Assessing Motives in Tehran

http://www.cfr.org/publication/18588/assessing_motives_in_tehran.html

Assessing Motives in Tehran

Author:
Frank Procida, National Intelligence Fellow

February 23, 2009

Analysts of all political stripes, including, most importantly, members of
the new U.S. president's foreign policy team, seem to agree that Iran is
striving to build the bomb. Why else would a state risk further economic
isolation, or worse, to develop nuclear-related technologies whose output
it could pursue more cheaply and easily on the open market? But as the
foreign policy cognoscenti argue the merits of enhanced sanctions
packages, grand bargains, and military options in changing Tehran's
behavior, it is worth reconsidering the question of whether Iran even
plans to develop nuclear weapons, and how certain anyone outside of
Iranian decision-making circles can be of that answer.

The controversial 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, which found that
Iran halted its nuclear weapons program four years earlier, appears to
have been all but forgotten. Regardless, more instructive is the inverse
of that report's central point; in order to halt a program it must first
exist, a fact that suggests the intelligence community has significant
evidence that Tehran, at one point at least, authorized the development of
nuclear weapons.

Beyond the estimate, all that is known publicly is that Iran has a history
of hiding sensitive nuclear sites from the International Atomic Energy
Agency and that Tehran has yet to answer the agency's questions on what
are known as the "alleged studies"--documents said to indicate Iran
attempted to develop a ballistic missile re-entry vehicle capable of
carrying a nuclear warhead. This lack of transparency has fueled the
charges of those who dismiss Tehran's denials of wrongdoing. The IAEA's
latest report is a case in point, revealing that Tehran understated by
about one-third the amount of bomb quality uranium it has enriched,
meaning it could very likely produce a bomb with current stocks if it
chose.

"An unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran¢s seemingly self-destructive
behavior today."

Still, probably more important to most observers than uncertain
intelligence and games of cat and mouse is simple logic; all experts agree
that Iran's desire to enrich uranium to produce nuclear fuel makes little
sense from an economic or energy perspective. Russia has agreed to provide
enriched uranium for Iran's only existing, and not yet operational, power
plant, and fuel for any future plants could be similarly acquired on the
open market. Indeed, the EU-led overtures to Iran have included such
guarantees. Moreover, Iran's efforts to produce this fuel are not only
premature but are costly and inefficient, wiping away the economic
benefits Tehran supposedly hopes to reap by developing nuclear power
plants in the first place. Adding the negative economic and political
consequences of sanctions to the mix only makes Iran's nuclear policy more
senseless unless the program is meant as a cover or hedge for weapons
development.

As tempting as it may be to accept such wisdom, the West's experience in
assessing the motives behind Iraq's behavior under sanctions should give
pause; sometimes actions that appear irrational--say, enduring crippling
economic sanctions and inviting a war to uphold the veneer of a WMD
capability--have a rationale that is unrecognizable to outsiders. It was
not tales of mobile biological labs and mistaken assessments of aluminum
tubes that led to the Bush administration's excessive confidence in Iraq's
guilt--although these collection and analytic lapses certainly did not
help. Rather, it was a gut feeling that Iraq's intransigence, and its
ensuing costs and risks, only made sense if Baghdad was harboring weapons
it felt it needed to ensure its survival. In reality, Saddam did view such
weapons as vital, so much so that his regime risked everything to maintain
the mirage it still possessed them. While Saddam's calculation was
wrong--in fact the ploy brought on the outcome he hoped it would
prevent--the thinking at least becomes understandable when viewed from the
Iraqi perspective.

Similarly, an unexpected reasoning might exist for Iran's seemingly
self-destructive behavior today. Investing in nuclear technology for
energy production does make some sense for Iran, a country with a growing
population that imports more than 40 percent of its refined petroleum.
Diversifying its energy needs also could, in theory at least, free up
crude oil for Iran to export. After all, no credible analyst is
questioning the United Arab Emirates' motives in seeking nuclear plants,
despite ranking sixth worldwide in proven oil reserves. Citing Iran's
massive reserves to prove the absurdity of an Iranian nuclear energy
program is therefore pointless.

There may even be a legitimate motive behind Iran's dogged pursuit of a
domestic enrichment capability, a much more alarming policy. While it is
true that the West has offered fuel guarantees that would negate the need
for a costly enrichment program, Tehran would have reason to doubt the
sanctity of such promises. The nuclear dispute is but one of many areas of
contention between Iran and the West, and it would not be unreasonable for
Tehran to expect nuclear-related deals to dissipate in the event of future
flare-ups involving Hezbollah. Given how sanctions have crippled other
important industries in Iran, why leave something as essential as energy
production vulnerable to outside suppliers?

"It might be worth spending a bit of time contemplating whether the
unbearable outcome the West is desperately trying to prevent even exists
as an option in the minds of Iranian decision-makers."

Domestic politics also should not be dismissed as a driver of Tehran's
nuclear policy. Iran remains autocratic, but even its recent election
results support the maxim that all politics is local. Although it would be
foolish to grant them too much credibility, most published poll results
show that a large majority of Iranians support the nuclear program and are
opposed to compromise. The issue appears to have become one of national
pride, with the ordinary Iranian, regardless of his or her opinion of the
ruling regime, viewing Western efforts to constrain its nuclear
development as hypocritical at best and malicious at worst. The already
unpopular mullahs could fear further backlash if they were seen as
abandoning technological development because of outside pressure. It would
be short-sighted to expect Iranian leaders to share the West's assumptions
that its promises are reliable, and raw domestic political calculations
could have a greater influence over Iranian policymaking than generic
concerns about the country's overall economic health.

The lack of any serious debate on the question of Iran's intentions is
somewhat stunning, given that the United States remains mired in a war
caused in part by the failure to accurately forecast Iraq's weapons
capabilities. President Bush himself has expressed disappointment at his
administration's failures regarding the Iraqi WMD case, and the U.S.
intelligence community, judging by the tone of the 2007 NIE, appears to be
similarly chastened. All the more surprising then that outside analysts,
even those opposed to the more hawkish options being floated to deal with
the problem, appear willing to assume the worst when it comes to Iran's
intentions.

The consequences of a deepening rift with Iran are unknown but scary--an
unleashed Hezbollah, further Iranian meddling in Iraq and Afghanistan,
potential missile attacks against U.S. allies in the region, and
skyrocketing oil prices. Some observers believe that if Iran acquired a
nuclear "guarantee" it would become even more mischievous than it is today
and for that reason alone the country must not be allowed to cross the
nuclear threshold. Others argue that whatever plans Tehran now has for its
nuclear program are irrelevant, since intentions are subject to change. In
such a view, capabilities are all that matter. But before risking such
costly consequences, it might be worth spending a bit of time
contemplating whether the unbearable outcome the West is desperately
trying to prevent even exists as an option in the minds of Iranian
decision-makers.

The writer is the National Intelligence Fellow at the Council on Foreign
Relations.