[Salon] Yemen: the Internationally Recognized Government escapes a crisis - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Yemen: the IRG escapes a crisis Summary: the quick collapse of the STC’s breakaway movement has ruptured relations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and created an opening for fresh dialogue that could possibly lead to peace but many obstacles remain. We thank our regular contributor Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water, among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast A black eye in Yemen for the UAE here. The crisis within Yemen’s internationally recognised government [IRG] looks to be easing. A new Prime Minister, the former Foreign Minister Shaye al Zindani, is expected to announce his new government in coming days and the Saudi-sponsored southern dialogue is likely to take place in the coming weeks. So what is the outcome of two months of acute crisis within the IRG? A quick reminder of the facts: in early December last year with, at the very least UAE complicity, the Southern Transitional Council [STC] under the leadership of Aidarous al-Zubaydi sent its forces to take over the northern part of Hadhramaut governorate and al Mahra governorate, the two parts of the territory of the former PDRY which it did not already control. Summoned to withdraw by Rashad al-Alimi the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council [PLC] and by the Saudis, the STC refused and instead moved further north towards the Saudi border. On 30 December, the IRG terminated its defence agreement with the UAE, giving it 24 hours to get out of the country. On the same day the Saudis launched air attacks on Hadhramaut’s capital Mukalla which struck and damaged two Emirati ships arriving from Fujairah loaded with military equipment for the STC. The reversal of the STC conquests rapidly spread, with pro-IRG forces taking over military positions throughout the southern governorates and reaching Aden by 6 January. With the rout clear to all, former senior STC officials were quick to declare support for the IRG and the Saudis. Two of the more prominent to switch sides were the Governor of Shabwa Abdul Rahman al Muharrami, head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces and a former deputy of al-Zubaydi and Tariq Saleh, a non-separatist PLC member who had backed the STC only a few weeks earlier. Both men publicised their meetings with Khalid bin Salman, the Saudi Minister of Defence on 4 January. MBS’s younger brother and Saudi Arabia’s Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman posted a photo on his X account of him meeting the Vice President of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC) and head of the main ‘Amaliqa’ separatist forces Abu Zaraa al-Mahrami where Prince Khalid said they discussed the latest developments “by the spirit of brotherhood and understanding.” Instead of going to Riyadh to join the proposed southern dialogue, al-Zubaydi escaped to Abu Dhabi thanks to UAE logistics. His call for uprisings were ignored and the STC was formally dissolved by leaders busy preparing the southern dialogue. On 7 January he was charged with high treason. Al-Zubaydi’s remaining support is primarily from people originally from his home area, a few districts of Lahej, Abyan and al Dhali’, north of Aden. However his statements supporting the establishment of relations with Israel and joining the Abraham Accords and his publicised corruption certainly reduced his popularity, alongside President al Alimi’s wisdom in appointing senior officials from that same area. By 8 January, forces loyal to the IRG, including those who until recently were part of the STC, had taken control of the temporary capital Aden, promptly followed by a delegation of senior Saudi military officers. The new military committee is focusing on removing army camps from Aden in anticipation of bringing the newly formed government back to the city. A few pointers in the coming weeks/months: The Huthis have barely figured in this saga. They have not been involved in a crisis that has shaken the IRG to its core. The prospect of a more effective and united IRG is bad news for them. Such an entity, particularly if deeply supported by the Saudis, might well build military forces to confront the Huthis more effectively than in the past. Whether this is likely to increase or decrease the likelihood of their reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia is open to debate. The UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg is continuing exchanges with the IRG and international parties, and there may be an opening for his efforts in coming months, particularly if the Huthis consider that the time has come to end the fundamental conflict. How stable will the new IRG be? Having one international sponsor, rather than two rival ones, will enable it to confront the multiple problems of administering the parts of Yemen it controls. Composition of the new government will be an indicator of the likelihood of success. PLC stability has improved as both al-Zubaydi and Faraj al-Bahsani a former governor of Hadhramaut have been removed and replaced by southerners who support the leadership: Mahmoud al Subayhi, former Defence Minister who was detained by the Huthis for 7 years and Salem al-Khanbashi the new governor of Hadhramaut. However, there are still significant differences and competition within the PLC, with some of its members’ loyalty to Saudi Arabia’s strategy doubtful. How successful the IRG is likely to be partly depends on the outcome of the southern dialogue. There are a multiplicity of southern political ambitions and many southern separatist organisations with the now-disbanded STC being only one of them. There are also supporters of Yemeni unity. In Hadhramaut, people are divided between supporters of Hadhrami autonomy or even independence and those who would be satisfied with a distant relationship with the capital, whether Aden or Sana’a. Long established political and economic relations between Hadhramaut and Saudi Arabia are important but they do not mean that Hadhramis are subservient. Overall, it would be wise for the Saudis to manage this dialogue in a way which enables Yemenis to reach solutions that are in the interests of the country as a whole. Who will control Yemen? There is little doubt that the main decision makers will be the Saudis directly involved with Yemen, namely Defence Minister Khalid bin Salman [brother of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman] and the Saudi ambassador Mohammed al Jaber. The financial dependence of the IRG on Saudi Arabia for everything from fuel to operate power stations to funds for development and rehabilitation activities give Riyadh unprecedented power. The extent to which the IRG will be able to develop autonomous policies addressing the needs and priorities of the Yemeni people is unclear. Certainly the Saudis care little about millions of poor and hungry Yemenis, nor is their neo-liberal philosophy likely to establish equitable social policies at a time when it is removing them at home. On the other hand, continued unrest in Yemen is not a desirable situation, so some degree of compromise and some investment in public services is to be expected. What is the likely future involvement of the UAE? The expulsion of the Emiratis from Yemen has been covered extensively by world media with the word ‘humiliating’ featuring prominently. This is certainly embarrassing for the regime in Abu Dhabi, alongside the blame it has received for its support for the genocidal RSF in Sudan, let alone its increasingly close relationship with Israel. In Yemen, it will most likely continue to undermine the rule of the IRG via its remaining contacts, mainly those elements still loyal to al-Zubaydi. In the past, collusion with al Qaeda has been suspected and may well be another mechanism used to sustain instability in coming months. The UAE leadership’s disruptive capacity should not be underestimated in the new regional context where its competition with the Saudi regime has turned into open rivalry. The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland, alongside Israel’s recent unique recognition of that state can reasonably be perceived as threatening to the very security of Saudi Arabia, worsening what is already a serious rift and leading the Saudis to consolidate their relationship with opponents of the UAE.