Initially, he said, Abbas’ plan was to resign as PA president
outright, and he’s still likely to do that soon. If he does, everyone
in the PA will quit, effectively collapsing the system. “His vision is
dead,” said Shikaki. “What he intends to do is to start shocking the
system.”

Precisely because Abbas raised expectations among Palestinians, and
because Fatah’s new institutions are more democratic and accountable,
Abbas could no longer ignore the widespread perception among his
constituents that a Palestinian state was still out of reach. By
“shocking the system” Abbas hopes that he can force the United States
to look more critically at the need for an Israel-Palestine accord,
which will require Washington to turn the screws on its Israeli
partner.