Iraq and Iran: Drifting Toward Conflict? MEI Commentary

Iraq and Iran: Drifting Toward Conflict?
MEI Commentary

April 30, 2008
Wayne White

Originally published in the Newark Star-Ledger April 29, 2008

The U.S. once again is stepping up its rhetoric aimed at Iran. Renewed charges of nefarious Iranian activities related to Iraq have been surfacing ever since the hearings featuring General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker earlier this month. Diplomacy is stalled on both Iran's nuclear ambitions and Iraq. It is unclear whether the U.S. and Iran will succeed in avoiding a military confrontation of one sort or another.

Not only have accusations escalated, but also the tone of Administration and U.S. military commentary on Iran has become noticeably more shrill. There has been a focus on Iranian-trained "special groups" operating in Iraq, especially in the context of this month's bloody confrontation involving radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

Late last week, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, alluded to Iran's "increasingly lethal and malign influence" (in Iraq). The normally cautious Mullen even went so far as to note that the Pentagon is preparing for "potential military courses of action" against Iran. General Petraeus reportedly is preparing a briefing on Iran's provision of lethal munitions to anti-U.S. elements in Iraq.

On the nuclear front, Defense Secretary Gates -- also typically reserved -- charged in a speech last week that Iran "is hell bent on acquiring nuclear weapons."

Tehran probably is guilty of supplying sympathetic militias in Iraq with money, arms, and training. The evidence so far has not made believers of many observers, but the sheer volume of reporting on this is sizeable. Yet, the U.S. does not seem to appreciate that Iraq is in Iran's backyard and expecting the Iranians to eschew involvement therespecially in the face of a robust U.S. presence--is simply unrealistic.

On the diplomatic front, there is little prospect for meaningful progress. Talks between Ambassador Crocker and the Iranians consist of American accusations against Iran and predictable Iranian denials. The restriction of these exchanges to Iraq blocks any useful trade-offs that might be drawn from other contentious issues dividing the two governments. The dim prospects for useful engagement were underscored when Secretary of State Rice apparently went to a major regional meeting on Iraq this month with explicit instructions not to engage with the Iranians.

A key factor the Administration either does not wish to acknowledge or cannot appreciate is that Iran's overall responsibility for the mess in Iraq is actually quite limited. In a country shattered by war, looting and violence, saddled with a dysfunctional, sectarian and corrupt government and ethno-sectarian communities with maximalist agendas, the fundamental problems are inherently Iraqi. Indeed, the Administration's focus on Iran might be, in part, driven by the need to distract attention from the more fundamental reasons for disappointmentven failure--in Iraq.

Regarding Iran's nuclear intentions, Defense Secretary Gates may be right. However, the main driver for any Iranian nuclear weapons program most likely relates to Iran's desire for the ultimate defensive deterrent against U.S. interferenceot a desire to launch a suicidal nuclear first-strike against Israel.

Gates has noted quite accurately that war with Iran would be "disastrous." Hostilities between the U.S. and Iran would trigger a major crisis without a clear end game in the Persian Gulf upon which the world depends for a huge slice of its tightening energy supplies.

Something often neglected in American policymaking is the good sense to proceed cautiously in certain highly complex situations. To avoid another massive crisis the U.S. can ill-afford, it would be best to acknowledge an Iranian role in Iraq, engage Tehran in a less one-dimensional fashion, and prepare to live with a nuclear Iran.

Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar with the Middle East Institute. Previously he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for the Near East, with a special focus on Iraq.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.