[Salon] America quits Syria - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

America quits Syria Summary: America’s withdrawal of its last remaining forces in Northeast Syria is a significant moment for Syria, one that rivals Türkiye and Israel will see as an opportunity to exploit. Further risks to the country’s fragile stability may also come from a re-emerging ISIS. We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter. Amid the American whiplash in the Middle East in the last few months, one might have missed that the last US convoy left its major bases in Syria in mid-April. Yet the moment is consequential. It reflects a convergence of opportunities and constraints. The evacuation of the last U.S. bases ends more than a decade of American military presence and signals a shift in military posture, as well as political strategy. US forces first entered Syria in 2014 to combat the Islamic State, partnering with Kurdish-led forces that would become the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). At its height, this partnership enabled the SDF to control nearly a third of Syrian territory, backed by roughly 2,000 U.S. troops and extensive airpower, intelligence, and logistical support. Over time, however, the mission narrowed, and US President Donald Trump had sought to leave Syria since his first term. With ISIS territorially defeated and regional priorities shifting, the rationale for maintaining dispersed ground positions weakened. The mechanics of the withdrawal are striking in their speed and scope. Since February, US forces have vacated a chain of key installations. These included the strategic tri-border garrison at al-Tanf and the al-Shaddadi base in Hasakah. On April 16, U.S. and Syrian officials said that forces completed their withdrawal from Qasak air base. Troops relocated to Jordan rather than Iraq due to security concerns. The United States military withdrawal from Syria allows Damascus to consolidate territorial control over lucrative resources but marginalizes Kurdish autonomy and risks renewed instability from the Islamic State and regional tensions involving Turkey and Israel. Despite starting a new war, President Trump can now say he ended the U.S. military presence in Syria. The U.S. military will now shift from permanent posts to military cooperation and training with Syrian security forces. US Central Command said “US forces continue to support partner-led counterterrorism efforts, which are essential to ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and strengthening regional security.” This reflects a broader US shift in the Middle East, especially after Syria last year joined the coalition against the Islamic State. This represents a major win for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in his desire to soon claim complete territorial consolidation after the country’s protracted civil war. The U.S. military exit removes a major constraint for Damascus’s reach into the country’s northeast, which contains lucrative oil fields and border crossings. It also reflects a broader development in U.S.-Syria relations, with both sides entering what appears to be a tentative period of engagement focused on security coordination and potential economic cooperation. Al-Sharaa visited President Trump at the White House in November, the first such visit by any Syrian head of state. There is also apparently an American plan to turn Syria into an oil transit hub. Still, this extension of al-Sharaa’s power comes with risk. While degraded, the Islamic State retains the capacity to exploit gaps in control. In December a gunman who the Syrian government claim to be affiliated with the Islamic State killed two US soldiers as well as a civilian American interpreter. In February the US transferred over 5,000 Islamic State detainees to Iraq ahead of their withdrawal, an effort to reduce exposure to any potential volatility once US troops pulled out. Without a US stabilising presence, the burden shifts to Syrian forces whose cohesion and capacity remain uneven. For Kurds in Syria, the consequences are more acute. The Trump administration’s withdrawal effectively ends the strategic partnership that underpinned the SDF’s autonomy. The US presence had functioned as both a deterrent against Turkish incursions and a mediator in tensions with Damascus. The removal of American troops accelerates a forced integration of the SDF into Syrian state structures and the transfer of border controls to the central government. Without US backing, the SDF has lost its autonomy and will become more of a subordinate actor amid Damascus’s consolidation. Kurdish forces—particularly the core People’s Defence Units (YPG)—remain capable, but their leverage has diminished significantly. Türkiye, by contrast, stands to gain. Ankara has long opposed US support for Kurdish forces along its southern border, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has called “terror groups.” The American exit removes a major source of anxiety and opens space for expanded Turkish influence, either directly or through coordination with Damascus. But, without U.S. mediation, there is an increased risk of miscalculation along contested areas between the Syrian government and a weakened but still armed Kurdish presence, conditions for renewed instability that could draw Turkish forces into the fray. The Islamic State may also be able to exploit the situation, which could lead to attacks near or inside Türkiye as well. Israel has sought to keep Syria divided, previously stoking tensions between Damascus and the country’s ethnic minority groups that remain suspicious of al-Sharaa. Further, Israel is concerned over the loss of the US presence at al-Tanf, long seen as a barrier to Iranian and Iraqi militias. While the withdrawal does raise concerns about a more permissive corridor linking Tehran to Lebanon and Hezbollah, Washington is less concerned, given Syria’s shift away from Iran. However Israel with its forces ensconced in Syria south of Damascus may still use this as justification to conduct airstrikes to try to keep its northern neighbour weak. America’s exit does not end its involvement in Syria but it does change its form toward indirect influence and selective engagement. While Washington’s reduced presence will likely be insufficient to manage the risks that remain, there also appears to be a reckoning with the constraints that there is less ability or appetite to control the vacuum it leaves behind. You can find more analysis on the US withdrawal on our 22 April podcast with the Syrian analyst Malik al-Abdeh.