CHINA WATCH Strait Talk

This ran in today's CongressDaily.

CHINA WATCH

Strait Talk

Monday, May 4, 2009

For Americans who have tracked the bitter, often hostile relations between mainland China and Taiwan over the past few decades, this year's dramatic reduction in tensions across the Taiwan Strait has been nothing short of stunning.

Since May 2008, the two Cold War enemies have ceased strident criticisms of one another, relaxed restrictions on trade, increased cooperation on food safety and postal service and expanded tourism. And, for the first time since their 1949 split, they have begun direct flights and shipping between their cities.

Last week, in a third round of high-level talks, they agreed to reduce trade barriers further, expand airline service, permit banks to open branches in both countries, cooperate on criminal investigations and let Chinese firms invest in Taiwan. Taiwanese investment in China, already permitted, now tops $100 billion.

And Wednesday, China said it would allow Taiwan to take part as an observer in a key decision-making meeting of the World Health Organization to be held in Geneva next month. It was the first time Beijing has not blocked the island's participation since 1971, when Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations in favor of mainland China.

"Relations between the two sides are the best they've been since 1949," says Douglas Paal, a former intelligence officer and U.S. representative to Taiwan who is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Indeed, the stunning thaw in China-Taiwan relations has prompted questions about why the United States still cares that much about Taiwan now that Taipei and Beijing seem to be on a path toward reconciliation. Some want the Obama administration to conduct a full-fledged review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

The argument is that America's continuing support of Taiwan only impedes a further strengthening of U.S.-China ties, which is far more important to the United States. Example: A controversial $6.5 billion U.S. weapons sale to Taipei in the fall angered Beijing and prompted China to cancel an exchange program for U.S. and Chinese military officers.

As in the case of Cuba, the constituency here for rigid U.S. support for Taiwan is fading. The Cold War-era stalwarts are dying. The United States long ago recognized Beijing as China's government, and the two countries' economies are closely linked. Taiwan's pro-independence posture before its elections last March made Washington uncomfortable.

But the realities of cross-Strait relations aren't that simple. First, unlike Cuba, which isn't a threat to the United States, China has massive numbers of missiles and troops poised to attack Taiwan. It devotes a significant slice of its defense budget to maintaining a military force that, but for the threat of U.S. intervention, could overwhelm Taiwan.

Second, despite the significant progress toward reconciliation, the China-Taiwan thaw is still in its infancy, and hasn't been tested by time.

The flurry of new treaties has come mainly because both governments have concluded it's in their interests to minimize tensions. The previous Taiwanese government, headed by President Chen Shui-bian, aggressively pursued independence. When Chen lost last year, Beijing embraced his more pragmatic successor, Ma Ying-jeou.

Despite the peaceful transfer of power from Chen to Ma, democracy still is a relatively new thing in Taiwan. For most of the past 60 years, the island has been ruled by the political dynasty of Chiang Kai-shek. Ma could easily lose next time, and the tensions could return.

"Jubilation should not be overtaking us," says David Finkelstein, director of China studies at the Center for Naval Analyses. "The politics could go bad in a minute -- where do you find domestic politics more mercurial than on Taiwan? Moreover, the military dimensions of the issue, while happily in the background for the moment, remain."

Finally, for all the talk about expanding ties and getting closer, the two sides are nowhere near agreement on how to unify the two countries. Despite Washington's acceptance of the one-China policy, Taiwan hasn't given up its quest for independence. Nor does it want to become a semi-autonomous region, like Hong Kong.

President Obama no doubt will have to confront the usual decisions U.S. presidents face -- selling more arms to Taiwan, letting Ma or other officials visit America, granting Taiwan more trade privileges. There's no push for the administration to change longstanding U.S. policy, which has been to keep cross-Strait tensions down.

Increasingly, however, Washington will have to consider the impact of its Taiwan policies on relations with China, which have overshadowed the importance of America's historic ties with Taiwan. China already is a global economic powerhouse, is becoming more active in geopolitics and is expanding its military to project its power in Asia beyond.

What if China provokes a military confrontation with Taiwan, as it did in 1995-96? Will the United States again be willing to send warships to avert a fight?

To many analysts, the best plan is for America to encourage both sides to expand ties in hopes of convincing both governments and their constituents that improving relations produces clear benefits for everyone.

That's still a long way from a sure bet, but the odds are far better than they were a year ago.
by Art Pine