Iran and the P5+1

. This comes to us courtesy of Conflicts Forum via the MEC Analytical Group in London.

MEC Analytical Group

26 November 2010

Iran and the P5+1

Talks between Iran and the the P5+1 [United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany] are due to recommence on 5 December. We are grateful to Conflicts Forum for bringing to our attention the article below, which though published in Farsi is clearly intended partly for a western readership, and which considers Iranian reaction to the international pressure facing Iran. The translation is taken from the Race for Iran website.

From Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett     

 As we look toward a possible renewal of nuclear talks with Iran in early December, we thought it would be worthwhile to take stock of interesting Iranian perspectives on the matter.  In that regard, we were struck by an analytic piece published last week in Kayhan, the principlist newspaper, by Mehdi Mohammadi, with a title that translates as “Changing the Rules of the Game or Adjusting the Goal Posts?”  We thank Mohammad Sagha, an editorial researcher at Foreign Policy, for helping with the translation, though any errors are ours.

 “Changing the Rules of the Game or Adjusting the Goal Posts?”

By Mehdi Mohammadi

 In the match that will soon take place, it is becoming clear that Westerners are in the process of adjusting the placement of the goal posts; representatives of Iran and the P5+1 group will probably meet somewhere in Switzerland or Turkey to negotiate on the 14th of Azar (December 5).  The determining factor of what will take place in these negotiations will directly be linked with the strategy the two sides will carry out.  One of the most important preoccupations of the two sides during these days will be accurate pursuit and analysis of the codes (and signals) that the two sides will transmit to each other.  The codes (signals) that the West has sent so far are deeply disappointing since they are still in the same line as previous strategies—a line which Iran considers to be a default setting for failure in any future negotiations.

 This is the strategy that Westerners call the “dual track” of pressure and negotiation.  The fundamental basis of this strategy is that any dialogue must be accompanied by pressure, and any pressure with dialogue; likewise, from this perspective, pressure without dialogue or dialogue without pressure is useless.  There is no sign that America, as the principal driving engine of the P5+1 group, will change its mind regarding this approach.  Iranian leaders have repeatedly stated that, as long as the West thinks that it can move Iran toward negotiations that suit it, the only result will be that Iran will become more determined to move in the opposite direction.  But there is no sign that there is a change of strategy on the other side [the 5+1 side] of the table.  Now, there are approximately 20 days left until negotiations, and everything that can be analyzed from the signals Westerners are sending is that they are, at most, in the process of adjusting the goal posts and have no intention of accepting new rules for the game.

There are two issues, which if precisely analyzed, will shed more light on this topic.

First—does such a thing as the “dual track” strategy even exist?  The Western side alleges that they are in the process of assessing a strategy that tries to continually increase pressure on Iran and, after each stage of increased pressure, offer Iran a package of incentives.  Robert Gates, as one of the main architects of this strategy, believes that only this course will be able to force Iran, in the long run, to reach the conclusion that pursuing its nuclear program will decrease its security, rather than increase it.  When confronted with this, Iran will presumably revise its calculations regarding the costs and benefits of the nuclear program, reach the conclusion that, all things considered, the current course is costing Iran and therefore revise its course.  This strategy has two important problems that the Western side has never precisely explored.

The first problem we witness is that when we look at the real history of this topic, there is essentially no such thing as a “dual track” approach.  Whatever exists in this vein is America acting to exacerbate the pressure track without a genuine effort to bring about change on the negotiations track.  To make things simpler, the Americans during this time have seriously tried to bring pressure on Iran (although they themselves say: “we have suffered defeat”); however, they have never seriously conducted negotiations.  A clear testament to this is that whenever an opportunity for negotiations and resolving the conflict materializes and grows stronger, the Americans renege at the last second and with great fanfare pursue the “pressure track.”  This is precisely what happened with the Tehran Declaration.  For over three months, America encouraged Turkey and Brazil to initiate diplomatic initiatives with Iran and they accepted the risk of undergoing this, despite Obama’s skepticism.  But when, to Obama’s disbelief, the joint efforts of the three countries produced a completely logical solution, America suddenly snapped and pronounced that it would not accept any of these things and questioned why Turkey and Brazil even reached an agreement with Iran(!)  If America was truly after a negotiated solution, why did it not engage in a dialogue regarding the Tehran Declaration?  If the words of the American analyst (Hillary Mann Leverett, a former member of the U.S. National Security Council) are correct that Obama lied to Lula and Erdoğan from the beginning and had no intention of accepting any proposal, does any room for discussing negotiations even exist?

The second problem is also that the Americans are still unable to correctly analyze the issue that pressure, instead of augmenting the path to negotiation, damages it.  Let us assume—an impossible assumption, but let’s assume it in the realm of imagination—that Iran makes the decision to accept one of America’s proposals.  But when America, six months prior, delivers a resolution that, aside from bringing pressure on the people of Iran and disrupting the order of their lives, it had no other intention, is the implementation of such a decision (accepting an American proposal) possible (for Iran) in terms of national prestige and credibility?  It is clear that the response to this question is no.  When the pressure track is enacted, the Iranian spirit—which apparently Westerners have not been able to understand even superficially—naturally moves to the conclusion that “pressure must be answered with pressure”.  The first step will be the rejection of all of the proposals that the Westerners put on the table, because accepting any type of offer will be evaluated as surrender in the face of pressure and a result of increased pressure.  If the Western side can comprehend this dynamism, it will understand that the strategy of pressure by itself will absolutely not affect Iran in the sense of resolving the issue in this manner, and even worse than this, the negotiation track—which, if there is hope that this issue can be resolved it is through this path—will have been wrecked and eliminated.  It is with this logic that the conclusion can be reached that the dual track strategy of “pressure-negotiation”, in its essence, is contradictory and paradoxical and that the further it progresses, the more it will fail.

The second point is that when the West says it wants to change Iran’s calculations, the question that is posed is whether there is actually a fundamentally correct understanding of Iran’s calculus?  Occasionally, news and analysis published from official Western sources shows that Western understanding of the Iranian side’s pattern and calculations is, to a comical extent, imprecise and elementary.  An example of this which is extremely indicative—and has for sometime occupied the mind of this author—is that Westerners in very high levels say that their goal, with closing the accounts and forbidding the travel of key elites involved in the Iranian nuclear and missile programs, is to have them reach the conclusion that continuing the nuclear and missiles programs of Iran will place their “interests” in danger and will make their lives more difficult; this will supposedly bring about a context in which these elites will feel it is better to stop the pursuit of nuclear and missile programs so that they will not be further harmed!  You may not believe this but a sizeable number of Western elites tied to this issue, when asked to explain why they believe that putting a few names on a sanctions list will stop a program which has been tied in with the national identity of the Iranian nation, responded using the same exact logic (of applying pressure on individuals as proposed in the question)! 

This type of outlook comes from extreme and destructive ignorance.  Do people in Washington who have labeled themselves as “strategists” truly expect that prohibiting the travelling or transactions of the Isfahan UCF project director will make him halt the entire project?!  Or, for example, will characterizing six commanders as “human rights violators” on a sanctions list for their hard work in quelling the sedition in ‘88 [the 2009 post-election riots] decrease their motivations in inhibiting further sedition?!  When the condition of American strategic analysis and policy makers is in this state, there should be no surprise that they cannot understand Iran’s calculations regarding nuclear and regional plans.

The calculations of Iran, which is incomprehensible to the mentality of materialist or lazy Westerner observers, are extremely transparent as well as deep, and precise.  If the Western side cannot clarify its position regarding that, entering any kind of negotiation, it is clear even now, will bear no result.  If we want to just present a list of Iran’s [true] calculus, we can summarize the situation as such:  Iran, without nuclear arms, is the number one power in the Middle East; any degree of stability or instability from the contours of the Mediterranean region to the borders of India relates to [Iran’s] decisions or is directly determined by it.  Iran has no intention for any war and believes no one else dares to initiate war with it.  Iran will not, under any cost, relinquish its nuclear enrichment because any government that would do so in Iran will face eternal disgrace and accusations of selling off Iran’s future and will never be able to lift its head in the country’s domestic political environment ever again.

Can the Westerners clarify their positions in relation to these strategic propositions in 20 days?