Russia, ISIL and the Diplomatic Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis
By James Nathan
Khalid Bin Sultan Eminent Scholar, Professor of International Policy at Auburn University
We
are now at the 52nd anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis. As
Khrushchev remembered it, it was a time that hung heavy with the ‘smell
of burning in the air.”
Forty-five
years on, at a Princeton conclave marking their wisdom, Presidential
advisors Theodore Sorenson and McGeorge Bundy were still congratulating
themselves for standing tough and prevailing. The Soviets capitulated,
they insisted. The crisis had gone the American way by dint of the
Kennedy team’s collective guts. In fact, the excavation of now-distant
events has been an industry for a regiment of academics. To many, such
as Harvard’s Graham Allison, President Kennedy’s paradigmatic resolve is
a template for our times, applicable to managing North Korea, Iran,
Russia, ISIL, you name it.
The
recent release of apparently complete White House Cuban Missile Crisis
tapes does indeed reveal a triumph of presidential fortitude, but not of
the customary hagiographies. Instead, it’s now clear that President
Kennedy alone, against his advisors, had been determined from the start
to strike a deal with Nikita Khrushchev.
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