Still at War: The United States in the Sahel

Still at War: The United States in the Sahel Comment by Todd Pierce I am not always in agreement with Just Security as too often they take an aggressive interventionist position for US foreign policy. But this is exactly on point in identifying the “cascade dynamic” which the US has used so often as “foreign policy,” such as when Marines were brought to Vietnam, then they needed an airbase, then Marine patrols to protect the airbase . . . We’re like the camel who gets its head into the tent, then . . . BLUF: "In the context of my Crisis Group research, former U.S. officials characterized the airbase at Agadez as a direct action facility in search of a mission. (“Direct action” is a term that encompasses lethal action, such as through drone strikes, and capture operations.) Another former official explained that basing for strike aircraft is the “untold story of U.S. direct action” in the war on terror. This official described a cascade dynamic in which first U.S. forces are deployed on an “advise, assist, and accompany” mission, which then increases the perceived threat to those U.S. forces as their numbers grow, creating a perceived need for air assets to protect the U.S. troops, an airbase is built, and then inevitably the newly available aircraft are used for strikes, often under the rubric of “self-defense” or “collective self-defense” of partner forces. Indeed, “collective self-defense” strikes against alShabaab in Somalia, beginning in 2015, were only possible because of the availability of such air assets. . . . "Yet, the testimony of executive branch witnesses at a recent hearing before the House Foreign Affairs Committee suggests that the administration is not yet prepared to seriously engage with Congress on durably curtailing the war by revising and carefully tailoring the expansive and outdated text of the 2001 AUMF. > > "That is a mistake. To forestall another twenty years of the war on terror, the administration should be more transparent about how it currently interprets the 2001 AUMF and more earnestly devote itself to working with Congress on concrete measures to rein in this antiquated war authorization. For its part, Congress should reclaim its war powers so that it, rather than the executive branch, determines against whom and where the United States is at war and imposes a sunset on any future use of force authorization. > > "Without such legislative reform, the White House will bequeath to another administration the loaded weapon of the 2001 AUMF. If the history of the war on terror is any guide, the Sahel may be its next battlefield."