[Salon] Yemen’s fractious puzzle - ArabDigest.org Guest Post

Yemen’s fractious puzzle Summary: Yemen’s seemingly intractable conflict and the failure to find resolution to it can best be understood by thinking of that part of the country not under Huthi control as a puzzle. Helen Lackner discusses the many pieces to the puzzle and why they seem doomed to never quite fit. We thank our regular contributor Helen Lackner for today’s article. An expert on Yemen, Helen also works as a freelance rural development consultant with a particular interest in water among other environmental issues. SAQI Books has published the paperback edition with new material of her Yemen In Crisis, now subtitled Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope. It is a seminal study of the war, what lies behind it and what needs to happen for it to finally end. Her latest book Yemen: Poverty and Conflict was published by Routledge in 2022. You can find Helen’s most recent Arab Digest podcast “Yemen in the Gaza war” here. Yemen’s internationally recognised government [IRG] is the generic term to describe the regime’s executive as a whole, including its leadership, the eight-man Presidential Leadership Council [PLC] and the government led by the Prime Minister. Internecine competition is its best known characteristic. To understand its dynamics and possible future, a brief outline of the factions and their areas of control may help. Bear in mind that prior to 1990 there were two Yemeni states: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and the socialist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY.) The almost systematic description of Yemen’s situation as being ‘north’ controlled by the Huthis and ‘south’ by the IRG is simply incorrect, both geographically and politically. It gives the impression that the Huthi-controlled area covers what was pre-1990 the Yemen Arab Republic and the IRG-controlled one the area of the former People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. A simple superposition of the relevant maps show that this is simply wrong. Within the former YAR area are two major IRG-connected areas: part of the north-eastern governorate of Marib is the base for PLC Vice-President Sultan al Arada who is close to the Islamist Islah party and to the Saudi regime, though significant parts of the governorate are under Huthi control. In the south-western coastal area, including parts of Hodeida and Taiz governorates another PLC Vice-President Tareq Saleh is in control: the nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, he is the military leader of the National Resistance Forces (NRF) which is financially supported by the UAE but maintains relations with the Saudis. His politics can be summarised as supporting the unity of the Yemeni state and favouring a strong, if not determinant role for himself or his cousin Ahmed Ali [son of the slain former president] in the country’s leadership. In most of the IRG-connected areas [except in Hadhramaut and al Mahra], a third PLC Vice-President Abdul Rahman al Mahrami, a Salafi leader, leads the militarily effective Amaliqa forces, aligned with the UAE. Given Salafi ‘quietist’ non-political ideology which by definition supports whoever is officially ruling, the question arises of why they are not supporting the PLC/IRG President Rashad Al Alimi. Central Lahej, al Dhala’ and the western part of Abyan governorates, as well as Aden city are the strongholds of the Southern Transitional Council (STC). As its name implies, it is a separatist movement calling for the return to the pre-1990 borders. In a snapshot of the tangled politics of the country the STC leader Aydaroos al Zubaidy signs his documents President of the STC and Vice President of the IRG. In doing so he claims for himself the presidency of a southern entity yet to be formally declared while hanging on to the IRG vice presidency of a Yemen he hopes to sunder. It is worth noting that his claims to control the entire former PDRY area are challenged by many, both other separatists and supporters of Yemeni unity. Al Zubaidy relies on UAE financial, diplomatic and military support and is the most explicit challenger to the IRG/PLC president, Rashad al Alimi. Shabwa governorate, which includes the main road from Saudi Arabia to Aden, was contested between the Huthis and their opponents until late 2021 when they were expelled by UAE and STC aligned forces, supported by the Amaliqa and Tareq Saleh’s NRF. Awadh al Awlaqi, a separatist was then appointed as governor leaving the governorate a site for a muted struggle between the STC separatists and the ‘mainstream’ unitary IRG. Hadhramaut is large and holds hydrocarbon resources and their export facilities. Historically it has three main parts, the scarcely inhabited plateaux north and south of the Wadi [valley] with Seiyun as its capital, and the coastal region with Mukalla the main port and capital of the governorate. For the past three years it has been the focus of competition between the unitary IRG which controls the wadi and most of the plateaux and the coastal strip under UAE-supported Elite Forces more or less aligned with the STC. Vice President Faraj al Bahsani was both governor and head of the Second Military region when the PLC was formed in April 2022 but was then removed from both these positions. He has aligned with the STC, thus strengthening this faction within the PLC. By contrast the ‘wadi and desert’ is semi-autonomous with a Deputy Governor in charge and is the base for the First Military Region, accused by the separatists of being ‘northern’ and Islah dominated. For the past three years or so, the struggle for control of the governorate is simultaneously between the interior, including the border crossing with Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of President al Alimi and his supporters, more closely aligned with the Saudis, and the coastal areas under Emirati and STC influence. Both Yemeni sides have set up ‘tribal organisations’ which claim to represent the governorate as a whole. To overcome these rivalries, the Saudis supported the creation of the Hadhramaut National Council in 2023, a model which they are trying to reproduce in other governorates. One important reason for the complexity in Hadhramaut is that historically sada [descendants of the Prophet] have been the most powerful political element in the governorate while the numerical majority of the population are low status agriculturalists who are not tribesmen. Hence the tribes are less powerful than they would like and is assumed by the external forces. Another major reason is that fundamentally, all Hadhramis are primarily loyal to Hadhramaut itself; none of them want to be ruled from Aden or elsewhere by the likes of the STC whom they consider to be uncouth. In addition, Hadhramaut is the only governorate of the country which has a sufficient economic base to be self-sustaining should the country fracture even further. The main asset of the far eastern al Mahra governorate is its position on the border with Oman which wants to retain influence, despite competition from both Saudis and Emiratis, the former currently having the upper hand. The al Mahra leadership is aligned with the IRG as a whole and avoids conflict with the southern separatists. It has no representative on the PLC. President of the PLC, Rashad al Alimi, former minister of the Interior was without any military force of his own when he was appointed in 2022. Since then, the Saudis have set up and equipped the National Shield Forces (Republican Decree 18 of 2023), which they finance and which is deployed mainly in Hadhramaut, along the border with Saudi Arabia and in Aden. The two remaining members of the PLC, Abdullah al Alimi [no relation to the president] from Shabwa and Othman Mujalli from Saada also lack military forces. This divided PLC is complemented by a formal government, since February this year led by Prime Minister Ahmed Awadh bin Mubarak, with ministers who have little power given the dire financial situation [see our posting of September 20 2024] and either work from Aden under pressure from the STC or spend much of their time abroad. Currently bin Mubarak’s relationship with the President is reputed to be under considerable stress. As usual, we can conclude by remembering that the leadership’s ongoing disunity worsens living conditions for millions of Yemenis.