[Salon] UK analysis of Venezuela - Guest Post from Graham Jones, a former MP who chaired the UK parliamentary committee on Venezuela.

from Graham Jones, a former MP who chaired the UK parliamentary committee on Venezuela. I appeared on the news yesterday to talk about Venezuela. It’s not a country that directly affects the UK, but it is one where people have suffered for years. I was, bizarrely, asked to chair the Parliamentary Committee on this far-flung place, so I know a great deal about it. That experience often left me despairing at the poor quality of our politicians and media coverage. I met hundreds of Venezuelans. Many of them also despaired at outside voices pursuing international ideals while conveniently forgetting the plight of ordinary Venezuelans, who have been pleading for help for years. From an observer’s point of view, this is how it looks to me. It appears Trump has struck some kind of deal for a bloodless transition. It also appears that members of Maduro’s government have betrayed him for their own ends—financial and criminal—under unrelenting US pressure. We are told the CIA have been in Caracas since August; that they accessed the presidential palace with ease; and that Maduro was taken without resistance. We are told the Venezuelan air defences, supplied by Moscow, were switched off as a swathe of Chinooks carrying 200 Delta Force personnel flew in. CORRECTION. We now know a little more detail. 38 Cubans died defending Maduro. It appears the US jammed/or circumvented some defence systems. Trump’s speeches are littered with hyperbole and nonsense, and it’s difficult to pick the bones out of his comments. But two points caught my attention. First, he said a second US wave wouldn’t be necessary—subtext: the regime remnants have conceded. Second, he implied the US would govern during a transition, which is worrying. Subtext: remnants of Maduro’s system want assurance that the opposition won’t take over immediately and come after them for their crimes and profiteering. Trump also described the opposition leader, Maria Machado, as a “nice woman” but “not capable”. Subtext: he isn’t picking sides. The read-through is that there is a guarantee to Delcy Rodriguez. In effect, he is telling both sides they will have to accept something uncomfortable for a while. I’m not sure Trump was comfortable saying America was going to “run” the country. His body language looked flaky—like this is ugly, but necessary. ADDITION: it appears Rubio has a senior if not lead role in this action. There are back-channel reports that the US initially wanted the opposition to take over. But after long conversations, the US may have concluded the opposition is divided and not yet capable of managing a transition—especially if the armed forces remain loyal to the old regime and the country risks sliding into civil conflict. Rubio indicated a pragmatic, reluctant conclusion—probably informed by the mistakes of Iraq, where the Ba’ath Party was dismissed and the state became ungovernable—would not be repeated in Venezuela. He said as much. US thinking seems more detailed than some commentary suggests. It appears a lot of thought has gone into US plans, but the plan pivots on whether the regime remnants “play ball”, and that likely includes uncomfortable guarantees. Trump made an interesting point: a bloodless transition is better than a bloody one. That may be the centre of his decision—but it may also produce ugly, unacceptable, and negative outcomes. Legally, the issue is simpler than many commentators suggest. The West—including the United Kingdom—recognises the opposition as the legitimate authority, and they have welcomed the US action. If the recognised sovereign authority is not making the case to trigger UN Article 51, then there is no case for illegality on that basis. ADDITION: it appears sovereignty is key in Maduro’s arrest. That the lack of removes immunity. There are rival opinions supporting Maduro’s claim that he is the sovereign leader; the corollary is that this was an illegal invasion. You can pick your side on who speaks for the nation. But from a legal point of view, the recognised Venezuelan authority has welcomed the action, describing it as liberation. This also affects who speaks for Venezuela at the UN: two different speeches, two different approaches—one that supports legality, one that argues illegality. The UK’s legal position since Maduro stole the 2017 election is that the opposition is the legitimate authority. On that view, it is for them to decide whether they were invaded or assisted. Many commentators mix up the law as they want it to be with the law as it is. My position is aligned with the UK’s stated position: the legitimate opposition is sovereign, and given they won 80/20 in an election that Maduro refused to recognise after losing, it is their view we accept. Maria Machado was given the Nobel Peace Prize in Norway recently, with every Liberal Democrat wanting a selfie in support. We should not retreat from that support. There are moral issues too—but there’s more to it. Maduro held a referendum in 2023 on taking over neighbouring Guyana. The Maduro regime is not in a strong position to lecture on illegal “big brother” interventions. And given the West believes the opposition won the elections of 2017 and 2024, it is difficult to argue this is “regime change” in the usual sense. The opposition won and should take rightful office. Maduro is being investigated for serious alleged crimes by the ICC, and Delcy Rodriguez may be mindful not just of US power, but of international courts too. That may be one explanation for why they have thrown Maduro under the bus. I’m sure their own status—and what they are guilty of having done—is front and centre in their thinking. It also appears the “rules-based order” is fraying—if it ever existed. As I said on TV, there are wider ramifications we need to be mindful of: global threats. The US cannot be allowed to subsume the democratic process, the will of the Venezuelan people, or Venezuelan sovereignty. Nor can the US be given a green light to act unilaterally elsewhere—for example, Greenland. In the South China Sea, we must be absolutely clear about what American interventionism means, because we cannot equivocate it with Chinese military action in Taiwan. If we misunderstand Venezuela, we fall into the trap of false equivalence—and into Beijing’s hands. Then there is the thorny issue of Ukraine: whether the United States continues to supply arms and funding, the effect on the war’s outcome, and the risk of NATO fragmentation. One thing is clear: Europe has to get off US dependency and dramatically increase defence spending to backfill any potential US withdrawal from NATO or from collective allied action. Then there is Trump’s peace plan in Gaza, which trundles along. Yesterday, the most worried person was probably President Zelenskyy, who is desperately trying to keep the Western coalition—including the United States—intact. Any fragmentation over Venezuela could have serious implications for Ukraine and for Europe. We must not lose sight of the humanitarian catastrophe: around 80% of Venezuelans live in poverty; roughly 60% are malnourished; inflation is around 178%; crime is out of control; and trafficking routes through Venezuela—including via ports and airports—have been significant, particularly toward places like Medellín and Honduras and other transit destinations. Waving placards does nothing to help Venezuelans, and they despair at the likes of Jeremy Corbyn. There is a parallel with Iraq—right or wrong: a US invasion, the Ba’ath Party kept in place rather than dismissed, and Saddam sent to the courts. Has the US learned lessons? For Europe, the red lines will rightly include: freezing out the opposition; any temporary US sovereignty over another nation; and, for some, the protection of regime figures from justice by the US. The UK has faced its own dilemmas on accountability for criminal political activity through the Good Friday Agreement. Difficult questions may lie ahead if Trump has struck this sort of deal. I can only presume the US is telling Delcy Rodriguez—who one minute pledged total allegiance to “the only president, Nicholas Maduro,” and later in the day was sworn in as Venezuela’s new president, albeit for a limited period—to go with the flow and accept it. And the same message to Maria Marchado, the opposition leader: go with the flow and accept it. Is this Trump’s best-case, bloodless option? We don’t know. But everything pivots on the actions of the remnants of the regime, and that is directly linked to their assessment of the risks of further US action—a “second wave”. It appears there have been many conversations in the background between all parties, excluding Maduro. That may explain why Maduro increasingly relied on Cuban advisers and Cuban security rather than Venezuelan forces. His grip was slipping. The American question to Delcy Rodriguez is simple: do you want your country to continue as an economic basket case? It’s a powerful emotional offer. Another major factor is oil. Venezuelan crude is heavy, low-grade sludge requiring enormous investment to process. Up to the 1990s—and before Chavez—major foreign companies had the infrastructure, capital, resources, and skills to keep pumping stations and refineries operating. During the Bolivarian revolution, when Hugo Chavez took power, he nationalised the industry, kicked the oil companies out, and took over their investment. That is the basis for Trump’s grievance. More importantly, over the following 30 years the Venezuelan regime has been unable to manufacture parts or manage production well enough to sustain the industry. Output has plummeted to a fraction of what it was. State seizure has been a catastrophe. Given Venezuela cannot currently support its own oil industry, it requires foreign expertise and investment. There is an argument for a proper framework to enable this. However, Trump’s “America First, no one else” posture is not exactly the sort of foreign investment approach that democratic countries can accept. At the moment there is an oil embargo, so no one is benefiting from Venezuelan oil. Opening it up depends on where companies sell it and whether it returns to open markets. Nicolas Maduro now looks like the fall guy for all sides. Trump’s decision to keep remnants of the regime in power—and effectively protect them with a piece of the pie—does not incentivise them to man the barricades for Maduro, regardless of the noise they make for domestic audiences and party apparatchiks. One issue that cannot be overlooked is the layered nature of the regime: police and defence structures. Army generals may have cut a deal through Rodriguez, or through an informal agent. But beneath them are criminal colectivos, gangs, and drug cartels that were given sanctuary so long as they defended the regime in the streets—plus the risk of rogue elements loyal to Maduro. The US may be trying to avoid repeating Iraq’s disaster by not dismantling the whole system overnight. Trump’s knock-down of Maria Riccardo may be the other side of the same coin. He cannot allow the opposition to surge and “scare the horses”—scare the remnants of the regime whom he calculates he needs for this transition. I’m sceptical. I’m not convinced Trump’s plan will work when you are dealing with people who have flagrantly disregarded laws and rights and do not respect their own people, solely for their own ends. It appears Trump has factored this in: the US has been on the ground for months, not just “pricing it in” but trying to smooth it out. It remains to be seen whether the plan works or fails. One of Venezuela’s problems is the people commenting on it. Many know little to nothing about it and quickly overlook ordinary Venezuelans in favour of global politics. There is very little value in what they say. There is also a danger that political posturing within Venezuela is misread: inward-facing noise gets amplified externally, and the international community turns Venezuela into a political football. If Delcy Rodriguez has done a deal, sticks to it, and can hold things together, and then—phase two—whoever wins elections can also hold things together, then Trump’s plan may work. But there are quite a few “ifs” in that sentence. Not notifying Europe is a big issue. Europe backs the opposition and will have serious concerns about democracy and a “dirty deal” with regime remnants. There has clearly been a coordinated response across Western capitals: they have not opposed the intervention for obvious reasons, and they have not stated it is illegal—probably the correct position, given they back the opposition as the sovereign authority. But with Ukraine in mind, they will have to be exceedingly diplomatic in pursuing any democratic agenda in Venezuela. The diaspora across Europe is absolutely delighted at the action taken by the US administration, and that adds another dimension—particularly in countries like Spain. Trump might pull this off, and I wouldn’t bet against him doing it. But it might be historic.