Iran’s Fantasy: A Renewed Cold War between "Infidels" Russia and America
By Walid Phares
Following is a short commentary I wrote about the Iranian regime strategic opportunity to dodge the international sanctions and the rise of its own opposition, seized through the ongoing tensions between the Russian Federation and NATO. The main point in this article is the Khomeinist Strategic thinking as it pushes hard to widen these international tentions and take advantage of the possibilities of a return of a kind of a Cold war. Evidently Counter Terrorism experts in the US and across the Atlantic have different views on the crisis with Russia and how to address it. But in view of the opportunity given to Iran and other Jihadists, the new East-West tensions may have to be addressed with this reality in mind. Following is my commentary, initially posted in the Cutting Edge News today
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Iran’s Fantasy: A Renewed Cold War between "Infidels" Russia and America
Walid Phares
The post-Soviet world has never been closer to what we knew as the Cold War than right now. Iran is pleased. We should all be concerned. New proxy conflicts may soon emerge.
The starkest reminder of the new chill came after Russian forces recently executed a military operation inside South Ossetia in Georgia. Ostensibly, the Georgian incursion was to bring back constitutional order. But Russia’s massive reaction has their forces entrenched just miles away from Tbilisi, Georgia’s capital.
Recent statements by Russian and Western leaders, the flights of long range Russian bombers across international skies, and the cruising of Russian battleships on the high seas are all images from the past months. But they are also a chilling reminder of what were four dangerous decades of the past century.
Moscow and NATO still stockpile thousands of nuclear heads. So any significant confrontation between the two camps is potentially lethal to the planet even though the ICBMs are no longer pre-targeted at major cities around the world. Targeting can change. Dangers emanating from these tensions—Cold War or not—are real and must be addressed seriously by the leaderships at the White House and the Kremlin.
Almost two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Democratic Revolution against Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union, neither the United States nor Russia has any interest in reviving this tumultuous past. First there is no ideological component for such a conflict. The Communist Party does not rule Moscow, and the USSR exists no more. Both powers are capitalist and both are super armed, even if not technically equal. Their arsenals can finish humanity in a few hours. Second, even if the governmental elite in the Russian Federation seem to act in an authoritarian manner and gesticulate in a pre-1990 mindset, the Russian people and especially the youth are not too excited about a war with the West, particularly with America. All sociological data and observation from Russia’s current popular mood and culture does not show a high support for the return to a Cold war, even if President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin proffer tough words toward the United States and its allies.
Yes, Russia will be determined to play hardball in situations involving the future of Russian-speaking or pro-Russian Slavic populations around its borders. But it is hard to see a come-back of Russian forces to areas where populations would resist them, such as Poland. The mood of the local peoples is more deterring to Moscow than any U.S. or European measures, and that is the real insurance against a Soviet reenactment in Europe. Currently, Russia cannot replay the role of military occupier of alien populations even if many experts and think tanks in the West claim otherwise. Hence, the kind of Cold War which may resurface, or is already showing its hallmarks, is about regions remote from the old Iron Curtain.
That brings us to the greater Middle East and parts of Africa with some, but limited, possibilities in Latin America. It is this type of Russo-American tension and proxy conflict that pleases many rogue regimes and forces in those parts of the world. For sure, one among these excited players is undoubtedly the Iranian regime.
Indeed, Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad have been mobilizing all resources possible, as early as 2005, to break Iran’s isolation since the pressures mounted seriously on the Pasdaran-dominated country. From Tehran’s perspective, cataclysmic geopolitical changes have been taking place in its neighborhood since the events of Sept 11. NATO has deployed in Afghanistan, a US-led Coalition has seized Iraq and American Task Forces have been cruising in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s Mullahs are feeling strategically encircled at a time when more sectors of the Iranian society are shifting to the opposition: Additionally, in 2005, two major allies of the Ayatollahs have been put under pressure: First, Assad’s Baathist regime, which was indicted in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri; and second, Hezbollah which was singled out by UN Security Council Resolution 1559 to surrender its weapons. Add to these pressures a mounting UN request for stopping the military nuclear program of Iran. If you were the men of the regime in Tehran, only a miracle or some sort of massive change in international relations can get you out of this pit. And indeed that salvation shift came in the form of Russo-American tensions.
In fact, only a nation holding veto power at the Security Council and strong enough to accompany its threats with action on the ground is able to save the Khamenei elite from complete isolation. And that giant is, as we see, an angry Russian leadership. The Iranian regime read very well the slowly faltering relations between the entourage of Putin and Bush despite the apparently good personal relations between the two leaders.
Throughout the 1990s under Yeltsin and immediately after 9/11 under Putin, Russo-American partnership against Terrorism seemed to discourage the Jihadists worldwide—both Salafists, that is, the Sunni Islamists, and the Khomeinists. Both Iranian camps hoped for an “infidel-versus-infidel” confrontation that would save the day. Jihadi ideologues such as Sheikh Yussuf Qaradawi, al Jazeera’s major doctrinal figure and master inspiration for the Muslim Brotherhood networks often lamented that today’s Kuffar (infidels) seem to be united against the Umma (the Islamic nation). Iranian-backed thinkers also hinted at the deadlock in international context. Sheikh Mohammed Fadlallah, Hezbollah’s ideological mentor repeatedly indicated that as long as Moscow and Washington were not at odds, it was difficult for the Jihadi forces to achieve a critical change in the balance of power in the region.
In Iran, strategic planners knew all too well that even though it was the United States which threatened the regime’s ambitions, it was in fact the passive entente between the old foes of the Cold War that allowed Americans to come so close to Iran’s borders. Hence, in order to reverse the Western advance in the Middle East and, more importantly, in order to escape a democratic revolution against the regional tyrannies, the Russo-American entente would have to crumble. Therefore, the current escalation into what looks like—but is not exactly— a return to the Cold war is a “gift from heaven” to the Iranian regime. For even if these tensions do not climax into a full fledge comeback to the post-WWII era, they will and have already allowed Khamenei and Ahmadinejad to break loose from the containment and isolation processes. Here is how.
In the past years after 9/11, Russia worked cooperatively with the West to pressure Iran and its allies in the region at the UN Security Council with the passing of UNSCR 1559 and its subsequent resolutions regarding Syria and Lebanon. Moscow still walked with the international community in pressuring Tehran to cooperate on the nuclear crisis. But in the last few years, Russian-Iranian, and to a lesser degree Russian-Syrian, cooperation began to grow and the attitude of the Kremlin towards U.S. policies in the region became more and more rigid.
Historians and maybe contemporary experts in Russian-Western relationships will sooner rather than later explain why the cordial relations rapidly deteriorated. Scores of Cold War and hard-core partisans in the West claim the politico-military establishment in Russia never really changed from the old Soviet Union to the current Russian Federation. But anti-Western Communists are today on the margins of politics in Russia. Who then is pushing for tensions and to achieve what goals? There is plenty of cash in Moscow and oil is providing unprecedented revenues. Critics of Moscow accuse the old Russian nationalism of provoking a non-Marxist return to the empire. The argument is valid, but Russian youth are more into rock, travel and job search than into chauvinism. So what is it that pushed the Russian bear to roar and show its anger over the secessionist provinces in Georgia after a decade and a half of status quo in the Caucuses? Is it the anti-missiles shield to be deployed in Eastern Europe? Is it the treatment of Russia by American diplomacy which, according to Moscow, acts unilaterally and ignores the second greatest power on Earth as U.S. forces roam the planet? Is it the stretching of NATO around the old Soviet borders? Or is it a combination of all of the above complicated by a slow process of democratization in an ex-superpower which is witnessing a sudden flood of cash revenues? It may be all of that.
Unfortunately, this transformation was certainly missed in Western capitals. Russia was too important to let slip back into enmity. Washington and Brussels should have seen the signals of frustrations much earlier and acted accordingly. In the couple years following the Jihadi onslaught of September 11, a window of opportunity was open wide. Bush and Putin were very comfortable with each other. Russians suffered from terrorism in their capital and in Beslan as much as the Spaniards and the British did in their capital cities. As suggested in a whole chapter of my most recent book, The Confrontation, the US and the West should have jumped immediately at this opportunity and brought Russia by all means to a world alliance against Jihadi terrorism. This convergence with Russia against the Terror forces should have been a priority for NATO, but apparently it didn’t happen.
Worse, a reverse policy was applied by Western foreign policies. In the Balkans, where ethnic conflict can explode the delicate balances, a straw broke the back of the Russian-Western equation. Neglecting Russian concerns over Kosovo’s separation from Serbia, Euro-American chanceries slapped the bear in the face while their troops were fighting the most lethal enemy of the international community in Afghanistan, Iraq and at home. From that day on, Russia was on its own looking for its own Kosovo, and the rest of the story is now being played in the Caucuses and more specifically in Georgia.
Ironically, it was the West that wanted to please the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) by rushing the Kosovo process without a real reconciliation with Serbia, Russia’s cousin. The move led to the alienation of the Russians and didn’t extract a massive Muslim support to the United States. Ironically, this is where Iran seized the opportunity.
Using all its energies and clout, the Iranian regime blocked the Arab League and the OIC from siding overwhelmingly with the West while Tehran further invited the Russians to exercise a counter balance in the region. Maneuvering admirably, Iran acted swiftly on the ground as the Russian-Western crisis was mounting. As soon as Moscow expressed its open anger about Kosovo last winter, the Ayatollah understood that from that day on Putin would not grant his green light for any UN action against Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah. In May, the Iranian-backed militia took over Beirut and the United States didn’t lift a finger. A new balance of power was now acting to the advantage of Tehran.
An angry Russia is naturally in the interest of Iran’s regime. A Russia that clashes with US allies in the Balkans is a magnificent gift to the Syro-Iranian axis in the region. A return to the Cold War, any form of Cold war, is a fantasy that would break the isolation of Tehran and allow the Islamist power to achieve even more victories.
Evidently, it is not in the long-term interest of today’s Russia, regardless of the plans of Medvedev and Putin, to see Jihadi regimes like the Ayatollah’s undermining international order and taking advantage of Russian-Western tensions. Iran is building a powerful third force in the world, bringing together Islamist Salafists and Khomeinists. Hezbollah is operating in Sudan and has ties to Sunnis radicals. The movements constructed by the Ayatollah in parallel to the Wahabis can eventually reach deep inside Russia and could be threatening to the Russian population in a disproportionate way with a supposed Western threat. Hence, the Russian-Iranian alliance is, first, against the nature of what Russia’s society wishes to accomplish and, second, will cause harm to democracies.
But one must expect that Tehran and its axis will attempt to exploit the crisis between both infidel powers as much as possible. This is an opportunity, perhaps the last chance, for the totalitarian regime in Iran to survive the rise of democracy in the region. Indeed, not only Iran but other authoritarian circles in the region are happy about the return of a Cold War of any temperature.
Such a reality should compel Western democracies to create more focused international strategies. Political transformations within Russia are tough and complex, but the United States and Europe have the ability to be assertive regarding the defense of their small allies, like Georgia, while redirecting Russian muscles to confront a common enemy, Jihadi terrorism. Obviously, such a talent needs visionaries both in Washington and in Brussels. Unfortunately, the developments of the past year shows that Iran’s regime was able to outmaneuver the West, escape isolation and watch with immense pleasure infidel powers at each other’s throats.
*******
Dr. Walid Phares is the Director of the Future of Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a visiting scholar at the European Foundation for Democracy and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad.
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Sunday, September 7, 2008
The General's Dilemma David Petraeus, the pressures of politics, and the road out of Iraq. by Steve Coll
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/09/08/080908fa_fact_coll
The New Yorker
A Reporter at Large
The General's Dilemma
David Petraeus, the pressures of politics, and the road out of Iraq.
by Steve Coll September 8, 2008
The New Yorker
A Reporter at Large
The General's Dilemma
David Petraeus, the pressures of politics, and the road out of Iraq.
by Steve Coll September 8, 2008
Saturday, September 6, 2008
The Resentment Strategy By PAUL KRUGMAN
The New York Times
September 5, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist
The Resentment Strategy
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Can the super-rich former governor of Massachusetts — the son of a Fortune 500 C.E.O. who made a vast fortune in the leveraged-buyout business — really keep a straight face while denouncing "Eastern elites"?
Can the former mayor of New York City, a man who, as USA Today put it, "marched in gay pride parades, dressed up in drag and lived temporarily with a gay couple and their Shih Tzu" — that was between his second and third marriages — really get away with saying that Barack Obama doesn't think small towns are sufficiently "cosmopolitan"?
Can the vice-presidential candidate of a party that has controlled the White House, Congress or both for 26 of the past 28 years, a party that, Borg-like, assimilated much of the D.C. lobbying industry into itself — until Congress changed hands, high-paying lobbying jobs were reserved for loyal Republicans — really portray herself as running against the "Washington elite"?
Yes, they can.
On Tuesday, He Who Must Not Be Named — Mitt Romney mentioned him just once, Rudy Giuliani and Sarah Palin not at all — gave a video address to the Republican National Convention. John McCain, promised President Bush, would stand up to the "angry left." That's no doubt true. But don't be fooled either by Mr. McCain's long-ago reputation as a maverick or by Ms. Palin's appealing persona: the Republican Party, now more than ever, is firmly in the hands of the angry right, which has always been much bigger, much more influential and much angrier than its counterpart on the other side.
What's the source of all that anger?
Some of it, of course, is driven by cultural and religious conflict: fundamentalist Christians are sincerely dismayed by Roe v. Wade and evolution in the curriculum. What struck me as I watched the convention speeches, however, is how much of the anger on the right is based not on the claim that Democrats have done bad things, but on the perception — generally based on no evidence whatsoever — that Democrats look down their noses at regular people.
Thus Mr. Giuliani asserted that Wasilla, Alaska, isn't "flashy enough" for Mr. Obama, who never said any such thing. And Ms. Palin asserted that Democrats "look down" on small-town mayors — again, without any evidence.
What the G.O.P. is selling, in other words, is the pure politics of resentment; you're supposed to vote Republican to stick it to an elite that thinks it's better than you. Or to put it another way, the G.O.P. is still the party of Nixon.
One of the key insights in "Nixonland," the new book by the historian Rick Perlstein, is that Nixon's political strategy throughout his career was inspired by his college experience, in which he got himself elected student body president by exploiting his classmates' resentment against the Franklins, the school's elite social club. There's a direct line from that student election to Spiro Agnew's attacks on the "nattering nabobs of negativism" as "an effete corps of impudent snobs," and from there to the peculiar cult of personality that not long ago surrounded George W. Bush — a cult that celebrated his anti-intellectualism and made much of the supposed fact that the "misunderestimated" C-average student had proved himself smarter than all the fancy-pants experts.
And when Mr. Bush turned out not to be that smart after all, and his presidency crashed and burned, the angry right — the raging rajas of resentment? — became, if anything, even angrier. Humiliation will do that.
Can Mr. McCain and Ms. Palin really ride Nixonian resentment into an upset election victory in what should be an overwhelmingly Democratic year? The answer is a definite maybe.
By selecting Barack Obama as their nominee, the Democrats may have given Republicans an opening: the very qualities that inspire many fervent Obama supporters — the candidate's high-flown eloquence, his coolness factor — have also laid him open to a Nixonian backlash. Unlike many observers, I wasn't surprised at the effectiveness of the McCain "celebrity" ad. It didn't make much sense intellectually, but it skillfully exploited the resentment some voters feel toward Mr. Obama's star quality.
That said, the experience of the years since 2000 — the memory of what happened to working Americans when faux-populist Republicans controlled the government — is still fairly fresh in voters' minds. Furthermore, while Democrats' supposed contempt for ordinary people is mainly a figment of Republican imagination, the G.O.P. really is the Gramm Old Party — it really does believe that the economy is just fine, and the fact that most Americans disagree just shows that we're a nation of whiners.
But the Democrats can't afford to be complacent. Resentment, no matter how contrived, is a powerful force, and it's one that Republicans are very, very good at exploiting.
September 5, 2008
Op-Ed Columnist
The Resentment Strategy
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Can the super-rich former governor of Massachusetts — the son of a Fortune 500 C.E.O. who made a vast fortune in the leveraged-buyout business — really keep a straight face while denouncing "Eastern elites"?
Can the former mayor of New York City, a man who, as USA Today put it, "marched in gay pride parades, dressed up in drag and lived temporarily with a gay couple and their Shih Tzu" — that was between his second and third marriages — really get away with saying that Barack Obama doesn't think small towns are sufficiently "cosmopolitan"?
Can the vice-presidential candidate of a party that has controlled the White House, Congress or both for 26 of the past 28 years, a party that, Borg-like, assimilated much of the D.C. lobbying industry into itself — until Congress changed hands, high-paying lobbying jobs were reserved for loyal Republicans — really portray herself as running against the "Washington elite"?
Yes, they can.
On Tuesday, He Who Must Not Be Named — Mitt Romney mentioned him just once, Rudy Giuliani and Sarah Palin not at all — gave a video address to the Republican National Convention. John McCain, promised President Bush, would stand up to the "angry left." That's no doubt true. But don't be fooled either by Mr. McCain's long-ago reputation as a maverick or by Ms. Palin's appealing persona: the Republican Party, now more than ever, is firmly in the hands of the angry right, which has always been much bigger, much more influential and much angrier than its counterpart on the other side.
What's the source of all that anger?
Some of it, of course, is driven by cultural and religious conflict: fundamentalist Christians are sincerely dismayed by Roe v. Wade and evolution in the curriculum. What struck me as I watched the convention speeches, however, is how much of the anger on the right is based not on the claim that Democrats have done bad things, but on the perception — generally based on no evidence whatsoever — that Democrats look down their noses at regular people.
Thus Mr. Giuliani asserted that Wasilla, Alaska, isn't "flashy enough" for Mr. Obama, who never said any such thing. And Ms. Palin asserted that Democrats "look down" on small-town mayors — again, without any evidence.
What the G.O.P. is selling, in other words, is the pure politics of resentment; you're supposed to vote Republican to stick it to an elite that thinks it's better than you. Or to put it another way, the G.O.P. is still the party of Nixon.
One of the key insights in "Nixonland," the new book by the historian Rick Perlstein, is that Nixon's political strategy throughout his career was inspired by his college experience, in which he got himself elected student body president by exploiting his classmates' resentment against the Franklins, the school's elite social club. There's a direct line from that student election to Spiro Agnew's attacks on the "nattering nabobs of negativism" as "an effete corps of impudent snobs," and from there to the peculiar cult of personality that not long ago surrounded George W. Bush — a cult that celebrated his anti-intellectualism and made much of the supposed fact that the "misunderestimated" C-average student had proved himself smarter than all the fancy-pants experts.
And when Mr. Bush turned out not to be that smart after all, and his presidency crashed and burned, the angry right — the raging rajas of resentment? — became, if anything, even angrier. Humiliation will do that.
Can Mr. McCain and Ms. Palin really ride Nixonian resentment into an upset election victory in what should be an overwhelmingly Democratic year? The answer is a definite maybe.
By selecting Barack Obama as their nominee, the Democrats may have given Republicans an opening: the very qualities that inspire many fervent Obama supporters — the candidate's high-flown eloquence, his coolness factor — have also laid him open to a Nixonian backlash. Unlike many observers, I wasn't surprised at the effectiveness of the McCain "celebrity" ad. It didn't make much sense intellectually, but it skillfully exploited the resentment some voters feel toward Mr. Obama's star quality.
That said, the experience of the years since 2000 — the memory of what happened to working Americans when faux-populist Republicans controlled the government — is still fairly fresh in voters' minds. Furthermore, while Democrats' supposed contempt for ordinary people is mainly a figment of Republican imagination, the G.O.P. really is the Gramm Old Party — it really does believe that the economy is just fine, and the fact that most Americans disagree just shows that we're a nation of whiners.
But the Democrats can't afford to be complacent. Resentment, no matter how contrived, is a powerful force, and it's one that Republicans are very, very good at exploiting.
Geopolitical Diary: The Deafening Silence on Iran
Geopolitical Diary: The Deafening Silence on Iran
Stratfor Today »--September 5, 2008
Geopolitical Diary Graphic — FINAL
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Libya, said on Thursday that Iran and North Korea should emulate Libya's example. What she meant by that was, like Libya, they should reach an accommodation with the United States while abandoning policies that the United States opposes.
That seems like a fairly uninteresting statement, except for the fact that Iran was mentioned. We have heard nothing from the Bush administration on Iran since before the war in Georgia — although a State Department official told us on Thursday that the last official statement was issued by the U.S. Treasury on Aug. 12. Certainly, the constant barrage of comments by the Bush administration on the Iranian threat has decreased dramatically. Frankly, while there might have been passing mentions, the administration appears to have simply dropped the subject.
The silence is, of course, enormously significant. Prior to Aug. 8, the focus of the United Stat es was on Iran. Washington was warning Iran that the deadline for delivering an answer on freezing nuclear development had passed, and the United States was now going to ask its partners in dealing with Iran — the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany — to impose sanctions. Obviously, Russia was part of that group and, equally obviously, it was in no mood to work with the United States on placing sanctions. The Russians have said that they do not see sanctions in general as a desirable strategy. With the Russians out of the picture, the sanctions won't work anyway. You can't have a dam with a section missing.
That made the negotiations and the sanctions strategy moot. What strikes us as extraordinary is that the Bush administration has not returned to discussing Iran and posing new strategy or making new threats. The administration simply has acted as if a major confrontation with Iran had not been under way just prior to the Russo-Georgian war and, indeed, has acted as if Iran was not a major issue, which it obviously was and continues to be. The American media have not been particularly aggressive in demanding that the administration explain the relative silence on Iran, and the administration has not raised it.
All this becomes more interesting with confirmation that an anti-Iranian group — Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) — had been ordered by the Iraqi government to leave Iraq, amid accusations that it had been involved with al Qaeda. The MeK has been a major issue between Iran and the United States. The Iranian position has been that while the Americans demand that Iran pull its support for Hezbollah, the United States is itself supporting an anti-Iranian terrorist group. The reports appear to be true, since supporters of the MeK demonstrated in the United States on Thursday protesting the expulsion from Iraq.
It is unlikely that the Iraqis decided to take this action unilaterally; the United States had to have supported it. It is understandable why Washington would not want its fingerprints on this, since the MeK has been a longtime ally, and this change of policy would leave other longtime allies nervous. Still, it is happening. And that means that the Americans have given in to a long-standing demand of the Iranians.
There are rumors that the United States and Iran have signed a document concerning the MeK — which is something we find hard to believe, and the sources aren't great. We have also received a report from a pretty good source who is in a position to know that a meeting is scheduled between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and unnamed Iranian officials at Italy's Lake Como later this week. We are not saying that we know that a meeting is taking place; we are saying only that we have heard rumors about this meeting. But there are many such rumors in the region at the moment. It should be noted that there are such rum ors whenever a senior American and Iranian official are within 50 miles of each other.
Given that, we still note three things. First, the United States has gone silent on Iran for the first time in a very long time. Second, the United States engineered or did not prevent the expulsion of the MeK from Iraq — which is a substantial concession to Iran. Third, unlike Syria, Iran has not sent its leaders to Moscow since the end of the war with Georgia and has been fairly subdued on the matter.
As we have said, one geopolitical option for the United States now is a deal with Iran. We do not know whether one is in the works, but we know this: The rhetoric from Washington on Iran has quieted since the Russo-Georgian war and has stayed quiet. And the United States has made a major concession to Iran this week.
The media have lost interest in Iran, but it is hard to believe the Bush administration has.
Yet the rhetoric has shifted. We do not think the United States is on the brink of attacking Iran. If the Americans were planning an attack on Iran, the last thing they would do is pull the MeK back. So something is up.
Stratfor Today »--September 5, 2008
Geopolitical Diary Graphic — FINAL
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Libya, said on Thursday that Iran and North Korea should emulate Libya's example. What she meant by that was, like Libya, they should reach an accommodation with the United States while abandoning policies that the United States opposes.
That seems like a fairly uninteresting statement, except for the fact that Iran was mentioned. We have heard nothing from the Bush administration on Iran since before the war in Georgia — although a State Department official told us on Thursday that the last official statement was issued by the U.S. Treasury on Aug. 12. Certainly, the constant barrage of comments by the Bush administration on the Iranian threat has decreased dramatically. Frankly, while there might have been passing mentions, the administration appears to have simply dropped the subject.
The silence is, of course, enormously significant. Prior to Aug. 8, the focus of the United Stat es was on Iran. Washington was warning Iran that the deadline for delivering an answer on freezing nuclear development had passed, and the United States was now going to ask its partners in dealing with Iran — the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany — to impose sanctions. Obviously, Russia was part of that group and, equally obviously, it was in no mood to work with the United States on placing sanctions. The Russians have said that they do not see sanctions in general as a desirable strategy. With the Russians out of the picture, the sanctions won't work anyway. You can't have a dam with a section missing.
That made the negotiations and the sanctions strategy moot. What strikes us as extraordinary is that the Bush administration has not returned to discussing Iran and posing new strategy or making new threats. The administration simply has acted as if a major confrontation with Iran had not been under way just prior to the Russo-Georgian war and, indeed, has acted as if Iran was not a major issue, which it obviously was and continues to be. The American media have not been particularly aggressive in demanding that the administration explain the relative silence on Iran, and the administration has not raised it.
All this becomes more interesting with confirmation that an anti-Iranian group — Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) — had been ordered by the Iraqi government to leave Iraq, amid accusations that it had been involved with al Qaeda. The MeK has been a major issue between Iran and the United States. The Iranian position has been that while the Americans demand that Iran pull its support for Hezbollah, the United States is itself supporting an anti-Iranian terrorist group. The reports appear to be true, since supporters of the MeK demonstrated in the United States on Thursday protesting the expulsion from Iraq.
It is unlikely that the Iraqis decided to take this action unilaterally; the United States had to have supported it. It is understandable why Washington would not want its fingerprints on this, since the MeK has been a longtime ally, and this change of policy would leave other longtime allies nervous. Still, it is happening. And that means that the Americans have given in to a long-standing demand of the Iranians.
There are rumors that the United States and Iran have signed a document concerning the MeK — which is something we find hard to believe, and the sources aren't great. We have also received a report from a pretty good source who is in a position to know that a meeting is scheduled between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and unnamed Iranian officials at Italy's Lake Como later this week. We are not saying that we know that a meeting is taking place; we are saying only that we have heard rumors about this meeting. But there are many such rumors in the region at the moment. It should be noted that there are such rum ors whenever a senior American and Iranian official are within 50 miles of each other.
Given that, we still note three things. First, the United States has gone silent on Iran for the first time in a very long time. Second, the United States engineered or did not prevent the expulsion of the MeK from Iraq — which is a substantial concession to Iran. Third, unlike Syria, Iran has not sent its leaders to Moscow since the end of the war with Georgia and has been fairly subdued on the matter.
As we have said, one geopolitical option for the United States now is a deal with Iran. We do not know whether one is in the works, but we know this: The rhetoric from Washington on Iran has quieted since the Russo-Georgian war and has stayed quiet. And the United States has made a major concession to Iran this week.
The media have lost interest in Iran, but it is hard to believe the Bush administration has.
Yet the rhetoric has shifted. We do not think the United States is on the brink of attacking Iran. If the Americans were planning an attack on Iran, the last thing they would do is pull the MeK back. So something is up.
Maliki drops the mask
Maliki drops the mask
With his tough stance on US withdrawal, Sunni militias and the Kurds Iraq's leader risks doom
What's up with Nouri al-Maliki? As security anxieties subside in this slowly calming city, political speculation has rarely been so intense. First, it was Maliki's demand that all US troops leave Iraq by the end of 2011. Then came signs that his government wants to undermine the Sunni tribal militias, known as the Awakening councils, on whom the Americans have relied to defeat al-Qaida in Iraq. Now there are moves to take on the powerful Kurdish peshmerga troops and push them out of disputed areas in the strategic central province of Diyala.
Why is the prime minister doing this? Is "the puppet breaking his strings", as one Arab newspaper put it? Or is the more appropriate metaphor "dropping the mask"? Those who knew Maliki in exile in Syria during Saddam Hussein's time now recall that he opposed the US-led invasion. His Daawa party did not attend the eve-of-invasion conference of US- and UK-supported exiles in London, and he opposed the party's decision six months later to join the hand-picked "governing council" set up by the first occupation overlord, Paul Bremer.
Maliki's new line has discomforted the Americans. Some officials put on a brave face, saying it is a sign of Iraqi confidence in their own sovereignty, a development that, of course, they support as proof that the Bush administration's strategy of rebuilding a proud country is succeeding. Others say it reflects overconfidence, even hubris, as Iraq is a long way from being able to survive without US military protection.
Either way, playing the nationalist card has huge potential consequences in Iraq. With provincial and parliamentary elections expected next year, it will sharpen the struggle for dominance in the Shia community. It is designed to undercut the appeal of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a consistent opponent of the occupation who is re-profiling his movement on the lines of Lebanon's Hizbullah. Its Mahdi army militia will be slimmed into a group of experienced resistance fighters, kept in reserve for action against US troops rather than to fight Iraqi Sunnis, while the rest of the movement goes into communal politics.
Posing as the nationalist who managed to get the US to accept a timetable for withdrawal (the tense negotiations could yet founder) allows Maliki to distance himself from his main Shia allies in government, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), seen as keen backers of the occupation. It also diverts attention from the chronic power cuts and other economic troubles. Every government has to fight on its record in office, but, by turning himself into a patriotic Iraqi hero, Maliki may sidestep this. Some observers suggest he may even go to the elections on a "prime minister's list", to redefine himself as no longer a Shia or a political Islamist, so as to win support from Iraq's secular and non-sectarian urban middle class. But there are uncomfortable echoes here of the effort by Ayad Allawi, the prime minister appointed by the US in 2004, to project himself in the December 2005 elections as a strong man. His vote total fell a long way below his expectations.
But if Maliki wants to present a new image as a man who stands up to the Americans, why does he choose this moment to go after Sunnis and Kurds? The principle of disarming all militias, and not just those of his Shia rivals, such as Sadr, may be laudable but the timing is highly risky and threatens to overload the circuits. Going after the Sunnis and Kurds may fail, dooming Maliki to defeat. Many Sunnis already believe he is a tool of the Iranians. Now they say his sudden anti-Americanism is no proof of Iraqi patriotism, but just shows he is a tool of Tehran. The Iranians want the US out of Iraq, not only in order to undermine US credibility in the region. They interpret Washington's support for the Awakening councils as a tilt towards the Sunnis and an effort to re-balance Iraqi politics from the Shia dominance of the early post-invasion period.
Maliki's tough stance towards the US could doom him personally. The US toppled his predecessor, Ibrahim Jaaferi, and, even though US power in Iraq has declined since then, it may find a way to remove Maliki too. It would not demand that the prime minister go, as it did in 2006, but could undermine his parliamentary majority. The US has alternative candidates, including the ambitious vice-president, Adel Abdel Mahdi, and the Sunni defence minister, Abdul Qader al-Obeidi, who told the New York Times in January that US troops would be needed for another 10 years.
Whatever his motives, Maliki's move has certainly shaken up Iraqi politics and forced the issue of a clear US departure timetable on to the agenda. The Iraqi prime minister has put Bush and McCain on to the back foot, and given help to Obama. Whether Maliki or Bush blinks first remains to be seen.
MEC International Ltd.
Registered in England No. 3212282,
Reg Office: 25 Harley St, London W1N 2BR
With his tough stance on US withdrawal, Sunni militias and the Kurds Iraq's leader risks doom
What's up with Nouri al-Maliki? As security anxieties subside in this slowly calming city, political speculation has rarely been so intense. First, it was Maliki's demand that all US troops leave Iraq by the end of 2011. Then came signs that his government wants to undermine the Sunni tribal militias, known as the Awakening councils, on whom the Americans have relied to defeat al-Qaida in Iraq. Now there are moves to take on the powerful Kurdish peshmerga troops and push them out of disputed areas in the strategic central province of Diyala.
Why is the prime minister doing this? Is "the puppet breaking his strings", as one Arab newspaper put it? Or is the more appropriate metaphor "dropping the mask"? Those who knew Maliki in exile in Syria during Saddam Hussein's time now recall that he opposed the US-led invasion. His Daawa party did not attend the eve-of-invasion conference of US- and UK-supported exiles in London, and he opposed the party's decision six months later to join the hand-picked "governing council" set up by the first occupation overlord, Paul Bremer.
Maliki's new line has discomforted the Americans. Some officials put on a brave face, saying it is a sign of Iraqi confidence in their own sovereignty, a development that, of course, they support as proof that the Bush administration's strategy of rebuilding a proud country is succeeding. Others say it reflects overconfidence, even hubris, as Iraq is a long way from being able to survive without US military protection.
Either way, playing the nationalist card has huge potential consequences in Iraq. With provincial and parliamentary elections expected next year, it will sharpen the struggle for dominance in the Shia community. It is designed to undercut the appeal of the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a consistent opponent of the occupation who is re-profiling his movement on the lines of Lebanon's Hizbullah. Its Mahdi army militia will be slimmed into a group of experienced resistance fighters, kept in reserve for action against US troops rather than to fight Iraqi Sunnis, while the rest of the movement goes into communal politics.
Posing as the nationalist who managed to get the US to accept a timetable for withdrawal (the tense negotiations could yet founder) allows Maliki to distance himself from his main Shia allies in government, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), seen as keen backers of the occupation. It also diverts attention from the chronic power cuts and other economic troubles. Every government has to fight on its record in office, but, by turning himself into a patriotic Iraqi hero, Maliki may sidestep this. Some observers suggest he may even go to the elections on a "prime minister's list", to redefine himself as no longer a Shia or a political Islamist, so as to win support from Iraq's secular and non-sectarian urban middle class. But there are uncomfortable echoes here of the effort by Ayad Allawi, the prime minister appointed by the US in 2004, to project himself in the December 2005 elections as a strong man. His vote total fell a long way below his expectations.
But if Maliki wants to present a new image as a man who stands up to the Americans, why does he choose this moment to go after Sunnis and Kurds? The principle of disarming all militias, and not just those of his Shia rivals, such as Sadr, may be laudable but the timing is highly risky and threatens to overload the circuits. Going after the Sunnis and Kurds may fail, dooming Maliki to defeat. Many Sunnis already believe he is a tool of the Iranians. Now they say his sudden anti-Americanism is no proof of Iraqi patriotism, but just shows he is a tool of Tehran. The Iranians want the US out of Iraq, not only in order to undermine US credibility in the region. They interpret Washington's support for the Awakening councils as a tilt towards the Sunnis and an effort to re-balance Iraqi politics from the Shia dominance of the early post-invasion period.
Maliki's tough stance towards the US could doom him personally. The US toppled his predecessor, Ibrahim Jaaferi, and, even though US power in Iraq has declined since then, it may find a way to remove Maliki too. It would not demand that the prime minister go, as it did in 2006, but could undermine his parliamentary majority. The US has alternative candidates, including the ambitious vice-president, Adel Abdel Mahdi, and the Sunni defence minister, Abdul Qader al-Obeidi, who told the New York Times in January that US troops would be needed for another 10 years.
Whatever his motives, Maliki's move has certainly shaken up Iraqi politics and forced the issue of a clear US departure timetable on to the agenda. The Iraqi prime minister has put Bush and McCain on to the back foot, and given help to Obama. Whether Maliki or Bush blinks first remains to be seen.
MEC International Ltd.
Registered in England No. 3212282,
Reg Office: 25 Harley St, London W1N 2BR
Geopolitical Diary: The Deafening Silence on Iran
Geopolitical Diary: The Deafening Silence on Iran
Stratfor Today »--September 5, 2008
Geopolitical Diary Graphic — FINAL
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Libya, said on Thursday that Iran and North Korea should emulate Libya's example. What she meant by that was, like Libya, they should reach an accommodation with the United States while abandoning policies that the United States opposes.
That seems like a fairly uninteresting statement, except for the fact that Iran was mentioned. We have heard nothing from the Bush administration on Iran since before the war in Georgia — although a State Department official told us on Thursday that the last official statement was issued by the U.S. Treasury on Aug. 12. Certainly, the constant barrage of comments by the Bush administration on the Iranian threat has decreased dramatically. Frankly, while there might have been passing mentions, the administration appears to have simply dropped the subject.
The silence is, of course, enormously significant. Prior to Aug. 8, the focus of the United Stat es was on Iran. Washington was warning Iran that the deadline for delivering an answer on freezing nuclear development had passed, and the United States was now going to ask its partners in dealing with Iran — the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany — to impose sanctions. Obviously, Russia was part of that group and, equally obviously, it was in no mood to work with the United States on placing sanctions. The Russians have said that they do not see sanctions in general as a desirable strategy. With the Russians out of the picture, the sanctions won't work anyway. You can't have a dam with a section missing.
That made the negotiations and the sanctions strategy moot. What strikes us as extraordinary is that the Bush administration has not returned to discussing Iran and posing new strategy or making new threats. The administration simply has acted as if a major confrontation with Iran had not been under way just prior to the Russo-Georgian war and, indeed, has acted as if Iran was not a major issue, which it obviously was and continues to be. The American media have not been particularly aggressive in demanding that the administration explain the relative silence on Iran, and the administration has not raised it.
All this becomes more interesting with confirmation that an anti-Iranian group — Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) — had been ordered by the Iraqi government to leave Iraq, amid accusations that it had been involved with al Qaeda. The MeK has been a major issue between Iran and the United States. The Iranian position has been that while the Americans demand that Iran pull its support for Hezbollah, the United States is itself supporting an anti-Iranian terrorist group. The reports appear to be true, since supporters of the MeK demonstrated in the United States on Thursday protesting the expulsion from Iraq.
It is unlikely that the Iraqis decided to take this action unilaterally; the United States had to have supported it. It is understandable why Washington would not want its fingerprints on this, since the MeK has been a longtime ally, and this change of policy would leave other longtime allies nervous. Still, it is happening. And that means that the Americans have given in to a long-standing demand of the Iranians.
There are rumors that the United States and Iran have signed a document concerning the MeK — which is something we find hard to believe, and the sources aren't great. We have also received a report from a pretty good source who is in a position to know that a meeting is scheduled between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and unnamed Iranian officials at Italy's Lake Como later this week. We are not saying that we know that a meeting is taking place; we are saying only that we have heard rumors about this meeting. But there are many such rumors in the region at the moment. It should be noted that there are such rum ors whenever a senior American and Iranian official are within 50 miles of each other.
Given that, we still note three things. First, the United States has gone silent on Iran for the first time in a very long time. Second, the United States engineered or did not prevent the expulsion of the MeK from Iraq — which is a substantial concession to Iran. Third, unlike Syria, Iran has not sent its leaders to Moscow since the end of the war with Georgia and has been fairly subdued on the matter.
As we have said, one geopolitical option for the United States now is a deal with Iran. We do not know whether one is in the works, but we know this: The rhetoric from Washington on Iran has quieted since the Russo-Georgian war and has stayed quiet. And the United States has made a major concession to Iran this week.
The media have lost interest in Iran, but it is hard to believe the Bush administration has.
Yet the rhetoric has shifted. We do not think the United States is on the brink of attacking Iran. If the Americans were planning an attack on Iran, the last thing they would do is pull the MeK back. So something is up.
Stratfor Today »--September 5, 2008
Geopolitical Diary Graphic — FINAL
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Libya, said on Thursday that Iran and North Korea should emulate Libya's example. What she meant by that was, like Libya, they should reach an accommodation with the United States while abandoning policies that the United States opposes.
That seems like a fairly uninteresting statement, except for the fact that Iran was mentioned. We have heard nothing from the Bush administration on Iran since before the war in Georgia — although a State Department official told us on Thursday that the last official statement was issued by the U.S. Treasury on Aug. 12. Certainly, the constant barrage of comments by the Bush administration on the Iranian threat has decreased dramatically. Frankly, while there might have been passing mentions, the administration appears to have simply dropped the subject.
The silence is, of course, enormously significant. Prior to Aug. 8, the focus of the United Stat es was on Iran. Washington was warning Iran that the deadline for delivering an answer on freezing nuclear development had passed, and the United States was now going to ask its partners in dealing with Iran — the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany — to impose sanctions. Obviously, Russia was part of that group and, equally obviously, it was in no mood to work with the United States on placing sanctions. The Russians have said that they do not see sanctions in general as a desirable strategy. With the Russians out of the picture, the sanctions won't work anyway. You can't have a dam with a section missing.
That made the negotiations and the sanctions strategy moot. What strikes us as extraordinary is that the Bush administration has not returned to discussing Iran and posing new strategy or making new threats. The administration simply has acted as if a major confrontation with Iran had not been under way just prior to the Russo-Georgian war and, indeed, has acted as if Iran was not a major issue, which it obviously was and continues to be. The American media have not been particularly aggressive in demanding that the administration explain the relative silence on Iran, and the administration has not raised it.
All this becomes more interesting with confirmation that an anti-Iranian group — Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MeK) — had been ordered by the Iraqi government to leave Iraq, amid accusations that it had been involved with al Qaeda. The MeK has been a major issue between Iran and the United States. The Iranian position has been that while the Americans demand that Iran pull its support for Hezbollah, the United States is itself supporting an anti-Iranian terrorist group. The reports appear to be true, since supporters of the MeK demonstrated in the United States on Thursday protesting the expulsion from Iraq.
It is unlikely that the Iraqis decided to take this action unilaterally; the United States had to have supported it. It is understandable why Washington would not want its fingerprints on this, since the MeK has been a longtime ally, and this change of policy would leave other longtime allies nervous. Still, it is happening. And that means that the Americans have given in to a long-standing demand of the Iranians.
There are rumors that the United States and Iran have signed a document concerning the MeK — which is something we find hard to believe, and the sources aren't great. We have also received a report from a pretty good source who is in a position to know that a meeting is scheduled between U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney and unnamed Iranian officials at Italy's Lake Como later this week. We are not saying that we know that a meeting is taking place; we are saying only that we have heard rumors about this meeting. But there are many such rumors in the region at the moment. It should be noted that there are such rum ors whenever a senior American and Iranian official are within 50 miles of each other.
Given that, we still note three things. First, the United States has gone silent on Iran for the first time in a very long time. Second, the United States engineered or did not prevent the expulsion of the MeK from Iraq — which is a substantial concession to Iran. Third, unlike Syria, Iran has not sent its leaders to Moscow since the end of the war with Georgia and has been fairly subdued on the matter.
As we have said, one geopolitical option for the United States now is a deal with Iran. We do not know whether one is in the works, but we know this: The rhetoric from Washington on Iran has quieted since the Russo-Georgian war and has stayed quiet. And the United States has made a major concession to Iran this week.
The media have lost interest in Iran, but it is hard to believe the Bush administration has.
Yet the rhetoric has shifted. We do not think the United States is on the brink of attacking Iran. If the Americans were planning an attack on Iran, the last thing they would do is pull the MeK back. So something is up.
The Cold War Reversed
The Cold War Reversed
William Pfaff
Paris, September 8, 2008 – There is much current talk about a new cold war, or a new configuration of nations, a new power balance (or imbalance). There is something in this; it's a consequence of the crisis produced by Georgia's foolhardy and tragic attack on South Ossetia and upon the Russian soldiers stationed there. This upset standard thinking about the U.S. and about Putin's Russia
(Parenthetically, there is no longer dispute as to Mikheil Saakashvili's responsibility for launching the attack, presumably in the mistaken belief that Georgia's pending NATO candidature would either deter Russian retaliation, or force the United States and NATO to support his adventure. He was wrong on both counts. See the devastating report by C.J. Chivers and Thom Shanker in the September 3 New York Times.)
What is being ignored in discussion of new power balances and revived cold war is the reason why international relations have fundamentally changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The cold war was ideological struggle. It obviously involved power confrontations, the Warsaw Pact versus NATO, the presumed Soviet military threat to Western Europe, the Korean war – and of course the nuclear threat.
But what was behind it was Marxist-Leninist, and later Maoist, ideology.
These were doctrinally expansionist. They said that capitalism was in its final stages, the class war between workers and industrial-capitalism and imperialism approaching its culminating crisis, and Communism on the march towards inevitable victory.
You can question to what extent leaders in Moscow and Beijing really believed this. They had to act as if they believed it. Millions of Communists in the West and an unknowable number in the U.S.S.R. and China really did believe it. The ideology was the only source of legitimacy and power for the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and governments.
They had to seem ever on the march, expanding – or seeming to expand – because they had to make people believe that they were revolutionary regimes which sooner or later, by the scientifically determined dialectical progression of history, were guaranteed to produce victory, a New Dawn, the Great Day, The Victory of the East, and millenarian rule by workers and peasants, and the "progressive intellectuals" allied with them.
The United States and its allies were in the struggle for classical geopolitical and strategic reasons. They had interests to defend. They were defending the new democratic postwar order in Western Europe. Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, George Kennan, and the leading American and Allied diplomatic figures of the time, were not ideologues. They were all in the classical sense of the term, conservatives, defending the democratic order.
It is true that during the period when John Foster Dulles was American secretary of state, the United States itself caught a bad case of the ideological fevers. Dulles was a prominent churchman, a Presbyterian Elder, as well as an international lawyer, and as John Lukacs writes in his history of the Cold War, brought "the distressingly puritanical and at times even pharisaic inclination to see in the world struggle a national personification of good versus evil." The fever unfortunately became a chronic condition, with as yet no cure.
Thus today the situation is the reverse of 1948-1950. Russia is not an ideological power. It has no doctrine to sell. Its preoccupations are prosperity and power. Vladimir Putin has no wish to subvert and rule the United States or Europe. He just doesn't want NATO's candidates biting his ankles. He wants level-headed governments on his borders who don't make trouble for Russia. But that is perfectly, if regrettably, normal.
The United States has been invading troublesome Caribbean and
Central American neighbors since the mid-19th century. It was what the U.S. Marine Corps did for a living – Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic. Ronald Reagan absurdly invaded Granada, officially to save American students from dangerous Cuban airport laborers. The senior George Bush invaded Panama to seize President Manuel Noriega, a former employee of the CIA. It has never been explained what those two invasions were really about. There were (widely publicized) clandestine operations in Nicaragua and El Salvador. All this has been taken for granted as the Monroe Doctrine at work.
China is no longer an ideological power. Chinese Communism has been intellectually dead for two decades. The Party is kept going with all its congresses and assemblies because that furnishes the only justification China's leaders have for why they are in power. China's actual politics function through Party co-option, favoritism and power struggle. This one day will probably end in a major crisis, as I have said before in this space.
China is not an expanding power. It wants Taiwan, various "lost" islands in the China Seas; it demands recognition that Tibet is Chinese. But all this is traditional. It certainly is not promoting Communism abroad.
Today the world's only expansionist ideological power is the United States, aggressively pushing everywhere, persuading, promoting, and even invading countries for "democracy." It wants to make everyone democratic "like us," which in the end means to do as we want them to do. The ideology is meant to be generous, but it is a generosity devoted to the control of energy resources, raw materials, trade, and finance.
This makes the U.S. the expanding and aggressive nation in the world today, the one with a "global ideology," with military power to back it up. This frightens people. When the power doesn't work as intended, as in the Caucasus, it makes other people frightened, the ones who have bet on the U.S. to advance their own agendas. That is what is changing the geopolitical map.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=340
William Pfaff
Paris, September 8, 2008 – There is much current talk about a new cold war, or a new configuration of nations, a new power balance (or imbalance). There is something in this; it's a consequence of the crisis produced by Georgia's foolhardy and tragic attack on South Ossetia and upon the Russian soldiers stationed there. This upset standard thinking about the U.S. and about Putin's Russia
(Parenthetically, there is no longer dispute as to Mikheil Saakashvili's responsibility for launching the attack, presumably in the mistaken belief that Georgia's pending NATO candidature would either deter Russian retaliation, or force the United States and NATO to support his adventure. He was wrong on both counts. See the devastating report by C.J. Chivers and Thom Shanker in the September 3 New York Times.)
What is being ignored in discussion of new power balances and revived cold war is the reason why international relations have fundamentally changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The cold war was ideological struggle. It obviously involved power confrontations, the Warsaw Pact versus NATO, the presumed Soviet military threat to Western Europe, the Korean war – and of course the nuclear threat.
But what was behind it was Marxist-Leninist, and later Maoist, ideology.
These were doctrinally expansionist. They said that capitalism was in its final stages, the class war between workers and industrial-capitalism and imperialism approaching its culminating crisis, and Communism on the march towards inevitable victory.
You can question to what extent leaders in Moscow and Beijing really believed this. They had to act as if they believed it. Millions of Communists in the West and an unknowable number in the U.S.S.R. and China really did believe it. The ideology was the only source of legitimacy and power for the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties and governments.
They had to seem ever on the march, expanding – or seeming to expand – because they had to make people believe that they were revolutionary regimes which sooner or later, by the scientifically determined dialectical progression of history, were guaranteed to produce victory, a New Dawn, the Great Day, The Victory of the East, and millenarian rule by workers and peasants, and the "progressive intellectuals" allied with them.
The United States and its allies were in the struggle for classical geopolitical and strategic reasons. They had interests to defend. They were defending the new democratic postwar order in Western Europe. Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, George Kennan, and the leading American and Allied diplomatic figures of the time, were not ideologues. They were all in the classical sense of the term, conservatives, defending the democratic order.
It is true that during the period when John Foster Dulles was American secretary of state, the United States itself caught a bad case of the ideological fevers. Dulles was a prominent churchman, a Presbyterian Elder, as well as an international lawyer, and as John Lukacs writes in his history of the Cold War, brought "the distressingly puritanical and at times even pharisaic inclination to see in the world struggle a national personification of good versus evil." The fever unfortunately became a chronic condition, with as yet no cure.
Thus today the situation is the reverse of 1948-1950. Russia is not an ideological power. It has no doctrine to sell. Its preoccupations are prosperity and power. Vladimir Putin has no wish to subvert and rule the United States or Europe. He just doesn't want NATO's candidates biting his ankles. He wants level-headed governments on his borders who don't make trouble for Russia. But that is perfectly, if regrettably, normal.
The United States has been invading troublesome Caribbean and
Central American neighbors since the mid-19th century. It was what the U.S. Marine Corps did for a living – Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic. Ronald Reagan absurdly invaded Granada, officially to save American students from dangerous Cuban airport laborers. The senior George Bush invaded Panama to seize President Manuel Noriega, a former employee of the CIA. It has never been explained what those two invasions were really about. There were (widely publicized) clandestine operations in Nicaragua and El Salvador. All this has been taken for granted as the Monroe Doctrine at work.
China is no longer an ideological power. Chinese Communism has been intellectually dead for two decades. The Party is kept going with all its congresses and assemblies because that furnishes the only justification China's leaders have for why they are in power. China's actual politics function through Party co-option, favoritism and power struggle. This one day will probably end in a major crisis, as I have said before in this space.
China is not an expanding power. It wants Taiwan, various "lost" islands in the China Seas; it demands recognition that Tibet is Chinese. But all this is traditional. It certainly is not promoting Communism abroad.
Today the world's only expansionist ideological power is the United States, aggressively pushing everywhere, persuading, promoting, and even invading countries for "democracy." It wants to make everyone democratic "like us," which in the end means to do as we want them to do. The ideology is meant to be generous, but it is a generosity devoted to the control of energy resources, raw materials, trade, and finance.
This makes the U.S. the expanding and aggressive nation in the world today, the one with a "global ideology," with military power to back it up. This frightens people. When the power doesn't work as intended, as in the Caucasus, it makes other people frightened, the ones who have bet on the U.S. to advance their own agendas. That is what is changing the geopolitical map.
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=340
China still on-side with Russia
China still on-side with Russia
The West is engaged in a premature celebration of the death of the China-Russia relationship following Beijing's perceived lack of support for Moscow's intervention in Georgia. This is a misreading of China's evolution to normal ties with Russia after going though "honeymoon" and "divorce" periods over the past 60 years. It is the West that should be worried about its confrontational policies with Russia. - Yu Bin (Sep 5, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JI06Ad01.html
The West is engaged in a premature celebration of the death of the China-Russia relationship following Beijing's perceived lack of support for Moscow's intervention in Georgia. This is a misreading of China's evolution to normal ties with Russia after going though "honeymoon" and "divorce" periods over the past 60 years. It is the West that should be worried about its confrontational policies with Russia. - Yu Bin (Sep 5, '08)
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JI06Ad01.html
Thursday, September 4, 2008
Democratic Dominoes: A Guest Post
NEW YORK TIMES
9/4/08
Democratic Dominoes: A Guest Post
Peter Leeson
Since the dawn of the cold war, a "democratic domino theory" has helped motivate important U.S. foreign policy decisions. Dwight D. Eisenhower summarized this theory, which he called "the falling domino principle," in 1954:
You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Eisenhower was talking about communist dominoes. Since him, however, other U.S. policymakers have invoked the same basic logic — only with democratic instead of communist dominoes — and thus virtuous effects where a "first domino" falls.
Most recently, some policymakers have pointed to the possibility of a democratic domino effect in the Middle East as a reason for America's continued presence in Iraq. According to George W. Bush, for instance, "The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution."
In a recent paper, co-author Andrea Dean and I investigate whether democratic dominoes like the ones American foreign policy posits actually exist and, if they do, how "hard" they fall.
Does democracy really spread between countries? If so, how much? We find that democratic dominoes do in fact exist, but they fall significantly "lighter" than foreign policy applications of this principle pretend.
Countries only "catch" about 11 percent of their geographic neighbors' average changes in democracy; the modesty of this spread rate is consistent over time. Our analysis extends back to 1850, but 150-plus years ago, like today, changes in countries' democracies were only mildly contagious.
Our study isn't focused on the impact of U.S. intervention on democracy abroad. But if our estimates are in the ballpark, they have potentially sobering implications for attempts to democratize the world through intervention. Even if U.S. intervention succeeds in improving democracy in a key country it occupies, the democracy-enhancing "spillovers" of the intervention are likely to be minimal.
Democratic dominoes don't have the "oomph" to democratize entire regions. Most of an intervention's benefits for democracy, where there are any at all, are likely to remain local.
Bill Easterly and two of his colleagues have a provocative working paper that looks specifically at foreign intervention's influence on democracy abroad. What they find is even more damning for domino-inspired interventions.
According to their work, which examines interventions in the cold war period, U.S. interventions decreased democracy by 33 percent in countries where America intervened (so did Soviet interventions). Christopher Coyne's important book examines the reasons for this failure and provides evidence that foreign intervention's democracy-reducing outcome isn't limited to the cold war context.
If U.S. interventions fail to enhance democracy in the countries where they take place, pro-democracy spillovers obviously cannot spread throughout the greater regions these countries are part of. If the evidence from past attempts is any indicator, the prospect of using falling dominoes to democratize the globe looks pretty dim.
Peter Leeson, the BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University and author of the forthcoming book "The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates," blogged here earlier this week about U.F.O.'s and Bigfoot. This is his second of three posts.
9/4/08
Democratic Dominoes: A Guest Post
Peter Leeson
Since the dawn of the cold war, a "democratic domino theory" has helped motivate important U.S. foreign policy decisions. Dwight D. Eisenhower summarized this theory, which he called "the falling domino principle," in 1954:
You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.
Eisenhower was talking about communist dominoes. Since him, however, other U.S. policymakers have invoked the same basic logic — only with democratic instead of communist dominoes — and thus virtuous effects where a "first domino" falls.
Most recently, some policymakers have pointed to the possibility of a democratic domino effect in the Middle East as a reason for America's continued presence in Iraq. According to George W. Bush, for instance, "The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution."
In a recent paper, co-author Andrea Dean and I investigate whether democratic dominoes like the ones American foreign policy posits actually exist and, if they do, how "hard" they fall.
Does democracy really spread between countries? If so, how much? We find that democratic dominoes do in fact exist, but they fall significantly "lighter" than foreign policy applications of this principle pretend.
Countries only "catch" about 11 percent of their geographic neighbors' average changes in democracy; the modesty of this spread rate is consistent over time. Our analysis extends back to 1850, but 150-plus years ago, like today, changes in countries' democracies were only mildly contagious.
Our study isn't focused on the impact of U.S. intervention on democracy abroad. But if our estimates are in the ballpark, they have potentially sobering implications for attempts to democratize the world through intervention. Even if U.S. intervention succeeds in improving democracy in a key country it occupies, the democracy-enhancing "spillovers" of the intervention are likely to be minimal.
Democratic dominoes don't have the "oomph" to democratize entire regions. Most of an intervention's benefits for democracy, where there are any at all, are likely to remain local.
Bill Easterly and two of his colleagues have a provocative working paper that looks specifically at foreign intervention's influence on democracy abroad. What they find is even more damning for domino-inspired interventions.
According to their work, which examines interventions in the cold war period, U.S. interventions decreased democracy by 33 percent in countries where America intervened (so did Soviet interventions). Christopher Coyne's important book examines the reasons for this failure and provides evidence that foreign intervention's democracy-reducing outcome isn't limited to the cold war context.
If U.S. interventions fail to enhance democracy in the countries where they take place, pro-democracy spillovers obviously cannot spread throughout the greater regions these countries are part of. If the evidence from past attempts is any indicator, the prospect of using falling dominoes to democratize the globe looks pretty dim.
Peter Leeson, the BB&T Professor for the Study of Capitalism at George Mason University and author of the forthcoming book "The Invisible Hook: The Hidden Economics of Pirates," blogged here earlier this week about U.F.O.'s and Bigfoot. This is his second of three posts.
Neoconservatism Lives
Readers who believe that the neo-conservatives have folded their tent may wish to look at Joshua Muravchik's article "The Future is Neo-Con." in the current issue of National Interest. Link is http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.28559/pub_detail.asp
White House Careful on Cutting Ties with Moscow
White House Careful on Cutting Ties with Moscow
Nicholas Kralev and Bill Gertz, The Washington Times The Bush administration has ordered a review of U.S. defense cooperation programs with Russia but is not about to draw up "mindless lists" of penalties that could alienate the Russian people while leaving Moscow's troops in Georgia, U.S. officials said Tuesday.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/03/white-house-treads-carefully-on-cutting-ties-with-/
Nicholas Kralev and Bill Gertz, The Washington Times The Bush administration has ordered a review of U.S. defense cooperation programs with Russia but is not about to draw up "mindless lists" of penalties that could alienate the Russian people while leaving Moscow's troops in Georgia, U.S. officials said Tuesday.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/03/white-house-treads-carefully-on-cutting-ties-with-/
SKorea says NKorea restoring nuclear complex
SKorea says NKorea restoring nuclear complex
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/04/asia/AS-Koreas-Nuclear.php
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/09/04/asia/AS-Koreas-Nuclear.php
Last Chance: Nuclear Suppliers Group Sharon Squassoni, Proliferation Analysis
Last Chance: Nuclear Suppliers Group Sharon Squassoni, Proliferation Analysis
This week, a group of forty-five countries has the last chance to prevent a deal which threatens to cause serious and long-lasting damage to the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In a special meeting on August 1, the 35 representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors gathered in Vienna for the first of several meetings designed to push through nuclear trade with India before the end of the Bush administration and the Singh government. Several countries reportedly objected to elements of a new safeguards agreement designed to open some of India's nuclear facilities to international inspection.
* Minding the Gaps: U.S. & India Views on Nuclear Cooperation
* Text of Revised U.S. NSG Proposal on India
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20448&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
This week, a group of forty-five countries has the last chance to prevent a deal which threatens to cause serious and long-lasting damage to the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime.
In a special meeting on August 1, the 35 representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors gathered in Vienna for the first of several meetings designed to push through nuclear trade with India before the end of the Bush administration and the Singh government. Several countries reportedly objected to elements of a new safeguards agreement designed to open some of India's nuclear facilities to international inspection.
* Minding the Gaps: U.S. & India Views on Nuclear Cooperation
* Text of Revised U.S. NSG Proposal on India
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=20448&prog=zgp&proj=znpp
Neither respected nor feared By Geoffrey Wheatcroft
International Herald Tribune
Neither respected nor feared
By Geoffrey Wheatcroft
Thursday, September 4, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/03/opinion/edwheatcroft.php
BATH, England:
In an exalted phrase, the keynote speaker at the Republican convention reviewed the record of the administration, and asked, "When have we rested more secure in friendship with all mankind?" That wasn't in St. Paul, where the Republicans are gathered this week, but at the 1904 Republican convention in Chicago, when the speaker was Elihu Root, a past Secretary of War and future Secretary of State.
His words were sonorous then, and they are haunting now. They will not be repeated this year, because they could not be. A senior American politician might have said something similar in 1920, or 1945 or 1960. But no Republican now - and no Democrat - could utter Root's words without inviting utter derision.
Today there might be a more bitter question: When has America rested less secure in friendship with all mankind?
And that explains the intense interest which this year's presidential election has inspired beyond the shores of the United States. It's not just Obamania - there's no point in denying that Senator Barack Obama is the man most people outside the United States would like to win - but he was one of three potential candidates until Senator Hillary Clinton conceded defeat who were all fascinating simply in personal terms: a septuagenarian war hero, a woman, a black man.
The election absorbs us in Europe - and others in Africa and Asia - because we can see that a general crisis spreading around the globe is directly linked to the follies and failures of American policy. In his new book, "The Much Too Promised Land," about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which he used to be engaged as a State Department official, Aaron David Miller puts it with lapidary succinctness.
Having stumbled for eight years under the Clinton administration over how to make peace in the Middle East, and then for eight years under the administration of George Bush the Younger over how to make war there, the United States finds itself "trapped in a region which it cannot fix and it cannot abandon." Still more to the point, throughout that region, for all of her seeming might, America is "not liked, not feared and not respected."
And not only in the Middle East. The theme of these past years has been American arrogance followed by American incompetence leading to American impotence.
From one side of the world to the other the story is the same, whether it's Vladimir Putin being told by Bush to leave Georgia, or Israel being told by Condoleezza Rice to desist from building more settlements on the West Bank, or China being told by Washington to behave better in Tibet, or even the European Union being told by any number of American politicians and pundits to accelerate Turkish membership.
All these American strictures are vaguely listened to. And then, as the late George Brown (a sometime British foreign secretary who shared Bush's verbal infelicity) might have said, the rest of the world treats them with a complete ignoral. After all, they come from a supposed hyperpower which in practice is neither respected not feared.
That is a direct consequence of what Washington has done. President Theodore Roosevelt said that America should speak softly and carry a big stick. President George W. Bush speaks loudly and waves a small stick. Stalin and Khrushchev had limits placed on their actions by awareness of what America might do if those limits were overstepped. Putin can do exactly what he likes in Georgia, since he knows that Washington is powerless to stop him.
One stock response from the bedraggled and diminished band of Bush supporters is that to say that all this is no more than "anti-Americanism." Prejudice against, and resentment of, America is indeed far from an imaginary phenomenon, in Europe or elsewhere, on right as well as left, and for generations past.
But today that stock response quite misses the point. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times (himself no radical extremist) has said very truly that attitudes toward America that were not long ago confined to the hard left in Europe are now found across the political spectrum. "Nous sommes tous Américains," the Monde bravely exclaimed after Sept. 11; seven years later it would be an exaggeration to say "We are all anti-Americans now," but not a wild one.
In any case, the whole-hearted enemy of America is the one who ought to be delighted by the eclipse of American prestige, and drink a toast to the Bush administration for bringing it about. It's those of us who believe that the United States needs to be constructively engaged in the world, and respected by it, who have most cause for dismay.
When Tony Blair said in early 2002 that he was worried about a drift towards American unilateralism, and that he wanted to "keep the United States in the international order," the diagnosis wasn't stupid. What was utterly preposterous was his subsequent reasoning that, in order to achieve this, he had to give unconditional support to every American action, above all the Iraq war a year later. As a result, the United States soon stood further still outside the international order, while in the end American power was gravely weakened.
No one who has followed the election campaign can be confident that there will truly be a new beginning in the new year. Electioneering puts reason and restraint at a discount and invites boastful bluster. John McCain's "we are all Georgians" is a fine example and obviously empty rhetoric. Even he ought to have worked out by now that his fellow-Americans, "Georgians" or otherwise, are not going to fight for South Ossetia, and Putin knows it.
Obama took an almost more damaging misstep when he said that "Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel, and it must remain undivided" - something not even Bush has said. If taken literally, his words would mean an end to any imaginable settlement of that bitter and intractable dispute - and they raise once again questions about the fitness of the United States for world leadership, under any president.
Whoever wins in November should pause and take stock. The United States has rarely faced greater challenges with the domestic economy but still more in international affairs. Why does America enjoy so little friendship with all mankind? And is there nothing at all that can be done to restore her standing?
Geoffrey Wheatcroft's books include "Le Tour: A History of the Tour de France 1903-2007," "The Strange Death of Tory England" and "Yo, Blair!"
Neither respected nor feared
By Geoffrey Wheatcroft
Thursday, September 4, 2008
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/03/opinion/edwheatcroft.php
BATH, England:
In an exalted phrase, the keynote speaker at the Republican convention reviewed the record of the administration, and asked, "When have we rested more secure in friendship with all mankind?" That wasn't in St. Paul, where the Republicans are gathered this week, but at the 1904 Republican convention in Chicago, when the speaker was Elihu Root, a past Secretary of War and future Secretary of State.
His words were sonorous then, and they are haunting now. They will not be repeated this year, because they could not be. A senior American politician might have said something similar in 1920, or 1945 or 1960. But no Republican now - and no Democrat - could utter Root's words without inviting utter derision.
Today there might be a more bitter question: When has America rested less secure in friendship with all mankind?
And that explains the intense interest which this year's presidential election has inspired beyond the shores of the United States. It's not just Obamania - there's no point in denying that Senator Barack Obama is the man most people outside the United States would like to win - but he was one of three potential candidates until Senator Hillary Clinton conceded defeat who were all fascinating simply in personal terms: a septuagenarian war hero, a woman, a black man.
The election absorbs us in Europe - and others in Africa and Asia - because we can see that a general crisis spreading around the globe is directly linked to the follies and failures of American policy. In his new book, "The Much Too Promised Land," about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which he used to be engaged as a State Department official, Aaron David Miller puts it with lapidary succinctness.
Having stumbled for eight years under the Clinton administration over how to make peace in the Middle East, and then for eight years under the administration of George Bush the Younger over how to make war there, the United States finds itself "trapped in a region which it cannot fix and it cannot abandon." Still more to the point, throughout that region, for all of her seeming might, America is "not liked, not feared and not respected."
And not only in the Middle East. The theme of these past years has been American arrogance followed by American incompetence leading to American impotence.
From one side of the world to the other the story is the same, whether it's Vladimir Putin being told by Bush to leave Georgia, or Israel being told by Condoleezza Rice to desist from building more settlements on the West Bank, or China being told by Washington to behave better in Tibet, or even the European Union being told by any number of American politicians and pundits to accelerate Turkish membership.
All these American strictures are vaguely listened to. And then, as the late George Brown (a sometime British foreign secretary who shared Bush's verbal infelicity) might have said, the rest of the world treats them with a complete ignoral. After all, they come from a supposed hyperpower which in practice is neither respected not feared.
That is a direct consequence of what Washington has done. President Theodore Roosevelt said that America should speak softly and carry a big stick. President George W. Bush speaks loudly and waves a small stick. Stalin and Khrushchev had limits placed on their actions by awareness of what America might do if those limits were overstepped. Putin can do exactly what he likes in Georgia, since he knows that Washington is powerless to stop him.
One stock response from the bedraggled and diminished band of Bush supporters is that to say that all this is no more than "anti-Americanism." Prejudice against, and resentment of, America is indeed far from an imaginary phenomenon, in Europe or elsewhere, on right as well as left, and for generations past.
But today that stock response quite misses the point. Martin Wolf of the Financial Times (himself no radical extremist) has said very truly that attitudes toward America that were not long ago confined to the hard left in Europe are now found across the political spectrum. "Nous sommes tous Américains," the Monde bravely exclaimed after Sept. 11; seven years later it would be an exaggeration to say "We are all anti-Americans now," but not a wild one.
In any case, the whole-hearted enemy of America is the one who ought to be delighted by the eclipse of American prestige, and drink a toast to the Bush administration for bringing it about. It's those of us who believe that the United States needs to be constructively engaged in the world, and respected by it, who have most cause for dismay.
When Tony Blair said in early 2002 that he was worried about a drift towards American unilateralism, and that he wanted to "keep the United States in the international order," the diagnosis wasn't stupid. What was utterly preposterous was his subsequent reasoning that, in order to achieve this, he had to give unconditional support to every American action, above all the Iraq war a year later. As a result, the United States soon stood further still outside the international order, while in the end American power was gravely weakened.
No one who has followed the election campaign can be confident that there will truly be a new beginning in the new year. Electioneering puts reason and restraint at a discount and invites boastful bluster. John McCain's "we are all Georgians" is a fine example and obviously empty rhetoric. Even he ought to have worked out by now that his fellow-Americans, "Georgians" or otherwise, are not going to fight for South Ossetia, and Putin knows it.
Obama took an almost more damaging misstep when he said that "Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel, and it must remain undivided" - something not even Bush has said. If taken literally, his words would mean an end to any imaginable settlement of that bitter and intractable dispute - and they raise once again questions about the fitness of the United States for world leadership, under any president.
Whoever wins in November should pause and take stock. The United States has rarely faced greater challenges with the domestic economy but still more in international affairs. Why does America enjoy so little friendship with all mankind? And is there nothing at all that can be done to restore her standing?
Geoffrey Wheatcroft's books include "Le Tour: A History of the Tour de France 1903-2007," "The Strange Death of Tory England" and "Yo, Blair!"
Bitterlemons-International Middle East Roundtable September 4, 2008 Russia-Georgia: Lessons for the Middle East
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
We wish our Muslim readers Ramadan Kareem
Edition 35 Volume 6 - September 04, 2008
Russia-Georgia: lessons for the Middle East
• Georgian defeat tarnishes Israel, spells trouble ahead - Ali Abunimah
If Georgia signals the beginning of the end of US "hyperpower", so too will Israel find itself increasingly challenged.
• Diplomacy by proxy - Zvi Bar'el
Can the Russian show of force in Georgia tilt the paralyzing status quo in the Middle East in a new direction?
• Russia could use Mideast ties in standoff with US - Konstantin von Eggert
The "Great Game" has just begun again.
• Telling every party what it wants to hear - Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze
Ignoring the Kremlin's attempt to effect a Middle East comeback is dangerous.
• That tiny war: Iran, Russia and the Middle East - Jalil Roshandel
There is no reason to believe that Iran is neutral regarding the Russian-Georgian dispute.
Georgian defeat tarnishes Israel, spells trouble ahead
Ali Abunimah
In the wake of Russia's counterattack against the Georgian invasion of the breakaway region of South Ossetia last month, Turkish President Abdullah Gul observed that the era when the United States alone could set the world agenda had ended. "I don't think you can control all the world from one center," he said, "There are big nations. There are huge populations. There is unbelievable economic development in some parts of the world." Instead of "unilateral actions," Gul called for states to "act all together, make common decisions and have consultations with the world. A new world order . . . should emerge." Even if the US remains the world's most powerful country, it is a diminished force and time is not on its side.
These developments have major implications for Israelis, Palestinians and the broader region. For Israel, Georgia represents another in a series of setbacks and embarrassments. Israel attempted to downplay its involvement for fear that Russia would step up support to Israel's adversaries in retaliation. In recent years, hundreds of millions of dollars of Israeli weapons and training had poured into Georgia--where the US has major energy and "strategic" interests--along with over two billion dollars of American military support. Israel played a similar role during the Cold War, arming at America's behest the apartheid regime in South Africa and the extreme right-wing US-backed regimes in Central America. In order to shore up its own American support, as well as for economic gain, Israel always does its part to help its patron.
But things did not go to plan. Israel's military reputation was already badly tarnished before the quick collapse of the Israeli-trained Georgian forces. This certainly did nothing to restore Israel's "deterrence" after a long series of setbacks: the collapse of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army in 2000, the Israeli failure to defeat Hizballah in July 2006, Hamas' rapid success in overcoming Israeli- and US-supported Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza in June 2007 and Hizballah's quick overrun of US-backed militias in Lebanon in May 2008. And, although the suffering was disproportionately on the Palestinian side, Israel was unable to defeat Hamas militarily and was forced to agree to a mutual ceasefire in order to stop resistance rocket fire at Israeli towns.
A clear danger to the region is that a new Israeli leadership will try to compensate by launching new military adventures to prove its toughness and reverse the trend. But Israel is much less likely to attack Iran, let alone without Washington's blessing and military support. Israel's dilemma, brought into stark relief by Georgia, is that it has no legitimate political solution within reach for its conflict with the Palestinians. At the same time, the military brute force that has sustained Israel has been losing the capacity to shape the region to its will. Israel relies on only one ally, the United States. If Georgia signals the beginning of the end of US "hyperpower", so too will Israel find itself increasingly challenged and its own needs increasingly at odds with those of its patron. Israel's neighbors will also have other choices than to fall into line behind America or stand alone as "rogue states".
Israel's loss does not necessarily mean the Palestinians' gain unless Palestinians are able to seize the initiative. One clear Palestinian loser is the US-backed Mahmoud Abbas/Mohammad Dahlan Authority in Ramallah which must now wonder if the US will be more loyal to it than it was to the Georgian leadership whose desperate calls for assistance went largely unanswered in Washington.
Yet if the US, bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, has trouble projecting power directly, and Russia gets more involved in the region, the US may rely more on the kinds of "dirty wars" that it has been stoking between Hamas and Fateh in Palestine and opposition and government in Lebanon. This will add to instability and human suffering and make it even harder for Palestinians to restore the kind of unity around a common agenda among all wings of the Palestinian nation (within Israel, in the 1967 occupied territories and the diaspora) needed to challenge Israeli apartheid and colonialism.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ali Abunimah is cofounder of the online publication The Electronic Intifada and author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse.
Diplomacy by proxy
Zvi Bar'el
It sounded like the best news the Middle East had heard for the last decade: Russia is back. A Gulf News editor, Abdul-Hadi al-Timimi, wrote in an op-ed that Russia's willingness to use its military might to reassert its influence in the former Soviet space was "long overdue" and "most urgently needed at a time when the US and its allies are targeting two of the last few Russian allies in the Middle East: Iran and Syria."
It was not so much the show of force that Russia demonstrated toward Georgia that made the Middle East beam with joy, as it was the feeling that Russia is getting even with the United States. Russia used Georgia as a proxy for its new diplomacy. The one-polar world, anti-Arab and pro-Israeli, was shattered; America and Europe were "dragged naked" on the streets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Middle East can breathe freely.
Can it really?
A very important common denominator between Israel and most Arab states has developed since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad came to power. It is not just the nuclear threat that Iran introduces, but rather the fact that its nuclear technology is not perceived anymore as Islamic power, let alone Arab power. It is the threat of a Persian or Shi'ite bomb that looms. Thus, no Islamic or Arabic counterbalance to the Israeli threat is achieved by an Iranian threat; rather, a more ominous power that is less controllable by Arab nations is in the making.
Political processes that have taken place in the Middle East in recent years--whether the crisis in Lebanon, establishing a more or less functioning government in Iraq, the power struggle between Fateh and Hamas or the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations--are void of any Arab influence. The last successful achievement was in 2002 at the Arab League summit in Beirut; since then, nothing new has emerged. A major attempt by leading Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and by the Arab League to isolate Syria or to force Assad into consensual "behavior" regarding Lebanon, has failed. On the contrary, Syria is now the new "star" with a new opening to Europe, a dialogue with Israel, a renewed welcome in Russia and a fully obedient Lebanon under its wings.
These are just a few examples for the Middle East state of affairs, whereby the parties that are directly involved in conflicts are unable or unwilling to solve them. Now, as they search for a new genie--that is how one might read al-Timimi's call--can the Russian show of force in Georgia tilt the paralyzing status quo in the Middle East in a new direction?
We recall that Russia is a member of the infamous quartet that was formed in 2002 to "promote a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict". While the US and the European Union were involved heavily, albeit with little success, in this process, Russia was absent and its voice barely heard. Yet it is not US President George W. Bush who alienated Russia. Russia alienated itself.
So far, Russia has given the impression that it has no interest in "local conflicts" that carry no strategic importance for it. Of course, there is no need to expand on how, from a Russian point of view, the Kosovo or South Ossetia cases are not just "local conflicts". But now, with tension between Russia, the US and the EU high and a new "world crisis map" being drawn, Russia may want to play a higher-profile role, and not only in the Black Sea or the Caucasus, but also in areas that are considered "American" or "European" spheres of influence.
For example, Russia has not yet translated its alliance with Iran into political leverage over Iraq. But, with Syria as a newly-reborn ally and Iran as a partner, is it unimaginable to see Russia developing a pro-Russian "crescent"? Can one dismiss the possibility that states like Kuwait or Qatar will join in? After all, this is not the old cold war between two ideologies, nor is it the question about "who is with America and who is against it". Rather, commercial and strategic interests are involved.
In the context of its rivalry with the US and EU, Russia may want to flex its political muscle in the Arab-Israel arena. Why not call for a "Russian Annapolis" meeting? Why not invite Hamas and Fateh to Moscow? Can an Israeli or Palestinian prime minister decline a meeting with the Russian foreign minister? Further, if Russia decides that now it is its turn to impose a Russian peace initiative, can the parties reject it? Will such an initiative shake the US? Will Washington compete then with Moscow on promoting the peace process?
All this may sound like a hot summer illusion: a scenario of wishful thinking that refuses to accept the fact that the current status quo, the ongoing conflicts and the power struggle that ensues from them may just serve Russia as it had served the Soviet Union. Still, as we observe the latest Russian swing of the pendulum, assess Putin's ambitions and anticipate a new American president, how long will it take Russia to develop a new role in the Middle East?- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Zvi Bar'el is the Middle East analyst of Haaretz daily.
Russia could use Mideast ties in standoff with US
Konstantin von Eggert
Although there is seemingly no direct link between the Russia-Georgia conflict and Russia's policy in the Middle East, the conflict could well lead to significant shifts in Moscow's posture in the region. If the current tendencies in the Kremlin's foreign policy prevail, the Middle East may return to a situation resembling that of the Cold War, with Moscow trying to make life difficult for Washington by supporting regimes the US considers hostile. It is the United States that Russia holds primarily responsible for what it terms the "aggressive policies" of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, and it is America's support for Tbilisi--including promises to re-equip Georgia's armed forces--that rattle Moscow the most.
It is interesting that one of the first politicians to support Russia's actions was Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. There have been reports in the Russian press that Moscow may increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean through the use of Latakia and Tartus, Syria's two ports. New arms deliveries to Damascus could well be another response from Moscow to what it perceives as America's unfriendly policies in the Caucasus.
Another and potentially more serious step Russia could take is to adopt a more assertive stance over Iran's nuclear program and international sanctions against Tehran. It is interesting that in the wake of the crisis in Georgia, US military action against Iran, which some people claimed to be imminent before the end of the year, looks less likely as Washington has to tackle the Caucasus problem first. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad expressed some support for Russia's actions at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe, though Tehran did not rush to recognize the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, Moscow got some moral support but nothing much in terms of real political solidarity from those it counted on, especially China and Iran. Yet these countries would appear to be among the few to which Russia will turn for support in case its standoff with the West over Georgia continues, as it might.
Overtures could also be made to Libya's maverick leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. A high-ranking Russian delegation paid Tripoli a visit to attend the thirty-ninth anniversary of the coup that brought Qaddafi to power. It was headed by Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of Russia's state railways and a man trusted by Vladimir Putin. Not much is known about the contents of the conversations in Tripoli, and it is doubtful that Qaddafi will take up a confrontational course with regard to US and Europe, as he cherishes his newly-found public acceptance by the West and even more so the economic benefits such acceptance could bring.
In the wider region, Russia is already taking steps to counter America's possible moves to secure a pipeline network in Caucasus and Central Asia. Prime Minister Putin has signed an agreement with Uzbek President Islam Karimov to build a new pipeline that will carry natural gas from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov, whose relations with America are tense over his harsh treatment of the opposition, was no doubt glad to get this shot in the arm from Moscow, which will be supplemented by massive Russian arms deliveries, if one believes what Putin said in Tashkent.
Another country that could get extra attention from Moscow is Azerbaijan, which has so far managed to maintain a precarious balance between Russia and the US. President Ilham Aliev had mostly let his officials support Georgia's territorial integrity (rather than condemn Russia's actions). However, a more pro-western tilt in Azeri policies is becoming visible, as Baku feels that events in Georgia could have a direct influence on its own frozen conflict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh. At the same time, there is a growing feeling in Washington that drawing Azerbaijan closer into the US orbit is in America's major interest. This will hardly be to Russia's liking. Iran, with its Azeri minority, also watches events in the neighboring country closely and will no doubt be unhappy if Baku strengthens its ties with the US.
It seems that a round of the twenty-first century version of the "Great Game" has just begun.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Konstantin von Eggert, MBE, is the Moscow Bureau Editor of the BBC Russian Service.
Telling every party what it wants to hear
Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze
On May 15, 2008 the United Nations General Assembly recognized the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians from Abkhazia in 1994. It seemed that the international community was finally paying attention to a conflict that, for reasons of political convenience, had been frozen for a decade and a half.
Tbilisi had been suggesting peace plans for Abkhazia as well as for South Ossetia for years, but no Georgian government could agree to settle the issue of separatism by accepting the outcome of referendums on independence in areas depopulated by force. In Abkhazia alone, militias enjoying Russian military support while using ethnicity as a cover expelled 80 percent of the population. The recognition of the 400,000 internally displaced persons' right of return a few months ago was an important diplomatic milestone toward solving a core issue of Georgia's two conflicts with separatists backed by Moscow.
In addition, Georgia had been focusing on developing the vicinity of the breakaway areas, creating incentives for people there to look toward Tbilisi rather than Moscow. Around Tskhinvali, the administrative capital of South Ossetia, the cleanup against smuggling started showing positive results, with young and old crossing checkpoints into Tbilisi-controlled areas to attend schools, see doctors, or simply work in a country that has been rated the top reformer by the World Bank.
Making Georgia attractive worked for the ordinary people who have always lived together in mixed situations. It did not work for the separatist elites who lived on smuggling and patronage rather than on economic development and political participation.
When Moscow's satraps in Tskhinvali realized they were losing influence among the population, they opted for escalation. The Kremlin's men on the spot had been violating everything from ceasefire agreements to Georgian airspace for many years. To prepare for supporting ground operations, Moscow arranged for maneuvers to be held in the North Caucasus. Separatist militias targeted Georgian police with roadside bombs. They increasingly terrorized the local population by shooting, looting and raiding, up to the point that farmers demanded stronger protection by the Georgian government. Moscow continued handing out Russian passports, dispossessing residents of their Georgian citizenship while creating a fictitious "Russian" entitled to the Kremlin's protection.
Despite the collusion between separatist militias and so-called Russian peacekeepers, Georgian State Minister Temuri Yakobashvili went to Tskhinvali early on August 7, 2008 to meet with separatist leaders; none of them showed up. Instead, the Russian commander of the peacekeeping forces, Murat Kulakhmetov, received him, stating that the Russian forces had lost control over the militias in South Ossetia. That was when the escalation began, with Russian material and personnel moving quickly through the Roki tunnel under the Caucasus chain into the area of Tskhinvali and from there onwards to Gori and the rest of Georgia.
This conflict was not really about South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Rather, it was about a country that over the last eight years has become increasingly intolerant internally and openly belligerent externally: Putin's Russia. While initially media and politicians worldwide took the conflict as a local incident, they quickly realized that the silent cold war going on since Putin's takeover in late 1999 had just entered its hot phase. The Russian invasion of Georgia aimed at reversing "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century", as Putin called the demise of the Soviet Union. In one word: little Georgia does matter, but it matters even more now that the bigger picture is becoming clearer around the world. Putin's "petro-state" is turning into a political project of national aggrandizement with global outreach.
Russia has not only been threatening, blackmailing and--now in the case of Georgia--occupying neighboring countries but has also been trying to reclaim its status as a great power beyond the borders of the infamous "near abroad". For three reasons, the area where Russian ambitions and local expectations appear most to coincide seems to be the Middle East.
First, Russia has been playing in the Middle East on old Cold War sympathies. It makes the Arab street and wide circles of uninformed but opinion-shaping actors believe that the past glory of the Soviet superpower is still alive. It actively plays on anti-Americanism, promoting the concept that the days of confrontation with the United States were in fact the good old days.
At the ideological level, Russia made its entry as a Muslim nation by becoming a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Supported by various Arab states, this has facilitated Russia's whitewashing of its negative record in the wider Middle East. Gone are the days when Arab mujahedin fought against Moscow's wars in Afghanistan or even more recently in Chechnya, where a quarter of the population was annihilated. Likewise, throughout the Levant in particular, the Kremlin supports the Russian-Orthodox Church, utilizing its clergy to counterbalance the largely Greek hierarchy.
At the secular end, Moscow cultivates friendship associations that regroup tens of thousands of graduates from former Soviet universities. Many among them are deeply convinced that Moscow's antagonism to Washington will benefit the Palestinian cause; Russia Today--by satellite television and online--carefully underlines this topic.
Second, as with its image strategy in Europe, the Kremlin presents itself as a reliable partner in business and politics: as modern and efficient as anybody else but not seeking to dominate the region. Russia consults with the oil countries of the Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia, on production figures and target prices. In addition, the Kremlin is silently building up a gas cartel resembling OPEC, with emphasis on Qatar, Iran, Algeria and Egypt. Qatar ranks high on the Russian list of priorities, not only because there were complications resulting from the murder by Russian agents of Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbayev in Doha in 2004. More importantly, the tiny Gulf state has the potential to compete with Russia in the global gas market. While the Kremlin commands a pipeline network based on long-term contracts and pricing, Doha is investing in liquefied natural gas that can be delivered by ship to any place in the world with re-gasification installations.
Keeping energy prices high is a key concern for Russia: its upstream operations are more costly than in the Arab Gulf states, and it was income from extractive industries that allowed Moscow to flex its muscles in the first place. Maintaining a high price-level also serves the purpose of converting Arab petrodollars into Russian arms sales. With this, Moscow benefits twice from soaring energy prices.
Third, just as Russia has painstakingly tried not to appear as antagonizing the United States, so it has cultivated close ties with Israel. Moscow's role in the Quartet overseeing the Middle East peace process is not that important regarding a settlement of the Palestine issue. Rather, this is a vehicle to convey to Americans and Europeans that Russia does not in any way harm Israel's interests. At the same time, this multilateral instrument allows Moscow to conceal--at the Arab street level--that its direct relations with Tel Aviv are in fact more substantial than they appear to those who think of the Kremlin as defending the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, Russia's coquetry with organizations such as Hamas and Hizballah allows it to score points in the Arab region. Another way of not arousing suspicion is Moscow's attempt to forge ever-closer ties with those Arab countries that have peace treaties with Israel, notably Egypt and Jordan. Here, too, cooperation in arms and energy diffuses the impression that Russian activities may ultimately turn into threats.
Until now, Moscow's ambitions have flourished by successfully telling separate audiences across the Atlantic, around the Mediterranean and in the Gulf what each wanted to hear. Until the Russian invasion of Georgia this may have appeared innocent; it is not anymore. As a lack of attention to Russia's policies has paved the way to disaster in Georgia, so too ignoring the Kremlin's attempt to effect a Middle East comeback is dangerous. In the new Cold War, support for Moscow in any matter whatsoever will be looked upon as a policy statement. Arab governments would be well advised to recall their experience of the old Cold War. Getting lost in contradictions does not pay in the long-term.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze is ambassador of Georgia to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Iraq and the Lebanese Republic. This article is written in a private capacity and reflects her personal opinion alone.
That tiny war: Iran, Russia and the Middle East
Jalil Roshandel
Based on news reports, the war erupted on August 7 when Georgians launched a massive artillery barrage targeting the separatist province of South Ossetia that was supported by Russia. The latter claimed that 15 peacekeepers were killed and, in retaliation, Russian forces drove deep into Georgia, occupying crucial positions across the country. Testing Colin Powell's doctrine of overwhelming force, Russia dispatched more troops on August 8 to retake South Ossetia. Russia accused Georgia of killing 2,000 Ossetian civilians, while Georgia accused Russia of summarily executing ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia and detaining others in camps. Within a few days, a ceasefire prevailed and troops were withdrawn. At the end of a five-day war, Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second separatist enclave of Georgia, ignoring the disapproval of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and strong criticism from the West.
Today the question is not who fired first or if Georgia was lured into firing first. In the words of the UN Security Council the two actors, Russia and Georgia, decided to resort to "open military aggression" to solve their political dispute. At this point the war is militarily over, but the political conflict will continue for some time. Its next phase will probably be the absorption of the newly "independent" territories by Russia. To many this might not appear important, but in fact this "small" incident is going to have much greater ramifications on a region that already has enough problems: the Middle East. Turkey, Iran, Syria, the Palestinian territories and Israel--in other words, the entire Middle East--will be affected.
Some states in the region now have an opportunity to realign or strengthen their ties with one of the parties by taking a stand for or against what has just happened. For instance, Syrian leader Bashar Assad was quick to take Russia's side in the war with Georgia. Assad also agreed to heighten Russia's naval presence at its Tartus port. Of course in return, he asked the Russians for advanced weapons systems. In international relations this might seem very normal, but in the context of fragile Middle East security this is interpreted as improving Syrian power versus Israel.
In terms of Middle East security, the Iranian position is of great importance. There is no reason to believe that Iran is neutral regarding the Russian-Georgian dispute. In fact, two policy options are available to Tehran, both of which, depending on long-term policy goals, could yield positive results. Thus Iran could, in theory, oppose Russia's action by arguing that Russian expansion southward is a clear threat to it and that instability in the Caucasus region would negatively affect its security. Or Iran could benefit from US-Russian tension over Georgia by taking calculated steps toward full support for Russia and maximizing its benefits in the nuclear sphere and elsewhere.
Iran appears to be tilting toward the second option. When you look at some of the less visible statements by Iranian authorities you find what the real, if not official, stance is. Thus the Iranian media described the fighting as a US-planned war to create a reason for intervention in the Caucasus. An anonymous Iranian military authority declared that the "US and its allies must accept the reality of Russia's victory in this war", meaning America's defeat, and warned Americans that everywhere they go they will face the same type of defeat.
Iran's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Hassan Firouzabadi's comments are the most important. He referred to the Georgian president as "a product of an American velvet revolution" who started the war, thereby jeopardizing Russian national interests and security and causing Russia to react and attack Georgia. Firouzabadi argued that the war was initiated by American warmongers who seek to persuade the public to vote for their presidential candidate. One may argue that his remarks were geared toward domestic Iranian consumption, but are they not equally revealing of the Iranian government's stance toward the war?
Despite the fact that Levan Asatiani, the Georgian ambassador in Tehran, praised Iran's stance on the Caucasus conflict and claimed it had been supportive, Tehran officially did no more than mildly "[ask] the sides to declare a ceasefire and to start negotiations to resolve the problems". Perhaps Georgia's dependence on Iran justifies the ambassador's deference.
Historically, the Shahs of Persia and Iran feared Tsarist Russia and more recently the former Soviet Union, but this is no longer the case. Today, Russia and Iran have a strong relationship. Russia is building Iran's nuclear plant at Bushehr and is selling arms, missiles, aircraft and all sorts of technologies and military equipment to Iran. Iran is also seeking full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; this would enable it to sit at the same table with two veto holders on the UN Security Council, Russia and China, and would in fact place it in a defense pact with Russia.
As was evident in the case of Chechnya, Iran will not go beyond a mild reaction to the Georgia-Russia war and to recognition by Russia of the independence of the two Georgian enclaves. Recent remarks by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad on the sidelines of the SCO meeting in Tajikistan that "there is evidence at hand that proves Zionists are behind the South Ossetia and Abkhazia events" and that "enemies do not wish to see Iran and Russia powerful" are very revealing.
For such a Russia-friendly position, Iran could as noted be rewarded with full membership in the SCO and more energetic support for its nuclear plans. Russia might strongly oppose additional international sanctions against Iran. Further, security, military and economic interactions between Iran and Russia could open the door for the Russians to step into the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, a traditional sphere of US interest and influence.
The picture is even gloomier when we look at all these probabilities together and link them to the future of security in the Middle East.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Jalil Roshandel is associate professor and director of the Security Studies Program at the Political Science Department of East Carolina University. He is currently working on a book project (with Dr. Alethia Cook): US-Iran Relations: Policy Challenges and Opportunities.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Middle East Roundtable
We wish our Muslim readers Ramadan Kareem
Edition 35 Volume 6 - September 04, 2008
Russia-Georgia: lessons for the Middle East
• Georgian defeat tarnishes Israel, spells trouble ahead - Ali Abunimah
If Georgia signals the beginning of the end of US "hyperpower", so too will Israel find itself increasingly challenged.
• Diplomacy by proxy - Zvi Bar'el
Can the Russian show of force in Georgia tilt the paralyzing status quo in the Middle East in a new direction?
• Russia could use Mideast ties in standoff with US - Konstantin von Eggert
The "Great Game" has just begun again.
• Telling every party what it wants to hear - Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze
Ignoring the Kremlin's attempt to effect a Middle East comeback is dangerous.
• That tiny war: Iran, Russia and the Middle East - Jalil Roshandel
There is no reason to believe that Iran is neutral regarding the Russian-Georgian dispute.
Georgian defeat tarnishes Israel, spells trouble ahead
Ali Abunimah
In the wake of Russia's counterattack against the Georgian invasion of the breakaway region of South Ossetia last month, Turkish President Abdullah Gul observed that the era when the United States alone could set the world agenda had ended. "I don't think you can control all the world from one center," he said, "There are big nations. There are huge populations. There is unbelievable economic development in some parts of the world." Instead of "unilateral actions," Gul called for states to "act all together, make common decisions and have consultations with the world. A new world order . . . should emerge." Even if the US remains the world's most powerful country, it is a diminished force and time is not on its side.
These developments have major implications for Israelis, Palestinians and the broader region. For Israel, Georgia represents another in a series of setbacks and embarrassments. Israel attempted to downplay its involvement for fear that Russia would step up support to Israel's adversaries in retaliation. In recent years, hundreds of millions of dollars of Israeli weapons and training had poured into Georgia--where the US has major energy and "strategic" interests--along with over two billion dollars of American military support. Israel played a similar role during the Cold War, arming at America's behest the apartheid regime in South Africa and the extreme right-wing US-backed regimes in Central America. In order to shore up its own American support, as well as for economic gain, Israel always does its part to help its patron.
But things did not go to plan. Israel's military reputation was already badly tarnished before the quick collapse of the Israeli-trained Georgian forces. This certainly did nothing to restore Israel's "deterrence" after a long series of setbacks: the collapse of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon Army in 2000, the Israeli failure to defeat Hizballah in July 2006, Hamas' rapid success in overcoming Israeli- and US-supported Palestinian Authority forces in Gaza in June 2007 and Hizballah's quick overrun of US-backed militias in Lebanon in May 2008. And, although the suffering was disproportionately on the Palestinian side, Israel was unable to defeat Hamas militarily and was forced to agree to a mutual ceasefire in order to stop resistance rocket fire at Israeli towns.
A clear danger to the region is that a new Israeli leadership will try to compensate by launching new military adventures to prove its toughness and reverse the trend. But Israel is much less likely to attack Iran, let alone without Washington's blessing and military support. Israel's dilemma, brought into stark relief by Georgia, is that it has no legitimate political solution within reach for its conflict with the Palestinians. At the same time, the military brute force that has sustained Israel has been losing the capacity to shape the region to its will. Israel relies on only one ally, the United States. If Georgia signals the beginning of the end of US "hyperpower", so too will Israel find itself increasingly challenged and its own needs increasingly at odds with those of its patron. Israel's neighbors will also have other choices than to fall into line behind America or stand alone as "rogue states".
Israel's loss does not necessarily mean the Palestinians' gain unless Palestinians are able to seize the initiative. One clear Palestinian loser is the US-backed Mahmoud Abbas/Mohammad Dahlan Authority in Ramallah which must now wonder if the US will be more loyal to it than it was to the Georgian leadership whose desperate calls for assistance went largely unanswered in Washington.
Yet if the US, bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan, has trouble projecting power directly, and Russia gets more involved in the region, the US may rely more on the kinds of "dirty wars" that it has been stoking between Hamas and Fateh in Palestine and opposition and government in Lebanon. This will add to instability and human suffering and make it even harder for Palestinians to restore the kind of unity around a common agenda among all wings of the Palestinian nation (within Israel, in the 1967 occupied territories and the diaspora) needed to challenge Israeli apartheid and colonialism.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ali Abunimah is cofounder of the online publication The Electronic Intifada and author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse.
Diplomacy by proxy
Zvi Bar'el
It sounded like the best news the Middle East had heard for the last decade: Russia is back. A Gulf News editor, Abdul-Hadi al-Timimi, wrote in an op-ed that Russia's willingness to use its military might to reassert its influence in the former Soviet space was "long overdue" and "most urgently needed at a time when the US and its allies are targeting two of the last few Russian allies in the Middle East: Iran and Syria."
It was not so much the show of force that Russia demonstrated toward Georgia that made the Middle East beam with joy, as it was the feeling that Russia is getting even with the United States. Russia used Georgia as a proxy for its new diplomacy. The one-polar world, anti-Arab and pro-Israeli, was shattered; America and Europe were "dragged naked" on the streets of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the Middle East can breathe freely.
Can it really?
A very important common denominator between Israel and most Arab states has developed since Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad came to power. It is not just the nuclear threat that Iran introduces, but rather the fact that its nuclear technology is not perceived anymore as Islamic power, let alone Arab power. It is the threat of a Persian or Shi'ite bomb that looms. Thus, no Islamic or Arabic counterbalance to the Israeli threat is achieved by an Iranian threat; rather, a more ominous power that is less controllable by Arab nations is in the making.
Political processes that have taken place in the Middle East in recent years--whether the crisis in Lebanon, establishing a more or less functioning government in Iraq, the power struggle between Fateh and Hamas or the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations--are void of any Arab influence. The last successful achievement was in 2002 at the Arab League summit in Beirut; since then, nothing new has emerged. A major attempt by leading Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia and by the Arab League to isolate Syria or to force Assad into consensual "behavior" regarding Lebanon, has failed. On the contrary, Syria is now the new "star" with a new opening to Europe, a dialogue with Israel, a renewed welcome in Russia and a fully obedient Lebanon under its wings.
These are just a few examples for the Middle East state of affairs, whereby the parties that are directly involved in conflicts are unable or unwilling to solve them. Now, as they search for a new genie--that is how one might read al-Timimi's call--can the Russian show of force in Georgia tilt the paralyzing status quo in the Middle East in a new direction?
We recall that Russia is a member of the infamous quartet that was formed in 2002 to "promote a just, comprehensive, and lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict". While the US and the European Union were involved heavily, albeit with little success, in this process, Russia was absent and its voice barely heard. Yet it is not US President George W. Bush who alienated Russia. Russia alienated itself.
So far, Russia has given the impression that it has no interest in "local conflicts" that carry no strategic importance for it. Of course, there is no need to expand on how, from a Russian point of view, the Kosovo or South Ossetia cases are not just "local conflicts". But now, with tension between Russia, the US and the EU high and a new "world crisis map" being drawn, Russia may want to play a higher-profile role, and not only in the Black Sea or the Caucasus, but also in areas that are considered "American" or "European" spheres of influence.
For example, Russia has not yet translated its alliance with Iran into political leverage over Iraq. But, with Syria as a newly-reborn ally and Iran as a partner, is it unimaginable to see Russia developing a pro-Russian "crescent"? Can one dismiss the possibility that states like Kuwait or Qatar will join in? After all, this is not the old cold war between two ideologies, nor is it the question about "who is with America and who is against it". Rather, commercial and strategic interests are involved.
In the context of its rivalry with the US and EU, Russia may want to flex its political muscle in the Arab-Israel arena. Why not call for a "Russian Annapolis" meeting? Why not invite Hamas and Fateh to Moscow? Can an Israeli or Palestinian prime minister decline a meeting with the Russian foreign minister? Further, if Russia decides that now it is its turn to impose a Russian peace initiative, can the parties reject it? Will such an initiative shake the US? Will Washington compete then with Moscow on promoting the peace process?
All this may sound like a hot summer illusion: a scenario of wishful thinking that refuses to accept the fact that the current status quo, the ongoing conflicts and the power struggle that ensues from them may just serve Russia as it had served the Soviet Union. Still, as we observe the latest Russian swing of the pendulum, assess Putin's ambitions and anticipate a new American president, how long will it take Russia to develop a new role in the Middle East?- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Zvi Bar'el is the Middle East analyst of Haaretz daily.
Russia could use Mideast ties in standoff with US
Konstantin von Eggert
Although there is seemingly no direct link between the Russia-Georgia conflict and Russia's policy in the Middle East, the conflict could well lead to significant shifts in Moscow's posture in the region. If the current tendencies in the Kremlin's foreign policy prevail, the Middle East may return to a situation resembling that of the Cold War, with Moscow trying to make life difficult for Washington by supporting regimes the US considers hostile. It is the United States that Russia holds primarily responsible for what it terms the "aggressive policies" of Mikheil Saakashvili, the Georgian president, and it is America's support for Tbilisi--including promises to re-equip Georgia's armed forces--that rattle Moscow the most.
It is interesting that one of the first politicians to support Russia's actions was Syria's President Bashar al-Assad. There have been reports in the Russian press that Moscow may increase its naval presence in the Mediterranean through the use of Latakia and Tartus, Syria's two ports. New arms deliveries to Damascus could well be another response from Moscow to what it perceives as America's unfriendly policies in the Caucasus.
Another and potentially more serious step Russia could take is to adopt a more assertive stance over Iran's nuclear program and international sanctions against Tehran. It is interesting that in the wake of the crisis in Georgia, US military action against Iran, which some people claimed to be imminent before the end of the year, looks less likely as Washington has to tackle the Caucasus problem first. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad expressed some support for Russia's actions at the recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Dushanbe, though Tehran did not rush to recognize the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Indeed, Moscow got some moral support but nothing much in terms of real political solidarity from those it counted on, especially China and Iran. Yet these countries would appear to be among the few to which Russia will turn for support in case its standoff with the West over Georgia continues, as it might.
Overtures could also be made to Libya's maverick leader Colonel Muammar Qaddafi. A high-ranking Russian delegation paid Tripoli a visit to attend the thirty-ninth anniversary of the coup that brought Qaddafi to power. It was headed by Vladimir Yakunin, the boss of Russia's state railways and a man trusted by Vladimir Putin. Not much is known about the contents of the conversations in Tripoli, and it is doubtful that Qaddafi will take up a confrontational course with regard to US and Europe, as he cherishes his newly-found public acceptance by the West and even more so the economic benefits such acceptance could bring.
In the wider region, Russia is already taking steps to counter America's possible moves to secure a pipeline network in Caucasus and Central Asia. Prime Minister Putin has signed an agreement with Uzbek President Islam Karimov to build a new pipeline that will carry natural gas from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan to Russia. Karimov, whose relations with America are tense over his harsh treatment of the opposition, was no doubt glad to get this shot in the arm from Moscow, which will be supplemented by massive Russian arms deliveries, if one believes what Putin said in Tashkent.
Another country that could get extra attention from Moscow is Azerbaijan, which has so far managed to maintain a precarious balance between Russia and the US. President Ilham Aliev had mostly let his officials support Georgia's territorial integrity (rather than condemn Russia's actions). However, a more pro-western tilt in Azeri policies is becoming visible, as Baku feels that events in Georgia could have a direct influence on its own frozen conflict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh. At the same time, there is a growing feeling in Washington that drawing Azerbaijan closer into the US orbit is in America's major interest. This will hardly be to Russia's liking. Iran, with its Azeri minority, also watches events in the neighboring country closely and will no doubt be unhappy if Baku strengthens its ties with the US.
It seems that a round of the twenty-first century version of the "Great Game" has just begun.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Konstantin von Eggert, MBE, is the Moscow Bureau Editor of the BBC Russian Service.
Telling every party what it wants to hear
Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze
On May 15, 2008 the United Nations General Assembly recognized the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Georgians from Abkhazia in 1994. It seemed that the international community was finally paying attention to a conflict that, for reasons of political convenience, had been frozen for a decade and a half.
Tbilisi had been suggesting peace plans for Abkhazia as well as for South Ossetia for years, but no Georgian government could agree to settle the issue of separatism by accepting the outcome of referendums on independence in areas depopulated by force. In Abkhazia alone, militias enjoying Russian military support while using ethnicity as a cover expelled 80 percent of the population. The recognition of the 400,000 internally displaced persons' right of return a few months ago was an important diplomatic milestone toward solving a core issue of Georgia's two conflicts with separatists backed by Moscow.
In addition, Georgia had been focusing on developing the vicinity of the breakaway areas, creating incentives for people there to look toward Tbilisi rather than Moscow. Around Tskhinvali, the administrative capital of South Ossetia, the cleanup against smuggling started showing positive results, with young and old crossing checkpoints into Tbilisi-controlled areas to attend schools, see doctors, or simply work in a country that has been rated the top reformer by the World Bank.
Making Georgia attractive worked for the ordinary people who have always lived together in mixed situations. It did not work for the separatist elites who lived on smuggling and patronage rather than on economic development and political participation.
When Moscow's satraps in Tskhinvali realized they were losing influence among the population, they opted for escalation. The Kremlin's men on the spot had been violating everything from ceasefire agreements to Georgian airspace for many years. To prepare for supporting ground operations, Moscow arranged for maneuvers to be held in the North Caucasus. Separatist militias targeted Georgian police with roadside bombs. They increasingly terrorized the local population by shooting, looting and raiding, up to the point that farmers demanded stronger protection by the Georgian government. Moscow continued handing out Russian passports, dispossessing residents of their Georgian citizenship while creating a fictitious "Russian" entitled to the Kremlin's protection.
Despite the collusion between separatist militias and so-called Russian peacekeepers, Georgian State Minister Temuri Yakobashvili went to Tskhinvali early on August 7, 2008 to meet with separatist leaders; none of them showed up. Instead, the Russian commander of the peacekeeping forces, Murat Kulakhmetov, received him, stating that the Russian forces had lost control over the militias in South Ossetia. That was when the escalation began, with Russian material and personnel moving quickly through the Roki tunnel under the Caucasus chain into the area of Tskhinvali and from there onwards to Gori and the rest of Georgia.
This conflict was not really about South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Rather, it was about a country that over the last eight years has become increasingly intolerant internally and openly belligerent externally: Putin's Russia. While initially media and politicians worldwide took the conflict as a local incident, they quickly realized that the silent cold war going on since Putin's takeover in late 1999 had just entered its hot phase. The Russian invasion of Georgia aimed at reversing "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century", as Putin called the demise of the Soviet Union. In one word: little Georgia does matter, but it matters even more now that the bigger picture is becoming clearer around the world. Putin's "petro-state" is turning into a political project of national aggrandizement with global outreach.
Russia has not only been threatening, blackmailing and--now in the case of Georgia--occupying neighboring countries but has also been trying to reclaim its status as a great power beyond the borders of the infamous "near abroad". For three reasons, the area where Russian ambitions and local expectations appear most to coincide seems to be the Middle East.
First, Russia has been playing in the Middle East on old Cold War sympathies. It makes the Arab street and wide circles of uninformed but opinion-shaping actors believe that the past glory of the Soviet superpower is still alive. It actively plays on anti-Americanism, promoting the concept that the days of confrontation with the United States were in fact the good old days.
At the ideological level, Russia made its entry as a Muslim nation by becoming a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Supported by various Arab states, this has facilitated Russia's whitewashing of its negative record in the wider Middle East. Gone are the days when Arab mujahedin fought against Moscow's wars in Afghanistan or even more recently in Chechnya, where a quarter of the population was annihilated. Likewise, throughout the Levant in particular, the Kremlin supports the Russian-Orthodox Church, utilizing its clergy to counterbalance the largely Greek hierarchy.
At the secular end, Moscow cultivates friendship associations that regroup tens of thousands of graduates from former Soviet universities. Many among them are deeply convinced that Moscow's antagonism to Washington will benefit the Palestinian cause; Russia Today--by satellite television and online--carefully underlines this topic.
Second, as with its image strategy in Europe, the Kremlin presents itself as a reliable partner in business and politics: as modern and efficient as anybody else but not seeking to dominate the region. Russia consults with the oil countries of the Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia, on production figures and target prices. In addition, the Kremlin is silently building up a gas cartel resembling OPEC, with emphasis on Qatar, Iran, Algeria and Egypt. Qatar ranks high on the Russian list of priorities, not only because there were complications resulting from the murder by Russian agents of Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbayev in Doha in 2004. More importantly, the tiny Gulf state has the potential to compete with Russia in the global gas market. While the Kremlin commands a pipeline network based on long-term contracts and pricing, Doha is investing in liquefied natural gas that can be delivered by ship to any place in the world with re-gasification installations.
Keeping energy prices high is a key concern for Russia: its upstream operations are more costly than in the Arab Gulf states, and it was income from extractive industries that allowed Moscow to flex its muscles in the first place. Maintaining a high price-level also serves the purpose of converting Arab petrodollars into Russian arms sales. With this, Moscow benefits twice from soaring energy prices.
Third, just as Russia has painstakingly tried not to appear as antagonizing the United States, so it has cultivated close ties with Israel. Moscow's role in the Quartet overseeing the Middle East peace process is not that important regarding a settlement of the Palestine issue. Rather, this is a vehicle to convey to Americans and Europeans that Russia does not in any way harm Israel's interests. At the same time, this multilateral instrument allows Moscow to conceal--at the Arab street level--that its direct relations with Tel Aviv are in fact more substantial than they appear to those who think of the Kremlin as defending the Palestinian cause. Meanwhile, Russia's coquetry with organizations such as Hamas and Hizballah allows it to score points in the Arab region. Another way of not arousing suspicion is Moscow's attempt to forge ever-closer ties with those Arab countries that have peace treaties with Israel, notably Egypt and Jordan. Here, too, cooperation in arms and energy diffuses the impression that Russian activities may ultimately turn into threats.
Until now, Moscow's ambitions have flourished by successfully telling separate audiences across the Atlantic, around the Mediterranean and in the Gulf what each wanted to hear. Until the Russian invasion of Georgia this may have appeared innocent; it is not anymore. As a lack of attention to Russia's policies has paved the way to disaster in Georgia, so too ignoring the Kremlin's attempt to effect a Middle East comeback is dangerous. In the new Cold War, support for Moscow in any matter whatsoever will be looked upon as a policy statement. Arab governments would be well advised to recall their experience of the old Cold War. Getting lost in contradictions does not pay in the long-term.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ekaterine Meiering-Mikadze is ambassador of Georgia to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Iraq and the Lebanese Republic. This article is written in a private capacity and reflects her personal opinion alone.
That tiny war: Iran, Russia and the Middle East
Jalil Roshandel
Based on news reports, the war erupted on August 7 when Georgians launched a massive artillery barrage targeting the separatist province of South Ossetia that was supported by Russia. The latter claimed that 15 peacekeepers were killed and, in retaliation, Russian forces drove deep into Georgia, occupying crucial positions across the country. Testing Colin Powell's doctrine of overwhelming force, Russia dispatched more troops on August 8 to retake South Ossetia. Russia accused Georgia of killing 2,000 Ossetian civilians, while Georgia accused Russia of summarily executing ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia and detaining others in camps. Within a few days, a ceasefire prevailed and troops were withdrawn. At the end of a five-day war, Moscow recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, a second separatist enclave of Georgia, ignoring the disapproval of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and strong criticism from the West.
Today the question is not who fired first or if Georgia was lured into firing first. In the words of the UN Security Council the two actors, Russia and Georgia, decided to resort to "open military aggression" to solve their political dispute. At this point the war is militarily over, but the political conflict will continue for some time. Its next phase will probably be the absorption of the newly "independent" territories by Russia. To many this might not appear important, but in fact this "small" incident is going to have much greater ramifications on a region that already has enough problems: the Middle East. Turkey, Iran, Syria, the Palestinian territories and Israel--in other words, the entire Middle East--will be affected.
Some states in the region now have an opportunity to realign or strengthen their ties with one of the parties by taking a stand for or against what has just happened. For instance, Syrian leader Bashar Assad was quick to take Russia's side in the war with Georgia. Assad also agreed to heighten Russia's naval presence at its Tartus port. Of course in return, he asked the Russians for advanced weapons systems. In international relations this might seem very normal, but in the context of fragile Middle East security this is interpreted as improving Syrian power versus Israel.
In terms of Middle East security, the Iranian position is of great importance. There is no reason to believe that Iran is neutral regarding the Russian-Georgian dispute. In fact, two policy options are available to Tehran, both of which, depending on long-term policy goals, could yield positive results. Thus Iran could, in theory, oppose Russia's action by arguing that Russian expansion southward is a clear threat to it and that instability in the Caucasus region would negatively affect its security. Or Iran could benefit from US-Russian tension over Georgia by taking calculated steps toward full support for Russia and maximizing its benefits in the nuclear sphere and elsewhere.
Iran appears to be tilting toward the second option. When you look at some of the less visible statements by Iranian authorities you find what the real, if not official, stance is. Thus the Iranian media described the fighting as a US-planned war to create a reason for intervention in the Caucasus. An anonymous Iranian military authority declared that the "US and its allies must accept the reality of Russia's victory in this war", meaning America's defeat, and warned Americans that everywhere they go they will face the same type of defeat.
Iran's Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major General Hassan Firouzabadi's comments are the most important. He referred to the Georgian president as "a product of an American velvet revolution" who started the war, thereby jeopardizing Russian national interests and security and causing Russia to react and attack Georgia. Firouzabadi argued that the war was initiated by American warmongers who seek to persuade the public to vote for their presidential candidate. One may argue that his remarks were geared toward domestic Iranian consumption, but are they not equally revealing of the Iranian government's stance toward the war?
Despite the fact that Levan Asatiani, the Georgian ambassador in Tehran, praised Iran's stance on the Caucasus conflict and claimed it had been supportive, Tehran officially did no more than mildly "[ask] the sides to declare a ceasefire and to start negotiations to resolve the problems". Perhaps Georgia's dependence on Iran justifies the ambassador's deference.
Historically, the Shahs of Persia and Iran feared Tsarist Russia and more recently the former Soviet Union, but this is no longer the case. Today, Russia and Iran have a strong relationship. Russia is building Iran's nuclear plant at Bushehr and is selling arms, missiles, aircraft and all sorts of technologies and military equipment to Iran. Iran is also seeking full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; this would enable it to sit at the same table with two veto holders on the UN Security Council, Russia and China, and would in fact place it in a defense pact with Russia.
As was evident in the case of Chechnya, Iran will not go beyond a mild reaction to the Georgia-Russia war and to recognition by Russia of the independence of the two Georgian enclaves. Recent remarks by President Mahmoud Ahmadinezhad on the sidelines of the SCO meeting in Tajikistan that "there is evidence at hand that proves Zionists are behind the South Ossetia and Abkhazia events" and that "enemies do not wish to see Iran and Russia powerful" are very revealing.
For such a Russia-friendly position, Iran could as noted be rewarded with full membership in the SCO and more energetic support for its nuclear plans. Russia might strongly oppose additional international sanctions against Iran. Further, security, military and economic interactions between Iran and Russia could open the door for the Russians to step into the warm waters of the Persian Gulf, a traditional sphere of US interest and influence.
The picture is even gloomier when we look at all these probabilities together and link them to the future of security in the Middle East.- Published 4/9/2008 © bitterlemons-international.org
Dr. Jalil Roshandel is associate professor and director of the Security Studies Program at the Political Science Department of East Carolina University. He is currently working on a book project (with Dr. Alethia Cook): US-Iran Relations: Policy Challenges and Opportunities.
Bitterlemons-international.org is an internet forum for an array of world perspectives on the Middle East and its specific concerns. It aspires to engender greater understanding about the Middle East region and open a new common space for world thinkers and political leaders to present their viewpoints and initiatives on the region. Editors Ghassan Khatib and Yossi Alpher can be reached at ghassan@bitterlemons-international.org and yossi@bitterlemons-international.org, respectively.
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
SCHAFFER: Kashmir's fuse alight
Wednesday, September 3, 2008
The Washington Times
SCHAFFER: Kashmir's fuse alight
Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer
COMMENTARY:
An estimated million Kashmiris marched through the streets of Srinagar, the disputed state's summer capital, on Friday, Aug. 22, many waving the green flag of Islam and demanding freedom - azadi - from Indian rule. A harsh crackdown followed.
The United States has not paid much attention to Kashmir for the past few years, confident that an active India-Pakistan peace process would prevent any crises on that front. It no longer enjoys that luxury. If the current unrest leads to another India-Pakistan confrontation, the whole area from Afghanistan through India will be affected, with critical U.S. interests in play.
Like the mass upheavals in 1963-64 and 1989-90, this Kashmir crisis was triggered by a specific event. This time it was the state administration's ill-conceived decision to make 100 acres of public land available to a Hindu religious organization to build facilities for pilgrims to a popular shrine in the state's Himalayan range. The land transfer provided ammunition to Kashmir's anti-Indian politicians, who made wild claims that it was part of a conspiracy to reduce the state's Muslim majority to minority status. Amid growing unrest, the government rescinded the transfer. Nationalist leaders in predominantly Hindu parts of the state started violent demonstrations against the revocation. Scores have since been killed in Hindu-Muslim clashes and firings by police and military units on civilian protesters.
The problem could not come at a worse time. India-Pakistan relations have been rocked by the apparent role of Pakistan's intelligence services, ISI, in last month's bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The 4.5-year cease-fire along the Line of Control that divides Indian and Pakistani forces in the state has been broken by hours-long artillery clashes. There are reports that infiltration across the line into Indian-held territory is increasing. The Pakistan government, which in recent years had reduced its support for insurgents against Indian rule in Kashmir, has expressed sympathy for the Muslim demonstrators and reiterated its call for settlement of the 60-year old dispute. This is the least it could do. But as in the past, there are surely elements in ISI and elsewhere in Pakistan who want to fish in troubled waters. Even if they do not, many in India will accuse the Pakistanis of aggravating the crisis.
A peaceful future depends on both governments' success in cooling the situation. However, Pakistan is caught up in a deadly insurgency fueled by the Taliban's local affiliate. Suicide bombings reached new heights last week with an attack on an army ordnance factory near Islamabad. The weak and fractured post-Musharraf government faces a host of severe economic and political problems. It does not need trouble with India when its Afghan border area is inflamed.
In India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government faces elections early next year. It has just survived a crisis over its nuclear agreement with the United States. Its political troubles, including soaring food and fuel costs, will make it even more reluctant to make any bold moves on Kashmir.
After many failed interventions, the United States has in recent years shied away from trying to broker a Kashmir settlement. It has confined itself to crisis management, most recently in 2002 when it helped defuse a confrontation that threatened to trigger another India-Pakistan war.
Washington's options and influence are limited. But the United States needs to convey to both Pakistan and India how much is riding on their ability to calm the crisis. The administration should make clear to the Pakistan government that meddling in Kashmir would be a dangerous course. Such an intervention would only heighten the country's problems and undercut its efforts to deal with insurgents near the Afghan border.
The message should be that exacerbating the trouble in Kashmir will only make things worse between us. At the same time, it should urge the Indians to show restraint. This includes reining in their natural tendency to pin the blame on Pakistan for their own mistakes in dealing with the Kashmiris.
The governments in both Islamabad and Delhi are ill-placed to make major policy changes, but they urgently need to maintain their promising back-channel contacts. This channel gives both a chance to refine and expand their ideas for an eventual Kashmir settlement, which they can share with their publics when the two governments are able to move forward. If the situation further deteriorates, Washington should send to the area a senior official to help defuse the crisis, as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage did so effectively five years ago.
Such efforts will burden a lame-duck administration overloaded with critical foreign policy issues. But Kashmir is again becoming very dangerous. Stabilizing Afghanistan, avoiding a potential nuclear face-off between Pakistan and India, and steadying the fragile democratic government in Pakistan are critical U.S. interests today, far more than in previous decades. They are all at risk if Kashmir sparks a new India-Pakistan crisis. The United States can ignore Kashmir only at its own peril.
Howard Schaffer is deputy director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and has just completed a book on the U.S. role in Kashmir. Teresita Schaffer is director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Both are retired U.S. ambassadors with long experience in South Asia.
The Washington Times
SCHAFFER: Kashmir's fuse alight
Howard Schaffer and Teresita Schaffer
COMMENTARY:
An estimated million Kashmiris marched through the streets of Srinagar, the disputed state's summer capital, on Friday, Aug. 22, many waving the green flag of Islam and demanding freedom - azadi - from Indian rule. A harsh crackdown followed.
The United States has not paid much attention to Kashmir for the past few years, confident that an active India-Pakistan peace process would prevent any crises on that front. It no longer enjoys that luxury. If the current unrest leads to another India-Pakistan confrontation, the whole area from Afghanistan through India will be affected, with critical U.S. interests in play.
Like the mass upheavals in 1963-64 and 1989-90, this Kashmir crisis was triggered by a specific event. This time it was the state administration's ill-conceived decision to make 100 acres of public land available to a Hindu religious organization to build facilities for pilgrims to a popular shrine in the state's Himalayan range. The land transfer provided ammunition to Kashmir's anti-Indian politicians, who made wild claims that it was part of a conspiracy to reduce the state's Muslim majority to minority status. Amid growing unrest, the government rescinded the transfer. Nationalist leaders in predominantly Hindu parts of the state started violent demonstrations against the revocation. Scores have since been killed in Hindu-Muslim clashes and firings by police and military units on civilian protesters.
The problem could not come at a worse time. India-Pakistan relations have been rocked by the apparent role of Pakistan's intelligence services, ISI, in last month's bombing of the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The 4.5-year cease-fire along the Line of Control that divides Indian and Pakistani forces in the state has been broken by hours-long artillery clashes. There are reports that infiltration across the line into Indian-held territory is increasing. The Pakistan government, which in recent years had reduced its support for insurgents against Indian rule in Kashmir, has expressed sympathy for the Muslim demonstrators and reiterated its call for settlement of the 60-year old dispute. This is the least it could do. But as in the past, there are surely elements in ISI and elsewhere in Pakistan who want to fish in troubled waters. Even if they do not, many in India will accuse the Pakistanis of aggravating the crisis.
A peaceful future depends on both governments' success in cooling the situation. However, Pakistan is caught up in a deadly insurgency fueled by the Taliban's local affiliate. Suicide bombings reached new heights last week with an attack on an army ordnance factory near Islamabad. The weak and fractured post-Musharraf government faces a host of severe economic and political problems. It does not need trouble with India when its Afghan border area is inflamed.
In India, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government faces elections early next year. It has just survived a crisis over its nuclear agreement with the United States. Its political troubles, including soaring food and fuel costs, will make it even more reluctant to make any bold moves on Kashmir.
After many failed interventions, the United States has in recent years shied away from trying to broker a Kashmir settlement. It has confined itself to crisis management, most recently in 2002 when it helped defuse a confrontation that threatened to trigger another India-Pakistan war.
Washington's options and influence are limited. But the United States needs to convey to both Pakistan and India how much is riding on their ability to calm the crisis. The administration should make clear to the Pakistan government that meddling in Kashmir would be a dangerous course. Such an intervention would only heighten the country's problems and undercut its efforts to deal with insurgents near the Afghan border.
The message should be that exacerbating the trouble in Kashmir will only make things worse between us. At the same time, it should urge the Indians to show restraint. This includes reining in their natural tendency to pin the blame on Pakistan for their own mistakes in dealing with the Kashmiris.
The governments in both Islamabad and Delhi are ill-placed to make major policy changes, but they urgently need to maintain their promising back-channel contacts. This channel gives both a chance to refine and expand their ideas for an eventual Kashmir settlement, which they can share with their publics when the two governments are able to move forward. If the situation further deteriorates, Washington should send to the area a senior official to help defuse the crisis, as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage did so effectively five years ago.
Such efforts will burden a lame-duck administration overloaded with critical foreign policy issues. But Kashmir is again becoming very dangerous. Stabilizing Afghanistan, avoiding a potential nuclear face-off between Pakistan and India, and steadying the fragile democratic government in Pakistan are critical U.S. interests today, far more than in previous decades. They are all at risk if Kashmir sparks a new India-Pakistan crisis. The United States can ignore Kashmir only at its own peril.
Howard Schaffer is deputy director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and has just completed a book on the U.S. role in Kashmir. Teresita Schaffer is director of the South Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Both are retired U.S. ambassadors with long experience in South Asia.
NATO's Self-Destruction
NATO's Self-Destruction
William Pfaff
Paris, September 2, 2008 – When a tool is used for the wrong purpose, it may break. NATO has now been broken because it was used by the United States and the European NATO members as a tool for expanding western power into the Russian "near abroad," and after that, to make an inexplicably rash and dangerous effort to break into and split off portions of the Russian Empire as it existed in the 19th century -- long before the Soviet Union existed.
Russia had to be expected to react, and violently so, to an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the historical Russia. But with its assurance of eventual NATO membership, NATO had given implied guarantees to defend Ukraine and Georgia which it did not expect to honor, or could not honor other than at the risk of a war it had no intention of fighting. The Georgian fiasco affair was the result. NATO membership does not guarantee security.
NATO has been conducting this policy towards Russia on the assumption that Russia is too intimidated by western military power to resist. Now Russia has done so, in Georgia. The bluff has been called. The sham of the NATO guarantee has collapsed. Nobody in the West seems willing to admit this.
The Polish and Baltic state governments, the American neo-conservatives and acolytes of a "New American Century" of expanding global domination, the vice president, Dick Cheney, and his friends in the armaments, energy and government services industries, act as if they do not understand what has happened.
All of these people, and all those in Western Europe who are demanding immediate admission of Georgia and Ukraine into full NATO membership, are unwittingly doubling their stakes, enlarging their implied commitment to go to war if Mikheil Saakashvili should make another assault on South Ossetia or Abkhazia in order to re-annex them to Georgia, and if Russia again "overreacted."
Of course the western governments don't mean it, or even understand what they are doing. Or most of them don't; there possibly are some in Washington today who believe a short and sharp little preemptive nuclear attack to disarm Russia might be just the thing, before Russia becomes any stronger. I don't think there are many people in NATO Europe, nor in the United States, prepared to give a nuclear guarantee to Georgian irredentism, or to an attempt to split Ukraine, or intensify its internal divisions.
NATO was founded on Canadian initiative in 1949 as a security alliance of the North American nations with the European military union formed the year before by France, the U.K., and the Benelux countries, to defend against a "resurgent Germany."
The new NATO's purpose was to keep the Germans down but also to keep the Russians out. The cold war had broken out in earnest in 1948, with the communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. Other European countries joined NATO, and in 1955 a rearmed and rehabilitated Germany became a member of the alliance, which needed its troops.
The organization ultimately saw the Berlin Wall come down, the Soviet Union fatally shaken, and Soviet agreement to the unification of Germany.
This was in 1999, during the administration of the first President George Bush, who convinced his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, that a free Eastern Europe and a united Germany would benefit the long-term interests of Russia.
Gorbachev accepted Germany's unification when he was assured that NATO would not be extended to the east. "Not one inch!" were the exact words of the reply made by Secretary of State James Baker.
That promise was then broken, first by the Clinton administration, and then by the son of the senior Bush, George W. Bush. Today, the American-led military alliance has been built up to the entire western frontier of Russia, from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the Black Sea.
The new members joined NATO for the perfectly good reason that they were afraid of a "resurgent Russia." They believed that NATO would go to war to defend them, should Russia again become a threat to Europe. However they did not join in order to take part in an aggressive program to encircle and dismantle Russia. Yet that is what has happened, and Russia has called the bluff.
It is time for the European members of NATO to take a serious hand in this. The question must be asked and answered as to whether the NATO countries wish to continue to pursue an aggressively hostile policy towards Russia. If so, why? To what useful and attainable objective? What is to be gained by supporting Georgia's revanchist demands to control the Ossetian and Abkahazian enclaves, the majority of whose people do not wish to be ruled by Georgia?
What are NATO's intentions with respect to Ukraine? Does it intend to interfere in Ukrainian internal affairs, to promote the domination by those Ukrainians who are pro-western and Uniate (Roman) Catholic, over those others who are Russian-speaking and attached to Russia?
If so, to what purpose? To force a national split in Ukraine? Or incite civil struggle? What do the NATO governments expect to gain from this?
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=339
William Pfaff
Paris, September 2, 2008 – When a tool is used for the wrong purpose, it may break. NATO has now been broken because it was used by the United States and the European NATO members as a tool for expanding western power into the Russian "near abroad," and after that, to make an inexplicably rash and dangerous effort to break into and split off portions of the Russian Empire as it existed in the 19th century -- long before the Soviet Union existed.
Russia had to be expected to react, and violently so, to an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the historical Russia. But with its assurance of eventual NATO membership, NATO had given implied guarantees to defend Ukraine and Georgia which it did not expect to honor, or could not honor other than at the risk of a war it had no intention of fighting. The Georgian fiasco affair was the result. NATO membership does not guarantee security.
NATO has been conducting this policy towards Russia on the assumption that Russia is too intimidated by western military power to resist. Now Russia has done so, in Georgia. The bluff has been called. The sham of the NATO guarantee has collapsed. Nobody in the West seems willing to admit this.
The Polish and Baltic state governments, the American neo-conservatives and acolytes of a "New American Century" of expanding global domination, the vice president, Dick Cheney, and his friends in the armaments, energy and government services industries, act as if they do not understand what has happened.
All of these people, and all those in Western Europe who are demanding immediate admission of Georgia and Ukraine into full NATO membership, are unwittingly doubling their stakes, enlarging their implied commitment to go to war if Mikheil Saakashvili should make another assault on South Ossetia or Abkhazia in order to re-annex them to Georgia, and if Russia again "overreacted."
Of course the western governments don't mean it, or even understand what they are doing. Or most of them don't; there possibly are some in Washington today who believe a short and sharp little preemptive nuclear attack to disarm Russia might be just the thing, before Russia becomes any stronger. I don't think there are many people in NATO Europe, nor in the United States, prepared to give a nuclear guarantee to Georgian irredentism, or to an attempt to split Ukraine, or intensify its internal divisions.
NATO was founded on Canadian initiative in 1949 as a security alliance of the North American nations with the European military union formed the year before by France, the U.K., and the Benelux countries, to defend against a "resurgent Germany."
The new NATO's purpose was to keep the Germans down but also to keep the Russians out. The cold war had broken out in earnest in 1948, with the communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia. Other European countries joined NATO, and in 1955 a rearmed and rehabilitated Germany became a member of the alliance, which needed its troops.
The organization ultimately saw the Berlin Wall come down, the Soviet Union fatally shaken, and Soviet agreement to the unification of Germany.
This was in 1999, during the administration of the first President George Bush, who convinced his Soviet counterpart, Mikhail Gorbachev, that a free Eastern Europe and a united Germany would benefit the long-term interests of Russia.
Gorbachev accepted Germany's unification when he was assured that NATO would not be extended to the east. "Not one inch!" were the exact words of the reply made by Secretary of State James Baker.
That promise was then broken, first by the Clinton administration, and then by the son of the senior Bush, George W. Bush. Today, the American-led military alliance has been built up to the entire western frontier of Russia, from the Gulf of Finland in the north to the Black Sea.
The new members joined NATO for the perfectly good reason that they were afraid of a "resurgent Russia." They believed that NATO would go to war to defend them, should Russia again become a threat to Europe. However they did not join in order to take part in an aggressive program to encircle and dismantle Russia. Yet that is what has happened, and Russia has called the bluff.
It is time for the European members of NATO to take a serious hand in this. The question must be asked and answered as to whether the NATO countries wish to continue to pursue an aggressively hostile policy towards Russia. If so, why? To what useful and attainable objective? What is to be gained by supporting Georgia's revanchist demands to control the Ossetian and Abkahazian enclaves, the majority of whose people do not wish to be ruled by Georgia?
What are NATO's intentions with respect to Ukraine? Does it intend to interfere in Ukrainian internal affairs, to promote the domination by those Ukrainians who are pro-western and Uniate (Roman) Catholic, over those others who are Russian-speaking and attached to Russia?
If so, to what purpose? To force a national split in Ukraine? Or incite civil struggle? What do the NATO governments expect to gain from this?
© Copyright 2008 by Tribune Media Services International. All Rights Reserved.
This article comes from William PFAFF
http://www.williampfaff.com
The URL for this article is:
http://www.williampfaff.com/article.php?storyid=339
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
A PALESTINIAN VIEW Local priorities
Bitterlemons
01/09/08
A PALESTINIAN VIEW
Local priorities
by Daoud Kuttab
Whether those supporting the moderate leadership of Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas admit it or not, Hamas appears to
have won. Now, before Islamists around the world start celebrating,
it is important to note that the region, let alone the world, is far
from embracing hard-line fundamentalists. Hamas, for the record, has
made some important ideological and practical changes, the most
important of which was the "tahdiya" (ceasefire-like quiet).
The signs of Hamas' victory can be seen all over. From the success of
the siege-breaking peace boats to the partial opening of the Rafah
crossing with Egypt and the serious talks Hamas leaders are holding
with Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence chiefs.
Part of the reason for Hamas' success is the fact that the region and
the world have little choice but to accept the reality that emerged
in February 2006 and that Hamas in June 2007, with its takeover of
Gaza, served notice was not going away.
Another reason is global and regional changes. The Russian-Georgian
struggle exposed Washington's geopolitical weakness, a result of its
military overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also comes at a time
when George. W. Bush, a president with the lowest approval ratings in
decades, seems to have blinked. America is near agreement on a
timetable for a withdrawal from Iraq and Washington clearly lacks the
stomach for a confrontation with Tehran. The Iranians have called
Bush's bluff and seem to have succeeded.
Israel too has blinked. To its north, Israel has been incapable of
preventing Hizballah from re-arming, while Tel Aviv consented to a
prisoner swap not long ago that clearly favored the Shi'ite group.
The Lebanese national unity government, meanwhile, is yet another
sign that hard-line rejectionist regional and international positions
are not producing results.
Politically things are stalled. Israelis are now preoccupied with
elections for a new leader of Kadima and will soon enter what
promises to be a long-winded coalition-building process. The
Americans too are busy with their presidential elections, and
Palestinians are due to face presidential elections in January and
could well face parliamentary elections as well.
In this shifting strategic landscape, Jordan and Egypt--staunch US
allies that they are--have nevertheless shown enough independence to
begin to tango with the Palestinian Islamists. If Condoleezza Rice,
the US secretary of state, considers the Lebanese unity government (a
Hizballah victory) a good thing and if she backs the release of
Palestinian prisoners accused of killing Israelis, she certainly
can't stop Jordanian intelligence from reaching agreements on ground
rules with the Islamists.
Hamas has clearly made some important politically moderating
decisions and ideological and practical calls, yet the group is still
far from gaining legitimacy in the region. Such legitimacy will only
be delayed by actions such as the recent round up of Fateh leaders in
Gaza and the banning of Ramallah-based Palestinian publications.
But changes in the Middle East are palpable at different levels.
Regionally it seems clear that little major change is going to take
place. Perhaps Syria will move slightly to the pro-US camp but not by
much. Within each country, however, the region is still very
volatile. The information revolution coupled with the large
percentage of young people in the Arab world dictate to all leaders
the need for new and more inclusive strategies.
Such new strategies will require groups like Hamas to be much more
careful in their actions than in the past, and Hamas will pay close
attention to the example of Hizballah. There is currently a very
clear offer on the table by Arab countries vis-a-vis the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. If Hamas moderates its views, its rhetoric and,
most importantly, its actions to accommodate said offer, the Islamist
group will find a much more welcoming Arab leadership than it might
have found in the past.
Leaders of Jordan and Egypt understand that they can't blindly follow
the policies of a discredited American government and a failed
Israeli leader to break the Islamists. They say all politics is local
in America. The local angle is also important here.
- Published 1/9/2008 © bitterlemons.org
Daoud Kuttab, a Palestinian columnist, is the director general of
Community Media Network, a media NGO that is registered in Jordan and
Palestine.
01/09/08
A PALESTINIAN VIEW
Local priorities
by Daoud Kuttab
Whether those supporting the moderate leadership of Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas admit it or not, Hamas appears to
have won. Now, before Islamists around the world start celebrating,
it is important to note that the region, let alone the world, is far
from embracing hard-line fundamentalists. Hamas, for the record, has
made some important ideological and practical changes, the most
important of which was the "tahdiya" (ceasefire-like quiet).
The signs of Hamas' victory can be seen all over. From the success of
the siege-breaking peace boats to the partial opening of the Rafah
crossing with Egypt and the serious talks Hamas leaders are holding
with Egyptian and Jordanian intelligence chiefs.
Part of the reason for Hamas' success is the fact that the region and
the world have little choice but to accept the reality that emerged
in February 2006 and that Hamas in June 2007, with its takeover of
Gaza, served notice was not going away.
Another reason is global and regional changes. The Russian-Georgian
struggle exposed Washington's geopolitical weakness, a result of its
military overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also comes at a time
when George. W. Bush, a president with the lowest approval ratings in
decades, seems to have blinked. America is near agreement on a
timetable for a withdrawal from Iraq and Washington clearly lacks the
stomach for a confrontation with Tehran. The Iranians have called
Bush's bluff and seem to have succeeded.
Israel too has blinked. To its north, Israel has been incapable of
preventing Hizballah from re-arming, while Tel Aviv consented to a
prisoner swap not long ago that clearly favored the Shi'ite group.
The Lebanese national unity government, meanwhile, is yet another
sign that hard-line rejectionist regional and international positions
are not producing results.
Politically things are stalled. Israelis are now preoccupied with
elections for a new leader of Kadima and will soon enter what
promises to be a long-winded coalition-building process. The
Americans too are busy with their presidential elections, and
Palestinians are due to face presidential elections in January and
could well face parliamentary elections as well.
In this shifting strategic landscape, Jordan and Egypt--staunch US
allies that they are--have nevertheless shown enough independence to
begin to tango with the Palestinian Islamists. If Condoleezza Rice,
the US secretary of state, considers the Lebanese unity government (a
Hizballah victory) a good thing and if she backs the release of
Palestinian prisoners accused of killing Israelis, she certainly
can't stop Jordanian intelligence from reaching agreements on ground
rules with the Islamists.
Hamas has clearly made some important politically moderating
decisions and ideological and practical calls, yet the group is still
far from gaining legitimacy in the region. Such legitimacy will only
be delayed by actions such as the recent round up of Fateh leaders in
Gaza and the banning of Ramallah-based Palestinian publications.
But changes in the Middle East are palpable at different levels.
Regionally it seems clear that little major change is going to take
place. Perhaps Syria will move slightly to the pro-US camp but not by
much. Within each country, however, the region is still very
volatile. The information revolution coupled with the large
percentage of young people in the Arab world dictate to all leaders
the need for new and more inclusive strategies.
Such new strategies will require groups like Hamas to be much more
careful in their actions than in the past, and Hamas will pay close
attention to the example of Hizballah. There is currently a very
clear offer on the table by Arab countries vis-a-vis the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. If Hamas moderates its views, its rhetoric and,
most importantly, its actions to accommodate said offer, the Islamist
group will find a much more welcoming Arab leadership than it might
have found in the past.
Leaders of Jordan and Egypt understand that they can't blindly follow
the policies of a discredited American government and a failed
Israeli leader to break the Islamists. They say all politics is local
in America. The local angle is also important here.
- Published 1/9/2008 © bitterlemons.org
Daoud Kuttab, a Palestinian columnist, is the director general of
Community Media Network, a media NGO that is registered in Jordan and
Palestine.
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