[Salon] Yemen: a very bad situation made worse - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Yemen: a very bad situation made worse Summary: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has caused fuel and cooking gas prices to rocket with a hugely damaging impact on tens of millions of Yemenis already made extremely vulnerable by massive cuts to international humanitarian aid. We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war: what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book is Yemen: Poverty and Conflict published by Routledge. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here. Following the US counter-blockade of the Hormuz Strait, the Iranian authorities have threatened to blockade the other major strait enclosing the Arabian Peninsula, the Bab al Mandab, reflecting the close alliance with the Yemeni Huthis who would implement such a threat. Although its immediate vicinity in Yemen is within the area managed by Tareq Saleh’s anti-Huthi forces, the Huthis control access to the Red Sea, leading to the Suez Canal at one end and the Bab al Mandab at the other. Following 178 attacks on ships and the sinking of four during their two year operations starting in late 2023, none have been carried out since May 2025 following the ‘ceasefire’ agreed last year between the US and the Huthis in the wake of the 52 day US bombing campaign on Yemen. Although it still holds, concern about renewed attacks in the current conflict surely contributed to the US decision to ensure the USS Bush aircraft carrier travelled around Africa rather than through the Red Sea to reach its Gulf destination. The Iranian threat on the Bab al Mandab also acknowledges the close alliance between its regime and the Huthis who have confirmed their full solidarity with Iran, despite only carrying out three minor ballistic missile attacks on Israel between February this year and the ceasefire in April. Regardless of this largely symbolic support, the Iran war has already had a major impact on living conditions throughout Yemen, worsening an already disastrous humanitarian situation. In her briefing to the UNSC on 14 April, Edem Worsonu a senior OCHA official noted that the current crisis has already increases fuel prices by 20 percent and cooking gas by 26 percent, reminding her audience that Yemen imports 90 percent of its wheat, a staple for most Yemenis. This sudden additional inflation burden will spread throughout the value chains of all basic commodities at a time when Yemenis are already suffering extreme deprivation. Geopolitical tension is exacerbating a dire humanitarian crisis in Yemen, where a combination of record-low international funding, 90% reliance on imports, and extreme inflation is leaving over 20 million people in desperate need of aid. Last year, the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan [HRP] was financed at a mere 29% of the US$ 2.5 billion required, a record low of an already reduced amount. With an appeal for US$ 2.16 billion, this year’s call is even lower despite the fact that both the total population and the needs have increased. As usual, the gap is vast between those in need [22.3mllion], those ‘targeted’ [12 million] and those ‘prioritized [9.4 million]. In plain English, although more than 22 million people are expected to suffer hunger, lack of water and sanitation, absence or inadequate education and medical services, only 9.4 million will be given priority for the limited funds made available by the international community. As of mid-April, i.e. more than a quarter of the year through, only 10% of this funding has materialised. Therefore fewer than 1 million of the 22 million people in need have received any support since the beginning of the year, in the midst of worsening local and international crises, leaving more than 20 million Yemenis in increased desperation. Humanitarian support has steadily declined since its height in 2018 [US$ 5.2 billlion], with systematic decline since the 2022 formal truce between the Huthis and the internationally recognised government [IRG]. From US$ 3.4 billion in 2022, it shrank to its lowest level in 2025 when only US$ 1.4 billion was disbursed. This suggests a link between active military clashes contributing to increased humanitarian funding as fighting between the two opposing sides has remained at a very low level since the truce of 2022. (The correlation should be treated with some caution as the greatest fall in funding worldwide took place in 2025 with the abolition of USAID immediately following Trump’s accession to the US presidency and most global north states reducing their international aid while increasing military spending.) The billions of dollars that have been slashed are not abstractions, they represent real suffering for children, women and men, none of whom are responsible for the crisis inflicted on them. While abysmal in Yemen, it is also worth remembering that the world’s other worst crises, Sudan and Gaza to name just two, experience similar lack of funding and support, and millions there are also suffering and dying. In Yemen, the situation is worse in the Huthi-controlled areas where two-thirds of the country’s population live. There the World Food Programme, the main provider of emergency food, completely ceased all distributions in early 2025, as negotiations had failed to bring about the liberation of the 70 UN humanitarian staff some of whom have been held in detention by the Huthis for years. Operational conditions have become unmanageable and all UN institutions have transferred their offices out of Sana’a. Although the truce has enable fighting to become a marginal issue for most Yemenis, there are many other factors which explain why poverty and deprivation are increasing. A major daily problem remains the division of the country between the areas controlled by the Huthis on the one hand, and the multiple and rival authorities in the IRG area. This has a direct impact on prices of basic goods, preventing producers from transporting and marketing their agricultural produce to the nearest markets across front lines, as each side prevents the crossing of people and goods to retain control of the income. With worsening inflation and high fuel prices, traders are forced to sell their produce in far more distant markets at a time when customers can least afford it. Most Yemenis depend on imported staples [wheat, rice, sugar, tea, etc.] and the increase of world prices of these basic foods, combined with inflation, additional transport costs due to the fuel crisis and the insurance premiums for shipping, all contribute to the dramatic price rises making these basics unaffordable for millions. The currency crisis in the IRG area is another factor: people’s ability to cope has diminished despite improvements in the exchange rate last year. There is a shortage of local currency in a society where cash overwhelmingly dominates exchanges. Delayed salary payments is a major issue throughout the country, with little improvement on the horizon. Financial problems explain both the Huthis’ determination to try and reach some agreement with the Saudis and the separate situation in the IRG areas where cash shortages are also worsening despite recent efforts by the government to pay salaries. Adding more problems, recent weeks have seen yet more major environmental problems: ruinous floods are killing people, wrecking houses and damaging agricultural areas, with landslides destroying fields on a long-term basis, thus affecting future production. In this context, regardless of who is in control anywhere in the country, the last thing Yemenis need is the renewal of conflict in the Red Sea which would almost certainly bring about further death and destruction from Israeli and US attacks should the Bab al Mandab be closed. 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