Israeli Paralysis Calls for Arab Action by Dr. James J. Zogby

February 23, 2009
Dr. James J. Zogby (c)
President
Arab American Institute



Israeli Paralysis Calls for Arab Action


Some elections serve as clarifying moments in a nation's
history, others resolve little and serve only as a reflection of
internal division. The former provide direction, the latter create
paralysis.

The recently completed Israeli elections and ongoing
deliberations over to the shape of the next government serve to
demonstrate the profound divisions that exist in Israel and the
dysfunctional state of its political system.

As is widely known, the current governing coalition lost
its mandate. The lead party, Kadima led by Tzipi Livni, a centrist
configuration (by Israeli calculations), was comprised of an amalgam
of individuals spun-off from Likud and Labor. They declined from 29 to
28 seats. Kadima's coalition partner, Labor, dropped from 19 seats to
13. And Meretz, a more leftist party (not in the coalition but
supportive of peace efforts), lost support, going from 5 to a mere 3
seats.

This gives the Zionist center-left a total of 44 seats -
far short of the 61 needed to form a government. But this is only part
of the story. Post-election analysis suggests suggested that while
Kadima was initially seen as Likud-lite (after all, its founder was
Ariel Sharon), it was viewed by voters in this election as a horse of
a different color. It is estimated that about 70% of the last-minute
support garnered by Livni's grouping came from Labor and Meretz voters
hoping to block a Netanyahu victory. All this may be academic, but is
still useful in order to understand the constraints that this will
impose on Livni and the strong push that will be made to merge Kadima
and Labor as an opposition bloc.

The right won, to be sure, but not without complications
of their own. Netanyahu's Likud won 27 seats, with some of his party's
most extreme members in leadership roles. Next in line was Avigdor
Lieberman's Yisrael Beiteinu party with 15 seats. Lieberman, a former
Likudnik, launched Yisrael Beiteinu to exploit the resentments of
Israel's sizable Russian immigrant community. Shas, a religious party
of Sephardic Jews garnered 11 seats, followed by a number of smaller
groupings representing hard-line nationalist and religious parties
which will hold a combined 12 seats.

The Arab parties and Hadash - a coalition of communists
and Israeli-Arab leftist groups (the communists once serving as a
substitute nationalist party for Israel's Arabs) garnered 11 seats.

Israel's problem is both political and demographic. The
"Jewish State" isn't just Jewish, nor is it in agreement on what it
means to be Jewish, with deep divisions between the ultra-orthodox and
the nationalists. And demographically speaking, with 20% Arabs, 20%
Russians, and 20% Orthodox, you have the makings of a dysfunctional
brew.

So Netanyahu won, but what exactly did he win? And how
does he govern, given the difficult choices he must face in forming a
coalition.

Since right-wing parties hold 65 seats, it might appear
easy to cobble together a government of the like-minded. But the
religious-secular divide is deep and, at times, ugly. The orthodox
will make demands for special consideration by the state that
Lieberman and other ultra-nationalists will reject.

At the same time, Netanyahu, though a hard-line
nationalist, is a savvy (some say dissembling) political leader,
keenly aware of Israel's international standing and image. He knows
that the Obama Administration has committed itself, as George Mitchell
has recently noted, not to a "process," but to the realization of a
two-state solution, and so will not countenance obstructionist
behavior. Nor will the European Union. Netanyahu, therefore, might
prefer a coalition with Yisrael Beiteinu and Kadima - choosing the
latter for political cover in much the same manner that Ariel Sharon
used Shimon Peres. Such a coalition would do little and be, itself,
dysfunctional (though for different reasons) than the coalition of the
right.

No matter how you add it up, the numbers aren't going to
yield either a majority for a clear direction, or peace.

All of this should move the Arabs to act. Instead of
accepting this Israeli paralysis and dysfunctionality as a
justification for their own, Arab leadership can seize the high ground
and establish themselves as the partners for peace, pushing Israel and
the U.S. to make the next moves.

Given Mitchell's recent indication that the Obama
Administration would, unlike its predecessor, work with a Palestinian
government of national unity, efforts must be made to move in that
direction. Hamas' leadership should be pressed (and shamed) into
joining such a unity effort on its well-known terms - forswearing
violence and accepting agreements already entered into by the
Palestinian Authority.

Such an agreement would put Netanyahu on a difficult
course with Washington over such issues as: ending the blockade of
Gaza, stopping West Bank settlement expansion and land confiscations,
and being asked to make the same commitments to honor past agreements
and forswear violence, while entering into good-faith negotiations on
"land for peace."

Given Netanyahu's penchant for attempting to change the
debate, as in the 90s he worked to shift the discussion he 90s it was
from "land for peace" to "security and combating incitement." now he
intends to substitute "economic growth" for making peace. He will want
to obfuscate and stall Mitchell's efforts - complaining of his own
government's paralysis. And under cover of this obfuscation, he will
continue to take unilateral measures that will solidify Israeli
control over Palestinian lands and lives.
This is a moment Arabs can seize, and an opportunity to
take control of the debate. This opportunity should not be missed.