Jordan and the 'last chance conference'
By Oraib Al-Rantawi
Commentary by
Monday, November 12, 2007
Of all the countries in the region, Jordan has been the most
enthusiastic and active in the course of the past two years in calling
to exploit what could be considered "the last chance for peace in the
region." This position gained additional momentum following US
President George W. Bush's speech last July in which he expressed his
desire to host an "international meeting" for peace this autumn.
The Jordanian perspective, which supports the Bush initiative, is
based on a number of considerations of which two are particularly
important. First, solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in its
various aspects and establishing a viable Palestinian state is a goal
in and of itself that will positively impact both Jordan's and the
region's security and stability. And second, solving this conflict
will contribute to enhancing the position of the Arab moderate camp
and lessening the influence of extremist forces in the region - Iran,
Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas and radical fundamentalist movements - that
are considered by decision-making institutions in Jordan as threats to
both Jordanian national security and regional stability.
Like the Palestinian Authority and some Arab countries, Jordan
believes that the conference should come up with a document that
outlines a clear plan to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and
sets out a series of steps necessary to establish a viable Palestinian
state and ensure Israel's security.
But Jordan's great enthusiasm for the conference is accompanied by
caution and wariness regarding the consequences of once again missing
an opportunity for peace. Recently it was noticed that official
Jordanian statements accompanying the faltering preliminary
negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis tend to lower
expectations and repeatedly warn of the risks arising from the failure
of the Annapolis conference, which would affect the entire region and
not only Palestinians and Israelis.
Some Jordanian newspapers have recently expressed surprise at the
optimistic climate generated by certain Palestinian officials
concerning Annapolis. They wonder whether the Palestinians are
planning to present the Jordanian leadership with an "Oslo-2-like"
surprise that could jeopardize Jordan's interests in final settlement
negotiations. This has prompted some journalists and newspapers to
talk about "coldness" in relations between Mahmoud Abbas, president of
the Palestinian National Authority, and the Jordanian leadership.
Jordanian political sources identify Jordan's basic interests in final
settlement negotiations as the refugee issue, Jerusalem, security
arrangements, water and the future of economic cooperation. Jordan
hosts 40 percent of all Palestinian refugees, who account for more
than half its population. It is committed to guard religious and holy
sites in East Jerusalem under the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. It
is interested in the water issue due to its financial deficit, and in
economic cooperation and financial assistance that would enable it to
rehabilitate a large portion of Palestinian refugees. This is in
addition of course to issues of common security in light of the
dangers resulting from the growing role of fundamentalist forces and
Islamic movements in Jordan, Palestine and the rest of the region.
Given all these considerations, there is a growing interest in Jordan
in the preliminary negotiations now in progress between Palestinians
and Israelis, accompanied by growing concern over their possible
failure. There are also warnings of the consequences of ignoring
Jordan's interests in the final settlement, accompanied by calls to
engage Jordan in the negotiations at an early stage so that it can
explain its position, present its demands and defend its interests.
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Jordan also views the Annapolis conference from a regional perspective
as an expression of moderate Arabs' joint interest in pursuing
regional peace and dealing with extremists who are trying to impose
their agenda on the region. In this context, Jordanian diplomacy
prefers to coordinate its steps with those Arab parties now joined in
the "Arab quartet," which in addition to Jordan comprises Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, the Palestinian Authority and the
Lebanese government.
Jordanian diplomacy also seeks to guarantee the support of a large
number of Islamic countries for the Annapolis conference, with the aim
of providing an Arab and Islamic "safety net" for Palestinian
negotiators. This explains the phone calls and visits of Jordan's King
Abdullah with the leaders of Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan, with the
aim of encouraging them to participate in the autumn conference.
Decision-making circles in Jordan believe that the success of the
Annapolis conference in taking steps along the path to a final
settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would remove the
"Palestinian card" from the political auction block, where it is used
for purposes that serve the interests of parties from Iran and Syria
to Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda and that neglect and often contradict the
interests of the Palestinian people.
Jordanian diplomacy seems convinced that wide circles in the US
administration, specifically in the State Department, share the
Jordanian and moderate Arab vision that stresses the need to solve the
Palestinian issue in all its aspects, regardless of the direction of
American policy in Iraq, the outcome of the Iranian nuclear program
crisis or the state of relations between Washington and Tehran.
Although Jordanian decision-making circles take into consideration
that the United States might have a hidden agenda behind its call to
hold the Annapolis conference - one seeking to mobilize Islamic and
Arab countries' support for the US in Iraq and/or in its confrontation
with Iran - these circles think that Annapolis is an opportunity that
should be seized regardless.
For all these reasons, Jordanian diplomacy is paying special attention
to Annapolis. It seeks through various channels to help both the
Palestinians and Israelis reach a common document as a basis for a
final settlement. It also believes, for the same reasons, that the
failure of the conference to reach the desired results will strengthen
the position of Hamas against Abbas in Palestine as well as that of
Hizbullah and its allies in fighting Siniora's government and its
allies in Lebanon. Failure will also strengthen the position of Iran
and the influence of forces of extremism and fanaticism, giving them
new pretexts to pursue their activities and win the support and
sympathy of the frustrated and angry Arab and Islamic public.
Oraib Al Rantawi is a media columnist and director of Al-Quds Center
for Political Studies in Amman. This commentary first appeared at
bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsle
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