Posts
Two excellent and important articles follow. They address the corrupt nature of America's general officer corps, and they are examples of journalism and think-tank work at their best.
"Corrupt officer corps?" An overstatement? You be the judge.
The first article is yet another in USA Today's Tom Vandenbrook's long and continuing series about DOD's "mentor" program. It describes corrupt behavior in indisputable terms. The second by POGO's Ben Freeman describes how the general officer corps has reversed former SecDef Gates' attempt at a modest reduction in officer bloat, a reversal enabled by Leon Panetta. (What next should we expect from this politician occupying the top position in America's most important national security agency?)
The issues are not just ethics and cost. Bloated officer corps are a characteristic of militaries in decline, or rather that have already declined and lose wars. The attachment is a briefing given in recent years by an anonymous and highly respected, at least by me, retired military officer.
It not just a budget crisis the Pentagon is experiencing; it's also a leadership crisis -- especially at the top. Moreover, the two are directly related.
I believe these materials are important reading.
USA Today
November 29, 2011
Pg. 1
November 29, 2011
Pg. 1
4 Stars For Hire Mentor's Role Led To Altered Exercise Air Force retiree also a Boeing exec By Tom Vanden Brook and Ray Locker, USA Today
The Air Force let a retired four-star general who was an executive for Boeing participate in a war game involving an aerial tanker that the company was vying to build for the military for more than $50 billion, according to records obtained by USA TODAY.
Air Force officials, concerned about retired general Charles Robertson's potential conflict of interest, altered the war game to let him participate as a "senior mentor," according to the Air Force e-mails released under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
"The episode regarding Gen. Robertson shows that concerns over the mentors' conflicts of interest are not just theoretical," said Nick Schwellenbach of the Project on Government Oversight, a watchdog group. "In this case, a mentor's work consulting for the Pentagon directly related to one of his company's biggest potential contracts."
The e-mail answers questions raised in the fall of 2009 about the Air Force's use of senior mentors, retired generals and admirals who advised the Pentagon. A USA TODAY investigation found that 80% of 158 mentors had ties to the defense industry, including Robertson.
The Air Force, in 2009, did not reveal Robertson's name, his role as a mentor or his business ties, and it took two years to respond to the FOIA request. Joint Forces Command released e-mails within weeks of a similar request.
In reaction to stories on the mentors, former Defense secretary Robert Gates and Congress capped mentors' pay at $179,900 and made them subject to government conflict-of-interest laws and required them to disclose their outside business interests.
Since the rules went into effect, 351 mentors quit, citing low pay and limits on outside consulting, according to the Pentagon inspector general. Four mentors remain as consultants.
Robertson's role in the Air Force's quest to build a new tanker took place before the rule changes. Attempts to reach him for comment were unsuccessful. Boeing spokeswoman Ellen Buhr declined to comment.
In February, the Pentagon awarded a $3.5billion contract to Boeing for development of the KC-46A aerial refueler. Eventually, 179 will be built for $51 billion, Bloomberg News reported.
Robertson, who retired in 2001, was the chief of U.S. Transportation Command and the Air Force Air Mobility Command, Pentagon agencies responsible for moving troops and material around the world. He took a position with Boeing in 2001 and retired in 2010 as a vice president.
In late 2007, the Air Force invited him to take part in the war game Global Mobility 2008, according to an e-mail. The Air Force omitted names of those who sent or received the e-mail.
Air Force officials noted concerns about Robertson's potential conflict "from the beginning of the process," and how they worked around it. Gen. Arthur Lichte, the top officer at Air Mobility Command in 2009, noted Robertson's position as a mentor and Boeing's involvement in the tanker contract and "suggested caution about how we play the (tanker) in the war game."
Air Force officials concluded that "Robertson's position on the 'support' side of Boeing would not conflict with the objectives" of the war game.
Today's Military: The Most Top-Heavy Force in U.S. History
By BEN FREEMAN
After Thanksgiving, waistlines aren't the only things that are bloated--the Pentagon's top ranks are fattening at an alarming rate.
Despite a plan set forth by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to rein in the Department of Defense's (DoD) increasingly top-heavy force and assurances from Pentagon personnel that these plans were being enacted, the U.S. military is still adding top brass faster than you can say tryptophan.
In September, I testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel about the military becoming increasingly top-heavy as a result of growth in the proportion of general and flag officers at the Pentagon. This trend, which we at POGO dubbed Star Creep, is costly to taxpayers who have to foot the large bill for every new general and admiral. It also hinders military effectiveness by leading to what Gates referred to as a "bureaucracy which has the fine motor skills of a dinosaur."
My fellow witnesses at the hearing-several generals and admirals as well as former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Clifford Stanley-assured the concerned Committee that they had everything under control. They cited Gates' Efficiency Initiatives, which purportedly eliminate 102 general and flag officer positions, as evidence of the DoD's commitment to combating Star Creep. Stanley confirmed to Chairman Jim Webb (D-VA) that Gates' successor-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta-supported these efforts and, "has accepted the policies and the things put in place by his predecessor." (Stanley tendered his notice of resignation in late October.)
What Senator Webb and I did not know at the time-and perhaps Stanley did-was that Gates' initiative to cut general and flag officers had already come to a screeching halt. Data that were released recently on the DoD personnel office's website tell the tale.
The Air Force let a retired four-star general who was an executive for Boeing participate in a war game involving an aerial tanker that the company was vying to build for the military for more than $50 billion, according to records obtained by USA TODAY.
Air Force officials, concerned about retired general Charles Robertson's potential conflict of interest, altered the war game to let him participate as a "senior mentor," according to the Air Force e-mails released under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
"The episode regarding Gen. Robertson shows that concerns over the mentors' conflicts of interest are not just theoretical," said Nick Schwellenbach of the Project on Government Oversight, a watchdog group. "In this case, a mentor's work consulting for the Pentagon directly related to one of his company's biggest potential contracts."
The e-mail answers questions raised in the fall of 2009 about the Air Force's use of senior mentors, retired generals and admirals who advised the Pentagon. A USA TODAY investigation found that 80% of 158 mentors had ties to the defense industry, including Robertson.
The Air Force, in 2009, did not reveal Robertson's name, his role as a mentor or his business ties, and it took two years to respond to the FOIA request. Joint Forces Command released e-mails within weeks of a similar request.
In reaction to stories on the mentors, former Defense secretary Robert Gates and Congress capped mentors' pay at $179,900 and made them subject to government conflict-of-interest laws and required them to disclose their outside business interests.
Since the rules went into effect, 351 mentors quit, citing low pay and limits on outside consulting, according to the Pentagon inspector general. Four mentors remain as consultants.
Robertson's role in the Air Force's quest to build a new tanker took place before the rule changes. Attempts to reach him for comment were unsuccessful. Boeing spokeswoman Ellen Buhr declined to comment.
In February, the Pentagon awarded a $3.5billion contract to Boeing for development of the KC-46A aerial refueler. Eventually, 179 will be built for $51 billion, Bloomberg News reported.
Robertson, who retired in 2001, was the chief of U.S. Transportation Command and the Air Force Air Mobility Command, Pentagon agencies responsible for moving troops and material around the world. He took a position with Boeing in 2001 and retired in 2010 as a vice president.
In late 2007, the Air Force invited him to take part in the war game Global Mobility 2008, according to an e-mail. The Air Force omitted names of those who sent or received the e-mail.
Air Force officials noted concerns about Robertson's potential conflict "from the beginning of the process," and how they worked around it. Gen. Arthur Lichte, the top officer at Air Mobility Command in 2009, noted Robertson's position as a mentor and Boeing's involvement in the tanker contract and "suggested caution about how we play the (tanker) in the war game."
Air Force officials concluded that "Robertson's position on the 'support' side of Boeing would not conflict with the objectives" of the war game.
Today's Military: The Most Top-Heavy Force in U.S. History
By BEN FREEMAN
After Thanksgiving, waistlines aren't the only things that are bloated--the Pentagon's top ranks are fattening at an alarming rate.
Despite a plan set forth by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to rein in the Department of Defense's (DoD) increasingly top-heavy force and assurances from Pentagon personnel that these plans were being enacted, the U.S. military is still adding top brass faster than you can say tryptophan.
In September, I testified before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Personnel about the military becoming increasingly top-heavy as a result of growth in the proportion of general and flag officers at the Pentagon. This trend, which we at POGO dubbed Star Creep, is costly to taxpayers who have to foot the large bill for every new general and admiral. It also hinders military effectiveness by leading to what Gates referred to as a "bureaucracy which has the fine motor skills of a dinosaur."
My fellow witnesses at the hearing-several generals and admirals as well as former Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Clifford Stanley-assured the concerned Committee that they had everything under control. They cited Gates' Efficiency Initiatives, which purportedly eliminate 102 general and flag officer positions, as evidence of the DoD's commitment to combating Star Creep. Stanley confirmed to Chairman Jim Webb (D-VA) that Gates' successor-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta-supported these efforts and, "has accepted the policies and the things put in place by his predecessor." (Stanley tendered his notice of resignation in late October.)
What Senator Webb and I did not know at the time-and perhaps Stanley did-was that Gates' initiative to cut general and flag officers had already come to a screeching halt. Data that were released recently on the DoD personnel office's website tell the tale.
New personnel data
When POGO began its analysis of Star Creep, the most recent data available to the public were from April 2011. Thus, when I presented Chairman Webb our recommendation that Secretary Panetta work to fully enact Gates' Efficiency Initiatives to combat Star Creep and heard the other witnesses declare their support for the initiatives, I had no way of knowing that the DoD had already completely reversed course on Gates' efforts.
Seventeen general and flag officers were scheduled to be eliminated between May and September through Gates' Efficiency Initiatives. But the DoD didn't reduce its top brass at all. Instead, six generals were added from May to September, increasing the number of general and flag officers from 964 to 970. Moreover, from July 1, 2011-Panetta's first day as Secretary of Defense-to September 30, the Pentagon added three four-star officers. Coincidentally, this is precisely the number of four-star officers Gates cut during his final year as SecDef, from June 2010 to the end of June 2011. Thus, in just three months, Panetta undid a year's worth of Gates' attempts to cut the Pentagon's very top brass. It's doubtful that Gates would consider Panetta's current rate of adding a new four-star officer every month conducive to efficiency.
One of these new four-star officers is Admiral Mark Ferguson, who became vice chief of naval operations and consequently a four-star admiral less than a month before he testified at Senator Webb's hearing. Ironically, this beneficiary of Star Creep wrote in his prepared statement that the "Navy supports these efficiency actions and anticipates additional review to reduce or merge flag officer positions." At the hearing he expanded upon this, stating that "We [the Navy] remain absolutely committed to create a more agile, flexible, and effective flag officer staff structure." Apparently, this support and commitment to flag officer efficiencies includes adding admirals.
Comparing bloat across branches and over time
The most top-heavy branch of the military, the Air Force, led the most recent surge in increasing top brass, adding six officers in the two-, three-, and four-star ranks, while cutting one brigadier general. The Marines and Army each netted two additional generals. The Navy was the only branch of the military that actually did cut its top ranks during this time period, even though they added a four-star admiral.
While the Pentagon was adding these officers it was cutting enlisted personnel (a phenomenon known as "officer inflation" or "brass creep"). Between May and September, more than 10,000 enlisted personnel were cut by the DoD, possibly in preparation for the end of military operations in Iraq, while more than 2,500 officers were added. Consequently, for the first time in the more than 200 years that the U.S. has had a standing military, there are fewer than five enlisted personnel for every officer. In other words, today's military is the most top-heavy force in U.S. history.
?
The Costs of Star Creep
The cost to taxpayers of uniformed military personnel increases markedly with their rank. In just basic compensation, these six new generals will cost taxpayers more than $1.25 million per year. Over the next ten years, they'll cost taxpayers more than $14 million (methodology).
The total cost to taxpayers of Star Creep is not trivial, even in the Pentagon's bloated budget. Since the war in Afghanistan began, the Pentagon has added 99 general and flag officers, a rate of growth that's tops among all DoD uniformed personnel groups, as can be seen in the above graph. In 2012, these general and flag officers will cost taxpayers more than $22 million in just direct financial compensation. Between 2012 and 2021, they'll cost nearly $250 million.
But the cost of Star Creep only begins with direct compensation. Other costs that surround generals and admirals-such as staff, contractors, and travel-increase with higher ranks. For example, Bloomberg recently reported that taxpayers in Huntsville, Alabama, footed a $3.8-million bill to build luxurious homes for generals in a successful effort to keep Pentagon pork flowing into the area. One such home, built for a major general, was a sprawling 4,200-square-foot mansion that included granite countertops, hardwood floors, and stainless steel appliances.
Luxurious homes are just the beginning of the extravagances available to top military commanders. According to Raymond Dubois, former DoD director of administration and management from 2002 to 2005, there are other perks:
Putting Star Creep on the table
The enlisted ranks have been shrinking, and even deeper cuts following the drawdown in Iraq have already been announced. So, with fewer personnel to command and a major conflict ending, why should the top ranks grow?
To find the budget savings they need to fulfill Panetta's pledge to cut $250 billion from the Pentagon's budget over the next five years, many military leaders should start by looking no further than the mirror.
Ben Freeman is POGO's National Security Fellow.
When POGO began its analysis of Star Creep, the most recent data available to the public were from April 2011. Thus, when I presented Chairman Webb our recommendation that Secretary Panetta work to fully enact Gates' Efficiency Initiatives to combat Star Creep and heard the other witnesses declare their support for the initiatives, I had no way of knowing that the DoD had already completely reversed course on Gates' efforts.
Seventeen general and flag officers were scheduled to be eliminated between May and September through Gates' Efficiency Initiatives. But the DoD didn't reduce its top brass at all. Instead, six generals were added from May to September, increasing the number of general and flag officers from 964 to 970. Moreover, from July 1, 2011-Panetta's first day as Secretary of Defense-to September 30, the Pentagon added three four-star officers. Coincidentally, this is precisely the number of four-star officers Gates cut during his final year as SecDef, from June 2010 to the end of June 2011. Thus, in just three months, Panetta undid a year's worth of Gates' attempts to cut the Pentagon's very top brass. It's doubtful that Gates would consider Panetta's current rate of adding a new four-star officer every month conducive to efficiency.
One of these new four-star officers is Admiral Mark Ferguson, who became vice chief of naval operations and consequently a four-star admiral less than a month before he testified at Senator Webb's hearing. Ironically, this beneficiary of Star Creep wrote in his prepared statement that the "Navy supports these efficiency actions and anticipates additional review to reduce or merge flag officer positions." At the hearing he expanded upon this, stating that "We [the Navy] remain absolutely committed to create a more agile, flexible, and effective flag officer staff structure." Apparently, this support and commitment to flag officer efficiencies includes adding admirals.
Comparing bloat across branches and over time
The most top-heavy branch of the military, the Air Force, led the most recent surge in increasing top brass, adding six officers in the two-, three-, and four-star ranks, while cutting one brigadier general. The Marines and Army each netted two additional generals. The Navy was the only branch of the military that actually did cut its top ranks during this time period, even though they added a four-star admiral.
While the Pentagon was adding these officers it was cutting enlisted personnel (a phenomenon known as "officer inflation" or "brass creep"). Between May and September, more than 10,000 enlisted personnel were cut by the DoD, possibly in preparation for the end of military operations in Iraq, while more than 2,500 officers were added. Consequently, for the first time in the more than 200 years that the U.S. has had a standing military, there are fewer than five enlisted personnel for every officer. In other words, today's military is the most top-heavy force in U.S. history.
?
The Costs of Star Creep
The cost to taxpayers of uniformed military personnel increases markedly with their rank. In just basic compensation, these six new generals will cost taxpayers more than $1.25 million per year. Over the next ten years, they'll cost taxpayers more than $14 million (methodology).
The total cost to taxpayers of Star Creep is not trivial, even in the Pentagon's bloated budget. Since the war in Afghanistan began, the Pentagon has added 99 general and flag officers, a rate of growth that's tops among all DoD uniformed personnel groups, as can be seen in the above graph. In 2012, these general and flag officers will cost taxpayers more than $22 million in just direct financial compensation. Between 2012 and 2021, they'll cost nearly $250 million.
But the cost of Star Creep only begins with direct compensation. Other costs that surround generals and admirals-such as staff, contractors, and travel-increase with higher ranks. For example, Bloomberg recently reported that taxpayers in Huntsville, Alabama, footed a $3.8-million bill to build luxurious homes for generals in a successful effort to keep Pentagon pork flowing into the area. One such home, built for a major general, was a sprawling 4,200-square-foot mansion that included granite countertops, hardwood floors, and stainless steel appliances.
Luxurious homes are just the beginning of the extravagances available to top military commanders. According to Raymond Dubois, former DoD director of administration and management from 2002 to 2005, there are other perks:
A four-star has an airplane. A three-star often doesn't.Can a three-star get an airplane when he needs it? Not always. Does a four-star get an airplane when he needs it? Always. Many times he'll already have a G5 sitting on the runway, gassed up. There are the kinds of costs that are fairly significant when you add them all up.In his August 2010 speech on Efficiency Initiatives, Gates referred to these perks as "the overhead and accoutrements that go with" senior positions, be they military or civilian, within DoD. In an interview with Newsweek, Gates bemoaned these accoutrements and entourages that surround generals and admirals, which he believes are indicative of a military leadership that is "suffering from an inflated sense of entitlement and a distorted sense of priorities."
Putting Star Creep on the table
The enlisted ranks have been shrinking, and even deeper cuts following the drawdown in Iraq have already been announced. So, with fewer personnel to command and a major conflict ending, why should the top ranks grow?
To find the budget savings they need to fulfill Panetta's pledge to cut $250 billion from the Pentagon's budget over the next five years, many military leaders should start by looking no further than the mirror.
Ben Freeman is POGO's National Security Fellow.
_____________________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397 (home office)
301 221-3897 (cell)
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397 (home office)
301 221-3897 (cell)
No comments:
Post a Comment