[Salon] Syria on the edge of regional escalation - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Syria on the edge of regional escalation Summary: Syria is suffering collateral damage as Israel and the US pursue their war against Iran; with its airspace violated by both sides and the economy reeling a country just beginning to emerge from 14 years of civil war risks being pulled further into the conflict. We thank Sirwan Kajjo for today’s newsletter. Sirwan, a regular contributor to the AD podcast, is a Kurdish American journalist based in Washington D.C. focusing on Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, extremism, and conflict in the Middle East and beyond. He is the author of Nothing But Soot about a twentysomething Kurdish man whose quest for a permanent home never ends. You can find his latest podcast here. It is unusual to see Syria not directly involved in a conflict that includes Iran. Under the leadership of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the country has so far avoided direct military engagement in the ongoing U.S.-Israel-Iran war. Yet despite its formal neutrality, Syria remains deeply entangled in the broader regional dynamics surrounding the war. As the conflict continues, the risk of spillover grows, making it more plausible that Syria could find itself pulled into a wider war with ominous consequences. Syria is already functionally entangled in the conflict. Its airspace has been used both to carry out attacks against Iran and to intercept Iranian missiles and drones. In practice, Damascus lacks the capacity to enforce or deny control of its airspace, meaning its protestations carry little practical weight in determining who operates there. From Tehran’s perspective, however, this reality could be interpreted as complicity. Given Iran’s increasingly aggressive actions toward Gulf states since the outset of the war, and should military pressure from the United States and Israel intensify, Iran may expand its regional response to include Syria directly. On Friday a large group of Syrian pro-Palestinian protesters gathered outside the UAE embassy in Damascus protesting at the country’s support for Israel amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza. Syria has seen incidents in which Israeli air defence systems intercept Israel-bound Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. These engagements, often unfolding over Syrian territory, have resulted in both civilian casualities and material damage. A Syrian base near the border with Jordan and Iraq, which until recently hosted US forces, was also struck by drones launched from Iraq, likely by Iranian-backed Shiite militias. Iran’s Iraqi proxies have also launched drone attacks on multiple occasions on two US military installations in Syria’s Hasakah region. The economic impact of this war is equally visible. For a country still reeling from 14 years of civil war, any regional escalation inevitably casts a long shadow over its fragile recovery. This is especially true for Syria, whose rebuilding efforts remain heavily dependent on regional Arab partners for fuel supplies, investment and broader economic relief. Syria’s energy sector was the first to feel the impact of the war. Just two days after the conflict began on February 28, the Syrian Ministry of Energy announced that daily electricity hours would be reduced due to disruptions in natural gas supplies transiting through Jordan. Syria receives much of its natural gas from Egypt, which in turn imports from Israel – whose natural gas exports were indefinitely suspended on the first day of the war. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have been major financial backers of Syria’s interim government since the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime. They have pledged substantial investment initiatives aimed at reviving Syria’s devastated economy. However, as Iran intensifies attacks on Gulf states and their infrastructure, their priorities may shift inward, especially as oil production declines significantly. This could reduce their capacity and willingness to sustain external economic commitments. Prices of everyday commodities have risen sharply, driven by higher shipping costs from regional markets. Economists estimate that inflation for some essential goods climbed between 20 and 40 percent two weeks after the start of the war. This is an especially severe burden in a country where 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line. Syria remains a devastated country, still grappling with significant domestic challenges. Damascus’s efforts to avoid becoming a direct participant in the conflict are rooted in this reality. But Syria’s ostensible neutrality is less a strategic choice than a reflection of its vulnerability. Lacking both the capacity to control its own territory and the resilience to absorb further shocks, Damascus is navigating a conflict whose consequences it cannot fully avoid. The longer the war persist, the more tenuous this posture becomes. With no end in sight for this conflict, Syria risks once again becoming not just a bystander, but a battleground where external rivalries are projected onto a fragile state still struggling to stand on its own.