[Salon] The growing Saudi-Emirati rift - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

The growing Saudi-Emirati rift Summary: Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may not yet be at daggers drawn but tensions between the two are increasing as the UAE flexes its muscles in Africa and together with Israel challenges Saudi Arabia’s stake in the Red Sea. We thank a regional contributor for today’s newsletter. Amid the crowded field of conflicts across the Middle East, the growing divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has drawn comparatively little attention. While it has not turned violent, this strategic drift between two cash-rich Gulf monarchies could carry far-reaching consequences from Yemen to the Horn of Africa to the Red Sea. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has increasingly sought to bolster regional governments and prioritise stability, while Abu Dhabi, under UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ), has continued to take risks, cultivating local partners to maximise access to resources and influence. At stake is not merely tactical disagreement but rather two competing modes of regional power projection. The fault line first became visible in Yemen. Both countries entered the war in 2015 with the stated aim of restoring the internationally recognised government and rolling back Huthi gains, which were seen as a dangerous extension of Iranian influence in the Arabian Peninsula. But as the war dragged on, Saudi Arabia, bearing the brunt, shifted toward deescalation and a frozen conflict aimed at securing its border and extracting itself from a costly war. Conversely, the UAE developed relationships with southern separatists, embedding itself in port infrastructure and maritime networks along Yemen’s coast and in the strategically important islands of Socotra in order to project power into eastern Africa. In late December, this fracture turned into an earthquake. Saudi Arabia reportedly struck a weapons shipment linked to UAE-backed factions amid accusations that the UAE was empowering southern separatists to seize territory, thus threatening Saudi security. The UAE was compelled to withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are increasingly at odds as they pursue competing strategies for regional power, with Riyadh prioritising economic stability and de-escalation while Abu Dhabi utilises subnational actors to expand its maritime and commercial influence For MbS, the logic is economic. Several giga project timelines have been delayed or scaled back as with low oil prices his Vision 2030 faces fiscal and implementation constraints. Regional stability is required to attract investment and tourism. The crown prince has sought to deescalate tensions with Iran, enhance relations with Türkiye and focus on economic growth. His decision to push the Emiratis out of Yemen, and since work to neutralise their influence across the region, is recognition that MbZ’s expansionist foreign policy seriously disrupts those efforts. The UAE has taken a different path. Its foreign policy relies on cultivating networks of subnational actors and establishing and developing commercial footholds. From southern Yemen to Somaliland and Sudan, Abu Dhabi has demonstrated a willingness to gamble in pursuit of access to trade and political leverage. This approach has expanded Emirati influence but it has also generated instability and insecurity. Nowhere is this seen more than in Sudan, where a conflict in its third year has led to famine and the world's largest displacement crisis. Multiple investigations and UN findings have alleged that the UAE has armed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in its fight against the Sudanese Armed Forces. UN reporting came out last week that has linked the RSF to mass atrocities, including “hallmarks of genocide” in Darfur. Prolonged chaos in Sudan is bad for business in the eyes of Riyadh, seeing instability along the Red Sea corridor as threatening plans for trade and coastal tourism and port developments. In November, on a trip to the United States, to the chagrin of the Emiratis MbS requested that President Trump intervene in the ongoing war in Sudan. Another diplomatic row came in late December when Israel became the first UN member state to recognise the independence of Somaliland, a breakaway region from Somalia, in return for joining the Abraham Accords. Earlier this week Israel formally welcomed the appointment of Mohamed Haji as Somaliland’s ambassador causing further unease in Riyadh.This controversy connects to Emirati port investments and their close security relationship with Israel, along with their multilayered relationships with both Somalia’s federal government and its semi-autonomous regions. Convinced that the Emiratis had helped facilitate Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, Mogadishu moved to end its long-standing partnership with the UAE, announcing the cancellation of all port management and security cooperation agreements. As far as Riyadh is concerned, the episode reinforced concerns that Emirati activism could further destabilise already fragile states and create new flashpoints. This concern is intertwined with the potential of an Emirati-Israeli foothold near Bab el-Mandeb, a strategic chokehold between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. Amid these regional dynamics, Saudi Arabia has partnered closer ties with Türkiye, Egypt and other countries to try to counterbalance the UAE’s assertiveness. Riyadh has deepened defence coordination with Pakistan and Türkiye. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan each visited Ethiopia this month to persuade the government not to recognise Somaliland. The visits came amid reports alleging Emirati financing of an RSF-linked facility in Ethiopia, the first direct evidence of Addis Ababa’s involvement in Sudan’s ever expanding war. As a new Middle East takes shape, one now marked by growing Saudi-Emirati competition, Washington has so far avoided direct mediation. President Trump appears more interested on deciding whether to start yet another war with Iran which will only further exacerbate the situation. He appears reluctant to engage in the intra-Gulf dispute, choosing to prioritise economic ties with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as he seeks to secure investments into the American economy as well as into his own family businesses. Yet Trump’s fence-sitting carries serious risks. In the past two months the competition between MbS and MbZ - two assertive cash-flush royals each with ambitions to secure regional hegemony - has become increasingly bitter. If left unmanaged, these tensions will only grow and further exacerbate proxy dynamics in Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and other fragile states, with the potential to disrupt and reshape the political landscape of the Red Sea and beyond.