[Salon] After MBS - ArabDigest.org. Guest Post

After MBS Summary: Saudi Arabia’s future under MBS is highly centralised and stable but long-term risks remain. The lack of a clear succession plan, economic dependency on oil, and growing authoritarianism pose potential threats. How will the Saudi regime end? Long-standing members will recall that we last reflected on the future of Saudi Arabia in 2017 as part of ‘The Future of the Middle East’ e-book that Arab Digest co-produced with the University of Durham’s Global Policy Institute. Since then the Kingdom has undergone profound political, economic, and social transformations. The traditional system of governance which relied on extensive consultation (Shura) within the royal family, merchant elites and religious scholars has been dismantled and power has become centralised entirely in the hands of MBS and his immediate family, making the regime highly autocratic and vulnerable to instability. Many key royal figures have also been sidelined, arrested, or exiled, making the monarchy less inclusive and more vulnerable to internal revolt. To prevent this the Kingdom has transformed into a police state with surveillance technology targeting any significant internal opposition or democratic uprising. Regionally and internationally, Saudi Arabia’s position has improved since 2017. The Kingdom has emerged as a dominant power in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia’s international alliances have also diversified, with strengthened ties with China, Russia, and India, as well as possible participation in BRICS. Saudi-Iranian relations have improved, but full normalisation with Israel has become a politically dangerous move. MBS controls all aspects of governance, security, and the economy in the Kingdom so if he dies or is incapacitated a power struggle could ensue When considering potential future scenarios, a description of possibilities is useful. The following possibilities are not mutually exclusive. The main threats to the regime’s stability are: Succession Crisis & Internal Power Struggles With no clear successor, MBS’s unexpected death could lead to a power struggle within the royal family. Power would then most likely pass to one of MBS’s full brothers, who have a firm grip on the security services, presumably Khaled the current Minister of Defence. Should they also be incapacitated, an internal royal family power struggle would ensue which Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, King Salman’s only surviving full brother, is likely to win. He would also garner the support of much of the security apparatus as well as Western powers, who regard him as the continuity candidate and a safe pair of hands. He has been under house arrest for the last five years. Likelihood 15%. An assassination or coup, most likely from within the royal family. In Saudi culture every relative of every prince MBS has humiliated is honour-bound to take revenge against him and MBS has made countless enemies within the royal family and powerful business elites. This means a fate similar to King Faisal’s who was shot dead in 1975 in a revenge killing by a close family member is a possibility. Likelihood 25% Economic Collapse & Oil Dependency Despite the launch of Vision 2030 in 2016, the Kingdom remains dependent on oil for 40 percent of its GDP and 75 percent of fiscal revenues. Furthermore, to balance its budget the Kingdom needs the price of Brent crude to be at around US$96 per barrel (pb) when it currently stands at around US$74. The Kingdom is already running a budget deficit and long-term oil revenues are increasingly vulnerable to a decline in demand. Yet the Saudi population is growing at 1.62 percent a year, and around 250,000 young Saudis enter the job market annually. Only around 30-40 percent of working age Saudis are either in work or actively seeking it. Taxation increases without economic benefits could lead to public discontent and unrest. With no history of mass political mobilisation the likelihood of economic collapse leading to a widespread popular revolt remains relatively low at 10%. Foreign Military Threats The Huthis have targeted Saudi oil facilities and cities across the Kingdom with drones and missiles and they continue to pose a military threat to the regime. Last summer fear of Huthi military attacks compelled the Saudis to order Yemen’s Internationally Recognised Government to reverse its attempt to take full control of the Yemeni banking system. A Huthi offensive could destabilise the southern region and threaten infrastructure and mega-tourism projects. Earlier this month Donald Trump launched fresh strikes against the Huthis upending Saudi efforts to bring the conflict to a close. Normalisation with Israel could trigger a domestic backlash or regional conflict with groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, or other Iran-backed militias in the region. Risk 15%. Islamist Extremism & Radicalisation Widespread social reforms have diminished the risk of a Salafi-led uprising, but pockets of extremism remain and the removal of religious elites and the crackdown on clerics by MBS has angered ultra-conservative factions. A renewed Islamist uprising, similar to the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, is a potential risk. Al-Qaeda and ISIS still have underground networks in Saudi Arabia and could attempt a terrorist campaign against the government as they have done in the past. Likelihood. 20% Regional Separatism & Tribal Discontent The oil-rich region Eastern Province has historically been marginalised. Its population could seek greater autonomy or independence. The Hijaz, home to Mecca and Medina, has long felt distant from Riyadh’s rule and elites there may also push for more regional autonomy, especially if economic disparities grow. The southern provinces of Najran, Asir and Jizan have historically had strong ties to Yemen, and in a worst-case scenario Huthi forces could attempt to seize these areas. Unlike Libya or Syria however, Saudi Arabia is not highly militarised among its civilian population making a prolonged civil war unlikely. 10% International Isolation & Western Pressure The US continues to give Saudi Arabia full military and political support because MBS has repeatedly shown that he is ready to do whatever he can to support Israel, far more than any previous Saudi ruler. Yet at the same time in recent years the regime has been shifting its international alliances in the direction of Russia and China, while emerging as a key player in a multipolar world order. If tensions were to emerge between Saudi Arabia and its Western backers that led to concerted diplomatic pressure and arms sales restrictions, MBS’s regime would soon be over and he would be replaced by a more pliant dictator ready to implement the Western/Zionist agenda in the land of the Two Holy Mosques. 5% Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Arab Digest website