China's foremost America-watcher on the Question of US Decline: Article by Staff Reporter Zhao Lingmin: "Optimistic View of Sino-US Relations "

This long interview with the Dean of International Studies at Beijing University, translated from the Chinese original by a US government service, provides a comprehensive look at the current state of world affairs and the US role in those affairs as seen from Beijing. For those concerned about how we look from abroad, in this case from a country like China that is more pro-American than many US allies now are, this article may be of interest. (N.B., the official -- Pentagon-inspired -- US government translation of the Chinese phrase "tao guang yang hui" as "concealing one's ability and biding one's time" is tendentious. A more accurate translation would be "to avoid grandstanding and focus on self-improvement." The original phrase, which refers to a scholar-official who has withdrawn from public service pending a change in policy and is awaiting possible reappointment to a government position, does not carry the sinister overtone of the Pentagon translation.)


China: Expert Wang Jisi Interviewed on Sino-US Relations, Question of US Decline

Guangzhou Nanfeng Chuang in Chinese, 8 October 2008


[Article by Staff Reporter Zhao Lingmin: "Optimistic View of Sino-US Relations -- Exclusive Interview With Professor Wang Jisi, Dean of the School of International Studies at Peking University"]



In looking at Sino-US relations, we should focus on the issue of specific functionality rather than being caught up in determining the nature of such relations or engaging in broad discussions of the overall strategic situation. Facing a trade-protectionist in the United States or a Chinese foreign trade company that has suffered losses over the valuation of the RMB (renminbi), it is meaningless to say things such as "the overall situation in Sino-US relations must take priority."


The United States Has Not Declined



Nanfeng Chuang (NFC): Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been incessant talk of the decline of the United States. What is your assessment of that, and how do you see the international position of the United States at present?


Wang Jisi: The theory of the decline of the United States is not something that has just appeared in the past few years. In 1946, Mao Zedong said that the American imperialists were a paper tiger. At the time a series of events occurred, such as the launch of a satellite by the Soviet Union in 1957 and, in the 1970s, the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam war and the de-linking of the dollar from gold, there were invariably people around the world who predicted the decline of the United States. There was the rapid development of the Japanese and West German economies at the end of the 1980s and in 1991 the United States asked its allies for money to fight the Gulf War, and at those times theories about the decline of the United States also abounded. Following the Iraq war, there has been an abrupt decline i n the soft power of the United States, and at present there is also the subprime mortgage crisis, so there is really nothing strange about some people being pessimistic about the United States.


In the United States, leftists such as [Emanuel] Wallerstein are forever trumpeting the decline of the United States. The problem lies in the question of what is the standard for measuring the decline of the United States? Actually, when you compare the current situation in the United States with different periods in its history, the conclusions one reaches are different. Compared to the situation around 1945 when it was at the summit of its power, the United States today has certainly declined, and that is the comparison that Wallerstein makes. Compared to the Nixon and Carter eras, the strength of the United States today has increased. Compared to the Clinton era, the relative position of the United States has also declined. When one summarizes the situation in various quarters, it is very difficult to conclude that the United States has at this point begun to go dow nhill. My sense is that the United States today is still traveling along a flat mountain top, but flat mountain tops are also uneven. As for how extensive this flat area is, no one knows, but there really is no reliable basis for saying that at this point the United States has had a setback from which it cannot recover. To date no country has been able to constitute a comprehensive challenge to the United States, and there is no question that its position as the only superpower will continue for 20-30 years.


Viewed from the perspective of the national might of the United States, its hard power in the areas of economics, the military, and science and technology have actually increased, and the sense that everyone has that the United States is already in decline mainly stems from the decline of its soft power. In that regard, other than the effects of international factors such as the Iraq war, etc., the more fundamental reason involves some domestic factors in the United States. Along with the ever increasing diversity of its races and cultures, the ethnic cohesiveness of the United States is declining. In his book Who Are We, [Samuel] Huntington has expressed that concern. The Enron incident a few years ago and the subprime mortgage crisis most recently both show that there is a major problem in financial oversight in the United States, and that the relationship bet ween the government and big business is too close. In addition, with regard to domestic politics, the conservative forces in the United States are extremely powerful, leading to a political imbalance domestically, and as to whether or not the United States has the ability to correct this, we will get an inkling of that following this year's presidential election.


Worth mentioning is the fact that, although the United States has encountered numerous difficulties, other countries have not benefited much from that. Under the subprime mortgage crisis, the global economy has been encumbered. Economically, the relationship between China and the United States is one of mutual-dependence, and there is not a situation in which they are undercutting each other. The upswing in China's power over the past few years really is not the result of a decline in the power of the United States, and similarly, none of the various factors resulting in a decline in the soft power of the United States and its unsightly reputation were created by China.


NFC: So, as you see it, what are the intrinsic values that are supporting the international position of the United States? And what is unique about the United States?


Wang: First there is the simple and uniform value that holds society in the United States together, that is, the so-called "American dream," and Americans, regardless of whether they are far left or far right, or of what race or language, all identify with this ideology. Second is the rule of law and democracy. We are opposed to the United States exporting its social system, but we should acknowledge that its system has promoted the country's development and power. Because of the domestic success of the United States, as some people around the world see it, the democracy, freedom, and rule of law of the United States are worth imitating, and this gives the United States formidable soft power. And third is the development of civil society in the United States. The emergence and development of Hollywood and Silicon V alley are results which reflect social initiative, and the soft power of the United States does not rely primarily on promotion by the government, but rather on the wellsprings of vitality and competitiveness in US society.


Society in the United States is even more powerful than the government. This is its primary unique feature, and it is also an important aspect in why many countries believe that the United States is not easy to deal with. In that sense, the relationship between China and the United States is essentially one between a country and a society. As far as the Chinese government is concerned, simply having dealings with the administrative authorities in the United States is far from sufficient, and it is also necessary to emphasize contacts with its Congress, business circles, the media, think tanks, labor unions, and religious circles, etc., to get them to understand China, and this is a very arduous task.


NFC: At present, anti-American feelings are very intense in many places around the world. What is the reason for that?


Wang: One reason is the reactionary policies of the United States. In Palestinian-Israeli relations, the United States has been partial to Israel for a long time, and this is the source of anti-American feelings in the Middle East. The situation in the Iraq war, with the large number of innocent casualties, is still to this day very unstable, and it is difficult even for the Americans to state clearly whether there was more suffering during the Saddam era or today. The rise in anti-American feelings in Afghanistan and Pakistan also stems from similar causes. The selfish and unjust positions of the United States with regard to the Doha talks and the Kyoto Protocol, and the drag on the world economy by the subprime mortgage crisis are also causes for the upsurge in anti-American feelings.


Another reason is that, if a given country has been the top dog for a long time, it is bound to incur opposition. As the expression goes, "those who stand out will be attacked by others." This is a structural problem resulting from being too powerful, and there is no fundamental way to resolve it. Furthermore, the bombastic behavior of the United States has exacerbated this situation. It is just as if, in a class in school, you are stronger than the others in every area to begin with, but also not the least bit modest, being fond of the limelight and being sure not to get along with the others. Wherever the might of the United States is used, the character of individuals and the nation invariably becomes fairly widely publicized. I do not believe that a change of administrations in the United States can fundamentally alter their own behavior.


At present, China is a rising power, and it will incur more and more criticism. We need to be aware that this is an inevitable phenomenon during the course of moving forward and respond by employing moderation, being level-headed, and not publicizing it, and thus the pressure will be somewhat less. If you only read Chinese newspapers and web sites, you may feel that the entire Western media is commenting on or slandering China. Actually, if you observe the Western media carefully, you may discover that China is not at the center of various controversies or disputes. The present is, as far as China is concerned, a rare period of strategic opportunity. We must actively avoid becoming embroiled in the central maelstrom of world politics and concentrate on managing our own affairs well.


NFC: Quite a few people are extremely dissatisfied with the "policeman of the world" approach of the United States in which they meddle in the affairs of other countries everywhere. What is your view on that? And in international society, in a condition in which there is essentially no government, is there an objective need for such a "policeman" or not?


Wang: There are two situations in which the United States has been called the "world's policeman." One is when they themselves want to interfere, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the other is when other people want to get them to interfere, when the politicians in other countries want to use the United States to achieve their own objectives. For example, Georgia hoped that the United States would intervene in the Georgia-Russia conflict, and furthermore believes that the United States has not intervened enough. When some countries hold elections, they take the initiative to invite the Americans to monitor it. There have been territorial disputes between Japan and South Korea, and there are people in both countries who hope that the United States will make an appearance to mediate things. It is very difficu lt to completely distinguish between these two situations.


To be sure, the world cannot do without a "policeman." When internal unrest in some countries reaches a certain level, it threatens the security of other countries and still requires a "policeman" to control things. But this "policeman" cannot be self-appointed. The peacekeeping forces dispatched by the UN Security Council are the "world's policemen" that are recognized by everyone. As for when and how they will intervene, the rules for that must be formulated by certain international mechanisms.


China Is A Beneficiary in the World System


NFC: What is your assessment of "Pax Americana"? If the United States declines, what will happen to the world? And as far as China is concerned, what are the pros and cons of US hegemony?


Wang: The so-called "Pax Americana" does to a certain degree benefit international stability, but this is a peace under power politics and has sacrificed many rights and interests of other countries. It is morally unfair, unjust, and is also very difficult to sustain for a long time. Speaking in theoretical terms, a multipolar world will be more just than a unipolar one, but it is certain that it will not be very stable. Is not achieving both justice and stability easier said than done? In a situation in which there is no better substitute, as far as China is concerned, the workable approach is to acknowledge the existing international order and, amid that, to safeguard its own rights and interests as much as possible. This not only includes struggling with US hegemony, it also includes the other aspect of coordina ting and cooperating with the United States, working together to deal with nuclear proliferation, climate change, energy shortages, and other such problems. This is also what we commonly refer to as "fighting dual tactics with dual tactics."


The United States' ability to maintain its position in first place in the world in overall national power must have some lessons that are worth other countries learning from. For example, inside some countries the ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts are very intense, and some ethnic groups are militating for independence. US society is becoming more and more diverse internally, and there are also several million to tens of millions of Muslims, but there really have been no real dangers involving a national break-up or religious clashes. The United States always wants to interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries, but other countries actually also want to intervene in US affairs. For example, sending people to the United States to lobby Congress, and the public in quite a few other countries has taken a position supporting the election of Obama, etc., e tc. However, the United States really does not worry much about other countries discussing its domestic affairs.


The decline of the United States is just a matter of time, and when the United States does decline, there will have to be an adaptation process in the world. At present the United States has financial problems, but very few countries are experiencing schadenfreude at this, and rather welcome the "saving of the market" by the United States government. Obviously, the slide of the US economy has more minuses than pluses for many countries. One expression of the decline of the United States would be a reduction of its military presence overseas, and also the inability to use coercive means to prevent nuclear proliferation. A possible consequence of that would be that Japan would have to develop an independent military force, or even equip itself with nuclear arms. North Korea and Iran may, because of a decline in the US threat, abandon their programs to develop nuclear for ces, but it is even more likely that they may not hesitate to accelerate their development of nuclear forces. The military outlays of the EU would also have to undergo large-scale increases in order to keep unstable situations from developing in the Middle East and Western Asia following the decline of the United States. And Russia would strengthen its influence over Eastern Europe and other former Soviet Union regions.


In sum, the decline of a great power -- and particularly a precipitate decline -- is invariably accompanied by an increase in new instabilities and imponderables. In the 1970s, China viewed the Soviet Union as the greatest security threat, and at the time naturally looked forward to the decline of the Soviet Union. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the actual decline or even the disappearance of the Soviet Union, we "felt ambivalent about that." The pros and cons with regard to us of a decline by the United States require careful analysis, and furthermore until that day it will also be very difficult to achieve a clear accounting of that. At present, the overbearing attitude of the United States has incurred quite a bit of enmity, and everyone believes that it is the greatest source of injustice and instability in the world. However, assuming there were no United States in the world, would things definitely be just and stable? History is unending. In 1945, German and Japanese Fascism was wiped out, but the world was not stable and fair because of that. At present, the most important thing is to strengthen the establishment of international mechanisms to constrain the power politics of the United States and also see that some other factors that undermine stability are held in check.


Recently, the National Intelligence Council in the United States drafted a report evaluating the world situation and the position of the United States in 2025, seeking out scholars in some other countries to provide comments. This report predicts that there will be a relative weakening of the position of the United States, and that the world is moving toward multi-polarity and the center of global wealth is shifting from the West to the East. On one hand, we can say, ha ha, even the Americans recognize that they are done for. On the other hand, this country dares to face the decline in its own position squarely, and furthermore also actively invites those from other countries to comment on this. This in and of itself illustrates that they have the desire to and possibility of correcting their own mistakes.


NFC: US diplomacy has a strong ideological coloration, but as quite a few Chinese see things, the stress on the values of "democracy and freedom" by the United States is nothing but a fig leaf to conceal their own self-interested objectives and is extremely hypocritical. How should we view this contradiction?


Wang: This question involves whether or not we believe that things such as ideology, values, and religious faith really exist. 80% of the people in the world are religious, with the majority of those who are not being in China. China has no tradition of religious faith, and the "Cultural Revolution" actually resulted in a sense of disillusionment by many people with regard to ideology. Accordingly, in China today, many people feel that ideology is false and hypocritical, that it is a tool that is used to package interests and cover up other objectives. Therefore, quite a few of us doubt that the Americans really have any faith, which actually is a projection of our own disillusionment toward all ideologies -- that there is no faith in the world, only interests.


I believe that, as far as most Americans are concerned, their faith in religion and belief in the ideology and values of the United States are real. However, there certainly are leaders and politicians who use the sincere faith of the Americans to serve their own selfish interests. We can criticize the values of the United States, and we should also point out that they are absolutely not "universally applicable," but we should not deny that the Americans truly believe in this and practice it. As far as the foreign relations of the United States are concerned, ideology and interests are tightly joined and inseparable, with ideology being realized, as are interests. It supports the democratically elected government of Georgia, and the Georgian government is also pro-American, and the realization of democracy there is also the realization of US interests. In the eyes of t he United States, Russia is not democratic. And the attitude of the United States toward South Korea, Japan, and China's cross-strait relations also has the same causation.


Of course, there are times when the ideology and interests of the United States are separate, and there also is a double standard. Saudi Arabia is really not democratic in the eyes of the Americans, but the United States has important interests in Saudi Arabia and the Saudi government is friendly toward the United States, and so the United States does not attack Saudi Arabia, but Iran. However, in overall terms, countries that are close to the United States in ideology are also fairly close to the United States in interests, and their attitude toward the United States is also fairly friendly. Accordingly, the United States must continue to stick to its values in its diplomatic relations.


'Concealing One's Ability and Biding One's Time' Must Not Be Abandoned


NFC: In recent years, China has pursued the diplomatic strategy of "concealing its ability and biding its time," and quite a few ordinary citizens feel that, on the diplomatic and territorial fronts, China has conceded too much, so has "concealing our ability and biding our time" reached the point where it should be abandoned? And how should a balance be achieved between diplomatic policies and the feelings of the people?


Wang: The reason why Deng Xiaoping proposed "concealing our ability and biding our time" at the beginning of the 1990s was because at that time the Soviet Union had already collapsed, there were dramatic changes in Eastern Europe, and "there were dark clouds bearing down on the city and threatening to overwhelm it," so some third-world countries wanted to have China come forward and become a leader, and some people in China had similar judgments and ideas, and when, at that time, Deng Xiaoping proposed "concealing our ability and biding our time," it was to remind our countrymen to first do a good job of managing their own affairs, rather than becoming a leader internationally.


At present, although China's national might has increased greatly, problems involving internal development and governance are still very serious, and I believe we must still adhere to the concept of "concealing one's ability and biding one's time." Whether or not we continue to use that expression is another matter. If one does a good job of managing one's own affairs, external affairs are relatively easy to manage. However, external censure or not getting along should not be a pretext for abandoning "concealing our ability and biding our time." I believe that when we talk about "concealing our ability and biding our time" at present, what we are referring to is continuing to avoid confrontations with the West, and we also must insist on avoiding overestimating our own power, being modest in front of developing countries and dealing with various international contradic tions prudently, getting our international environment to be a bit more relaxed, the road a bit wider, and the obstacles ahead somewhat fewer.


As far as a powerful country is concerned, there is a considerable contrast in the conclusions arrived at when it views itself and when others do so. The Chinese people view the world with a moral vision, believing we ourselves to be altruistic and that we are peace-loving, and therefore the stronger we are the better it will be for the world. The problem is that others really do not view things this way, and there are quite a few people who believe that if you become powerful, it is a threat to me. This is the "security dilemma" that is invariably encountered by all major powers historically, and the Chinese must have a sober understanding of that.


As for the problem of the feelings of the people, this is something about which nothing can be done. The ordinary people in just about every country in the world believe that their own government is weak toward other countries. Some people in France criticize Sarkozy for being too weak with China, and the people in Pakistan criticize their government for being too pro-American, and so on and so forth. One of the basic reasons for this is that the interests involved between countries are extremely complex, and compromises and negotiations cannot be avoided. Furthermore, these often must be done in private, and therefore it is very difficult to conduct diplomacy in a democratic and open manner. To take Sino-US relations for example, the United States makes demands on China with regard to the North Korean and Iranian problems, and may make concessions to China on the Taiw an strait and other such problems, and this benefits both sides. However, this is something that involves a tacit understanding, and cannot be acknowledged openly by US officials.


On the level of personal morality, an individual may use methods such as shedding one's blood and throwing down one's life or engaging in demonstrations or protests to uphold national interests, but the highest morality of the leaders of a nation is to safeguard the overall interests of the state, and they cannot be ruled by emotion and "gallantly rise to the occasion" or "sacrifice oneself to save someone else" the way an individual can. In the past, our diplomacy was often demarcated by ideology and was influenced by sentiment or emotion, but now we are stressing national interests, which is progress. The leaders of a country must consider national interests with the overall situation in mind, and the compromises and concessions therein may sacrifice limited interests, but there also may be benefits and rewards. One cannot simply proceed from a partial perspective in saying that the concessions are too great, nor can one always decry compromises or concessions as being weak or traitorous.


NFC: With regard to Sino-US relations, there are two well-known positions. One is that China should become an ally of the United States and, along with the United States, manage the world. The other is that it should meet [the United States] head on and cannot compromise too much. What is your assessment of this?


Wang: China and the United States can cooperate, but cannot be allies, because the gap between the two countries is too great with regard to ideology, social systems, and national interests, so there is no basis for becoming allies. The bottom line between China and the United States is that they should not be enemies -- neither enemies nor friends. China cannot accept being led by the United States, but the two countries can communicate with regard to ideas. Such universal values as human rights and rule of law are also what China is pursuing, it is just that, with regard to the approach and speed of the pursuit, China demands to determine that on its own.


At the same time, when faced with external pressures and suspicions, there is really no need for us to be over-anxious. Actually, in some respects external pressures on China are beneficial and help in promoting a resolution of domestic problems. For example, with regard to the problems of intellectual property rights (IPR) and food safety, the Chinese government stepped up law enforcement after the United States had offered an opinion. This was not "conceding too much" to the United States but rather was something that we should have done to begin with. By the same logic, can it be that we should not protect the environment? Or should not promote democracy?


I do not endorse the idea of "managing the world together" with the United States. This idea overestimates our power and position, and furthermore is wishful thinking. In addition, with the image of the United States around the world being this bad, wanting China and the United States to "manage the world together" is tantamount to asking us to be a scapegoat for them.


NFC: There is some commentary that believes that China's diplomacy has a tendency to "apply stopgap and piecemeal solutions," and even more responds to incidents in a passive manner, but lacks a long-range strategy and philosophy. What is your assessment of that?


Wang: Actually, compared to quite a few countries, China's diplomacy is something that involves even longer-range calculations and strategy. Many people like to make a comparison with the United States, because the United States has a comprehensive national strategy, and every few years they will put out a national security strategy report and a defense evaluation report, etc. Relatively speaking, China's strategy is more akin to a principled position. This is related to our culture and political traditions and really does not mean that the Chinese government has no long-range considerations, or when studying specific policies only considers those moral principles of making public announcements. The national situation in China is more complex than in any other country. The national security of the United States is of a narrow sense, and their national security strategy basically gives no consideration to the problem of domestic political stability, nor do they have any difficult problems similar to ours with regard to Taiwan, Tibet, nationalities, and religions, etc., and their national might is also far more powerful than China's. Even so, the United States has no way to map out its actions based on its national security strategy. When Iran makes trouble, they go to punish it. And when the situation in Afghanistan or Pakistan deteriorates, they rush in to put out the fire. This is "applying stopgap and piecemeal solutions." With China's internal and external environments being so complex, stopgap measures and piecemeal solutions are an inevitable consequence. I do not deny the importance of a "grand strategy," but at present there is no strategy that we could come up with by racking our brains that would be able to cover all the aspects of our national interests, so we can only determine pr iorities in a general manner.


People all pursue the perfectly logical impulse to make complex things simple and design a strategy that appears to be simple and crystal clear, and on the surface it may appear to be very fine, but often it cannot adapt to ever-changing reality, and if implemented poorly may even lead one astray. There was a time when our diplomatic thinking was quite simple, all right: The clear-cut adversaries were the United States and the Soviet Union -- or the "two hegemons" -- and we supported whoever opposed our adversaries. Everyone has seen the consequences of that. Today's China can no longer rely on this kind of fixed mental framework to deal with complex challenges, but can only deal with each case on its merits in keeping w ith the specific situation.