[Salon] In a US-China world, Asean must do more than avoid choosing sides - Guest Post

Simon Tay In a US-China world, Asean must do more than avoid choosing sides Following the uneasy truce at the Xi-Trump summit, Asean must go beyond passive hedging and forge middle-power partnerships to secure its autonomy SCMP Simon Tay is a public intellectual as well as an adviser to major corporations and policymakers. Published: 8:30pm, 25 Sep 2026 The good news is, when US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Washington this week, neither chose confrontation. Amid the high pomp and ceremony, what China has called “constructive strategic stability” continues. Even an uneasy truce in great power relations can be useful. Both recognise the considerable incentive to prevent their economic rivalry from spiralling out of control. Even limited understandings can reduce risks in artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies, and many will look for mechanisms that can stabilise the relationship. But that does not mean an end to competition. Washington and Beijing continue to differ over technology, industrial policy, security and the shape of the international order, while Iran and Taiwan remain fraught topics. They have moved away from the broad tariff war waged last year, but targeted restrictions and industrial measures continue. The contest will play out in efforts to win influence and support across our region. As the Xi-Trump summit ends, and Asean leaders prepare for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in the Philippines, the familiar question arises again: must the region choose between the two? For many years, the answer has been no. Seeking good relations with both and not being drawn too closely into either camp has been the common response. Yet by itself, hedging is no longer sufficient. The challenge for Asean and the wider region is to preserve the ability to make our own choices. There are obvious pressures to align. Security concerns push some countries towards the United States. Economic geography, trade and investment bring others closer to China. Technology restrictions, tariffs, supply-chain policies and defence arrangements can increasingly turn seemingly separate decisions into strategic choices. China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Prak Sokhonn and Cambodia’s Defence Minister General Tea Seiha meeting on April 22 in Phnom Penh. Photo: Handout / Agence Kampuchea Press / AFP) China’s Defence Minister Dong Jun, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Prak Sokhonn and Cambodia’s Defence Minister General Tea Seiha meeting on April 22 in Phnom Penh. Photo: Handout / Agence Kampuchea Press / AFP) Picking a side also carries costs. Consider Cambodia, which has an exceptionally close relationship with China. Yet during Cambodia’s border conflict with Thailand last year, Beijing treated both countries as friends, stressing its impartiality. That was understandable for China, as Thailand matters greatly too. But there is a lesson to draw. A close relationship does not necessarily mean a major power will support you when interests diverge. Similarly, consider the Korean peninsula. South Korea is a formal US treaty. Yet Trump’s renewed interest in diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un led to substantial cuts in the US-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises. Seoul has not been abandoned, but it is a reminder that great powers will do what great powers do. Alignment is no guarantee that interests will coincide when it matters. Yet not choosing is not enough. Nor does this concern only security. US restrictions on advanced semiconductors and other technologies are directed primarily at competition with China, but increasingly affect third countries. Rules of origin and tariffs put Chinese investment and manufacturing throughout Southeast Asia under scrutiny even as China’s presence in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy and digital systems deepens. Decisions about technology, investment and manufacturing therefore acquire geopolitical significance. Simply hedging and refusing to choose does not preserve autonomy. Countries need to create more choices with other powers to exercise autonomy in what I call a “Minus 2” world. From time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together. The possibilities are considerable A Minus 2 world does not mean excluding the US and China. Nor should middle and smaller powers organise a third bloc. The proposition is more modest: from time to time, subtract both the US and China from our mental map and ask what everyone else can do together. The possibilities are considerable. Japan has deep technological and industrial capabilities. South Korea is important in semiconductors, batteries and advanced manufacturing. India has scale and a growing technological base. Europe offers investment, markets and green technologies. Australia has resources, education and security capabilities. Their interests are not identical. Some are US allies. Asean members are diversely oriented. But almost all share one important interest: they do not want every consequential decision to be defined by US-China rivalry. Diversification is often valued in economic terms. Countries and companies diversify markets and suppliers to become more resilient. But there is today a strategic dimension to diversification. A Minus 2 mindset can give smaller countries more choices and agency, and foster more centres of influence. The more either great power pressures others to choose sides, the stronger the incentive for these others to work with one another in a genuinely multipolar world. US President Donald Trump with Asean leaders at the 13th Asean-US summit during the 47th Asean summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 26, 2025. Photo: AFP US President Donald Trump with Asean leaders at the 13th Asean-US summit during the 47th Asean summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on October 26, 2025. Photo: AFP The coming Asean summit brings that into focus. Of course, this is a platform to engage the US and China. But it should also strengthen relationships that give Asean members greater room for manoeuvre. Many other partners will already be around the table, offering a practical application of how Asean thinks about “centrality”. The group must go beyond merely convening meetings at which the two great powers compete for attention. Asean centrality can connect a wider range of countries with one another and advance practical cooperation. There is already an agenda to build on: concluding the Asean Digital Economy Framework Agreement, advancing the Asean power grid and cross-border electricity trading, and strengthening regional supply chains and investment. These are some projects already making progress. They can also provide platforms for deeper partnerships with Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Europe and others, including in AI and digital technologies, green finance and advanced manufacturing. The Xi-Trump truce may give breathing room. But the initiative must be taken by others in Asia, using that space to deepen connections among themselves. Strategic autonomy is not secured simply by refusing to choose. It grows from having more choices and a Minus 2 perspective. The Asean summit is an opportunity to show the region has agency. Simon Tay Simon Tay is a public intellectual as well as an adviser to major corporations and policymakers. He is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, an --