IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance

IAEA Safeguards: Dealing Preventively with Non-Compliance
By Pierre Goldschmidt
July 12, 2008
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In a study commissioned jointly by the Harvard Belfer Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie's Pierre Goldschmidt, formerly Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), presents a multi-stage process that the international community should follow to strengthen the capacity of the IAEA to resolve in a timely manner cases of non-compliance. Drawing upon the cases of North Korea and Iran, Dr. Goldschmidt proposes a generic UN Security Council Resolution and a Model Temporary Complementary Protocol which he argues are necessary to help address the current limitations of the IAEA's verification authority when a non-compliant state does not fully and proactively cooperate with the Agency.

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http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20308