Iraq: Dark Shadowsw of Things to Come by Wayne White

Middle East Institute Commentary

Iraq: Dark Shadows of Things to Come
April 03, 2008
Wayne White

The Nuri al Maliki government's failure to defeat Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Basra is yet another indication that beneath the widely acclaimed "success" of the surge is a country largely bereft of the legitimate governance required for genuine stability. Iran's intermediary role between Maliki and Sadr suggests that what passes for an Iraqi central government is, in fact, little more than another actor on an Iraqi political scene still badly fragmented along factional lines.

At the conclusion of Prime Minister Maliki's determined effort to wrest control of much of Basra from Sadr's fighters, Sadr's people reportedly controlled even more of the city than before. The government has lost face, Sadr's standing has been considerably enhanced, and his defiance of the government, which he labeled a "Satan" in an interview with al-Jazeera, is unshaken. Past US and Iraqi government efforts to wear down Sadr's forces with scattered attacks and arrests clearly have had little impact. Indeed, a Mahdi Army commander in Baghdad bragged last week: "We can take on anyone now."

The popular appeal of the brash, anti-American and nationalistic young cleric among vast numbers of downtrodden Shi'a has been powerful. It may now exceed that of other more established movements such as that of leading rival Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI).

Although little-discussed, this episode also undermines the myth of the successful surge. Sadr's Mahdi Army was not especially strong in Basra until the surge into Baghdad in early 2007 caused thousands of Sadr's fighters to redeploy to southern Iraq, effectively out of reach of US forces, in order to wait out the surge. This major reverse for the Iraqi central government is partly an adverse consequence of the surge.

Meanwhile, Maliki's government continues to drag its feet in allowing tens of thousands of Sunni Arab Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) cadres to be incorporated into the Iraqi security forces. This comes as no surprise since the CLC's, the result of the so-called Sunni Arab "Awakening," are made up largely of former insurgents and other Sunni Arab tribal elements who harbor considerable hostility and mistrust toward the Shi'a-dominated government.

Maliki and other key government figures strongly opposed the US decision to allow the CLC's and other local Sunni Arab groups to arm and organize themselves in the first place. Such elements had begun asking for an alliance of convenience between themselves and US forces (but not the Iraqi government) since 2004 in order to move against abusive al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) elements in their midst. The U.S. only agreed to this dicey arrangement in late 2006 amidst the awful sectarian strife of that year: violence driven by AQI's bombardment of suicide bombings.

Ever since, the Administration has done quite well in convincing many that the Awakening is a surge-related success story, even though the vast majority of U.S. troops involved in the surge were sent to Baghdad, not to areas where the CLC's have been active. The deal with the CLC's, not the surge, stabilized large predominantly Sunni Arab areas, cut U.S. casualties, delt severe blows to AQI, and reduced suicide bombings hammering the Iraqi capital. This cooperation, however, is uncertain over the long-term in the face of profound government mistrust.

The Administration has gone so far as to characterize this hasty improvisation in the midst of crisis as a new "bottom-up" strategy for bringing stabilization to much of Iraq. However, in the continued absence of meaningful reconciliation between Shi'a and Sunni Arabs, the CLC's are, in reality, a robust collection of potentially very dangerous Sunni Arab militias now numbering nearly 100,000. And they are fast losing faith that the government will ever accept them. There is great risk that the CLC's could turn on the government at some point down the line, one reason Gen. Petraeus recently characterized the situation on the ground as still "tenuous."

Limited as they are to largely Sunni Arab portions of the country, the CLC's hardly represent a new approach to stable governance. In fact, the only reason they have been described in such terms is out of frustration with the dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt performance of the Iraqi central government.

The government's lack of authority in most areas of Iraq has reduced it, especially in the context of its botched effort to bring the Mahdi Army to heel, to little more than another major party competing for power on an Iraqi political scene dominated otherwise by the Kurdish Regional Government and its armed Peshmerga in the far north, armed Sunni Arab elements in north central Iraq, and various Shia militias in Baghdad and much of the south. That was illustrated when the Iranians had to mediate between Maliki and Sadr, strongly suggesting that only they had sufficient influence with Sadr to broker a ceasefire.

Both the U.S. government and military have failed to recognize in recent years that the one major Iraqi government institution upon which Americans have pinned so much hope—the Iraqi Army—also is deeply divided by various conflicting factional loyalties. The lackluster performance of the army (and other Iraqi security forces, such as the long-troubled police) against the Mahdi Army (as well as desertions to Sadr's side during the fighting) revealed that many soldiers feel more loyalty toward Shi'a parties and their militias than the central government. This should come as no surprise given the Baghdad's poor performance on a variety of issues since a fully sovereign government was established back in 2005.

This Administration—as well as the next—may find itself increasingly in a quandary. As the U.S. continues to withdraw additional troops, there could be a rebound in violence in various forms. With most Iraqi loyalties factional, U.S. troops in many ways represent the only relatively neutral party separating potentially hostile elements. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Gen. Petraeus has asked that withdrawals be halted in July when the downsizing to pre-surge levels has been completed. Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that simply "sitting on" or separating various factions for a long time to come would bring genuine stability.

Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. Previously he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Near East, with a special focus on Iraq.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.


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