[Salon] Syrian Kurds turn to their Iraqi brethren - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Syrian Kurds turn to their Iraqi brethren Summary: amid a series of setbacks for Syria’s Kurds in recent weeks one potential silver lining has emerged for their political future. We thank Sirwan Kajjo for today’s newsletter. Sirwan, a regular contributor to the AD podcast, is a Kurdish American journalist based in Washington D.C. focussing on Kurdish politics, Islamic militancy, extremism, and conflict in the Middle East and beyond. He is the author of Nothing But Soot a novel about a twentysomething Kurdish man whose quest for a permanent home never ends. You can find his latest podcast here. As the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) came under attack by forces aligned with the Syrian interim government, Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) stepped into a leading role, both diplomatically, in efforts to prevent the violence from spreading further into Kurdish areas, and politically, by offering direct support to embattled Kurdish actors in Syria. The rapid pace of developments in northeast Syria in recent weeks was met by an equally swift humanitarian and political response from Iraqi Kurds in support of their counterparts in Syria. The scale of solidarity, demonstrated by both political forces and ordinary citizens across Iraqi Kurdistan, has few parallels in the Kurds’ complicated political history. It has even surpassed the cross-border mobilisation seen when Kurdish communities in both countries faced attacks by the Islamic State more than a decade ago. Kurdish women in Erbil braid their hair in an act of defiance in solidarity with a Kurdish fighter who had her braid cut off by a Syrian soldier, 23 January 2026 Despite the loss of much of their hard-won de facto autonomy in recent events, Syrian Kurds may yet find long-term benefit in the strong support emerging from Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. If the current ceasefire between the Syrian government and the SDF holds and evolves into a durable political settlement, Syrian Kurds stand to gain significantly from a close and sustained relationship with the KRG. Here is why: The KRG possesses substantial diplomatic reach across the region and in Western capitals. In recent weeks, the ruling Barzani family and its Kurdistan Democratic Party, as well as their rivals in the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by the Talabani family, demonstrated their ability to leverage this political influence in support of Syria’s Kurds. Even before the latest crisis, Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, had emerged as a key destination for regional and international diplomats seeking to defuse tensions between Syria’s Kurdish actors and the central government in Damascus. For Iraqi Kurds, support for their brethren across the border is not only a moral imperative but also a strategic calculation. The threats confronting Syrian Kurds are not confined to Syria alone. This is a reality Iraqi Kurdish leaders and society recognised clearly during the recent crisis in northeast Syria. With Kurdish autonomy in Syria under pressure, Iraqi Kurds perceived potential spillover effects on their own autonomous region. Although the Kurdistan Region of Iraq enjoys a more institutionalised form of autonomy within Iraq’s federal system, Kurdish leaders nonetheless view the Kurdish political experiment in Syria as strategic depth that reinforces the security and viability of their own political entity. Syrian Kurds, many of whom have long supported the historic leadership of the Barzanis, also recognised that at this critical juncture it was the Iraqi Kurds who stepped in to support them at a time when most countries – including the United States – aligned with Damascus. It is important to note, however, that solidarity in times of crisis does not necessarily translate into political consensus among divergent actors. In the Kurdish case in particular, ideological differences between Kurdish political movements across national boundaries run deep. Over the past century, Kurdish political history has been marked by fragmentation and ideological divisions, shaped in large part by the fact that Kurds are spread across four different states (Iraq, Iran, Syria and Türkiye), each with distinct political environments that have compelled Kurdish elites to adopt differing strategies and priorities. This polarisation has been most evident in Syria and Iraq, where Kurds have adopted two distinct models of governance, largely reflecting ideological differences between the dominant political forces in each region. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is generally characterised as conservative and nationalist. In contrast, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the de facto ruling party in Kurdish Syria, espouses a leftist ideology heavily influenced by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). These divergent ideologies have frequently placed the two Kurdish groups at odds and, at times, led to confrontation. There are, therefore, clear limits to how far political alignment between Syria’s and Iraq’s Kurds can extend. Yet the recent developments in northeast Syria have been significant enough that many Kurdish ideologues and political figures on both sides have openly called for setting ideological differences aside and prioritising the protection of what remains under Kurdish control in Syria. It is this shift in attitude, unthinkable even months ago, that has led many Kurds to believe a durable political partnership between Kurdish actors in Iraq and Syria may no longer be far-fetched. With a new generation that is increasingly politically aware, both within the region and across the diaspora, Kurdish unity, at least in a political and strategic sense, appears increasingly realistic more than ever before.