IN HAVANA, WAITING FOR OBAMA OR FOR PUTIN?

IN HAVANA, WAITING FOR OBAMA OR FOR PUTIN?

by Rens Lee

As I left Havana earlier this month, Cuba was eagerly
awaiting the United States' November presidential elections.
The buzz around the capital, reportedly from a highly placed
source, was that Barack Obama has already talked to Raul
Castro by phone. Obama has publicly stated that if elected,
he would immediately ease restrictions on Cuban American
travel and remittances placed by the Bush administration in
2004, but maintain the embargo, which has been in place
since 1961, until there is evidence of Cuban democratization
Indeed, no president could unilaterally lift the U.S.
embargo--the main sticking point in U.S.-Cuban relations--
because U.S. law (the 1996 Helms-Burton Act) mandates
preconditions for this, such as legalization of all
political activity and departure of the Castro brothers from
the political scene, that Cuba finds unacceptable. But a new
president who is open to dialogue with America's enemies
could prevail on a solidly democratic Congress to amend or
abrogate the law and thus un-freeze the U.S.-Cuban
relationship.

The embargo bans most U.S. trade with and all investment in
Cuba. While damaging the country's economy, it has obviously
failed in its intended purpose of getting rid of the Castro
regime. Cuba remains a police state in which the population
is subject to a repressive control and, excepting favored
few, lives at or close to the subsistence level.
(Interestingly, the police are among the best paid
professionals in Cuba, earning almost twice the miserly
average wage of $17 per month). Cuba-watchers debate whether
lifting the embargo and flooding the country with U.S.
tourists and businesspersons would erode the legitimacy of
the current regime or breathe new life into it. Yet there
are very good strategic reasons why America should not
continue its policy of isolating Cuba, even in the absence
of positive signs of democratization on the island.

One reason is that the current U.S. policy makes Cuba a
target of opportunity for a resurgent and increasingly
hostile Russia. Vladimir Putin talks openly about "restoring
our position in Cuba," and hints are surfacing in Moscow
that Russia might reestablish a military and intelligence
presence on the island in response to the planned missile
defense shield in Eastern Europe. Points of cooperation
under consideration include use of Cuba as a refueling stop
for long range bombers and for reconnaissance ships and
aircraft, and also reopening of a gigantic Soviet-era
electronic monitoring and surveillance facility at Lourdes,
near Havana. A state visit to Havana in July by hard-line
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin (an ex-KGB member of
Putin's inner circle) and head of Russia's Security Council
Nikolai Patrushev could presage a new strategic dialogue
between Moscow and Havana, even though the visit was
officially touted as investment-related.

It is hardly coincidental that the warming of Cuban-Russian
ties and discussion of a renewed military relationship
follows closely on the accession of Raul Castro as de facto
Cuban leader. Moscow has historically regarded Raul's
brother as a bit of a nut case, stemming from Fidel's
erratic behavior during the Cuban missile crisis, when (in
the Soviet's view) Castro was trying to provoke a U.S.-
Soviet nuclear conflict. With Raul--who resembles a Soviet-
style apparatchik--in charge, Russia may feel more
comfortable about deploying strategic or intelligence assets
on the island.

Another point to consider in reevaluating U.S. Cuba policy--
and for doing so in the short term--relates to Cuba's huge
potential energy reserves located deep offshore in the Gulf
of Mexico, which the U.S. Geological Survey says could
contain 4.6 billion barrels of oil and 9.8 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas. With most of the U.S. east and west
coasts closed to offshore drilling and oil prices at well
above $100 a barrel, and international demand for
hydrocarbons projected to increase massively in future
years, U.S. exploration and development of these deposits
becomes a tempting prospect--a justification of rescinding
the embargo or at least creating an exception to it. Other
energy-dependent countries (such as China and India) already
are negotiating exploration rights, but because Cuba is a
sanctioned country, U.S. companies are forced to stand idly
by.

In sum, current strategic and economic realities argue for
dealing with the communist Cuban regime "as is"--i.e. not
insisting on regime change as a precondition for improving
relations. Opening Cuba to commerce and interchange with the
United States could, as many argue, plant the seeds of
democracy and capitalism there and give Americans some
leverage to moderate the regime's police-state
characteristics. But positioning the United States to
participate in what could be a Cuban energy bonanza and
keeping Cuba out of the orbit of America's geopolitical
competitors represent more immediate challenges that should
guide a new U.S.-Havana dialogue.