[Salon] Can Iraq Really Claim Neutrality in the US/Israel-Iran War? - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Can Iraq Really Claim Neutrality in the US/Israel-Iran War? Summary: Iraq finds itself caught between Iran and the US with its interim government struggling to hold to a neutral path; as the war accelerates Baghdad will need to take a firmer stand or risk being pulled into the widening conflict. We thank Sirwan Kajjo for today’s newsletter. Sirwan, a regular contributor to the AD podcast, is a Kurdish American journalist based in Washington D.C. focusing on Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, extremism, and conflict in the Middle East and beyond. He is the author of Nothing But Soot about a twentysomething Kurdish man whose quest for a permanent home never ends. You can find his latest podcast here. Iraq faces a delicate dilemma as the US and Israel continue strikes against the Iranian regime. With the conflict escalating by the hour, Baghdad finds itself in an increasingly precarious position, both politically and on the security front. On the one hand, Iraq values its partnership with the United States and seeks to maintain it now more than ever. On the other, it has deep political and economic ties with Iran, as well as strong connections of Shiite armed forces with Tehran that constitute a significant portion of Iran’s regional proxy network. Iraq also shares a roughly 1,000-mile border with Iran, stretching from the Zagros Mountain in the Kurdistan Region in the north down to the Shatt al-Arab waterway in the south, parts of which could be porous, particularly in an escalating conflict such as the one unfolding. Given these pressures, it is understandable that the Iraqi government, including the Kurdistan Regional Government, aims to maintain some degree of neutrality in the conflict. Yet achieving this will require bold, decisive and immediate action without which Baghdad risks being drawn further into the regional confrontation. A suicide drone intercepted near Bahirka district, Erbil province on Monday [photo credit: Rudaw] It would be an illusion for Iraq to hope for complete insulation from this war. The country has already felt the impact of the ongoing violence. Since the war broke out on 28 February, Erbil – the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region, which hosts a US base – has been targeted by a wave of missile and drone attacks carried out by Iran and its proxies operating inside Iraq. Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein confirmed that more than 70 missiles and drones have struck the regional Kurdish capital. The Iraqi government declared three days of official mourning after the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in a US-Israel strike at the outset of the war and senior Iraqi officials, including figures from the Kurdistan Region, issued statements of condolence commemorating Khamenei as a “martyr.” These conflicting situations make it exceedingly difficult for Iraq to maintain neutrality or shield itself from the conflict, especially as other regional actors, including Gulf states that have been directly targeted by Iranian strikes and are increasingly asserting their right to self-defense recalibrate their positions amid a spreading war. Yet Iraq still has some options that, if exercised decisively, could prevent the country from becoming further entangled in the war. First, ruling Shiite elites must rein in pro-Iran factions within the Popular Mobilisation Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi). Beyond launching attacks against the Kurdistan Region as well as on US troops at Baghdad’s airport there have been reports of Shiite militiamen moving across the border into Iran to support the Iranian regime. Such actions expose Iraq to the danger of retaliatory US or Israeli strikes. If these armed groups are not effectively restrained, Iraq could quickly become a direct theatre of confrontation. For Israel in particular, Iran’s network of regional proxies is part of an interconnected front. Attacks by the Lebanese Hezbollah on Israel, and Israel’s subsequent response, demonstrate how quickly states with pro-Iranian non-state actors can be drawn into this conflict. It is evident that the central government has no control over many of these armed groups but influential figures within the dominant Shiite Coordination Framework coalition do. Their inaction, if not outright encouragement, towards the militias risks further destabilising the already fragile political order in Baghdad which has failed to form a government since the November 2025 elections. From a US perspective, at a minimum, the Iraqi government should prevent Iranian-backed groups from launching attacks against American assets and partners on Iraqi soil as well as ensuring that Iraq does not become a logistical support base for an isolated Iranian regime. The Iraqi government has a legitimate basis for taking a firm stance against violations of its sovereignty. With Iran striking Iraqi Kurdistan, a formal condemnation from Baghdad would have international support. Such a move could also help bridge longstanding grievances with the Kurds who have often complained that Baghdad has been too hesitant in condemning cross-border violations against Iraqi Kurdistan by Iranian or Turkish forces. The other measure Iraq must take immediately is to stand in solidarity with its Arab neighbours. With Iran actively violating the sovereignty of Gulf states, Baghdad cannot afford strategic ambiguity. Aligning itself more clearly with regional norms of sovereignty and noninterference would strengthen Iraq’s own claim to having its sovereignty respected and reinforce its position within the Arab fold, especially if this war drags on longer than expected. Iraq has often found itself in an awkward position during previous confrontations between the United States and Iran. This time, however, the scale and intensity of the conflict carry the potential to reshape the broader regional order. Therefore, the choices Iraq makes now may not only determine internal stability but also where the country will stand in the future.