Arab Digest. org - Iraq’s Water Crisis guest post

Iraq’s Water Crisis Summary: Iraq’s water security is poor and – absent urgent action – is set to get much worse. We are grateful to Greg Shapland for the posting below. He is a writer on environmental affairs (including water), climate change, politics and security in the MENA region. He was Head of Research Analysts in the FCO (now FCDO) from 2010-13 and is currently a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Middle East Centre, LSE. In many years, Iraq doesn’t have enough water to meet all the needs of its economy. Allocations of water to agriculture – which uses almost 80% of the country’s supply – often have to be cut in summer when river flows are low. Rice, a notoriously “thirsty” crop, is the usual victim. A report written by the present author and funded by the FCDO makes it clear that this situation has multiple causes. Over 90% of Iraq’s water comes from outside the country. Three-quarters of the water which reaches Iraq via rivers that rise in Türkiye or Iran comes from Türkiye; around 11% comes from Iran and 5% from Syria. This dependence on sources beyond Iraq’s borders makes the country very vulnerable. [photo credit: Ribale Sliman-Haidar] Türkiye has been taking much more water out of these transboundary rivers than has Iran. Flows down the Euphrates into Iraq have suffered as a result. But Iranian use has had a very harmful impact on some parts of Iraq, notably eastern Kurdistan, Diyala Governorate and Basra. Not only has there been a fall in the volume of water flowing into Iraq from Türkiye and Iran – the quality of the water has declined as well. This is important, as water polluted beyond a certain point cannot be safely used. Iraq’s growing water crisis has another cause, too, namely, the extreme inefficiency with which water is used in Iraq. Iraq’s water security looks set to get even more precarious in future. There are six main reasons for this. The first is that Türkiye’s use of water from the Tigris and Euphrates will increase as its South-East Anatolia Project (GAP) proceeds. The next leap in Turkish use of transboundary water will come when the irrigation schemes associated with the Cizre dam on the Tigris come into operation within the next few years. The second reason is that Iran’s extractions will also increase: Iran hasn’t yet exhausted the full potential to use the water which still flows into Iraq. Thirdly, reconstruction in Syria, when it happens, will mean the use of more water from the Euphrates and to a lesser extent from the Tigris. Fourthly, the increased use for irrigation by upstream countries (Türkiye, Syria and Iran) will further undermine water quality. The fifth reason is the looming monster of climate change. Projections suggest that, by 2050, there could be a 20-30% reduction in the flow of rivers entering Iraq. Moreover, higher temperatures will mean greater losses of water to evaporation, while crops will need more water per unit of output. Lastly, within Iraq, population growth, reconstruction and economic development will all create more demand. There will be stiffer competition for less water. What can Iraq do about all this? In terms of getting its upstream neighbours to allow more water to flow into Iraq on a permanent basis, perhaps not much. Türkiye has professed itself willing to negotiate with Iraq but only on its own terms. Baghdad has been able to get Ankara to provide Iraq with more water at times of severe shortage but Iraq has had to be sure to ask politely. And such provision is temporary and leaves Türkiye in full control of the flow of the Euphrates and Tigris into Iraq. Until very recently, Iran had simply declined to engage with Iraq in any serious way over transboundary water. It is too soon to tell whether an apparent change of attitude displayed during the Baghdad Water Conference in May by the Iranian Minister of Energy, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, represents a breakthrough or just some fine-sounding but hollow words. Iraq might be able to offer incentives to Türkiye and Iran to make nice over water. What both Ankara and Tehran would most value from Baghdad would be the suppression of Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq. But this is in Erbil’s gift rather than Baghdad’s – and Iraqi Kurdish leaders would find it politically impossible to act against their fellow Kurds. Alternatively, Baghdad could offer Türkiye discounted oil and gas. This would probably only be acceptable to Ankara – if at all – as a temporary measure until Türkiye’s economy has recovered from its present difficulties. Iraq doesn’t have a military option either. Both Türkiye and Iran are stronger militarily than Iraq. And Iran has penetrated the Iraqi political system so thoroughly that no Iraqi government could take measures against Iran over water – or anything else for that matter. Legal remedies might seem appealing. But neither Türkiye nor Iran has acceded to the relevant UN conventions on the subject. And there are no agreements covering the whole of the basin or even three out of the four riparian states. The threat by Iraq’s then Minister of Water to take Iran to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over water in 2021 was not backed by the rest of the Baghdad government and has turned out to be empty rhetoric. The situation is rapidly reaching the point of no return. That is, Türkiye and Iran will soon have put in place all the dams and irrigation schemes which, from their perspective, make economic sense. Iraq will then be unable to do more than to try to persuade Türkiye and Iran to operate their dams in ways which guarantee a certain level of flow in the rivers they share. So far, there has been no sign of willingness on the part of either country to offer such guarantees. In years of low flow, it is likely that Ankara and Tehran will prioritise their own needs over those of Iraq. Given the likelihood of lower flows from its upstream neighbours in future, the most effective thing Iraq could do to enhance its water security would be to improve the efficiency of its irrigated agriculture. There is undoubtedly plenty of scope for improvement, Iraqi irrigation techniques having hardly advanced since Sumerian times. However, formidable obstacles stand in the way of such an endeavour, notably a lack of capacity among officials in both central and provincial government, governmental dysfunction and incoherence more generally and endemic corruption. If Iraq can successfully address these challenges, it will still be able to save something of its agricultural sector. If not, then the prospects for farming in this part of the ancient Fertile Crescent will be poor indeed. Food insecurity could be added to water insecurity.