[Salon] Huthis and the Iran war - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Huthis and the Iran war Summary: the odds are long that the Huthis will join the current war in support of Tehran with reasons for that ranging from a pragmatic leadership to a Yemeni population under their control that has little love for the Iranian regime. We thank Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here. Since the US-Israeli air war against Iran started, observers have been speculating on the likelihood of Huthi military participation. Most assume that Huthi actions are decided in Tehran, following the patronising assumption that Ansar Allah is no more than an Iranian proxy and has no agency based on its own interests. Whether and how the Huthis get directly involved in the war remains unknown at the time of writing but the issues that will determine that decision deserve to be addressed. There is no doubt that Ansar Allah supports Iran in its current predicament and all major Huthi leaders have made loud and clear statements to that effect some quoted more frequently than others in particular Abdul Malik al Huthi’s assertion that his movement has its ‘hands on the trigger.’ Given regional events in the past two years, Ansar Allah is the only member of the Axis of Resistance which remains largely unscathed by devastating Israeli and US attacks and could be said to be the last man standing. So, what are the main considerations likely to determine Huthi decision making? They are both domestic and international. The Huthi leadership’s decision to join the US-Israeli-Iranian conflict will be driven by their own strategic interests—such as preserving a potential deal with Saudi Arabia and countering a strengthening domestic opposition—rather than by Iranian orders alone. Relations with Saudi Arabia: the Huthis are still hoping to reach an agreement with the Saudis which would ensure their continued control over the two thirds of Yemenis surviving under their rule: the Saudis would finance public sector salaries, reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed in the past decade and provide development investments and the Huthis would refrain from any attacks on the Kingdom. While revival of the deal almost reached in late 2023 is unlikely, the risk of Huthi attacks on Red Sea and other Saudi major projects continues to be a good reason why the Saudis may want to proceed with an agreement. Huthi attacks on the kingdom’s oil, military or tourist sites would seriously jeopardise this option. By contrast, the possibility of the Huthis persuading Iran to minimise its attacks against the Kingdom would serve both Saudi and Huthi interests. To date it is worth noting that Iran’s attacks on the UAE have been far more numerous and damaging than those against Saudi Arabia, reflecting the degree of comparative closeness of these two regimes to Israel. Recent developments in the internationally recognised government [IRG] are another source of concern for the Huthis, specifically the ousting of the UAE-supported Southern Transitional Council in January this year. As a result, the IRG is gradually becoming stronger and more united as it now includes many of the former UAE-supported units, particularly the Amaliqa brigades. A more effective IRG is keen to confront the Huthis hoping to defeat them and regain control over the whole country and re-establish its base in the capital Sana’a. The Saudis, now the sole significant external influence on the IRG, might well support such a move, an additional reason why the Huthi leadership would want to reach agreement with the Saudis and not alienate them further. Ansar Allah’s military situation also plays a role: last year’s US and Israeli strikes have significantly weakened Huthi military capacity, destroying significant stocks. In addition, in recent months there have been a number of interceptions of incoming advanced components for drones and missiles so replenishment of materiel has slowed down. Local production has become a major element of Huthi weaponry, but its output is of less sophisticated items, lacking the range and technology needed to reach distant targets. In the current situation Iran is unlikely to have any spares to send to Yemen, let alone the logistics of such traffic while under constant US and Israeli bombardment. In addition to the destruction suffered in 2025 the emergence of Israeli intelligence penetration is a very worrying development for the Ansar Allah leadership which has become more cautious and fearful of consequences. It is also possible that it is heeding reported warnings from the US to hold their fire. Two thirds of Yemenis live under Huthi rule, most of them reluctantly. They are experiencing a shockingly deteriorating humanitarian crisis with millions hungry due to the almost complete interruption of food and other humanitarian aid. The 2025 US declaration of the Huthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation now affects financial flows, most importantly impacting the banking sector and local businesses, many of which are relocating to the IRG area. This is also reducing remittances, worsening the already disastrous living conditions for the people. The local economy has shown no sign of revival. Any Huthi military action today would explicitly be intended to help Iran against the US and Israel. This is different from earlier Huthi attacks which supported Palestinians in Gaza. While Yemenis are almost universally pro-Palestine, the same cannot be said about Iran as a nation or its Islamist revolutionary regime. Iran is widely disliked in Yemen for religious, cultural and political reasons, including by the majority of Yemenis living under Huthi rule. Only the core of the Huthi movement is close to the Iranian regime, so risking massive destructive US and Israeli retaliation would certainly damage already weak popular support for Ansar Allah within Yemen. Finally, it is important to remember that within the leadership of Ansar Allah, there are divergent views and strategies, ranging from those who want to ensure their continued control over the parts of Yemen under their rule to those whose ambitions go as far as the three holy sites, including Jerusalem. Whether or not the Huthis eventually take military action will be based on their assessment of their own long-term interests and the balance of power within Ansar Allah’s leadership. The decision will not be taken in Tehran, regardless of the views of international experts on the region.