BARACK OBAMA DOES THE WORLD
by Philip J. Cunningham
It’s official. US President Barack Obama, long suspected of being the type of person who wanted to have his cake and eat it too, wine and dine with Wall Street while tossing rhetorical crumbs to the poor, dispossessed and hungry, all the while hobnobbing with the rich and famous and amassing draconic executive privilege, has, in his Nobel speech, just proved himself to be the world’s biggest phony.
The two-faced master of the mellow sound-bite has just outdone himself in trying to convince a jaded world that war is peace, that imperialism is liberation, that down is up and two plus two equals five. Even at this most international of events, in a world that desperately needs some leaders willing to look beyond their own narrow self-interests of the nation state, he preaches America the good, America the beautiful, America the just. Music to the ears of a stateside schoolchild or your died-in-the-wool Yankee xenophobe, perhaps, but hardly cosmopolitan in spirit.
Rather, his speech is mean-spirited. He goes out of his way, and beyond the bounds of decency, in his effort to show that war is necessary and American warfare is especially just. His argument is lame and conflicted. He says war’s been around for a long time so, hey, get used to it. If he was making a speech in favor of legalization prostitution or opium, there might be some point in making the “oldest profession” kind of argument, but surely that flimsy line of thinking has no place coming from a man who has unique and unparalleled access to the world’s most deadly nuclear arsenal. Surely that pale logic doesn’t justify a war, any war, the war of the moment, the Af-Pak War of Obama’s design, just because there have been wars in the past.
Obama gets shockingly narrow and parochial at times, saying in effect that America is good and anyone who opposes America is bad. He pins war crimes on the other guys, but doesn’t begin to address war crimes of his own nation. Suspicion of American is not justified, it’s “reflexive.”
Read more on this article...
http://icga.blogspot.com/2009/12/barack-obama-does-world.html
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Sunday, December 27, 2009
As the World Turns
As the World Turns
Matthew Yglesias
Obama's foreign policy approach could hardly be called radical, but it has noticeably improved America's global position all within the short span of a year.
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=as_the_world_turns
Matthew Yglesias
Obama's foreign policy approach could hardly be called radical, but it has noticeably improved America's global position all within the short span of a year.
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=as_the_world_turns
Obama Year One
Obama Year One
Paul Starr
Obama was right to take on a wide range of tough problems, and no one should be shocked at the obstacles in his path.
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=obama_year_one
Paul Starr
Obama was right to take on a wide range of tough problems, and no one should be shocked at the obstacles in his path.
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=obama_year_one
Obama's Indecent Interval Despite the U.S. president's pleas to the contrary, the war in Afghanistan looks more like Vietnam than ever.
This article in Foreign Policy by a senior researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School and a Foreign Service Officer with recent experience in Afghanistan is drawing a lot of commentary.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/10/sorry_obama_afghanistans_your_vietnam?page=0,0&hidecomments=yes
Obama's Indecent Interval
Despite the U.S. president's pleas to the contrary, the war in Afghanistan looks more like Vietnam than ever.
BY THOMAS H. JOHNSON, M. CHRIS MASON | DECEMBER 10, 2009
As German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer once said, truth is ridiculed, then denied, and then "accepted as having been obvious to everyone from the beginning." So let's start with the obvious: There isn't the slightest possibility that the course laid out by Barack Obama in his Dec. 1 speech will halt or even slow the downward spiral toward defeat in Afghanistan. None. The U.S. president and his advisors labored for three months and brought forth old wine in bigger bottles. The speech contained not one single new idea or approach, nor offered any hint of new thinking about a conflict that everyone now agrees the United States is losing. Instead, the administration deliberated for 94 days to deliver essentially "more men, more money, try harder." It sounded ominously similar to Mikhail Gorbachev's "bloody wound" speech that led to a similar-sized, temporary Soviet troop surge in Afghanistan in 1986.
But the Soviet experience in Afghanistan isn't what everyone is comparing Obama's current predicament to; it's Vietnam. The president knows it, and part of his speech was a rebuttal of those comparisons. It was a valiant effort, but to no avail. Afghanistan is Vietnam all over again.
In his speech, the president offered three reasons why the two conflicts are different. And all are dead wrong. First, Obama noted that Afghanistan is being conducted by a "coalition" of 43 countries -- as if war by committee would magically change the outcome (a throwback to former President George W. Bush's "Iraq coalition" mathematics). The truth is, outside of a handful of countries, it's basically a coalition of pacifists. In fact, more foreign troops fought alongside the United States in Vietnam than are now actually fighting with Americans today. Only nine countries in today's 43-country coalition have more than 1,000 personnel there; nine others have 10 (yes, not even a dozen people) -- or fewer. And although Australia and New Zealand have sent a handful of excellent special operations troops to Afghanistan, only Britain, Canada, and France are providing significant forces willing to conduct conventional offensive military operations. That brings the coalition's combat-troop contribution to approximately 17,000. Most of the other 38 "partners" have strict rules prohibiting them from ever doing anything actually dangerous. Turkish troops, for example, never leave their firebase in Wardak province, according to U.S. personnel who monitor it.
In Vietnam, by contrast, there were six countries fighting with the United States. South Korea alone had three times more combat troops in that country (50,000) than the entire coalition has in Afghanistan today. The Philippines (10,500), Australia (7,600), New Zealand (500), Thailand (about 1,000), and Taiwan also had boots on the ground. So the idea that Afghanistan's coalition sets it apart doesn't hold water.
The president went on to assert that the Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan, whereas the Viet Cong represented a broadly popular nationalist movement with the support of a majority of the Vietnamese. But this is also wrong. Neither the Viet Cong then, nor the Taliban now, have ever enjoyed the popular support of more than 15 percent of the population, according to Daniel Ellsberg, the senior Pentagon official who courageously leaked the Pentagon Papers revealing the military's endemic deceit in the Vietnam War.
The president's final argument, that Afghanistan is different because Vietnam never attacked American soil, is a red herring. History is overflowing with examples of just causes that have gone down in defeat. To suggest that the two conflicts will have different outcomes because the U.S. cause in Afghanistan is just (whereas, presumably from the speech, the war in Vietnam was not) is simply specious. The courses and outcomes of wars are determined by strategy, not the justness of causes or the courage of troops.
The reality on the ground is that Afghanistan is Vietnam redux. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime is an utterly illegitimate, incompetent kleptocracy. The Afghan National Army (ANA) -- slotted to take over the conflict when the coalition pulls out -- will not even be able to feed itself in five years, much less turn back the mounting Taliban tide. The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned determined by statistical analysis that the ANA will never grow larger than 100,000 men because nearly 30 percent either desert or fail to re-enlist each year. The ANA is disproportionately Tajik, drug use is a major problem, all recruits are illiterate, and last month the ANA reached only half its modest recruiting goal despite 40 percent unemployment nationwide. The American media, in its own regression to 1963, simply regurgitates Pentagon press releases that vastly inflate the actual size of the Afghan military, which is actually less than 60,000 men, just 32,000 of whom are combat troops.
The strategy's other component for dealing with the Taliban, "negotiating with moderates," is also ludicrous to anyone who is familiar with the insurgents. The Taliban are a virus. There is no one to negotiate with, and from their perspective, nothing to discuss. And the Taliban know they are winning. Meanwhile, commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan to secure the urban areas (rather than the rural countryside where the insurgency is actually metastasizing) is plagiarized from the famous never-written textbook, How to Lose a War in Afghanistan, authored jointly by Alexander the Great, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union.
Most critically of all, Pakistan's reaction to Obama's speech was to order its top military intelligence service, the ISI, to immediately begin rebuilding and strengthening covert ties to the Afghan Taliban in anticipation of their eventual return to power, according to a highly placed Pakistani official. There will be no more genuine cooperation from Pakistan (if there ever was).
And that is why the United States is now headed for certain defeat in Afghanistan. Obama's new "strategy" is no strategy at all. It is a cynical and politically motivated rehash of Iraq policy: Toss in a few more troops, throw together something resembling local security forces, buy off the enemies, and get the hell out before it all blows up. Even the dimmest bulb listening to the president's speech could not have missed the obvious link between the withdrawal date for combat troops from Iraq (2010), the date for beginning troop reductions in Afghanistan (2011), and the domestic U.S. election cycle.
So we are faced with a conundrum. Obama is one of the most intelligent men ever to hold the U.S. presidency. But no intelligent person could really believe that adding 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, a country four times larger than Vietnam, for a year or two, following the same game plan that has resulted in dismal failure there for the past eight years, could possibly have any impact on the outcome of the conflict.
Arthur Conan Doyle's character Sherlock Holmes used to say that "when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." The only conclusion one can reach from the president's speech, after eliminating the impossible, is that the administration has made a difficult but pragmatic decision: The war in Afghanistan is unwinnable, and the president's second term and progressive domestic agenda cannot be sacrificed to a lost cause the way that President Lyndon B. Johnson's was for Vietnam. The result of that calculation was what we heard on Dec. 1: platitudes about commitment and a just cause; historical amnesia; and a continuation of the exact same failed policies that got the United States into this mess back in 2001, concocted by the same ship of fools, many of whom are still providing remarkably bad advice to this administration.
We believe the president knows perfectly well that Afghanistan is Vietnam all over again, both domestically and, as we wrote in Military Review this month, in Kabul and out in the Afghan hills, where good men are bleeding and dying. And he's seeking the same cynical exit strategy that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did in 1968: negotiating the best possible second-place position and a "decent interval" between withdrawal and collapse. In office less than a year, the Obama administration has already been seduced by the old beltway calculus that sometimes a little wrong must be done to get re-elected and achieve a greater good.
Thomas H. Johnson is research professor of the Department in National Security Affairs and director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.
M. Chris Mason, a retired Foreign Service officer who served in 2005 as political officer for the provincial reconstruction team in Paktika, is senior fellow at the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies and at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/10/sorry_obama_afghanistans_your_vietnam?page=0,0&hidecomments=yes
Obama's Indecent Interval
Despite the U.S. president's pleas to the contrary, the war in Afghanistan looks more like Vietnam than ever.
BY THOMAS H. JOHNSON, M. CHRIS MASON | DECEMBER 10, 2009
As German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer once said, truth is ridiculed, then denied, and then "accepted as having been obvious to everyone from the beginning." So let's start with the obvious: There isn't the slightest possibility that the course laid out by Barack Obama in his Dec. 1 speech will halt or even slow the downward spiral toward defeat in Afghanistan. None. The U.S. president and his advisors labored for three months and brought forth old wine in bigger bottles. The speech contained not one single new idea or approach, nor offered any hint of new thinking about a conflict that everyone now agrees the United States is losing. Instead, the administration deliberated for 94 days to deliver essentially "more men, more money, try harder." It sounded ominously similar to Mikhail Gorbachev's "bloody wound" speech that led to a similar-sized, temporary Soviet troop surge in Afghanistan in 1986.
But the Soviet experience in Afghanistan isn't what everyone is comparing Obama's current predicament to; it's Vietnam. The president knows it, and part of his speech was a rebuttal of those comparisons. It was a valiant effort, but to no avail. Afghanistan is Vietnam all over again.
In his speech, the president offered three reasons why the two conflicts are different. And all are dead wrong. First, Obama noted that Afghanistan is being conducted by a "coalition" of 43 countries -- as if war by committee would magically change the outcome (a throwback to former President George W. Bush's "Iraq coalition" mathematics). The truth is, outside of a handful of countries, it's basically a coalition of pacifists. In fact, more foreign troops fought alongside the United States in Vietnam than are now actually fighting with Americans today. Only nine countries in today's 43-country coalition have more than 1,000 personnel there; nine others have 10 (yes, not even a dozen people) -- or fewer. And although Australia and New Zealand have sent a handful of excellent special operations troops to Afghanistan, only Britain, Canada, and France are providing significant forces willing to conduct conventional offensive military operations. That brings the coalition's combat-troop contribution to approximately 17,000. Most of the other 38 "partners" have strict rules prohibiting them from ever doing anything actually dangerous. Turkish troops, for example, never leave their firebase in Wardak province, according to U.S. personnel who monitor it.
In Vietnam, by contrast, there were six countries fighting with the United States. South Korea alone had three times more combat troops in that country (50,000) than the entire coalition has in Afghanistan today. The Philippines (10,500), Australia (7,600), New Zealand (500), Thailand (about 1,000), and Taiwan also had boots on the ground. So the idea that Afghanistan's coalition sets it apart doesn't hold water.
The president went on to assert that the Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan, whereas the Viet Cong represented a broadly popular nationalist movement with the support of a majority of the Vietnamese. But this is also wrong. Neither the Viet Cong then, nor the Taliban now, have ever enjoyed the popular support of more than 15 percent of the population, according to Daniel Ellsberg, the senior Pentagon official who courageously leaked the Pentagon Papers revealing the military's endemic deceit in the Vietnam War.
The president's final argument, that Afghanistan is different because Vietnam never attacked American soil, is a red herring. History is overflowing with examples of just causes that have gone down in defeat. To suggest that the two conflicts will have different outcomes because the U.S. cause in Afghanistan is just (whereas, presumably from the speech, the war in Vietnam was not) is simply specious. The courses and outcomes of wars are determined by strategy, not the justness of causes or the courage of troops.
The reality on the ground is that Afghanistan is Vietnam redux. Afghan President Hamid Karzai's regime is an utterly illegitimate, incompetent kleptocracy. The Afghan National Army (ANA) -- slotted to take over the conflict when the coalition pulls out -- will not even be able to feed itself in five years, much less turn back the mounting Taliban tide. The U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned determined by statistical analysis that the ANA will never grow larger than 100,000 men because nearly 30 percent either desert or fail to re-enlist each year. The ANA is disproportionately Tajik, drug use is a major problem, all recruits are illiterate, and last month the ANA reached only half its modest recruiting goal despite 40 percent unemployment nationwide. The American media, in its own regression to 1963, simply regurgitates Pentagon press releases that vastly inflate the actual size of the Afghan military, which is actually less than 60,000 men, just 32,000 of whom are combat troops.
The strategy's other component for dealing with the Taliban, "negotiating with moderates," is also ludicrous to anyone who is familiar with the insurgents. The Taliban are a virus. There is no one to negotiate with, and from their perspective, nothing to discuss. And the Taliban know they are winning. Meanwhile, commanding Gen. Stanley McChrystal's plan to secure the urban areas (rather than the rural countryside where the insurgency is actually metastasizing) is plagiarized from the famous never-written textbook, How to Lose a War in Afghanistan, authored jointly by Alexander the Great, the British Empire, and the Soviet Union.
Most critically of all, Pakistan's reaction to Obama's speech was to order its top military intelligence service, the ISI, to immediately begin rebuilding and strengthening covert ties to the Afghan Taliban in anticipation of their eventual return to power, according to a highly placed Pakistani official. There will be no more genuine cooperation from Pakistan (if there ever was).
And that is why the United States is now headed for certain defeat in Afghanistan. Obama's new "strategy" is no strategy at all. It is a cynical and politically motivated rehash of Iraq policy: Toss in a few more troops, throw together something resembling local security forces, buy off the enemies, and get the hell out before it all blows up. Even the dimmest bulb listening to the president's speech could not have missed the obvious link between the withdrawal date for combat troops from Iraq (2010), the date for beginning troop reductions in Afghanistan (2011), and the domestic U.S. election cycle.
So we are faced with a conundrum. Obama is one of the most intelligent men ever to hold the U.S. presidency. But no intelligent person could really believe that adding 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, a country four times larger than Vietnam, for a year or two, following the same game plan that has resulted in dismal failure there for the past eight years, could possibly have any impact on the outcome of the conflict.
Arthur Conan Doyle's character Sherlock Holmes used to say that "when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." The only conclusion one can reach from the president's speech, after eliminating the impossible, is that the administration has made a difficult but pragmatic decision: The war in Afghanistan is unwinnable, and the president's second term and progressive domestic agenda cannot be sacrificed to a lost cause the way that President Lyndon B. Johnson's was for Vietnam. The result of that calculation was what we heard on Dec. 1: platitudes about commitment and a just cause; historical amnesia; and a continuation of the exact same failed policies that got the United States into this mess back in 2001, concocted by the same ship of fools, many of whom are still providing remarkably bad advice to this administration.
We believe the president knows perfectly well that Afghanistan is Vietnam all over again, both domestically and, as we wrote in Military Review this month, in Kabul and out in the Afghan hills, where good men are bleeding and dying. And he's seeking the same cynical exit strategy that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did in 1968: negotiating the best possible second-place position and a "decent interval" between withdrawal and collapse. In office less than a year, the Obama administration has already been seduced by the old beltway calculus that sometimes a little wrong must be done to get re-elected and achieve a greater good.
Thomas H. Johnson is research professor of the Department in National Security Affairs and director of the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.
M. Chris Mason, a retired Foreign Service officer who served in 2005 as political officer for the provincial reconstruction team in Paktika, is senior fellow at the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies and at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington.
Letter from China Green Giant Beijing’s crash program for clean energy.
A marvelously informative article on this subject appears in the latest New Yorker. The text is too long to post but may be found at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/21/091221fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=all. The opening paragraphs are as follows:
Letter from China
Green Giant
Beijing’s crash program for clean energy.
by Evan Osnos December 21, 2009
China’s clean-tech advances should be a warning to the U.S.
China’s clean-tech advances should be a warning to the U.S.
On March 3, 1986, four of China’s top weapons scientists—each a veteran of the missile and space programs—sent a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the country. Their letter was a warning: Decades of relentless focus on militarization had crippled the country’s civilian scientific establishment; China must join the world’s xin jishu geming, the “new technological revolution,” they said, or it would be left behind. They called for an élite project devoted to technology ranging from biotech to space research. Deng agreed, and scribbled on the letter, “Action must be taken on this now.” This was China’s “Sputnik moment,” and the project was code-named the 863 Program, for the year and month of its birth.
In the years that followed, the government pumped billions of dollars into labs and universities and enterprises, on projects ranging from cloning to underwater robots. Then, in 2001, Chinese officials abruptly expanded one program in particular: energy technology. The reasons were clear. Once the largest oil exporter in East Asia, China was now adding more than two thousand cars a day and importing millions of barrels; its energy security hinged on a flotilla of tankers stretched across distant seas. Meanwhile, China was getting nearly eighty per cent of its electricity from coal, which was rendering the air in much of the country unbreathable and hastening climate changes that could undermine China’s future stability. Rising sea levels were on pace to create more refugees in China than in any other country, even Bangladesh.
In 2006, Chinese leaders redoubled their commitment to new energy technology; they boosted funding for research and set targets for installing wind turbines, solar panels, hydroelectric dams, and other renewable sources of energy that were higher than goals in the United States. China doubled its wind-power capacity that year, then doubled it again the next year, and the year after. The country had virtually no solar industry in 2003; five years later, it was manufacturing more solar cells than any other country, winning customers from foreign companies that had invented the technology in the first place. As President Hu Jintao, a political heir of Deng Xiaoping, put it in October of this year, China must “seize preëmptive opportunities in the new round of the global energy revolution.”
Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/21/091221fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=all#ixzz0arRNycSG
Letter from China
Green Giant
Beijing’s crash program for clean energy.
by Evan Osnos December 21, 2009
China’s clean-tech advances should be a warning to the U.S.
China’s clean-tech advances should be a warning to the U.S.
On March 3, 1986, four of China’s top weapons scientists—each a veteran of the missile and space programs—sent a private letter to Deng Xiaoping, the leader of the country. Their letter was a warning: Decades of relentless focus on militarization had crippled the country’s civilian scientific establishment; China must join the world’s xin jishu geming, the “new technological revolution,” they said, or it would be left behind. They called for an élite project devoted to technology ranging from biotech to space research. Deng agreed, and scribbled on the letter, “Action must be taken on this now.” This was China’s “Sputnik moment,” and the project was code-named the 863 Program, for the year and month of its birth.
In the years that followed, the government pumped billions of dollars into labs and universities and enterprises, on projects ranging from cloning to underwater robots. Then, in 2001, Chinese officials abruptly expanded one program in particular: energy technology. The reasons were clear. Once the largest oil exporter in East Asia, China was now adding more than two thousand cars a day and importing millions of barrels; its energy security hinged on a flotilla of tankers stretched across distant seas. Meanwhile, China was getting nearly eighty per cent of its electricity from coal, which was rendering the air in much of the country unbreathable and hastening climate changes that could undermine China’s future stability. Rising sea levels were on pace to create more refugees in China than in any other country, even Bangladesh.
In 2006, Chinese leaders redoubled their commitment to new energy technology; they boosted funding for research and set targets for installing wind turbines, solar panels, hydroelectric dams, and other renewable sources of energy that were higher than goals in the United States. China doubled its wind-power capacity that year, then doubled it again the next year, and the year after. The country had virtually no solar industry in 2003; five years later, it was manufacturing more solar cells than any other country, winning customers from foreign companies that had invented the technology in the first place. As President Hu Jintao, a political heir of Deng Xiaoping, put it in October of this year, China must “seize preëmptive opportunities in the new round of the global energy revolution.”
Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/21/091221fa_fact_osnos?currentPage=all#ixzz0arRNycSG
The Long Decline of the American Economy by John Kozy
The Long Decline of the American Economy
by John Kozy
Global Research, December 21, 2009
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16639
The official position on the cause of the current financial downturn is that it was caused by the reckless practices of financial institutions and the failure of regulatory bodies, and it is likely that these were the proximate causes, but they were not the ultimate cause. Americans, unfortunately, are rarely willing to search for ultimate causes or do anything about them when they are found.
In the 1980s, I was living in a suburb of Washington, DC. One evening, a friend and I were walking the streets of Georgetown when we met a group of Japanese taking pictures of a building they had just purchased. They asked us to take some photographs of them in front of it, which we did. A few blocks further along, we observed a group of teenagers drumming on plastic household buckets. The kids were very good drummers, but I pointed out to my friend that after WW2, the youths of the Caribbean altered abandoned oil drums into musical instruments of various ranges and created a new and unique musical genre—steel drums. Later over dinner, my friend and I discussed what appeared to be a serious decline in America's economic fortunes and culture.
We were not alone in noting this decline. There was much talk and writing at the time about how the Japanese seemed to be on the verge of buying America and how the quality of products and services delivered by American companies had been outstripped by foreign competitors, especially the Japanese. TQM (Total Quality Management) programs, made up of approaches to management that originated in Japanese industry in the 1950s, were highly touted. Having observed Japan’s success employing quality control techniques, western companies started to take their own quality initiatives. TQM, developed as a catchall phrase for the broad spectrum of quality-focused strategies and programs. The most well-known proponents of TQM are Deming, Juran, Ishikawa, Feigenbaum, and the ISO (International Standards Organization).
The success of these programs has been slim. Numerous studies have shown that implementing a quality standard rarely improves a company's performance, and my own personal experience validates that. I was involved in ISO standard implementations in three companies. It was obvious to me that none would work, and the first company went bust within three years of acquiring certification, the second company also no longer exists, having had its assets sold off in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the third is currently in the process of being sold. During this last implementation, I asked to be relieved of my work on it because the project was so shoddy, I didn't want to be associated with it.
Today TQM talk has almost entirely disappeared from popular literature. It has disappeared along with factories and jobs. TQM citations in the business literature began a continuous long-term decline in 1992. There has also been a marked decline in TQM consulting firms. "Commitment to TQM appears to have been only skin deep."
Various reasons are cited for this failure, because anyone familiar with the standards recognizes that the best practices advocated themselves are not faulty. The reasons cited mainly have to do with American managerial attitudes. The implementations were 'top-down,' imposed from above rather than 'bottom-up' so rank and file employees never had a stake in them, managements created no follow-up programs to measure effectiveness, etc. And all of these reasons are also proximate causes for their failure.
But quality in TQM is often defined as the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy the expectations of consumers. In other words, quality is "giving the customer what he wants." In pre-implementation training, consultants often used McDonalds as an example. Every McDonalds' hamburger, no matter where made or bought is identical. When this example was presented to rank and file employees, they scoffed. They often asked, "What do we need all these new policies and procedures for? We're already producing junk." It was not that the policy was being imposed 'top-down' that alienated the rank and file employees, it was the program's goal. The employees recognized that merely producing junk more consistent would not stem the economy's decline, since junk never competes well with quality. What really caused the economy's decline was the business model adopted by American companies, touted by America's orthodox economists, and aided and abetted by the government.
Recently, TechRepublic summarized a piece published by Forrester:
Most . . . managers are stumped when it comes to capturing the right . . . metrics and then effectively conveying their relevance to management. Decision makers tend to focus on the one metric they understand: The cost . . . and how to reduce it. This Forrester White Paper reveals the five essential metrics for effective . . . managing. . . .
1. investment alignment to business strategy,
2. business value of . . . investments,
3. . . . budget balance,
4. service level excellence,
5. and operational excellence.
These five metrics should form the core of a . . . performance scorecard.
But this advice is pie in the sky. Decision makers focus on the only metric they care about—the cost and how to reduce it, not the only one they understand.
Ideally, companies exist to provide products and services to people. If the products and services are good, the companies prosper; if they aren't, the companies fail. That's risky, so American companies inverted this model. They fed the public the notion, which has rarely been questioned, that a company's responsibility is solely the financial welfare of its stockholders. Products and services are no longer the goal of business; they are merely means to profit. That reducing quality leads to greater profits quickly became evident. One fewer olive in each jar, one flimsy part in a complex device, one inefficient procedure in a manufacturing process, built-in obsolescence, built-in short product life-cycles, engineered high failure rates. The American quality standard became, "Junk"! For more examples, see my paper, America on the Dulling Edge.
To ensure that American consumers would buy this junk, a number of other policies were advanced—declining employee wages so that consumers could not afford to buy more expensive imported produces, unenforcement of immigration laws and the introduction of special visas such as H1B1s so that the workforce would expand putting even further downward pressure on wages, restrictions on the ability of American workers to organize, and finally the offshoring of production. None of these policies could have succeeded without the complicit cooperation of America's orthodox economists and government.
But logically, this business model could not be sustained. As the incomes of workers drop, so does their consuming ability. To mask this result, easy consumer credit at high interest was introduced, but that would eventually bring about consumer defaults. So even the bankruptcy law was changed to make it more difficult for debtors to be relieved of their debts. GNP was calculated so that all of this consumer debt was counted as productive spending which masked the economy's decline. Sooner or later, the current economic collapse was inevitable. The nation's negative balance of payments became huge as did its deficit. Foreign nations have far more American dollars to spend than does the vast portion of Americans themselves. This business model has bankrupted the nation.
So now American companies are hoping to sell their foreign-manufactured junk in foreign countries. But this hope involves two problematical scenarios. It can only succeed if foreign countries also adopt this junky model, and only so long as the countries where the junk is being made don't realize that they can manufacture and market the junk without the help of American companies. The likelihood of either of these is slim.
First, most of the developed nations in Europe have strong labor movements which not only can and often have shut down all economic activity in their nations. So many of the policies described above which have enabled the American model to succeed domestically are not likely to be adopted elsewhere. Second, China, at least, has already discovered that it can market its products in developing countries itself.
So when the American power elite speak of a rebounding economy, they are whistling Dixie in the Yukon. There is no economy left to rebound. It has been dismantled and exported. The ultimate cause of America's collapse is the entrenched, rigid, faulty ideologies that our nation's leaders have adopted. These ideologies placed America on the road to ruin. Foreign policies, especially wars paid for by borrowing, have increased the speed of travel on this road. And as incomes decrease, so do our freedoms. Future historians will someday ask, who lost America? The answer will be the American business community, its economists, and its politicians who have adopted rigid ideologies. That answer will serve as America's epitaph.
John Kozy is a retired professor of philosophy and logic who blogs on social, political, and economic issues. After serving in the U.S. Army during the Korean War, he spent 20 years as a university professor and another 20 years working as a writer. He has published a textbook in formal logic commercially, in academic journals and a small number of commercial magazines, and has written a number of guest editorials for newspapers. His on-line pieces can be found on http://www.jkozy.com/ and he can be emailed from that site's homepage.
by John Kozy
Global Research, December 21, 2009
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16639
The official position on the cause of the current financial downturn is that it was caused by the reckless practices of financial institutions and the failure of regulatory bodies, and it is likely that these were the proximate causes, but they were not the ultimate cause. Americans, unfortunately, are rarely willing to search for ultimate causes or do anything about them when they are found.
In the 1980s, I was living in a suburb of Washington, DC. One evening, a friend and I were walking the streets of Georgetown when we met a group of Japanese taking pictures of a building they had just purchased. They asked us to take some photographs of them in front of it, which we did. A few blocks further along, we observed a group of teenagers drumming on plastic household buckets. The kids were very good drummers, but I pointed out to my friend that after WW2, the youths of the Caribbean altered abandoned oil drums into musical instruments of various ranges and created a new and unique musical genre—steel drums. Later over dinner, my friend and I discussed what appeared to be a serious decline in America's economic fortunes and culture.
We were not alone in noting this decline. There was much talk and writing at the time about how the Japanese seemed to be on the verge of buying America and how the quality of products and services delivered by American companies had been outstripped by foreign competitors, especially the Japanese. TQM (Total Quality Management) programs, made up of approaches to management that originated in Japanese industry in the 1950s, were highly touted. Having observed Japan’s success employing quality control techniques, western companies started to take their own quality initiatives. TQM, developed as a catchall phrase for the broad spectrum of quality-focused strategies and programs. The most well-known proponents of TQM are Deming, Juran, Ishikawa, Feigenbaum, and the ISO (International Standards Organization).
The success of these programs has been slim. Numerous studies have shown that implementing a quality standard rarely improves a company's performance, and my own personal experience validates that. I was involved in ISO standard implementations in three companies. It was obvious to me that none would work, and the first company went bust within three years of acquiring certification, the second company also no longer exists, having had its assets sold off in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the third is currently in the process of being sold. During this last implementation, I asked to be relieved of my work on it because the project was so shoddy, I didn't want to be associated with it.
Today TQM talk has almost entirely disappeared from popular literature. It has disappeared along with factories and jobs. TQM citations in the business literature began a continuous long-term decline in 1992. There has also been a marked decline in TQM consulting firms. "Commitment to TQM appears to have been only skin deep."
Various reasons are cited for this failure, because anyone familiar with the standards recognizes that the best practices advocated themselves are not faulty. The reasons cited mainly have to do with American managerial attitudes. The implementations were 'top-down,' imposed from above rather than 'bottom-up' so rank and file employees never had a stake in them, managements created no follow-up programs to measure effectiveness, etc. And all of these reasons are also proximate causes for their failure.
But quality in TQM is often defined as the totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy the expectations of consumers. In other words, quality is "giving the customer what he wants." In pre-implementation training, consultants often used McDonalds as an example. Every McDonalds' hamburger, no matter where made or bought is identical. When this example was presented to rank and file employees, they scoffed. They often asked, "What do we need all these new policies and procedures for? We're already producing junk." It was not that the policy was being imposed 'top-down' that alienated the rank and file employees, it was the program's goal. The employees recognized that merely producing junk more consistent would not stem the economy's decline, since junk never competes well with quality. What really caused the economy's decline was the business model adopted by American companies, touted by America's orthodox economists, and aided and abetted by the government.
Recently, TechRepublic summarized a piece published by Forrester:
Most . . . managers are stumped when it comes to capturing the right . . . metrics and then effectively conveying their relevance to management. Decision makers tend to focus on the one metric they understand: The cost . . . and how to reduce it. This Forrester White Paper reveals the five essential metrics for effective . . . managing. . . .
1. investment alignment to business strategy,
2. business value of . . . investments,
3. . . . budget balance,
4. service level excellence,
5. and operational excellence.
These five metrics should form the core of a . . . performance scorecard.
But this advice is pie in the sky. Decision makers focus on the only metric they care about—the cost and how to reduce it, not the only one they understand.
Ideally, companies exist to provide products and services to people. If the products and services are good, the companies prosper; if they aren't, the companies fail. That's risky, so American companies inverted this model. They fed the public the notion, which has rarely been questioned, that a company's responsibility is solely the financial welfare of its stockholders. Products and services are no longer the goal of business; they are merely means to profit. That reducing quality leads to greater profits quickly became evident. One fewer olive in each jar, one flimsy part in a complex device, one inefficient procedure in a manufacturing process, built-in obsolescence, built-in short product life-cycles, engineered high failure rates. The American quality standard became, "Junk"! For more examples, see my paper, America on the Dulling Edge.
To ensure that American consumers would buy this junk, a number of other policies were advanced—declining employee wages so that consumers could not afford to buy more expensive imported produces, unenforcement of immigration laws and the introduction of special visas such as H1B1s so that the workforce would expand putting even further downward pressure on wages, restrictions on the ability of American workers to organize, and finally the offshoring of production. None of these policies could have succeeded without the complicit cooperation of America's orthodox economists and government.
But logically, this business model could not be sustained. As the incomes of workers drop, so does their consuming ability. To mask this result, easy consumer credit at high interest was introduced, but that would eventually bring about consumer defaults. So even the bankruptcy law was changed to make it more difficult for debtors to be relieved of their debts. GNP was calculated so that all of this consumer debt was counted as productive spending which masked the economy's decline. Sooner or later, the current economic collapse was inevitable. The nation's negative balance of payments became huge as did its deficit. Foreign nations have far more American dollars to spend than does the vast portion of Americans themselves. This business model has bankrupted the nation.
So now American companies are hoping to sell their foreign-manufactured junk in foreign countries. But this hope involves two problematical scenarios. It can only succeed if foreign countries also adopt this junky model, and only so long as the countries where the junk is being made don't realize that they can manufacture and market the junk without the help of American companies. The likelihood of either of these is slim.
First, most of the developed nations in Europe have strong labor movements which not only can and often have shut down all economic activity in their nations. So many of the policies described above which have enabled the American model to succeed domestically are not likely to be adopted elsewhere. Second, China, at least, has already discovered that it can market its products in developing countries itself.
So when the American power elite speak of a rebounding economy, they are whistling Dixie in the Yukon. There is no economy left to rebound. It has been dismantled and exported. The ultimate cause of America's collapse is the entrenched, rigid, faulty ideologies that our nation's leaders have adopted. These ideologies placed America on the road to ruin. Foreign policies, especially wars paid for by borrowing, have increased the speed of travel on this road. And as incomes decrease, so do our freedoms. Future historians will someday ask, who lost America? The answer will be the American business community, its economists, and its politicians who have adopted rigid ideologies. That answer will serve as America's epitaph.
John Kozy is a retired professor of philosophy and logic who blogs on social, political, and economic issues. After serving in the U.S. Army during the Korean War, he spent 20 years as a university professor and another 20 years working as a writer. He has published a textbook in formal logic commercially, in academic journals and a small number of commercial magazines, and has written a number of guest editorials for newspapers. His on-line pieces can be found on http://www.jkozy.com/ and he can be emailed from that site's homepage.
Saturday, December 26, 2009
Holy Father's Christmas Message "God Still Kindles Fires in the Night of the World"
Holy Father's Christmas Message
"God Still Kindles Fires in the Night of the World"
VATICAN CITY, DEC. 25, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a Vatican translation of Benedict XVI's Christmas message, which he gave today at noon from the balcony of St. Peter's Basilica.
* * *
Dear Brothers and Sisters in Rome and throughout the world,
and all men and women, whom the Lord loves!
"Lux fulgebit hodie super nos,
quia natus est nobis Dominus.
http://www.zenit.org/article-27950?l=english
A light will shine on us this day,
the Lord is born for us"
(Roman Missal, Christmas, Entrance Antiphon for the Mass at Dawn)
The liturgy of the Mass at Dawn reminded us that the night is now past, the day has begun; the light radiating from the cave of Bethlehem shines upon us.
The Bible and the Liturgy do not, however, speak to us about a natural light, but a different, special light, which is somehow directed to and focused upon "us", the same "us" for whom the Child of Bethlehem "is born". This "us" is the Church, the great universal family of those who believe in Christ, who have awaited in hope the new birth of the Saviour, and who today celebrate in mystery the perennial significance of this event.
At first, beside the manger in Bethlehem, that "us" was almost imperceptible to human eyes. As the Gospel of Saint Luke recounts, it included, in addition to Mary and Joseph, a few lowly shepherds who came to the cave after hearing the message of the Angels. The light of that first Christmas was like a fire kindled in the night. All about there was darkness, while in the cave there shone the true light "that enlightens every man" (Jn 1:9). And yet all this took place in simplicity and hiddenness, in the way that God works in all of salvation history. God loves to light little lights, so as then to illuminate vast spaces. Truth, and Love, which are its content, are kindled wherever the light is welcomed; they then radiate in concentric circles, as if by contact, in the hearts and minds of all those who, by opening themselves freely to its splendour, themselves become sources of light. Such is the history of the Church: she began her journey in the lowly cave of Bethlehem, and down the centuries she has become a People and a source of light for humanity. Today too, in those who encounter that Child, God still kindles fires in the night of the world, calling men and women everywhere to acknowledge in Jesus the "sign" of his saving and liberating presence and to extend the "us" of those who believe in Christ to the whole of mankind.
Wherever there is an "us" which welcomes God's love, there the light of Christ shines forth, even in the most difficult situations. The Church, like the Virgin Mary, offers the world Jesus, the Son, whom she herself has received as a gift, the One who came to set mankind free from the slavery of sin. Like Mary, the Church does not fear, for that Child is her strength. But she does not keep him for herself: she offers him to all those who seek him with a sincere heart, to the earth's lowly and afflicted, to the victims of violence, and to all who yearn for peace. Today too, on behalf of a human family profoundly affected by a grave financial crisis, yet even more by a moral crisis, and by the painful wounds of wars and conflicts, the Church, in faithful solidarity with mankind, repeats with the shepherds: "Let us go to Bethlehem" (Lk 2:15), for there we shall find our hope.
The "us" of the Church is alive in the place where Jesus was born, in the Holy Land, inviting its people to abandon every logic of violence and vengeance, and to engage with renewed vigour and generosity in the process which leads to peaceful coexistence. The "us" of the Church is present in the other countries of the Middle East. How can we forget the troubled situation in Iraq and the "little flock" of Christians which lives in the region? At times it is subject to violence and injustice, but it remains determined to make its own contribution to the building of a society opposed to the logic of conflict and the rejection of one's neighbour. The "us" of the Church is active in Sri Lanka, in the Korean peninsula and in the Philippines, as well as in the other countries of Asia, as a leaven of reconciliation and peace. On the continent of Africa she does not cease to lift her voice to God, imploring an end to every injustice in the Democratic Republic of Congo; she invites the citizens of Guinea and Niger to respect for the rights of every person and to dialogue; she begs those of Madagascar to overcome their internal divisions and to be mutually accepting; and she reminds all men and women that they are called to hope, despite the tragedies, trials and difficulties which still afflict them. In Europe and North America, the "us" of the Church urges people to leave behind the selfish and technicist mentality, to advance the common good and to show respect for the persons who are most defenceless, starting with the unborn. In Honduras she is assisting in process of rebuilding institutions; throughout Latin America, the "us" of the Church is a source of identity, a fullness of truth and of charity which no ideology can replace, a summons to respect for the inalienable rights of each person and his or her integral development, a proclamation of justice and fraternity, a source of unity.
In fidelity to the mandate of her Founder, the Church shows solidarity with the victims of natural disasters and poverty, even within opulent societies. In the face of the exodus of all those who migrate from their homelands and are driven away by hunger, intolerance or environmental degradation, the Church is a presence calling others to an attitude of acceptance and welcome. In a word, the Church everywhere proclaims the Gospel of Christ, despite persecutions, discriminations, attacks and at times hostile indifference. These, in fact, enable her to share the lot of her Master and Lord.
Dear Brothers and Sisters, how great a gift it is to be part of a communion which is open to everyone! It is the communion of the Most Holy Trinity, from whose heart Emmanuel, Jesus, "God with us", came into the world. Like the shepherds of Bethlehem, let us contemplate, filled with wonder and gratitude, this mystery of love and light! Happy Christmas to all!
© Copyright 2009 -- Libreria Editrice Vaticana
"God Still Kindles Fires in the Night of the World"
VATICAN CITY, DEC. 25, 2009 (Zenit.org).- Here is a Vatican translation of Benedict XVI's Christmas message, which he gave today at noon from the balcony of St. Peter's Basilica.
* * *
Dear Brothers and Sisters in Rome and throughout the world,
and all men and women, whom the Lord loves!
"Lux fulgebit hodie super nos,
quia natus est nobis Dominus.
http://www.zenit.org/article-27950?l=english
A light will shine on us this day,
the Lord is born for us"
(Roman Missal, Christmas, Entrance Antiphon for the Mass at Dawn)
The liturgy of the Mass at Dawn reminded us that the night is now past, the day has begun; the light radiating from the cave of Bethlehem shines upon us.
The Bible and the Liturgy do not, however, speak to us about a natural light, but a different, special light, which is somehow directed to and focused upon "us", the same "us" for whom the Child of Bethlehem "is born". This "us" is the Church, the great universal family of those who believe in Christ, who have awaited in hope the new birth of the Saviour, and who today celebrate in mystery the perennial significance of this event.
At first, beside the manger in Bethlehem, that "us" was almost imperceptible to human eyes. As the Gospel of Saint Luke recounts, it included, in addition to Mary and Joseph, a few lowly shepherds who came to the cave after hearing the message of the Angels. The light of that first Christmas was like a fire kindled in the night. All about there was darkness, while in the cave there shone the true light "that enlightens every man" (Jn 1:9). And yet all this took place in simplicity and hiddenness, in the way that God works in all of salvation history. God loves to light little lights, so as then to illuminate vast spaces. Truth, and Love, which are its content, are kindled wherever the light is welcomed; they then radiate in concentric circles, as if by contact, in the hearts and minds of all those who, by opening themselves freely to its splendour, themselves become sources of light. Such is the history of the Church: she began her journey in the lowly cave of Bethlehem, and down the centuries she has become a People and a source of light for humanity. Today too, in those who encounter that Child, God still kindles fires in the night of the world, calling men and women everywhere to acknowledge in Jesus the "sign" of his saving and liberating presence and to extend the "us" of those who believe in Christ to the whole of mankind.
Wherever there is an "us" which welcomes God's love, there the light of Christ shines forth, even in the most difficult situations. The Church, like the Virgin Mary, offers the world Jesus, the Son, whom she herself has received as a gift, the One who came to set mankind free from the slavery of sin. Like Mary, the Church does not fear, for that Child is her strength. But she does not keep him for herself: she offers him to all those who seek him with a sincere heart, to the earth's lowly and afflicted, to the victims of violence, and to all who yearn for peace. Today too, on behalf of a human family profoundly affected by a grave financial crisis, yet even more by a moral crisis, and by the painful wounds of wars and conflicts, the Church, in faithful solidarity with mankind, repeats with the shepherds: "Let us go to Bethlehem" (Lk 2:15), for there we shall find our hope.
The "us" of the Church is alive in the place where Jesus was born, in the Holy Land, inviting its people to abandon every logic of violence and vengeance, and to engage with renewed vigour and generosity in the process which leads to peaceful coexistence. The "us" of the Church is present in the other countries of the Middle East. How can we forget the troubled situation in Iraq and the "little flock" of Christians which lives in the region? At times it is subject to violence and injustice, but it remains determined to make its own contribution to the building of a society opposed to the logic of conflict and the rejection of one's neighbour. The "us" of the Church is active in Sri Lanka, in the Korean peninsula and in the Philippines, as well as in the other countries of Asia, as a leaven of reconciliation and peace. On the continent of Africa she does not cease to lift her voice to God, imploring an end to every injustice in the Democratic Republic of Congo; she invites the citizens of Guinea and Niger to respect for the rights of every person and to dialogue; she begs those of Madagascar to overcome their internal divisions and to be mutually accepting; and she reminds all men and women that they are called to hope, despite the tragedies, trials and difficulties which still afflict them. In Europe and North America, the "us" of the Church urges people to leave behind the selfish and technicist mentality, to advance the common good and to show respect for the persons who are most defenceless, starting with the unborn. In Honduras she is assisting in process of rebuilding institutions; throughout Latin America, the "us" of the Church is a source of identity, a fullness of truth and of charity which no ideology can replace, a summons to respect for the inalienable rights of each person and his or her integral development, a proclamation of justice and fraternity, a source of unity.
In fidelity to the mandate of her Founder, the Church shows solidarity with the victims of natural disasters and poverty, even within opulent societies. In the face of the exodus of all those who migrate from their homelands and are driven away by hunger, intolerance or environmental degradation, the Church is a presence calling others to an attitude of acceptance and welcome. In a word, the Church everywhere proclaims the Gospel of Christ, despite persecutions, discriminations, attacks and at times hostile indifference. These, in fact, enable her to share the lot of her Master and Lord.
Dear Brothers and Sisters, how great a gift it is to be part of a communion which is open to everyone! It is the communion of the Most Holy Trinity, from whose heart Emmanuel, Jesus, "God with us", came into the world. Like the shepherds of Bethlehem, let us contemplate, filled with wonder and gratitude, this mystery of love and light! Happy Christmas to all!
© Copyright 2009 -- Libreria Editrice Vaticana
For Obama, No Opportunity Is Too Big to Blow
For Obama, No Opportunity Is Too Big to Blow
Naomi Klein, TheNation.com
World: No President since FDR has been handed as many opportunities to transform the U.S. into something that doesn't threaten the stability of life on this planet. Is he blowing it?
http://www.alternet.org/world/144720/for_obama%2C_no_opportunity_is_too_big_to_blow
Naomi Klein, TheNation.com
World: No President since FDR has been handed as many opportunities to transform the U.S. into something that doesn't threaten the stability of life on this planet. Is he blowing it?
http://www.alternet.org/world/144720/for_obama%2C_no_opportunity_is_too_big_to_blow
Can We Rescue the Republic Before the Dark Politics Take Over?
Can We Rescue the Republic Before the Dark Politics Take Over?
http://www.alternet.org/politics/144809/can_we_rescue_the_republic_before_the_dark_politics_take_over_
http://www.alternet.org/politics/144809/can_we_rescue_the_republic_before_the_dark_politics_take_over_
Uncommon Commentary from Agence Global December 26, 2009
A Year Later: Gaza and Israel Both Under Siege by Rami G. Khouri
Israel militarily attacked and laid siege to Gaza, but a year after its war Israel now finds itself under political siege by much of the world.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2222
How to Exit Afghanistan by Selig S. Harrison (The Nation)
A timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should set the stage for the military neutralization of the country.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2221
Crack Down on Peace by Nadia Hijab
On December 16, Jamal Juma became the third anti-Wall activist to be arrested in the last few months. By these arrests, Israel is acknowledging the success of growing non-violent protest actions -- at great personal cost for the activists and their families.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2220
A Grim Year for the Middle East by Patrick Seale
2009, begun with Israel’s murderous assault on Gaza, was a year of great torment and much misery in the Middle East. The ascent of Barack Obama as U.S. President has not been enough to bring a semblance of peace to a profoundly troubled region.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2219
A Bad Decade by Rami G. Khouri
The Middle East region has changed significantly in the past decade, mostly for the worse.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2218
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2216
The Democratic Value of Universal Accountability by Rami G. Khouri
Holding the United States and Israel accountable -- like everyone else -- to a single, equitable standard of justice and behavior is the best way these countries can spread democratic values.
more...
Tony Blair’s Confession by Patrick Seale
Six years after the invasion of Iraq, the British public believes it will at last have a chance to learn how and why Blair went to war. But will the full facts emerge? Nothing is less likely.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2217
Israel militarily attacked and laid siege to Gaza, but a year after its war Israel now finds itself under political siege by much of the world.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2222
How to Exit Afghanistan by Selig S. Harrison (The Nation)
A timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan should set the stage for the military neutralization of the country.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2221
Crack Down on Peace by Nadia Hijab
On December 16, Jamal Juma became the third anti-Wall activist to be arrested in the last few months. By these arrests, Israel is acknowledging the success of growing non-violent protest actions -- at great personal cost for the activists and their families.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2220
A Grim Year for the Middle East by Patrick Seale
2009, begun with Israel’s murderous assault on Gaza, was a year of great torment and much misery in the Middle East. The ascent of Barack Obama as U.S. President has not been enough to bring a semblance of peace to a profoundly troubled region.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2219
A Bad Decade by Rami G. Khouri
The Middle East region has changed significantly in the past decade, mostly for the worse.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2218
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2216
The Democratic Value of Universal Accountability by Rami G. Khouri
Holding the United States and Israel accountable -- like everyone else -- to a single, equitable standard of justice and behavior is the best way these countries can spread democratic values.
more...
Tony Blair’s Confession by Patrick Seale
Six years after the invasion of Iraq, the British public believes it will at last have a chance to learn how and why Blair went to war. But will the full facts emerge? Nothing is less likely.
more...
http://www.agenceglobal.com/Article.asp?Id=2217
Obama and the Permanent War Budget By William D. Hartung
Foreign Policy in Focus
December 22, 2009
Obama and the Permanent War Budget
By William D. Hartung
It's been a good decade for the Pentagon. The most recent numbers from Capitol Hill indicate that Pentagon spending (counting Iraq and Afghanistan) will reach over $630 billion in 2010. And that doesn’t even include the billions set aside for building new military facilities and sustaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
But even without counting the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense budget has been moving relentlessly upward since 2001. Pentagon budget authority has jumped from $296 billion in 2001 to $513 billion in 2009, a 73% increase. And again, that's not even counting the over $1 trillion in taxpayer money that has been thrown at the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if those wars had never happened, the Pentagon would still be racking up huge increases year after year after year.
And perhaps most disturbing of all, the Pentagon budget increased for every year of the first decade of the 21st century, an unprecedented run that didn't even happen in the World War II era, much less during Korea or Vietnam. And if the government's current plans are carried out, there will be yearly increases in military spending for at least another decade.
We have a permanent war budget, and most of it isn't even being used to fight wars — it's mostly a giveaway to the Pentagon and its favorite contractors.
What Can Be Done?
For starters, the Pentagon needs to cut unnecessary weapons systems that were designed to meet Cold War threats that no longer exist. A good place to look for these kinds of cuts is in the Unified Security Budget, an analysis provided annually by a taskforce organized by Foreign Policy In Focus. Its most recent recommendations call for over $55 billion in cuts in everything from unneeded combat aircraft to anti-missile programs to nuclear weapons spending.
To their credit, President Obama and his Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have sought to eliminate eight such programs, from the F-22 combat aircraft to the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (a leftover from the old "Star Wars" program). An analysis recently produced by Taxpayers for Common Sense indicated that six of the eight proposed program cuts stuck. This is an impressive record, given the need to fight the weapons contractors and their pork-barreling allies in Congress to get the job done. But as the analysis also notes, additional spending on other programs added up to $1 billion more than the amount saved by the cuts.
This shouldn't be surprising. As a candidate for president, Obama told a rally in Iowa that it might be necessary to "bump up" the military budget beyond the record levels established by the Bush administration. And in announcing the administration's proposed weapons cuts in spring 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made it clear that he was seeking to rearrange priorities within the Pentagon, not reduce its budget. Gates sought more funding for equipment that would support counterinsurgency operations — like unmanned aerial vehicles — and less for systems designed to fight a Soviet threat that no longer exists — like the F-22 combat aircraft. And he got pretty much what he asked for.
Reducing U.S. Reach
Another area for savings would be to cut the size of the armed forces. But Obama campaigned on a promise to carry out a troop increase of 92,000, mirroring proposals made by the Bush administration. And his commitment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan might set the stage for even larger increases in the total U.S. forces at some point down the road.
Finally, any real savings in U.S. military spending would need to be accompanied by a reduction in U.S. "global reach" — in the hundreds of major military facilities it controls in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. But — in parallel to the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan— U.S. overseas-basing arrangements have been on the rise, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan themselves but in bordering nations.
So, barring major public pressure, don't expect the overall Pentagon budget to go down anytime soon. We can certainly still achieve some real reforms, from the elimination of outmoded systems like the F-22, to cracking down on war profiteering, to supporting the Obama administration's indispensable efforts to cut back the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. At least for now, though, making the Pentagon do with less when most communities in the country are suffering from the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression is not in the cards. Not unless large numbers of us make it an issue.
December 22, 2009
Obama and the Permanent War Budget
By William D. Hartung
It's been a good decade for the Pentagon. The most recent numbers from Capitol Hill indicate that Pentagon spending (counting Iraq and Afghanistan) will reach over $630 billion in 2010. And that doesn’t even include the billions set aside for building new military facilities and sustaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
But even without counting the costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of Defense budget has been moving relentlessly upward since 2001. Pentagon budget authority has jumped from $296 billion in 2001 to $513 billion in 2009, a 73% increase. And again, that's not even counting the over $1 trillion in taxpayer money that has been thrown at the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if those wars had never happened, the Pentagon would still be racking up huge increases year after year after year.
And perhaps most disturbing of all, the Pentagon budget increased for every year of the first decade of the 21st century, an unprecedented run that didn't even happen in the World War II era, much less during Korea or Vietnam. And if the government's current plans are carried out, there will be yearly increases in military spending for at least another decade.
We have a permanent war budget, and most of it isn't even being used to fight wars — it's mostly a giveaway to the Pentagon and its favorite contractors.
What Can Be Done?
For starters, the Pentagon needs to cut unnecessary weapons systems that were designed to meet Cold War threats that no longer exist. A good place to look for these kinds of cuts is in the Unified Security Budget
To their credit, President Obama and his Secretary of Defense Robert Gates have sought to eliminate eight such programs, from the F-22 combat aircraft to the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (a leftover from the old "Star Wars" program). An analysis recently produced by Taxpayers for Common Sense indicated that six of the eight proposed program cuts stuck. This is an impressive record, given the need to fight the weapons contractors and their pork-barreling allies in Congress to get the job done. But as the analysis also notes, additional spending on other programs added up to $1 billion more than the amount saved by the cuts.
This shouldn't be surprising. As a candidate for president, Obama told a rally in Iowa that it might be necessary to "bump up" the military budget beyond the record levels established by the Bush administration. And in announcing the administration's proposed weapons cuts in spring 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made it clear that he was seeking to rearrange priorities within the Pentagon, not reduce its budget. Gates sought more funding for equipment that would support counterinsurgency operations — like unmanned aerial vehicles — and less for systems designed to fight a Soviet threat that no longer exists — like the F-22 combat aircraft. And he got pretty much what he asked for.
Reducing U.S. Reach
Another area for savings would be to cut the size of the armed forces. But Obama campaigned on a promise to carry out a troop increase of 92,000, mirroring proposals made by the Bush administration. And his commitment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan might set the stage for even larger increases in the total U.S. forces at some point down the road.
Finally, any real savings in U.S. military spending would need to be accompanied by a reduction in U.S. "global reach" — in the hundreds of major military facilities it controls in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America. But — in parallel to the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan— U.S. overseas-basing arrangements have been on the rise, not only in Iraq and Afghanistan themselves but in bordering nations.
So, barring major public pressure, don't expect the overall Pentagon budget to go down anytime soon. We can certainly still achieve some real reforms, from the elimination of outmoded systems like the F-22, to cracking down on war profiteering, to supporting the Obama administration's indispensable efforts to cut back the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. At least for now, though, making the Pentagon do with less when most communities in the country are suffering from the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression is not in the cards. Not unless large numbers of us make it an issue.
Tuesday, December 22, 2009
WILL AMERICA’S ARAB ALLIES STRIKE THEIR OWN DEAL WITH IRAN?
WILL AMERICA’S ARAB ALLIES STRIKE THEIR OWN DEAL WITH IRAN?
http://www.raceforiran.com/will-america%E2%80%99s-arab-allies-strike-their-own-deal-with-iran
December 21st, 2009
On Sunday, the Speaker of the Iranian majlis (parliament), Ali Larijani, met for two hours with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. Ostensibly, Larijani was in Egypt to attend a meeting of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which includes Turkey, Kuwait, Niger, Azerbaijan, and Uganda in addition to Egypt and Iran. Larijani publicly described his meeting with Mubarak as “very good and constructive”, and official Egyptian and Iranian media reported that the two men discussed bilateral relations and regional issues of mutual concern. After meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, Larijani declared Iran’s support for Palestinian unity and, following a meeting with Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, noted that “relations between the two countries could be a great help for creation of peace and security in the region”.
Larijani’s meeting with Mubarak was unusual; among other reasons, Larijani is not a head of state or government. More broadly, Larijani’s high-level reception was striking because Egypt and the Islamic Republic have yet to restore diplomatic ties since Cairo cut them off in 1980 and Egyptian-Iranian relations were recently strained by the 2008-09 conflict in Gaza. The potential significance of Larijani’s visit was highlighted today when Mubarak—who, at this point in his career, travels abroad infrequently—set out on a previously unannounced tour of several Gulf Arab states. An unnamed Egyptian official told the Associated Press that the Iranian had presented a “new proposal” to improve relations with Arab states and that Mubarak was traveling to discuss it with his Gulf Arab allies.
Larijani’s discussions in Cairo and Mubarak’s swing through the Gulf need to be understood through at least two analytic “prisms”: the first is the increasingly polarized strategic environment in the Middle East, and the second is growing concern among America’s traditional Arab allies about the ability of the Obama Administration to “deliver” in dealing with key regional challenges. Broadly speaking, the Middle East today is deeply divided between two camps—a reality that some commentators, borrowing a phrase from the late Malcolm Kerr, describe as a new regional “Cold War”.
On one side of this divide are those states willing to work in various forms of strategic partnership with the United States, with an implied acceptance of American hegemony over the region. This camp includes Israel, those Arab states that have made peace with Israel (Egypt and Jordan), and other so-called moderate Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council).
On the other side of this divide are those Middle Eastern states and non-state actors that are unwilling to legitimize American (and, some in this camp would say, Israeli) hegemony over the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged in recent years as the de facto leader of this camp, which also includes Syria and prominent non-state actors such as HAMAS and Hizballah. Notwithstanding its close security ties to the United States, Qatar has also aligned itself with the “resistance” camp on some issues in recent years. And, notwithstanding Turkey’s longstanding membership in NATO and ongoing European “vocation”, the rise of the Justice Development Party and declining military involvement in Turkish politics have prompted an intensification of Ankara’s diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, in ways that give additional strategic options to various actors in the “resistance” camp.
While the “pro-American” camp retains considerable resources and influence, the “resistance” camp has made impressive strategic gains since the turn of the millennium—in no small part, because of the George W. Bush Administration’s strategically counterproductive approach to the region. Against this backdrop, the “pro-American” camp clearly hoped that President Obama would re-legitimate America’s leadership role in the Middle East and deal effectively with the region’s most pressing strategic challenges—with the Palestinian issue and Iran at the top of that list. But, as we have met with senior diplomats and officials from the “pro-American” camp in recent weeks, we have been struck by the accelerating pace at which our interlocutors’ concern about the direction of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policies is mounting. They are becoming increasingly dubious that President Obama will “deliver” in the Middle East—on Palestine, on Iran, in Afghanistan, and on other important regional issues.
It is in this context that Larijani’s visit to Cairo and Mubarak’s subsequent departure for the Gulf take on special significance. As the Islamic Republic prepares for an intensification in its longstanding “Cold War” struggle with the United States and Israel—and a corresponding rise in the risks of eventual military attacks against Iranian interests—Tehran has a clear interest in trying to bolster regional “solidarity” with America’s traditional Arab allies. But America’s traditional Arab allies, such as Egypt, have an even more compelling interest in improving relations with Tehran, to reduce the odds of U.S. (or Israeli) military confrontation with Iran, minimize perceived Iranian threats to their interests, and mitigate the domestic and regional backlash that would ensue if these states were somehow implicated in a U.S. and/or Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic.
We noted an important manifestation of this dynamic when Saudi King Abdallah traveled to Damascus in October to mend fences with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and acknowledge Syrian and Iranian prerogatives in forming Lebanon’s new “unity” government, in which Hizballah and its allies retained prominent roles. (We saw another high-profile acknowledgement of those prerogatives this weekend when Saad al-Hariri, Lebanon’s newly-installed Prime Minister and son of the late Rafiq al-Hariri, visited President Assad in Damascus . Today—as Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Beirut to congratulate the Lebanese on their new unity government—the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Hariri would visit Tehran “soon”.) Now, it is Egypt that seems, in more subtle fashion, to be exploring the possibilities for rapprochement with the Islamic Republic.
President Obama’s embrace of George W. Bush’s Iran policy is likely to do serious damage to America’s already weakened position in the Middle East.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
http://www.raceforiran.com/will-america%E2%80%99s-arab-allies-strike-their-own-deal-with-iran
December 21st, 2009
On Sunday, the Speaker of the Iranian majlis (parliament), Ali Larijani, met for two hours with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. Ostensibly, Larijani was in Egypt to attend a meeting of the Parliamentary Union of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which includes Turkey, Kuwait, Niger, Azerbaijan, and Uganda in addition to Egypt and Iran. Larijani publicly described his meeting with Mubarak as “very good and constructive”, and official Egyptian and Iranian media reported that the two men discussed bilateral relations and regional issues of mutual concern. After meeting with Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit, Larijani declared Iran’s support for Palestinian unity and, following a meeting with Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, noted that “relations between the two countries could be a great help for creation of peace and security in the region”.
Larijani’s meeting with Mubarak was unusual; among other reasons, Larijani is not a head of state or government. More broadly, Larijani’s high-level reception was striking because Egypt and the Islamic Republic have yet to restore diplomatic ties since Cairo cut them off in 1980 and Egyptian-Iranian relations were recently strained by the 2008-09 conflict in Gaza. The potential significance of Larijani’s visit was highlighted today when Mubarak—who, at this point in his career, travels abroad infrequently—set out on a previously unannounced tour of several Gulf Arab states. An unnamed Egyptian official told the Associated Press that the Iranian had presented a “new proposal” to improve relations with Arab states and that Mubarak was traveling to discuss it with his Gulf Arab allies.
Larijani’s discussions in Cairo and Mubarak’s swing through the Gulf need to be understood through at least two analytic “prisms”: the first is the increasingly polarized strategic environment in the Middle East, and the second is growing concern among America’s traditional Arab allies about the ability of the Obama Administration to “deliver” in dealing with key regional challenges. Broadly speaking, the Middle East today is deeply divided between two camps—a reality that some commentators, borrowing a phrase from the late Malcolm Kerr, describe as a new regional “Cold War”.
On one side of this divide are those states willing to work in various forms of strategic partnership with the United States, with an implied acceptance of American hegemony over the region. This camp includes Israel, those Arab states that have made peace with Israel (Egypt and Jordan), and other so-called moderate Arab states (e.g., Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council).
On the other side of this divide are those Middle Eastern states and non-state actors that are unwilling to legitimize American (and, some in this camp would say, Israeli) hegemony over the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged in recent years as the de facto leader of this camp, which also includes Syria and prominent non-state actors such as HAMAS and Hizballah. Notwithstanding its close security ties to the United States, Qatar has also aligned itself with the “resistance” camp on some issues in recent years. And, notwithstanding Turkey’s longstanding membership in NATO and ongoing European “vocation”, the rise of the Justice Development Party and declining military involvement in Turkish politics have prompted an intensification of Ankara’s diplomatic engagement in the Middle East, in ways that give additional strategic options to various actors in the “resistance” camp.
While the “pro-American” camp retains considerable resources and influence, the “resistance” camp has made impressive strategic gains since the turn of the millennium—in no small part, because of the George W. Bush Administration’s strategically counterproductive approach to the region. Against this backdrop, the “pro-American” camp clearly hoped that President Obama would re-legitimate America’s leadership role in the Middle East and deal effectively with the region’s most pressing strategic challenges—with the Palestinian issue and Iran at the top of that list. But, as we have met with senior diplomats and officials from the “pro-American” camp in recent weeks, we have been struck by the accelerating pace at which our interlocutors’ concern about the direction of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policies is mounting. They are becoming increasingly dubious that President Obama will “deliver” in the Middle East—on Palestine, on Iran, in Afghanistan, and on other important regional issues.
It is in this context that Larijani’s visit to Cairo and Mubarak’s subsequent departure for the Gulf take on special significance. As the Islamic Republic prepares for an intensification in its longstanding “Cold War” struggle with the United States and Israel—and a corresponding rise in the risks of eventual military attacks against Iranian interests—Tehran has a clear interest in trying to bolster regional “solidarity” with America’s traditional Arab allies. But America’s traditional Arab allies, such as Egypt, have an even more compelling interest in improving relations with Tehran, to reduce the odds of U.S. (or Israeli) military confrontation with Iran, minimize perceived Iranian threats to their interests, and mitigate the domestic and regional backlash that would ensue if these states were somehow implicated in a U.S. and/or Israeli military campaign against the Islamic Republic.
We noted an important manifestation of this dynamic when Saudi King Abdallah traveled to Damascus in October to mend fences with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and acknowledge Syrian and Iranian prerogatives in forming Lebanon’s new “unity” government, in which Hizballah and its allies retained prominent roles. (We saw another high-profile acknowledgement of those prerogatives this weekend when Saad al-Hariri, Lebanon’s newly-installed Prime Minister and son of the late Rafiq al-Hariri, visited President Assad in Damascus . Today—as Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki visited Beirut to congratulate the Lebanese on their new unity government—the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Hariri would visit Tehran “soon”.) Now, it is Egypt that seems, in more subtle fashion, to be exploring the possibilities for rapprochement with the Islamic Republic.
President Obama’s embrace of George W. Bush’s Iran policy is likely to do serious damage to America’s already weakened position in the Middle East.
–Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett
CLIMATE CHANGE The Copenhagen Accord
CLIMATE CHANGE
The Copenhagen Accord
The international climate change conference in Copenhagen took an important step this past weekend toward tackling the "mortal threat" of climate change. After a week of rancorous talks that descended at one point into a public row between U.S. and Chinese negotiators and a walk-out of developing nations, major emitters reached an agreement which was grudgingly acknowledged by nearly all countries in attendance. This step was not as large or as bold as many nations, NGOs, and experts had called for. And if additional steps are not taken, the world will remain in tremendous peril as the threat of climate change grows. However, the fact that an agreement was reached with China and India and other developing countries is a significant step that potentially signifies a major structural shift in international climate change negotiations and lays the groundwork for bolder future action. After eight years of obstructing action at international negotiations by the Bush administration, the Obama administration has sought to reassert America's role as a global leader. However, while President Obama played a critical role in brokering the accord, American negotiators were hamstrung by lack of action in the Senate, which served as a major obstacle to bolder action.
WHAT WAS ACHIEVED: The agreement that emerged out of Copenhagen contains emission targets for greenhouse gases for both developed and developing countries, as well as commitments on the part of developed countries to contribute $100 billion per year to assist developing countries deal with the effects of climate change. Importantly, the agreement moved past one of the major points of contention between the U.S. and China, as the Chinese -- as well as all major developing countries -- agreed "to a regime of reporting and verification of their emissions goals." The deal was brokered in rather dramatic circumstances, with Obama crashing a multilateral meeting involving the leaders of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, amidst fears that leaders were about to depart Copenhagen with no accord in hand. The New York Times noted that "Obama deserves much of the credit. He arrived as the talks were collapsing, spent 13 hours in nonstop negotiations and played hardball with the Chinese. With time running out...he forged an agreement that all but a handful of the 193 nations on hand accepted." Shortly before departing Copenhagen, Obama gave a brief statement where he said the conference had delivered a "meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough," but noted that "we have come a long way, but we have much further to go."
THE SHORTCOMINGS: To those hoping for and demanding bold action, the agreement fell far short. The deal failed to set concrete targets for mid- to long-term reductions in greenhouse emissions and failed to set a deadline to reach a binding treaty for next year. Additionally, initial optimism over deals to protect forests and transfer technology from rich to poor countries were premature and devoid of detail. As the Washington Post noted, "Some of the targets included, meanwhile, aren't adequate. A U.N. report leaked last week concluded that, taken together, pledged emissions cuts would almost certainly allow for warming far beyond 2 degrees Celsius, the threshold beyond which scientists say global warming could be disastrous." During the conference, a group of top climate scientists warned that "global GHG emissions would almost certainly need to decline extremely rapidly after 2015, and reach essentially zero by midcentury" for warming to stay below two degrees. A significant number of developing countries -- those most at risk -- vehemently argued that the agreement didn't go far enough. The German center-left newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, explained that "without the minimum of figures that the powerful countries should have committed themselves to in Copenhagen, an agreement in Mexico will not be enough to achieve the distant goal of climate protection -- insofar as an agreement is even possible. The fight against global warming has been set back by years." While the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described the conference as "an all-out failure." The Financial Times noted that Obama "might have angered Europe by agreeing a hasty deal with key developing countries and disappointed environmental activists calling for bold action but...with Congress a long way from passing legislation to cut carbon emissions in the world's second largest polluter, Mr Obama could not have signed up to any binding agreement."
NEXT STEPS: While there is no question that the Copenhagen conference did not do enough by itself to mitigate the threat of climate change, it did however lay the groundwork for bolder action in the near future. The agreement may signal a structural shift in future international climate negotiations. The New York Times summed up the agreement in an editorial this morning, "For the moment it is worth savoring the steps forward. China is now a player in the effort to combat climate change in a way it has never been, putting measurable emissions reductions targets on the table and accepting verification. And the United States is very much back in the game too. After eight years of playing the spoiler, it is now a leader with a president who seems to embrace the role." Andrew Light of the Center for American Progress pushed back against claims that the deal was meaningless. "The truth right now is that this agreement is not only meaningful but potentially groundbreaking. ... The Copenhagen Accord was not forged among our closest allies in the developed world; it was the product of cooperation between the US and a group of the largest carbon emitters in the developing world." Contrary to the assumptions behind the talks in Kyoto, which pit developed countries against developing and placed the sole responsibility for action on the developed, in this agreement "a framework has finally been advanced for cooperation between developed and developing countries on reductions rather than continuing a process mired in the old divisions which have hampered us for so long." Carl Pope, the Executive Director of the Sierra Club, agreed, "This deal is still not nearly enough, even for these four countries, but it is a major step forward." Robert Stavins of Harvard's Belfer Center concluded, "We may look back upon Copenhagen as an important moment...the foundation was laid for a broad-based coalition of the willing to address effectively the threat of global climate change."
BATTLE IN THE SENATE: The attention of the world will shift to the U.S. Senate. This past summer, the House passed significant legislation to tackle climate change, but it has been bogged down in the Senate. The Copenhagen Accord should strengthen the President's hand, as well as those in the Senate trying to tackle the threat of climate change and promoting clean energy jobs. The Center for American Progress Action Fund's Daniel J. Weiss, noted, "Although the Accord is not yet binding, this agreement should quell some senators' uncertainty about China, India and other developing nations' level and transparency of pollution reductions. These concerns have been a major reason that some senators from Midwestern states were reluctant to support domestic global warming legislation." A recent poll indicates that three out of four Americans view climate change "as a serious problem that will harm future generations if not addressed." Weiss concluded, "President Obama's international and domestic leadership, the Copenhagen Accord, the need for jobs, EPA's enforcement of the Clean Air Act, completion of health care, and the public's support for reform are all factors that should improve prospects for Senate legislation in 2010."
The Copenhagen Accord
The international climate change conference in Copenhagen took an important step this past weekend toward tackling the "mortal threat" of climate change. After a week of rancorous talks that descended at one point into a public row between U.S. and Chinese negotiators and a walk-out of developing nations, major emitters reached an agreement which was grudgingly acknowledged by nearly all countries in attendance. This step was not as large or as bold as many nations, NGOs, and experts had called for. And if additional steps are not taken, the world will remain in tremendous peril as the threat of climate change grows. However, the fact that an agreement was reached with China and India and other developing countries is a significant step that potentially signifies a major structural shift in international climate change negotiations and lays the groundwork for bolder future action. After eight years of obstructing action at international negotiations by the Bush administration, the Obama administration has sought to reassert America's role as a global leader. However, while President Obama played a critical role in brokering the accord, American negotiators were hamstrung by lack of action in the Senate, which served as a major obstacle to bolder action.
WHAT WAS ACHIEVED: The agreement that emerged out of Copenhagen contains emission targets for greenhouse gases for both developed and developing countries, as well as commitments on the part of developed countries to contribute $100 billion per year to assist developing countries deal with the effects of climate change. Importantly, the agreement moved past one of the major points of contention between the U.S. and China, as the Chinese -- as well as all major developing countries -- agreed "to a regime of reporting and verification of their emissions goals." The deal was brokered in rather dramatic circumstances, with Obama crashing a multilateral meeting involving the leaders of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, amidst fears that leaders were about to depart Copenhagen with no accord in hand. The New York Times noted that "Obama deserves much of the credit. He arrived as the talks were collapsing, spent 13 hours in nonstop negotiations and played hardball with the Chinese. With time running out...he forged an agreement that all but a handful of the 193 nations on hand accepted." Shortly before departing Copenhagen, Obama gave a brief statement where he said the conference had delivered a "meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough," but noted that "we have come a long way, but we have much further to go."
THE SHORTCOMINGS: To those hoping for and demanding bold action, the agreement fell far short. The deal failed to set concrete targets for mid- to long-term reductions in greenhouse emissions and failed to set a deadline to reach a binding treaty for next year. Additionally, initial optimism over deals to protect forests and transfer technology from rich to poor countries were premature and devoid of detail. As the Washington Post noted, "Some of the targets included, meanwhile, aren't adequate. A U.N. report leaked last week concluded that, taken together, pledged emissions cuts would almost certainly allow for warming far beyond 2 degrees Celsius, the threshold beyond which scientists say global warming could be disastrous." During the conference, a group of top climate scientists warned that "global GHG emissions would almost certainly need to decline extremely rapidly after 2015, and reach essentially zero by midcentury" for warming to stay below two degrees. A significant number of developing countries -- those most at risk -- vehemently argued that the agreement didn't go far enough. The German center-left newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, explained that "without the minimum of figures that the powerful countries should have committed themselves to in Copenhagen, an agreement in Mexico will not be enough to achieve the distant goal of climate protection -- insofar as an agreement is even possible. The fight against global warming has been set back by years." While the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung described the conference as "an all-out failure." The Financial Times noted that Obama "might have angered Europe by agreeing a hasty deal with key developing countries and disappointed environmental activists calling for bold action but...with Congress a long way from passing legislation to cut carbon emissions in the world's second largest polluter, Mr Obama could not have signed up to any binding agreement."
NEXT STEPS: While there is no question that the Copenhagen conference did not do enough by itself to mitigate the threat of climate change, it did however lay the groundwork for bolder action in the near future. The agreement may signal a structural shift in future international climate negotiations. The New York Times summed up the agreement in an editorial this morning, "For the moment it is worth savoring the steps forward. China is now a player in the effort to combat climate change in a way it has never been, putting measurable emissions reductions targets on the table and accepting verification. And the United States is very much back in the game too. After eight years of playing the spoiler, it is now a leader with a president who seems to embrace the role." Andrew Light of the Center for American Progress pushed back against claims that the deal was meaningless. "The truth right now is that this agreement is not only meaningful but potentially groundbreaking. ... The Copenhagen Accord was not forged among our closest allies in the developed world; it was the product of cooperation between the US and a group of the largest carbon emitters in the developing world." Contrary to the assumptions behind the talks in Kyoto, which pit developed countries against developing and placed the sole responsibility for action on the developed, in this agreement "a framework has finally been advanced for cooperation between developed and developing countries on reductions rather than continuing a process mired in the old divisions which have hampered us for so long." Carl Pope, the Executive Director of the Sierra Club, agreed, "This deal is still not nearly enough, even for these four countries, but it is a major step forward." Robert Stavins of Harvard's Belfer Center concluded, "We may look back upon Copenhagen as an important moment...the foundation was laid for a broad-based coalition of the willing to address effectively the threat of global climate change."
BATTLE IN THE SENATE: The attention of the world will shift to the U.S. Senate. This past summer, the House passed significant legislation to tackle climate change, but it has been bogged down in the Senate. The Copenhagen Accord should strengthen the President's hand, as well as those in the Senate trying to tackle the threat of climate change and promoting clean energy jobs. The Center for American Progress Action Fund's Daniel J. Weiss, noted, "Although the Accord is not yet binding, this agreement should quell some senators' uncertainty about China, India and other developing nations' level and transparency of pollution reductions. These concerns have been a major reason that some senators from Midwestern states were reluctant to support domestic global warming legislation." A recent poll indicates that three out of four Americans view climate change "as a serious problem that will harm future generations if not addressed." Weiss concluded, "President Obama's international and domestic leadership, the Copenhagen Accord, the need for jobs, EPA's enforcement of the Clean Air Act, completion of health care, and the public's support for reform are all factors that should improve prospects for Senate legislation in 2010."
Monday, December 21, 2009
Neocons Must Be Pissed; China and Russia Are Getting the Sweet Oil Deals in Iraq Pepe Escobar, Asia Times
Neocons Must Be Pissed; China and Russia Are Getting the Sweet Oil Deals in Iraq
Pepe Escobar, Asia Times
World: Cheney and Rumsfeld's script was never supposed to develop like this. Instead of US Big Oil getting the lion's share in Iraq, its top competitors turned out to be big winners.
http://www.alternet.org/world/144639/neocons_must_be_pissed%3B_china_and_russia_are_getting_the_sweet_oil_deals_in_iraq
Pepe Escobar, Asia Times
World: Cheney and Rumsfeld's script was never supposed to develop like this. Instead of US Big Oil getting the lion's share in Iraq, its top competitors turned out to be big winners.
http://www.alternet.org/world/144639/neocons_must_be_pissed%3B_china_and_russia_are_getting_the_sweet_oil_deals_in_iraq
Matt Taibbi, Bill Moyers and Robert Kuttner: Why Can't Democrats Do Anything Right?
Matt Taibbi, Bill Moyers and Robert Kuttner: Why Can't Democrats Do Anything Right?
By Bill Moyers, Matt Taibbi, Robert Kuttner, Bill Moyers Journal
Could a crushing defeat on health reform teach Democrats to stop prioritizing corporate interests?
http://www.alternet.org/story/144697/matt_taibbi%2C_bill_moyers_and_robert_kuttner%3A_why_can%27t_democrats_do_anything_right
By Bill Moyers, Matt Taibbi, Robert Kuttner, Bill Moyers Journal
Could a crushing defeat on health reform teach Democrats to stop prioritizing corporate interests?
http://www.alternet.org/story/144697/matt_taibbi%2C_bill_moyers_and_robert_kuttner%3A_why_can%27t_democrats_do_anything_right
It's Not A Gold Bubble
It's Not A Gold Bubble
Rational investors are buying gold to hedge against inflation. No speculative
mania here.
Click the link below to read the full story:
http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/21/gold-bubble-dollar-markets-currencies-china.html?partner=alerts
Rational investors are buying gold to hedge against inflation. No speculative
mania here.
Click the link below to read the full story:
http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/21/gold-bubble-dollar-markets-currencies-china.html?partner=alerts
WaPo Shreds Fed’s Pre-Crisis Performance as Regulator
WaPo Shreds Fed’s Pre-Crisis Performance as Regulator
Posted: 20 Dec 2009 11:18 PM PST
An intriguing piece is up at the Washington Post, “Fed’s approach to regulation left banks exposed to crisis,” not simply because it does a good job of finding and analyzing some case studies of the Federal Reserve’s failures at a bank regulator, but also because in the critical opening paragraphs, it launches a full bore attack on Bernanke. It focuses on a speech he gave at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in May 2007:
“Importantly, we see no serious broad spillover to banks or thrift institutions from the problems in the subprime market,” Bernanke said. “The troubled lenders, for the most part, have not been institutions with federally insured deposits.”
He was wrong. Five of the 10 largest subprime lenders during the previous year were banks regulated by the Fed. Even as Bernanke spoke, the spillover from subprime lending was driving the banking industry into a historic crisis that some firms would not survive. And the upheaval would shove the economy into recession.
Just as the Fed had failed to protect borrowers from the consequences of subprime lending, so too had it failed to protect banks.
For those of you who are not crisis mavens, the subprime market, which had been bumpy since the end of 2006, officially went terminal in July 2007 with the failure of two Bear Stearns hedge funds, a mere two months after Bernanke’s remarks. But he had given evidence earlier of being wildly out of touch. In a March speech, he had estimates subprime losses at $50 to $100 billion. I recall gasping out loud when I read that, for by then no private sector analyst pegged the damage as anything less than $150 billion.
But the bigger point is that a piece openly critical of the Fed’s performance, and one that puts Bernanke in the spotlight, is running while his confirmation is still in play. This appears to be further confirmation of the observation made by Politico last week, that the enthusiasm for him is waning. That does not mean he will not be confirmed in the end (as much as we think it would be salutary; as one reader pointed out, any replacement would be sorely aware of the fact that the Fed was being called to conceive of its constituency more broadly than it has of late). But it does signal that his confirmation is not a done deal.
The article focuses on how:
The Fed let Citigroup make vast investments without setting aside enough money to cover its eventual losses. The company would need more than $45 billion in federal aid.
The Fed watched as National City made billions of dollars in subprime loans that were never repaid. Regulators would arrange its sale to a rival, PNC.
And the Fed approved Wachovia’s purchase of a California mortgage lender shortly before California mortgage lenders led the nation into recession. Wachovia, on the verge of collapse, was bought by Wells Fargo with government help.
The piece accessible to laypeople while still presenting key financial and regulatory details. And it has some wonderfully revealing tidbits, to wit:
In fall 2006, the Fed conducted a broad review of the nation’s largest banks. The result was a picture of an industry in good health.
The report, called “Large Financial Institutions’ Perspectives on Risk,” found “no substantial issues of supervisory concern for these large financial institutions” and that “asset quality . . . remains strong,” according to a summary by the Government Accountability Office. The Fed declined to release the internal report.
The full article is here.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/20/AR2009122002580.html?hpid=topnews
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/12/wapo-shreds-feds-pre-crisis-performance-as-regulator.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NakedCapitalism+%28naked+capitalism%29
Posted: 20 Dec 2009 11:18 PM PST
An intriguing piece is up at the Washington Post, “Fed’s approach to regulation left banks exposed to crisis,” not simply because it does a good job of finding and analyzing some case studies of the Federal Reserve’s failures at a bank regulator, but also because in the critical opening paragraphs, it launches a full bore attack on Bernanke. It focuses on a speech he gave at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in May 2007:
“Importantly, we see no serious broad spillover to banks or thrift institutions from the problems in the subprime market,” Bernanke said. “The troubled lenders, for the most part, have not been institutions with federally insured deposits.”
He was wrong. Five of the 10 largest subprime lenders during the previous year were banks regulated by the Fed. Even as Bernanke spoke, the spillover from subprime lending was driving the banking industry into a historic crisis that some firms would not survive. And the upheaval would shove the economy into recession.
Just as the Fed had failed to protect borrowers from the consequences of subprime lending, so too had it failed to protect banks.
For those of you who are not crisis mavens, the subprime market, which had been bumpy since the end of 2006, officially went terminal in July 2007 with the failure of two Bear Stearns hedge funds, a mere two months after Bernanke’s remarks. But he had given evidence earlier of being wildly out of touch. In a March speech, he had estimates subprime losses at $50 to $100 billion. I recall gasping out loud when I read that, for by then no private sector analyst pegged the damage as anything less than $150 billion.
But the bigger point is that a piece openly critical of the Fed’s performance, and one that puts Bernanke in the spotlight, is running while his confirmation is still in play. This appears to be further confirmation of the observation made by Politico last week, that the enthusiasm for him is waning. That does not mean he will not be confirmed in the end (as much as we think it would be salutary; as one reader pointed out, any replacement would be sorely aware of the fact that the Fed was being called to conceive of its constituency more broadly than it has of late). But it does signal that his confirmation is not a done deal.
The article focuses on how:
The Fed let Citigroup make vast investments without setting aside enough money to cover its eventual losses. The company would need more than $45 billion in federal aid.
The Fed watched as National City made billions of dollars in subprime loans that were never repaid. Regulators would arrange its sale to a rival, PNC.
And the Fed approved Wachovia’s purchase of a California mortgage lender shortly before California mortgage lenders led the nation into recession. Wachovia, on the verge of collapse, was bought by Wells Fargo with government help.
The piece accessible to laypeople while still presenting key financial and regulatory details. And it has some wonderfully revealing tidbits, to wit:
In fall 2006, the Fed conducted a broad review of the nation’s largest banks. The result was a picture of an industry in good health.
The report, called “Large Financial Institutions’ Perspectives on Risk,” found “no substantial issues of supervisory concern for these large financial institutions” and that “asset quality . . . remains strong,” according to a summary by the Government Accountability Office. The Fed declined to release the internal report.
The full article is here.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/20/AR2009122002580.html?hpid=topnews
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2009/12/wapo-shreds-feds-pre-crisis-performance-as-regulator.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+NakedCapitalism+%28naked+capitalism%29
Iraq plays down oil surge before OPEC meeting
Iraq plays down oil surge before OPEC meeting
Luanda (AFP) Dec 20, 2009 - Iraq's oil minister on Sunday played down the prospect of a surge in its oil production, saying the OPEC crude producers' cartel was not likely to discuss setting production quotas for several years. Observers had said ministers at Tuesday's meeting would have one eye on Iraq's recovering industry and its ambitious plans to ramp up its production to levels that could rival OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani told reporters on Sunday he did not expect to tackle the question of production allowances for Iraq, but stressed its special situation as a country recovering from war. ... more
http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Iraq_plays_down_oil_surge_before_OPEC_meet_999.html
Luanda (AFP) Dec 20, 2009 - Iraq's oil minister on Sunday played down the prospect of a surge in its oil production, saying the OPEC crude producers' cartel was not likely to discuss setting production quotas for several years. Observers had said ministers at Tuesday's meeting would have one eye on Iraq's recovering industry and its ambitious plans to ramp up its production to levels that could rival OPEC kingpin Saudi Arabia. Iraqi Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani told reporters on Sunday he did not expect to tackle the question of production allowances for Iraq, but stressed its special situation as a country recovering from war. ... more
http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Iraq_plays_down_oil_surge_before_OPEC_meet_999.html
Conservative gains in Muslim Brotherhood elections Marc Lynch
ABU AARDVARK
12/21/09
Conservative gains in Muslim Brotherhood elections
Marc Lynch
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has just announced the results of its internal elections to the 16 member Guide's Office (which acts a sort of executive branch for the movement). Held in the midst of intense pressure from the Egyptian regime and a hot internal crisis, the election has produced a dramatic turn towards the conservative end of the spectrum. The most dramatic result was the failure of leading reformist Abdel Mounim Abou el-Fattouh and the Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammad Habib to win a place in the Guide's office. Essam el-Erian, whose defeat in a special election several months ago prompted the latest round of internal crisis, did win a seat -- reportedly by joining a slate with conservative leader Mahmoud Ezzat. Otherwise, conservatives focused on religious outreach rather than politics won a thumping majority.
The very fact of the elections is noteworthy, of course. Virtually no other Arab political movement, party, or government holds such free or fair internal elections to positions of real power. Such internally democratic practices in the Muslim Brotherhood may come as a surprise to those who don't follow the Islamist movement closely, but they are a long-standing feature of the movement's internal organization. These elections took on added significance when Mohammed Mehdi Akef, Supreme Guide since 2004, vowed to step down voluntarily at the end of his term in January 2010 -- another decision rarely made by leaders of Arab movements, parties, or governments.
The results of the elections look like a repudiation from within of the choice by the MB to engage in democratic politics despite regime pressures, and likely signals both a withdrawal from political engagement and possibly some serious internal splits. Such an internal retreat from democratic engagement has seemed increasingly likely, as I warned in late October, as regime repression and political manipulation slammed the door in the face of MB efforts to be democrats. Hopes that free and fair elections would resolve intense internal divides and produce a legitimate leadership appear to be fast fading in the Muslim Brotherhood... just as in so many other recent cases (see: Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and soon Iraq).
The results seem to have been the opposite of what was intended. Losers -- including Habib -- have publicly cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections themselves, which were called by Akef himself rather than by normal channels and for which the Shura Council could not meet in one place due to fears of arrest by Egyptian security forces. A statement of protest has been filed to the MB's legal committee, and it is not clear whether the results will stand. But MB reformers havereacted with fury. MB blogger Abdel Monem Mahmoud has been writing up a storm about the elections, while fellow MB blogger Abdel Rahman Ayyesh posted on his Facebook page a fiery denunciation of the elections, rejecting their legitimacy and their results, and calls it a catastrophe.
Akef insists that the elections were 100% fair and the results should stand, and efforts are being taken to smooth over the crisis. While the dissenters have real grounds for complaint, there is no real reason to think that the elections were not truly representative of the mood in the movement. Attitudes have evidently always been more conservative outside of Cairo and the politicized youth activists. The reformists have taken a beating due to the limited fruits of their efforts to participate in the democratic process. With the rewards of electoral participation being increased arrests and harassment at all levels of the organization, no influence over legislation, a constitutional amendment explicitly aimed at preventing their further participation, and little international support for their struggles, it isn't hard to see why they would fail to rally internal support for their cause.
The voting and the results were announced amidst intense media scrutiny. That level of scrutiny is one of the biggest differences from past such elections. In the old days, the MB would carry out its business in secret, with few people even knowing the identities of the members of the Guide's office. Now, blogs and forums and newspapers and satellite television stations cover the MB's internal doings in great detail -- often with a sensationalist twist which has transformed the MB's modus operandi. The legion of media outlets hostile to the MB are gleefully egging the crisis on. Habib himself took to al-Jazeera to air his complaints. This is a case where the new media environment is clearly making a significant difference.
It is too soon to know how this will fully play out. The new Supreme Guide has not yet been announced. The pragmatic and politically oriented Mohammed Habib, the presumptive favorite, is very likely out of the running after his failure to win a seat in this election. The best known leader of the conservative trend, Mahmoud Ezzat, has said repeatedly that he does not want the position. Whoever becomes the new Guide will be working with a much more conservative top leadership and a deeply disgruntled and alienated reformist branch. It seems likely that the next Guide will steer the MB to a less politically engaged stance, concentrating on social work and religious outreach rather than public politics --- which will please the Egyptian regime, which wants no turbulence as it manages the transition from Hosni Mubarak to his successor (whether Gamal or someone else). It seems highly unlikely that the MB will turn to violence or more radical views, and there are few if any signs of that developing. The real question is whether the frustrated reformists will split from the MB and form a new political movement (as in the stillborn Wasat Party schism of the 1990s) --- something the MB has largely avoided in the past, but which now looms large on the horizon.
12/21/09
Conservative gains in Muslim Brotherhood elections
Marc Lynch
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has just announced the results of its internal elections to the 16 member Guide's Office (which acts a sort of executive branch for the movement). Held in the midst of intense pressure from the Egyptian regime and a hot internal crisis, the election has produced a dramatic turn towards the conservative end of the spectrum. The most dramatic result was the failure of leading reformist Abdel Mounim Abou el-Fattouh and the Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammad Habib to win a place in the Guide's office. Essam el-Erian, whose defeat in a special election several months ago prompted the latest round of internal crisis, did win a seat -- reportedly by joining a slate with conservative leader Mahmoud Ezzat. Otherwise, conservatives focused on religious outreach rather than politics won a thumping majority.
The very fact of the elections is noteworthy, of course. Virtually no other Arab political movement, party, or government holds such free or fair internal elections to positions of real power. Such internally democratic practices in the Muslim Brotherhood may come as a surprise to those who don't follow the Islamist movement closely, but they are a long-standing feature of the movement's internal organization. These elections took on added significance when Mohammed Mehdi Akef, Supreme Guide since 2004, vowed to step down voluntarily at the end of his term in January 2010 -- another decision rarely made by leaders of Arab movements, parties, or governments.
The results of the elections look like a repudiation from within of the choice by the MB to engage in democratic politics despite regime pressures, and likely signals both a withdrawal from political engagement and possibly some serious internal splits. Such an internal retreat from democratic engagement has seemed increasingly likely, as I warned in late October, as regime repression and political manipulation slammed the door in the face of MB efforts to be democrats. Hopes that free and fair elections would resolve intense internal divides and produce a legitimate leadership appear to be fast fading in the Muslim Brotherhood... just as in so many other recent cases (see: Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and soon Iraq).
The results seem to have been the opposite of what was intended. Losers -- including Habib -- have publicly cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections themselves, which were called by Akef himself rather than by normal channels and for which the Shura Council could not meet in one place due to fears of arrest by Egyptian security forces. A statement of protest has been filed to the MB's legal committee, and it is not clear whether the results will stand. But MB reformers havereacted with fury. MB blogger Abdel Monem Mahmoud has been writing up a storm about the elections, while fellow MB blogger Abdel Rahman Ayyesh posted on his Facebook page a fiery denunciation of the elections, rejecting their legitimacy and their results, and calls it a catastrophe.
Akef insists that the elections were 100% fair and the results should stand, and efforts are being taken to smooth over the crisis. While the dissenters have real grounds for complaint, there is no real reason to think that the elections were not truly representative of the mood in the movement. Attitudes have evidently always been more conservative outside of Cairo and the politicized youth activists. The reformists have taken a beating due to the limited fruits of their efforts to participate in the democratic process. With the rewards of electoral participation being increased arrests and harassment at all levels of the organization, no influence over legislation, a constitutional amendment explicitly aimed at preventing their further participation, and little international support for their struggles, it isn't hard to see why they would fail to rally internal support for their cause.
The voting and the results were announced amidst intense media scrutiny. That level of scrutiny is one of the biggest differences from past such elections. In the old days, the MB would carry out its business in secret, with few people even knowing the identities of the members of the Guide's office. Now, blogs and forums and newspapers and satellite television stations cover the MB's internal doings in great detail -- often with a sensationalist twist which has transformed the MB's modus operandi. The legion of media outlets hostile to the MB are gleefully egging the crisis on. Habib himself took to al-Jazeera to air his complaints. This is a case where the new media environment is clearly making a significant difference.
It is too soon to know how this will fully play out. The new Supreme Guide has not yet been announced. The pragmatic and politically oriented Mohammed Habib, the presumptive favorite, is very likely out of the running after his failure to win a seat in this election. The best known leader of the conservative trend, Mahmoud Ezzat, has said repeatedly that he does not want the position. Whoever becomes the new Guide will be working with a much more conservative top leadership and a deeply disgruntled and alienated reformist branch. It seems likely that the next Guide will steer the MB to a less politically engaged stance, concentrating on social work and religious outreach rather than public politics --- which will please the Egyptian regime, which wants no turbulence as it manages the transition from Hosni Mubarak to his successor (whether Gamal or someone else). It seems highly unlikely that the MB will turn to violence or more radical views, and there are few if any signs of that developing. The real question is whether the frustrated reformists will split from the MB and form a new political movement (as in the stillborn Wasat Party schism of the 1990s) --- something the MB has largely avoided in the past, but which now looms large on the horizon.
History’s Lessons on Afghanistan by Anthony Arnold
American Diplomacy
A retired intelligence officer and expert on Russo-Afghan history recalls how history influences present day Afghan reality and what this should mean for American policy.—Ed.
History’s Lessons on Afghanistan
by Anthony Arnold
Nowadays it has become the conventional wisdom that the internationalist al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, the leadership-decimated Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, are essentially one amorphous enemy. To lump all three together, however, is to ignore the differences between insurgency and terrorism in general, and especially between the Pakistani/internationalist and the distinctively Afghan opponents whom we face. History shows that the Afghans deserve our special, separate attention, especially now that commitment of more American forces to that unhappy land impends.
Though once a crossroads on the Silk Route between Asia and Europe, Afghanistan largely lost its cosmopolitan exposure centuries ago when the land route gave way almost entirely to the sea-lanes for trade and commerce. As in many mountainous lands, from Switzerland to our own Ozarks, this isolationism suited the independent and individualistic mind set that so often seems to go along with alpine topography. The term “internationalist”, implying collectivist values and allegiances, is a hopelessly inappropriate label to put on most Afghans, whatever their individual beliefs.
How does that feature relate to the present security problem? To illustrate the difference between terrorism and insurgency, we need only look at our own history, first and foremost to George Washington. Hard though it might be to stomach, by today’s definitions George was unquestionably a “warlord.” In addition, he organized and led an illegal, violence-prone movement that sought to (and eventually did) overthrow a foreign (British) ruling presence. But except for loudly voiced British monarchist propaganda, was he a terrorist? Scarcely.
Nor was he an internationalist. His basic motive was limited to securing his people’s independence, and although he foresaw that the same democratic message might appeal elsewhere in the world, he certainly had no ambitions to have America play an active role in any such movement. Could this be true of most Afghan Taliban insurgents? History says: Yes. Consider the following:
• In 1842 the Afghans rose up to visit on the British Army the first defeat it ever suffered at the hands of an ethnically unrelated colony. True, the British stormed back within a year and beat the Afghans down but thereafter London ceased trying to rule directly from Kabul. Only 15 years later, with this semi-successful rebellion still fresh in all minds, impassioned Indian insurgents called on the Afghans to help in their own massacre and expulsion of British overlords, an undertaking that came within a whisker of succeeding. With Afghan help, the Indians might well have won, but the Afghans refused, on the grounds that India’s war with England was India’s; not Afghanistan’s.
• In World War I the Central Powers included Turkey, then the most advanced Moslem state, which tried to provoke the Afghans into launching a religious jihad against British rule in India. Despite lingering anti-British sentiment, firm Islamic traditions, and deep admiration for Turkish achievements, the Afghans refused. Shortly after the war, the Afghans won full independence and sovereignty from Britain, but entirely on their own, without foreign help.
• Perhaps the closest thing to Afghan connivance in international military diversions occurred in the 1920s, when a newly crowned leftist Afghan amir, Amanullah, came under heavy pressure by Moscow to allow the transit across Afghan territory of Soviet-trained Indian revolutionaries. Amanullah reluctantly concurred in principle, but with the provisos that the Indians be disarmed for the trip, and their munitions forwarded separately, under Afghan guard. As it turned out, the operation never occurred, thanks to a British/Soviet treaty of non-interference that was signed while these negotiations were under way.
• German attempts to secure influence in Afghanistan emerged again in the early years of World War II. In August 1940 an almost prostrate Great Britain was the only power still opposing the victorious Nazis. Awaiting an anticipated German cross-channel invasion from occupied France, the British Empire’s only foreign support was an officially neutral United States. With Germany and the Soviet Union still locked in an unholy imperial embrace (the Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact) that had already seen each of the two profit territorially from military aggressions, the Germans came to Kabul to offer the Afghans restoration of their entire old Durrani Empire. This included much of today’s Pakistan and western India, and it would have more than doubled Afghanistan’s territory. The price? Merely fomenting enough diversionary attacks along the border with India to tie up some British divisions. Instead, on August 17, 1940, the Afghans firmly declared their neutrality. With a bellicose, expansionist Russia on its northern frontier, a weak but pro-Axis neighbor in Iran to its west, and no possibility of support from an enfeebled colonial Britain, this declaration of neutrality showed unusual courage.
• In the late summer of 1941, a reeling USSR was now a British ally, and the two countries had managed to dispose of Iran’s pro-Axis government in a joint Anglo-Russian military operation. With this local South Asian show of force as a precedent, London then put great pressure on Kabul to expel all German non-diplomatic residents, whom the British accused of stirring up trouble in India. The Afghan response was to kick out the non-diplomatic visitors of all belligerent powers (including the English), thus preserving Kabul’s neutrality stance throughout the war.
Has Afghan dedication to international non-involvement survived in the present century’s upheavals? Available evidence certainly supports that conclusion. It is true that al-Qaeda took advantage of the anarchy that followed the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan to set up its terrorist training camps near Kandahar, but one may question how much detailed information was shared with the still struggling Taliban in Kabul about al-Qaeda’s international intentions. The rings of non-Afghan security forces that isolated the camps from contact with any unauthorized visitors (including Afghans) imply that there was precious little “openness.”
In this regard, note that no Afghans participated in the 9/11 assaults. Also, despite a generation of Afghan refugee male children’s brainwashed education in Pakistani religious extremist boarding schools (madrasas), no Afghan has been implicated in any post-9/11 terrorist attacks outside his own country. Only in 2009 have we seen for the first time allegations that an Afghan father-son team probably was planning a subway attack in New York. Considering the allegedly tight Taliban/al-Qaeda links that is an extraordinary exception to an extraordinary record.
Returning now to the al-Qaeda long-term basic objective, it is the creation of an international caliphate of all Moslem states to oppose the infidel world. Can anyone with knowledge of Afghan history believe that there is anything in common between al-Qaeda’s goals and the Afghan Taliban’s? Joining such a collective jihad would be anathema to basic Afghan values no matter how sympathetic any individual Afghan might be to al-Qaeda aspirations.
Yes, Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar may still enjoy good relations, but now there are signs of a possible fissure in that relationship as Omar seems to be opening the door for discussions with NATO forces. Even if proven untrue, such rumors are much more in line with traditional Afghan values than with any Afghan allegiance to the surreal al-Qaida goals.
What, then, are the Afghan Taliban’s goals beyond simple removal of the foreign presence and an imputed desire again to take over complete political power? These have not been enunciated and with the precedents of Taliban atrocities committed in the name of Islam after their 1996 occupation of Kabul, we are faced with the daunting possibility of a return to the same kind of cruel autocracy.
Again we must keep in mind basic Afghan values. The Soviet withdrawal left anarchy and a power vacuum. Into this vacuum stepped the Pakistanis with a hidden but extremely heavy military presence that all but dictated Taliban operations, military as well as civilian, in the era of civil war (1993-2001). Included were not only Pakistani ground troops, but heavy weapons, artillery and air units, none of which could have been manned by youngsters with only a madrasa education. Pakistan itself and especially its Intelligence Service (ISI) must bear some responsibility for the Taliban crimes committed in the name of Islam during this time.
Today, a case can be made that Afghans should be, if anything, less tolerant of the Pakistani version of a “foreign presence” than they are of ours. After all, the Pakistanis are next door and have territorial aspirations that run counter to Afghanistan’s interests, whereas it should be clear that America has no such ambitions.
What are the implications of this Afghan unilateralism for US policy?
• First, certainly any negotiations, direct or indirect, with the Afghan Taliban should openly and honestly show honor and respect for the Afghan historical dedication to independence and self-determination. After all, it is exactly how we as a country began, isn’t it? There is a fundamental kinship in values there that must be openly recognized and exploited.
• Second, our present military “surge” plans in Afghanistan, though probably necessary to avoid a complete collapse of the discredited Karzai regime in the short term, must be extremely brief and be followed by as rapid a withdrawal as we can manage. Those who maintain that any such withdrawal will result in extremist exultation over defeat of yet another foreign invader of Afghanistan are unquestionably correct in their predictions. But so what? Realistically, that is exactly what is happening anyway, and the only way of “winning” this war would be a long-term commitment to military occupation, entailing ongoing American losses in pursuit of an unachievable goal. Can anyone believe that we as a people have (or even should have) the stomach for such a fight? I submit, quite happily, that we Americans make lousy imperialists.
• Third, we must step in and put full heat on the Pakistanis to cease their covert efforts to bend Afghanistan to Pakistani aspirations of establishing a “strategic reserve” territory to be used in case of a war with India.
• Fourth, we must focus our future attention inside Afghanistan on the drug trade, analyzing and openly revealing the connivance of specific individuals, organizations, and whole countries in this primary source of terrorist financing. Forget about the “warlords.” Go after the drug lords, no matter what the cost.
• Fifth, we must reassure all Afghans that we remain committed to human rights (especially women’s rights) but have learned to our sorrow that we as foreigners can do little practically to solve what must be essentially an Afghan problem. We do not favor Afghan blind obedience to any theocratic or corrupt regime, and we will continue to oppose all human rights violations wherever detected. But it is the Afghans themselves who must determine their own future by eliminating corruption, damping the drug-financed violence, and establishing their own human rights parameters. Our main effort now is to be focused on preventing any other foreign entity be it Pakistani, Arab, drug cartel or other source from interfering in their affairs.
• Sixth and last, we must get across the message that America remains immensely grateful to the Afghans whose struggle against the Soviet occupation of their country was such an important element in bringing down the entire Soviet empire.
And on that score we do, in fact, owe the Afghans more than we can ever repay them. We truly do.
Anthony “Tony” Arnold is a 26-year veteran of the intelligence community who specialized in Soviet affairs. He served in Afghanistan in the mid-1970s and retired from government service in 1979. He went on to lecture and write on Russian-Afghan relations. He is the author of Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, and The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire.
_______________________________________________
A retired intelligence officer and expert on Russo-Afghan history recalls how history influences present day Afghan reality and what this should mean for American policy.—Ed.
History’s Lessons on Afghanistan
by Anthony Arnold
Nowadays it has become the conventional wisdom that the internationalist al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden, the leadership-decimated Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, are essentially one amorphous enemy. To lump all three together, however, is to ignore the differences between insurgency and terrorism in general, and especially between the Pakistani/internationalist and the distinctively Afghan opponents whom we face. History shows that the Afghans deserve our special, separate attention, especially now that commitment of more American forces to that unhappy land impends.
Though once a crossroads on the Silk Route between Asia and Europe, Afghanistan largely lost its cosmopolitan exposure centuries ago when the land route gave way almost entirely to the sea-lanes for trade and commerce. As in many mountainous lands, from Switzerland to our own Ozarks, this isolationism suited the independent and individualistic mind set that so often seems to go along with alpine topography. The term “internationalist”, implying collectivist values and allegiances, is a hopelessly inappropriate label to put on most Afghans, whatever their individual beliefs.
How does that feature relate to the present security problem? To illustrate the difference between terrorism and insurgency, we need only look at our own history, first and foremost to George Washington. Hard though it might be to stomach, by today’s definitions George was unquestionably a “warlord.” In addition, he organized and led an illegal, violence-prone movement that sought to (and eventually did) overthrow a foreign (British) ruling presence. But except for loudly voiced British monarchist propaganda, was he a terrorist? Scarcely.
Nor was he an internationalist. His basic motive was limited to securing his people’s independence, and although he foresaw that the same democratic message might appeal elsewhere in the world, he certainly had no ambitions to have America play an active role in any such movement. Could this be true of most Afghan Taliban insurgents? History says: Yes. Consider the following:
• In 1842 the Afghans rose up to visit on the British Army the first defeat it ever suffered at the hands of an ethnically unrelated colony. True, the British stormed back within a year and beat the Afghans down but thereafter London ceased trying to rule directly from Kabul. Only 15 years later, with this semi-successful rebellion still fresh in all minds, impassioned Indian insurgents called on the Afghans to help in their own massacre and expulsion of British overlords, an undertaking that came within a whisker of succeeding. With Afghan help, the Indians might well have won, but the Afghans refused, on the grounds that India’s war with England was India’s; not Afghanistan’s.
• In World War I the Central Powers included Turkey, then the most advanced Moslem state, which tried to provoke the Afghans into launching a religious jihad against British rule in India. Despite lingering anti-British sentiment, firm Islamic traditions, and deep admiration for Turkish achievements, the Afghans refused. Shortly after the war, the Afghans won full independence and sovereignty from Britain, but entirely on their own, without foreign help.
• Perhaps the closest thing to Afghan connivance in international military diversions occurred in the 1920s, when a newly crowned leftist Afghan amir, Amanullah, came under heavy pressure by Moscow to allow the transit across Afghan territory of Soviet-trained Indian revolutionaries. Amanullah reluctantly concurred in principle, but with the provisos that the Indians be disarmed for the trip, and their munitions forwarded separately, under Afghan guard. As it turned out, the operation never occurred, thanks to a British/Soviet treaty of non-interference that was signed while these negotiations were under way.
• German attempts to secure influence in Afghanistan emerged again in the early years of World War II. In August 1940 an almost prostrate Great Britain was the only power still opposing the victorious Nazis. Awaiting an anticipated German cross-channel invasion from occupied France, the British Empire’s only foreign support was an officially neutral United States. With Germany and the Soviet Union still locked in an unholy imperial embrace (the Molotov/Ribbentrop Pact) that had already seen each of the two profit territorially from military aggressions, the Germans came to Kabul to offer the Afghans restoration of their entire old Durrani Empire. This included much of today’s Pakistan and western India, and it would have more than doubled Afghanistan’s territory. The price? Merely fomenting enough diversionary attacks along the border with India to tie up some British divisions. Instead, on August 17, 1940, the Afghans firmly declared their neutrality. With a bellicose, expansionist Russia on its northern frontier, a weak but pro-Axis neighbor in Iran to its west, and no possibility of support from an enfeebled colonial Britain, this declaration of neutrality showed unusual courage.
• In the late summer of 1941, a reeling USSR was now a British ally, and the two countries had managed to dispose of Iran’s pro-Axis government in a joint Anglo-Russian military operation. With this local South Asian show of force as a precedent, London then put great pressure on Kabul to expel all German non-diplomatic residents, whom the British accused of stirring up trouble in India. The Afghan response was to kick out the non-diplomatic visitors of all belligerent powers (including the English), thus preserving Kabul’s neutrality stance throughout the war.
Has Afghan dedication to international non-involvement survived in the present century’s upheavals? Available evidence certainly supports that conclusion. It is true that al-Qaeda took advantage of the anarchy that followed the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan to set up its terrorist training camps near Kandahar, but one may question how much detailed information was shared with the still struggling Taliban in Kabul about al-Qaeda’s international intentions. The rings of non-Afghan security forces that isolated the camps from contact with any unauthorized visitors (including Afghans) imply that there was precious little “openness.”
In this regard, note that no Afghans participated in the 9/11 assaults. Also, despite a generation of Afghan refugee male children’s brainwashed education in Pakistani religious extremist boarding schools (madrasas), no Afghan has been implicated in any post-9/11 terrorist attacks outside his own country. Only in 2009 have we seen for the first time allegations that an Afghan father-son team probably was planning a subway attack in New York. Considering the allegedly tight Taliban/al-Qaeda links that is an extraordinary exception to an extraordinary record.
Returning now to the al-Qaeda long-term basic objective, it is the creation of an international caliphate of all Moslem states to oppose the infidel world. Can anyone with knowledge of Afghan history believe that there is anything in common between al-Qaeda’s goals and the Afghan Taliban’s? Joining such a collective jihad would be anathema to basic Afghan values no matter how sympathetic any individual Afghan might be to al-Qaeda aspirations.
Yes, Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar may still enjoy good relations, but now there are signs of a possible fissure in that relationship as Omar seems to be opening the door for discussions with NATO forces. Even if proven untrue, such rumors are much more in line with traditional Afghan values than with any Afghan allegiance to the surreal al-Qaida goals.
What, then, are the Afghan Taliban’s goals beyond simple removal of the foreign presence and an imputed desire again to take over complete political power? These have not been enunciated and with the precedents of Taliban atrocities committed in the name of Islam after their 1996 occupation of Kabul, we are faced with the daunting possibility of a return to the same kind of cruel autocracy.
Again we must keep in mind basic Afghan values. The Soviet withdrawal left anarchy and a power vacuum. Into this vacuum stepped the Pakistanis with a hidden but extremely heavy military presence that all but dictated Taliban operations, military as well as civilian, in the era of civil war (1993-2001). Included were not only Pakistani ground troops, but heavy weapons, artillery and air units, none of which could have been manned by youngsters with only a madrasa education. Pakistan itself and especially its Intelligence Service (ISI) must bear some responsibility for the Taliban crimes committed in the name of Islam during this time.
Today, a case can be made that Afghans should be, if anything, less tolerant of the Pakistani version of a “foreign presence” than they are of ours. After all, the Pakistanis are next door and have territorial aspirations that run counter to Afghanistan’s interests, whereas it should be clear that America has no such ambitions.
What are the implications of this Afghan unilateralism for US policy?
• First, certainly any negotiations, direct or indirect, with the Afghan Taliban should openly and honestly show honor and respect for the Afghan historical dedication to independence and self-determination. After all, it is exactly how we as a country began, isn’t it? There is a fundamental kinship in values there that must be openly recognized and exploited.
• Second, our present military “surge” plans in Afghanistan, though probably necessary to avoid a complete collapse of the discredited Karzai regime in the short term, must be extremely brief and be followed by as rapid a withdrawal as we can manage. Those who maintain that any such withdrawal will result in extremist exultation over defeat of yet another foreign invader of Afghanistan are unquestionably correct in their predictions. But so what? Realistically, that is exactly what is happening anyway, and the only way of “winning” this war would be a long-term commitment to military occupation, entailing ongoing American losses in pursuit of an unachievable goal. Can anyone believe that we as a people have (or even should have) the stomach for such a fight? I submit, quite happily, that we Americans make lousy imperialists.
• Third, we must step in and put full heat on the Pakistanis to cease their covert efforts to bend Afghanistan to Pakistani aspirations of establishing a “strategic reserve” territory to be used in case of a war with India.
• Fourth, we must focus our future attention inside Afghanistan on the drug trade, analyzing and openly revealing the connivance of specific individuals, organizations, and whole countries in this primary source of terrorist financing. Forget about the “warlords.” Go after the drug lords, no matter what the cost.
• Fifth, we must reassure all Afghans that we remain committed to human rights (especially women’s rights) but have learned to our sorrow that we as foreigners can do little practically to solve what must be essentially an Afghan problem. We do not favor Afghan blind obedience to any theocratic or corrupt regime, and we will continue to oppose all human rights violations wherever detected. But it is the Afghans themselves who must determine their own future by eliminating corruption, damping the drug-financed violence, and establishing their own human rights parameters. Our main effort now is to be focused on preventing any other foreign entity be it Pakistani, Arab, drug cartel or other source from interfering in their affairs.
• Sixth and last, we must get across the message that America remains immensely grateful to the Afghans whose struggle against the Soviet occupation of their country was such an important element in bringing down the entire Soviet empire.
And on that score we do, in fact, owe the Afghans more than we can ever repay them. We truly do.
Anthony “Tony” Arnold is a 26-year veteran of the intelligence community who specialized in Soviet affairs. He served in Afghanistan in the mid-1970s and retired from government service in 1979. He went on to lecture and write on Russian-Afghan relations. He is the author of Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective, Afghanistan's Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq, and The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan's Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire.
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