Bitterlemons-International Middle East Roundtable August 21, 2008, The Regional Dimension of Palestinian Disunity

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Middle East Roundtable


Edition 33 Volume 6 - August 21, 2008

The regional dimension of Palestinian disunity

• Jordan-Hamas: the untold story - Saad Hattar
Jordan and Hamas both have vested interests in reviving their once strong bonds.

• It's Israel's dilemma - Elias Samo
Syria is sitting tight while watching Israel twist in the wind.

• Ending the divide is a long-term endeavor - Gamal A. G. Soltan
Containing Hamas is still Egypt's strategy, but under increasingly strict terms.

Jordan-Hamas: the untold story
Saad Hattar

Jordan's move to thaw relations with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) following nine years of estrangement has raised eyebrows as to the timing and the motives behind this tactic.

Internal and external factors dictated the rapprochement amid growing Jordanian dismay at US and Israeli behavior--the kingdom's main strategic allies since the turn of the century. Hence, the timing bears significance considering the last months of President George W. Bush's tenure and Israel's political paralysis. On the other side, the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas looks headed toward failure in light of Hamas' pounding and US-Israeli indifference.

Anxious about the deadlocked Palestinian track, the dwindling prospects for a viable Palestinian state and disenchanted with the lip service paid by the outgoing Republican administration, Jordan has moved fast to rebuild ties with Hamas--an arch enemy of the PA in the West Bank and an offshoot of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood.

Jordan's concerns are strategic. If the prospects for a Palestinian state diminish, it revives the old notion of the Jordan option, positing the kingdom as an alternative state for Palestinians. Jordan is home to 1.9 million Palestinian refugees, 41 percent of the UNRWA-registered refugees in the region and more than 50 percent of Jordan's population.

Jordan is not happy with the performance of Fateh, and Abbas has become a lame duck president pending new elections. There is a growing belief that Khaled Mishaal will become the next president, as Hamas seems bound to win any upcoming elections in the occupied Palestinian territories. But the call for dialogue came from Hamas, which has grown discontent with the increasing boundaries laid down by host countries from Syria to Iran.

The rapprochement with Hamas started two months ago with a preliminary meeting. Subsequently, two rounds of dialogue were held between GID (Jordanian Intelligence Services) Director General Lt. General Mohammad Thahabi and Hamas representatives led by Mohammad Nazzal.

The Beirut-based Nazzal was declared persona non grata in 1999, when the authorities here expelled five Hamas leaders, notably the head of the movement's political bureau Khaled Mishaal. Since then Mishaal has been living between Damascus and Doha. Before 1999, however, the late King Hussein used Hamas as a bargaining chip in the face of nationalist PLO leader Yasser Arafat--who sought to keep Jordan at bay from the West Bank. Since then, the kingdom's strategy shifted and it now considers the creation of a Palestinian state "a higher national interest".

Jordan and Hamas both have vested interests in reviving their once strong bonds--for their own respective benefits. Jordan wants Hamas to acknowledge its 1988 severance of ties with the West Bank (part of the kingdom between 1950 and 1967) halt any meddling in the country's affairs or intertwining politically with the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the most influential party on the local scene.

Parallel to the dialogue with Hamas, the authorities reopened channels here with the Islamic current, ending a decade of cold relations inspired by the tense ties with Hamas. Analysts see this move as a preemptive tactic to contain looming threats to Jordan. Since its inception in 1946, the Brotherhood has functioned as a social safety valve in a traditionally religious state, especially at crucial junctures: the assassination of Jordan's founder King Abdullah I in July 1951; the alleged military putsch in 1957 attributed to leftist parties; the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the show-down pitting the Jordanian army against PLO factions in 1970.

Hamas seems fed up with the limited maneuvers imposed on it by its regional allies and interlocutors Syria, Iran, Egypt and Qatar. Many Hamas leaders find in Jordan a strategic depth with fewer red lines to cross than is the case in the other countries. Iran has not been happy with the domino-effect detente across the region: indirect negotiations between Syria and Israel, Egypt-brokered calm in Gaza and the German-brokered swap of PoWs between Hizballah and Israel. All these moves have not distracted US attention from the simmering nuclear file, and Hamas has been forced to restrain itself as a result.

Although Jordan labels its dialogue with Hamas as security-oriented, leaks suggest that the kingdom might exploit its revived good offices with Hamas to win the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit--believed to be in the custody of Hamas militants since he was captured in Gaza two years ago.

Hence, the rapprochement with Hamas and its local ally the Muslim Brotherhood could serve as a safety valve in case of future pressure on Jordan for some kind of a link-up with what will be left of the West Bank.

On the other side of the compass, King Abdullah II made a breakthrough visit last week to Baghdad, the first by an Arab leader to war-torn Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. Economic and strategic considerations took the king to oil-rich Iraq. The step provoked Jordan's strategic western allies, its peace treaty partner Israel and close partner the PA.

Officially, Jordan insists that those meetings fell within tactics to diversify its options in a fast-changing region, where old allies trade trenches and the prospects of an independent Palestinian state fade away. Nor are they designed to undermine the authority of Abbas, Jordan's traditional ally. Likewise, Jordan has no plans to rescind the peace treaty with Israel or give up its strategic alliance with the US--Jordan's major donor state.

Jordan has reached a stage, however, where it has to reshuffle its cards ahead of possible crucial changes west of the Jordan River. The "lip service" paid by President Bush to the creation of a Palestinian state at the end of 2008 is not taken seriously in political circles here.- Published 21/8/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Saad Hattar is deputy editor of Jordan's al-Ghad newspaper

It's Israel's dilemma
Elias Samo

The Israelis want to make peace with the Palestinians, they say. But they are facing a dilemma of a divided people, part of which rejects the existence of Israel and neither part of which has a leader strong enough to make the hard decisions. The Israeli dilemma reminds us of the child who killed his parents and then pleaded with the judge for mercy because he is an orphan.

This raises two interesting points. First, if one were to compare the division of the Palestinians and their lack of a strong leader--which according to Israel are the reasons for the stalled peace process--with the division of the Israelis and the status of their present leadership, there is no contest as to whom to blame. At least the Palestinian leadership, despite all its difficulties and handicaps, has been able to fulfill many of its commitments made in past agreements. By comparison, the Israelis have maintained their intransigence with total disregard for the dignity of Palestinians, no action on freezing settlements or removing illegal ones--in fact expanding them and erecting new ones--while maintaining dehumanizing checkpoints and taking no serious action to release prisoners.

No wonder Gaza has become Hamas-land. In fact, if present Israeli policies continue, Hamas will become stronger; it appears that only a miracle can prevent the West Bank from becoming Hamas-land as well.

Second, the Palestinians are divided and lack leadership, but there was a time when they were not so divided, there was no Hamas-land and there was a charismatic Palestinian leader who symbolized, represented and spoke authoritatively for the Palestinians. He was willing and eager to deal, but what did the Israelis do? They emasculated, contained and ultimately, some believe, neutralized him. The Israelis practiced the old colonial dictum of divide and rule, and it has backfired.

The Israeli policies that brought about Hamas are the same ones that created the dilemma of Hizballah, a confident military establishment that in the summer of 2006 successfully confronted the legendary Israeli military machine. The Israelis are screaming foul, because Hizballah is improving its military capability with the help of Syria and Iran. It is kosher for Israel to improve its military capability, but for Hizballah to do so is sacrilegious. If this is not a double standard, what is? Israel and Hizballah are two military entities that confront each other; they have equal rights to improve their military status. As the Americans say, what is good for the goose is good for the gander.

How does Syria figure in all this? It is sitting tight watching Israel twist in the wind. Israel's dilemmas are Syria's blessings in disguise, for these dilemmas--coupled with the special relations Syria has with both Hamas, whose leadership resides in Damascus, and Hizballah--provide Syria with a major role, almost a veto power, in the Arab-Israel conflict, assuring it that the Golan is part of the package and remains on the front burner, not marginalized and frozen indefinitely.

Mystifying are the Israelis! They helped create these dilemmas and paved the way for their prominence and success and now they are demanding, actually pleading with Syria, to contain and restrain them. Mystifying are the Israelis and the Americans! They worked hard to isolate and marginalize Syria, forcing it to develop closer ties with Iran and are now demanding, actually pleading with Damascus, to sever its ties with Tehran.

In recent years, the Americans along with the Israelis have viewed Syria as an evil spoiler. Why not give it the benefit of the doubt, view it as a serious and constructive peace partner and engage it in a serious peace process? This is now particularly timely since the American crusade for democracy and human rights has vanished, eliminating a major point of contention. Such a move would undoubtedly have a positive impact on resolving Israel's dilemmas.

However, the Israelis are not showing any such willingness. In the recent peace initiative with the Syrians and despite their internal and external dilemmas and setbacks, the Israelis have raised their demands--Hamas, Hizballah and Iran--and lowered their offers, some would say reneged on previous agreements and understandings. This amounts to procrastination if not obstruction, as if the Israelis have the luxury of time. They don't.

The June 1967 war proved that Israel was a giant among midgets. However, Israeli arrogance and mismanagement of that decisive victory--Sharm al-Sheikh should never have been declared more important than peace with the Arabs--coupled with Arab division and uncertainty never gave peace a chance. Had the Israelis seized the many opportunities for peace, and they were there, there would have been no reason for the rise of Hamas, Hizballah and perhaps political Islam, or at least the process would have been delayed. Even nuclear Iran, under conditions of Arab-Israel peace, would not be more "royal than the king".

With the passage of time, the giant began to shrink and some of the midgets have given birth to little giants growing in quantity and quality to haunt Israel. The Israelis have created their own bogey men and they will live or die with them.- Published 21/8/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Elias Samo is professor of international relations at American and Syrian universities.

Ending the divide is a long-term endeavor
Gamal A. G. Soltan

The current divide in Palestinian politics is likely to continue for a long time to come. The ideological and political gap between the nationalist Fateh and the Islamist Hamas is too deep. Chances for either faction to compromise with its rival are very slim.

Since Hamas took over the Gaza Strip, Egypt's strategy has been to keep Hamas at arm's length in order to contain it. While persistent in denying Hamas the gains it sought when it took control over Gaza, Egypt is also keen not to fully alienate Hamas. The intermittent opening of the Rafah crossing, mediating the Hamas-Israel negotiations toward the completion of a prisoner exchange deal and mediating relations between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah are some of the ways Egypt contains Hamas.

Mutual mistrust between Hamas and Egypt, however, does not allow Egypt's strategy to fully succeed. Hamas is exploiting the tragedy of besieged civilians in Gaza to embarrass Egypt. The breach of Egypt's borders with Gaza earlier this year was a learning experience for Cairo regarding the limits of the working relations it can develop with Hamas. The latter's reluctance to accept Egypt's efforts to cut a prisoner exchange deal between it and Israel is another indication of the limits of Egypt's Hamas strategy. The recent atrocities committed by Hamas' militia against a pro-Fateh armed clan in Gaza demonstrate Hamas' relentless effort to establish itself as the sole armed power in Gaza.

Thus containing Hamas is still Egypt's strategy, but under increasingly strict terms. Fortifying the border with Gaza and deploying larger numbers of better equipped security forces there have been proven effective in denying Hamas the opportunity to replicate the experience of last January. Applying stricter measures at the Egypt-Gaza border to limit tunnel-smuggling is instrumental toward the same purpose. A display of impatience at Hamas' tactic of avoiding serious talks with the PA and Fateh is another sign of Egypt's changing policy toward Hamas.

There is no reason to believe that Egypt's strict policy can cause major changes in Hamas' strategy in the near future. The Islamist movement's hard-line policy is a function of the resources it can mobilize region-wide. These include assistance provided by Iran and Syria as well as widespread popular support from disenchanted people in diverse Arab countries. Changing the regional environment that has proved to be conducive to the rise of radicalism and Islamism is a long-term strategy pursued by Egypt and like-minded Arab countries.

Divided Palestine in many ways resembles other divided countries in the post-WWII era. Germany, Vietnam, China and Korea have been divided along the ideological lines that split the post-war world. The nationalist-Islamist divide in Palestine is a function of the regional ideological divide between moderates and radicals. This is the Middle East's cold war, in which states that are divided along ideological lines are not likely to restore unity until major systemic changes are brought about. Stabilizing the regional system of states in the Middle East should contribute to the cohesion and stability of the region's failing states, Palestine included.

Efforts to reconcile Palestinian factions should not be abandoned, however. Lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved with two rival Palestinian mini-states in place. It is important to keep Palestinian factions under pressure to reconcile. Efforts in that direction should constrain their mutual enmity. Consolidating the PNA and enhancing its legitimacy as the future Palestinian state is a pivotal piece in the Middle East puzzle. Moderating Hamas is a must-do task. It is important to deny Hamas the legitimacy it is seeking independent of the institutions of the PNA. It is equally important to make Fateh and the PNA the robust center of the Palestinian polity. Demonstrating that moderation pays is central to the success of this approach--something that only Israel and the United States can do.

Bringing change to the regional environment in the Middle East is far beyond the capacity of any single actor. Serious change can be brought about only through the collective and concerted efforts of a number of actors from within and without the region. Here Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, the US and the European Union are instrumental.

The Middle East peace process is the main factor that could produce the desired effect. A breakthrough in the peace process is not likely in the remaining months of 2008. Only the arrival of a new president to the White House is likely to have a positive effect on our region. Declining US influence in the Middle East in the years that followed the invasion of Iraq has encouraged revisionist forces led by Iran. The rise of Hamas to power and the parallel decline of Fateh should be seen within this context. A new leadership in Washington should allow the US to engage in a major overhaul of its Middle East policy.

The region itself is already warming to the expected change in the US. Peace talks between Syria and Israel, new trends in Syrian foreign policy and limited progress in Lebanon are some of the important indicators in that direction. Recent extensive talks among heads of leading Arab states are geared to address the same concerns. While the Middle East has to wait for the new occupant of the White House, regional actors should nevertheless use the next few months to demonstrate that peace in the Middle East is a viable endeavor.- Published 21/8/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org

Gamal A. G. Soltan is a senior research fellow at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo and a visiting professor of political science at the American University in Cairo.



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