Uri
Avnery
September 30,
2016
Abu-Mazen's Balance Sheet
MAHMOUD ABBAS was not present at my first meeting with Yasser
Arafat during the siege of Beirut in the First Lebanon War. That was, it
may be remembered, the first meeting ever between Arafat and an
Israeli.
Some
months later, in January 1983, a meeting was set up between Arafat and the
delegation of the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace,
consisting of (retired) General Matti Peled, former Director General of
the Treasury Yaakov Arnon and myself.
At
Tunis airport, a PLO official asked us to meet with Abbas before meeting
with Arafat himself. Abbas was in charge of relations with Israelis. Until
then I had heard about him only from the two senior PLO members with whom
I had conducted secret talks – Said Hamami (who was murdered) and Issam
Sartawi (who was murdered).
My
first impression of Abu Mazen (the nom-de-guerre of Abbas) was that he was
very different from Arafat, that he was indeed the total opposite. Arafat
was a warm person, flamboyant, extrovert, touching, hugging. Abbas is a
cool person, introvert, matter-of-fact. (Mazan, by the way, is Hebrew for
"balance sheet")
Arafat
was the perfect national liberation leader, and took care to look that
way. He always wore a uniform. Abbas looks like a high-school principal
and always wears a European suit.
WHEN
ARAFAT founded Fatah at the end of the 1950s in Kuwait, Abbas was one of
the first who joined. He is one of the "founders".
That
was not easy. Almost all the Arab governments disliked the new-born group,
which claimed to speak for the Palestinian people. At the time, each Arab
government claimed to represent the Palestinians itself and tried to
exploit the Palestinian cause for its own purposes. Arafat and his people
took that cause out of their hands, and were therefore persecuted all over
the Arab world.
After
that first meeting with Abbas, I met him on all my visits to Tunis. I
conferred first with Abbas, discussing plans for possible actions to
promote peace between our two peoples. When we had agreed on possible
initiatives, Abbas would say: "Now we shall submit this to the
Ra'is."
We
moved to Arafat's office and put forward the proposals we had devised.
When we had hardly finished, Arafat would say "Yes" or "No" without the
slightest hesitation. I was always impressed by his quickness of mind and
his capacity for making decisions. (One of his Palestinian opponents told
me once: "He is the leader because he is the only one courageous enough to
make decisions.")
In the
presence of Arafat, Abu-Mazen's place was clear: Arafat was the leader who
made the decisions, Abbas was an advisor and assistant, like all the other
"Abus" – Abu-Jihad (who was murdered), Abu-Iyad (who was murdered) and
Abu-Alaa (who is still alive).
On one
of my visits to Tunis, I was asked to do a personal favor: to bring Abbas
a book about the Kasztner trial. Abu-Mazen was writing a doctoral thesis
for a university in Moscow about the cooperation between Nazis and
Zionists – a theme very popular in Soviet times. (Israel Kasztner was a
Zionist functionary when the Nazis invaded Hungary. He tried to save Jews
by negotiating with Adolf Eichmann.)
ARAFAT
DID not send Abbas to Oslo, because Abbas was already too recognizable.
Instead he sent Abu-Alaa, the unknown financial expert of the PLO. The
entire operation was initiated by Arafat, and I assume that Abbas had a
part in it. In Israel, there was a quarrel between Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon
Peres (who died this week) and Yossi Beilin about who deserved the glory,
but the Oslo initiative actually came from the Palestinian side. The
Palestinians initiated, the Israelis reacted. (That explains, by the way,
the sad story of the Oslo agreement.)
As I
have already pointed out in a previous article, the Nobel Prize committees
awarded the peace prize to Arafat and Rabin. Peres' friends around the
world raised hell, so the committee added Peres to the list. Justice
demanded that Abbas, too, should receive the prize, but the Nobel statutes
allow only for three laureates. So Abbas did not get the prize. That was a
glaring injustice, but Abbas kept quiet.
When
Arafat returned to Palestine, all the festivities were held for him. That
evening, when I made my way among the delirious crowds around Arafat’s
temporary HQ in Hotel Palestine, Abbas was nowhere to be
seen.
Afterwards Abbas remained in the shadows. Obviously, he got
other tasks and was no longer in charge of contacts with Israelis. I saw
Arafat many times, and twice I served as a "human shield" in his Ramallah
office, when Ariel Sharon threatened his life. I saw Abbas only two or
three times (I remember a picture: once, when Arafat insisted on taking
the hands of my wife Rachel and me and led us to the entrance of the
building, we came across Abbas. We shook hands, exchanged civilities, and
that was that.)
Rachel
and Abbas were of the same age and both had spent much of their childhood
in Safed. Her father had a clinic on Safed's Mount Canaan and once we
speculated if as a boy Abbas had been treated by him.
WHEN
ARAFAT DIED (murdered, I believe), Abbas was his natural successor. As a
founding member, he was acceptable to everyone. Farouk Kaddoumi, of equal
rank, is an adherent of the Baath regime in Damascus and rejected Oslo. He
did not return to Palestine.
I met
Abbas at Arafat's mourning ceremony at the Mukata'a. He sat next to the
chief of Egyptian intelligence. After we shook hands, I saw from the
corner of my eye that he tried to explain to the Egyptian who I
am.
Since
then, Abbas has served as the president of the "Palestinian National
Authority". This is one of the most difficult jobs on
earth.
A
national government under occupation is compelled to tread a very narrow
line. It can fall any minute on one side (collaboration with the enemy) or
on the other side (suppression by the occupation authorities).
At the
age of 17, when I was a member of the Irgun, my company held a mock trial
for Philippe Petain, the marshal put by the Nazis at the head of the Vichy
government functioning under Nazi rule in "unoccupied" Southern France.
My job
was to "defend" Petain. I said that he was a French patriot, who tried to
save what could be saved after the collapse of France and to ensure that
France would be still there at the hour of victory.
But
when victory came, Petain was condemned to death and saved only by the
wisdom of his enemy, Charles de Gaulle, the leader of Free
France.
There
is no possibility of safeguarding freedom under occupation. Anyone trying
to do so finds himself on a slippery slope, trying to satisfy the occupier
and to protect his people from harm. In the course of the years the Vichy
regime was compelled to collaborate with the Germans, step by step, from
the persecution of the underground to the expulsion of the Jews.
Moreover, where there is an authority, even under occupation,
interest groups spring up. Some people acquire an interest in the status
quo and support the occupation. Pierre Laval, an opportunist French
politician, rose to the top in Vichy, and quite a lot of French people
gathered around him. In the end, he was executed.
NOW
ABBAS finds himself in a similar situation. An impossible situation. He
plays poker with the occupation authorities, when they hold all the four
aces, and he has in his hand nothing but one minor
card.
He
sees his job as guarding the occupied Palestinian population until the day
of deliverance – until the day Israel is compelled to give up the
occupation in all its forms – the settlements, the stealing of the land,
the oppression.
Compelled to give up – but how?
Abbas
objects to the violent resistance ("terrorism"). I believe that he is
right in this. Israel has a huge army, the occupation has no moral brakes
(see: Elor Azaria). The acts of the "martyrs" may reinforce the national
pride of the Palestinian population, but they make the occupation worse
and lead nowhere.
Abbas
has adopted a strategy of international action. He is investing a large
part of his resources in achieving a pro-Palestinian UN resolution, a
resolution that will condemn the occupation and the settlements and
recognize Palestine as a full-fledged UN member. At this moment, Binyamin
Netanyahu is afraid that President Obama might use the two months of
irresponsibility - between election day and the end of his term of office
– to let such a resolution pass.
So
what? Will this reinforce in any way the world's struggle against the
Israeli occupation? Will this lower by one dollar the US aid to Israel? In
the past, successive Israeli governments have ignored dozens of UN
resolutions, and Israel's international position has only
improved.
The
Palestinians are not a stupid people. They know all these facts. A victory
in the UN will gladden their hearts, but they know that it will do very
little to help them in practice.
I DO
not give advice to the Palestinians. I have always believed that a member
of the occupying people has no right to give advice to the occupied
people.
But I
allow myself to think aloud, and these thoughts bring me to the conviction
that the only effective method for an occupied people is civil
disobedience – total non-violent popular opposition to the occupation,
total disobedience to the foreign conqueror.
This
method was refined by the Indian opposition to the British occupation. Its
leader, Mahatma Gandhi, was an unusual personality, a moral person with a
lot of practical political acumen. In India, some tens of thousands of
military and civilian British personnel faced more than a million Indians.
Civil disobedience put an end to the occupation.
In our
country, the balance of power is extremely different. But the principle is
the same: no government can function for long when faced by a population
that refuses to cooperate with it in any way.
In
such a struggle, violence is always implemented by the occupation. The
occupation is always violent. Therefore, in a non-violent struggle of
civil disobedience, many Palestinians will get killed, the general
suffering will increase a lot. But such a struggle will win. It always did
when applied anywhere.
The
world, which is expressing deep sympathy with the Palestinian people while
cooperating with the occupation regime, will be compelled to
intervene.
And,
most importantly, the Israeli public, which is now looking at what is
happening a few dozen miles from their homes as if it was happening in
Honolulu, will wake up. The best of our people will join the political
struggle. The weak peace camp will become strong
again.
THE
OCCUPATION regime is well aware of this danger. It tries to weaken Abbas
by any means. It accuses Abbas of "incitement" – meaning opposition to the
occupation – as if he were a brutal enemy. All this while the security
forces of Abbas openly cooperate with the occupation police and
army.
In
practice, the occupation strengthens the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip,
which hates Abbas.
The
relations between Hamas and the Israeli government go back a long way. In
the first years of the occupation, when any kind of political activity in
the occupied territories was strictly forbidden, only Islamists were
allowed to be active. First, because it was impossible to close the
mosques, and second, because the occupation authorities believed that the
enmity of religious Muslims towards the secular PLO would weaken
Arafat.
This
illusion disappeared at the beginning of the first intifada, when
Hamas was founded and rapidly became the most militant resistance
organization. But even then the occupation authorities saw in Hamas a
positive element, because it divided the Palestinian struggle.
It
must be remembered that the separate Gaza Strip is an Israeli invention.
In the Oslo agreement, Israel undertook to open four "safe passages"
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Under the influence of the army,
Rabin violated this obligation right from the beginning. As a result, the
West Bank was totally cut off from the Strip – and the present situation
is a direct result of that.
People
everywhere wonder why Netanyahu daily denounces Abbas as an "inciter" and
"sponsor of terror", while not mentioning Hamas. To solve this mystery,
one must understand that the Israeli Right does not fear war, but is
afraid of international pressure – and therefore the "moderate" Abbas is
much more dangerous than the "terrorist" Hamas.
CIVIL
RESISTANCE will not happen in the near future. The Palestinian public is
not yet ripe for it. Also, Abbas is not the suitable leader for such a
struggle. He is not a Palestinian Gandhi, nor a second
Mandela.
Abu-Mazen is the leader of a people trying to survive in impossible
circumstances – until the situation takes a turn.