[Salon] Iraq and Syria: a cautious courtship - ArabDigest.org. Guest Post

Iraq and Syria: a cautious courtship Summary: Iraq and Syria have long distrusted one another but economic necessities and the Iran war are leading to a warming in relations. We thank Winthrop Rodgers for today’s newsletter. A journalist and analyst who spent several years in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, he focuses on politics, human rights and economics and is an associate fellow with the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House. @wrodgers2 Iraq and Syria have had difficult relations for decades, first as estranged Ba’athists and then in the chaos of post-Saddam Iraq and the Syrian civil war. But new governments in both Baghdad and Damascus could provide an opportunity for a reset and revaluation of what positive ties between the two neighbours can mean for each other and the wider region. Supported by the US and based on new infrastructure that will embed a durable economic relationship, it is possible that Iraq and Syria are on the verge of a transitional era. Since the fall of the Assad regime in 2024, Iraq and Syria have approached their early engagement with caution — and for good reason. Their recent history has given each side great reason to distrust one another. For Iraq, the new Syrian leadership, which is made up largely of former jihadis and Sunni Islamists, was extremely suspect. In fact, Syrian Transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa spent five years in US military and Iraqi prisons under his old nom de guerre, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, during his time as a member of Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Hardly the kind of figure Iraqi leaders would want on their doorstep. For the new Syrian government, Baghdad’s cold reaction to the victory over Assad - in contrast to the enthusiastic welcome it received in other regional capitals - underlined the trust deficit. Iraq’s Shia leadership’s close ties to Iran are a major concern for Damascus, as is the power of Iraq’s resistance militias which fought on the side of Assad during the civil war. Syrian Security forces thwart an attempt to smuggle a shipment of "advanced weapons" and missiles across the Iraqi border, intended for Hezbollah, 16 July 2026 Still, from this mutually distrustful beginning, green shoots of cooperation have begun to emerge. Two initiatives stand out. The first and immediately most impactful and important relates to oil exports. When the Strait of Hormuz shut down as a result of the US/Israeli-Iran War, Iraq lost its main route for exporting crude. Planners in Baghdad always knew that over reliance on a single export route was a risk, but they saw the total closure of Horumz as a remote enough possibility not to do anything to diversify their options. The war forced a reckoning. Quickly, Iraqi and Syrian officials brokered a temporary deal to truck oil across the border into Syria, where it could be exported from the Mediterranean port of Baniyas. This led to further discussions regarding the future of the long defunct Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline between the two countries. On July 17, during Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s visit to Washington the two sides signed a deal for the US oil major Chevron to build a new pipeline to export Iraqi crude directly from the Kirkuk network to Baniyas. It is expected to take four years and cost US$15 billion to build. The new pipeline is viewed as a major achievement by both governments. The second initiative relates to the route of the planned Iraq Development Road Project. Though it is not currently expected to travel directly through Syria, it will cross from Iraq into Türkiye near the tripoint between the three countries. As a result, the US$17 billion road and rail route between Europe and the Gulf will act as a trunk off of which trade can flow down many branches, including into northeastern Syria. This major piece of geopolitical infrastructure will further bind the region, although it will take time to build. For now, the developing political relationship between Iraq and Syria is being midwifed by some of Iraq’s key powerbrokers, who have become increasingly visible in Damascus in recent weeks. First to arrive was Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, who was warmly welcomed on 3 August. Barzani is a fixture of regional politics able to carry messages and feel out relationships with lower levels of risk than the heads of government in Baghdad and Damascus. More notably, the head of Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan visited Damascus on 13 August. Zaidan, who exerts considerable influence behind the scenes, is often referred to as the most powerful man in Iraq. His engagement with the Syrian leadership is a strong indicator of Baghdad’s interest in exploring closer relations with Damascus. The US has also strongly supported this détente. US diplomat Tom Barrrack, who oversees a sprawling regional portfolio, has explicitly linked the countries. “Iraq, Syria, and Turkey remain the strategic fulcrum upon which any enduring Middle East stability must pivot,” he said in June. This has gone beyond rhetoric, with US political and business involvement key to brokering the new Iraq-Syria pipeline. While Washington’s presence in these early stages is welcome and useful, it will ultimately be up to Iraqi and Syrian leaders — across (presumably) multiple changes of government — for this to become a fruitful and positive relationship in the face of historical enmity and suspicion. For the moment, this development is fragile, transactional, and personalised rather than institutional. It will take time and positive experience for better relations to develop between Iraq and Syria beyond the blue sky thinking of a Tom Barrack, reactive responses to a crisis or the promise of future benefits. The US/Israel-Iran War and its ultimate impact on developments poses its own complications and Iranian influence over Iraq could prove to be a poison pill for the Syrians. Moreover, domestic developments in either Iraq or Syria may precipitate crises that undermine the best of intentions. Issues like that of the remaining Iraqi nationals left over in Syria from the war against Islamic State (ISIS) could prove thorny, for example. Nevertheless, the strategy of introducing greater economic interconnectivity in the region via durable infrastructure seems a practical and durable approach. Once the Baniyas pipeline becomes operational, it will be difficult for Baghdad to live without it, especially if disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz persist. Once goods begin flowing along the Development Road, it will be hard to imagine economic life without it. The subtle economic, political and logistical ties that begin to grow will begin to exert their own gravity, reducing that of past difficulties. There is a long road to get to that point, but optimists are beginning to see concrete reasons on which to base their hopes.