[Salon] A Time for Fear - ArabDigest.org

A Time for Fear Summary: the creation of quasi-state mercenary militias in Egypt raises the prospect that the Sisi regime is preparing itself for civil strife as the country’s economy continues to falter and more and more Egyptians are driven into absolute poverty. We thank Maged Mandour for today’s newsletter. Maged is a political analyst and a regular contributor to Arab Digest and to Middle East Eye and Open Democracy. He is also a writer for Sada, the Carnegie Endowment online journal. Maged is the author of the recently published Egypt under El-Sisi (I.B.Tauris) which examines social and political developments since the coup of 2013. Keep an eye out for it! You can find Maged’s most recent AD podcast here. On 1 May in a semi-official ceremony heavily covered by local media the creation of the Union of Arab tribes (AUT), a union of five tribes from across the country, was announced. AUT is headed by the infamous Ibrahim El-Organi, a Sinai tribal leader and a close ally of the security services. El- Organi was one of the leaders of a tribal grouping that joined with the regime in its long and bloody counter-insurgency campaign against IS militants in North Sinai. It is a campaign that has seen numerous human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings of minors, forced disappearances and the use of heavy weaponry in populated areas resulting in significant civilian casualties. The stated goal of the AUT is to support the Egyptian state and fight sedition across the country. These are convenient euphemisms for backing the Sisi regime and repressing its political opponents. Indeed, the close alliance between the regime and the AUT was made public in a series of dramatic gestures. One saw the AUT announce the inauguration of “Sisi City”, a new city on the Egyptian- Israeli border to be built on the site of al-Arjaa, a village that El- Organi claims was a bastion of support for IS, thus a symbolic statement to signal the victory of the regime over the insurgents. Another instance is the naming of Sisi as honorary President of the AUT. The emergence of El-Organi and his regime-allied militia is part of an alarming trend, with the regime diversifying its repressive apparatus to include non-state actors that could prove essential in the repression of a popular protest movement with little cost to the official security forces. Essentially, we could be witnessing the emergence of an Assad-like Shabiha, who have been responsible for mass abuses and massacres during Syria’s ongoing civil war. This is not to argue that consecutive autocracies in Egypt did not rely on a criminal network to rig elections and intimidate opponents but there seems to be a qualitative shift of policy towards reliance on officially sanctioned militias that have access to military grade weaponry, something that Egypt has not witnessed in living memory. The AUT is not alone in this trend, with the emergence of Sabri Nakhnoukh, a well known thug sentenced to life in 2014 for charges that included weapons and drugs possession. In May 2018 he was the recipient of a presidential pardon leading to his immediate release. In September 2023 Nakhnoukh purchased Falcon Group, the most important private security firm in the country, considered by many to be a front for military intelligence. The company was sold for the token price of EGP 3 million (roughly US$ 64,000) with the new owner agreeing to take over the Falcon Group’s debt which had reached EGP 120 million. The company employs 15,000 people, and has a rapid deployment force which works closely with the ministry of the interior to combat “terrorists”. Falcon Group is also responsible for securing universities, consulates and the headquarters of a number of large companies. This effectively makes it a close adjunct force to the security services and responsible for securing vital buildings. The company is well placed to serve as a direct participant in repression of dissent if and when it erupts. It is worth noting that Nakhnoukh was part of a network of Mubarak era thugs that the regime habitually used to rig elections and harass activists. Sabri Nakhnoukh received a presidential pardon in May 2018 after being sentenced to 28 years in prison for drug trafficking The Sisi regime has also worked to incorporate these new militia leaders into its crony network, more specifically El- Organi, who is now considered to be an important businessman and the owner of several companies. This includes Hala, a company that is tasked with coordinating the granting of travel permission to Palestinians from Gaza with the Egyptian security apparatus. The company has made a reported US$ 180 million since the war in Gaza erupted charging Palestinians between US$ 5,000 per adult and US$ 2,500 per child as a coordination fee. There are no guarantees that permissions will be granted even after the fee has been paid. A money spinner preying on families desperate to escape the Gaza violence, it allows the regime to consolidate its support with these newly established militias, ensuring their absolute loyalty. This shift in policy raises an important question, namely are we witnessing the fragmentation of the regime’s repression apparatus and the possible emergence of competing centres of power? Something similar to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan? Currently, this seems unlikely. The Egyptian military is the uncontested hegemon of Egyptian politics and these emerging militias do not have an independent economic or political base that would allow them to challenge the regime in the foreseeable future. The more plausible scenario and one with immediate consequence is that these militias can be used to repress dissent with little cost to the security forces. Indeed, the security forces can even maintain some deniability, arguing that the militias were acting in quasi-independent fashion to protect the state with sheer patriotic zeal. It would also allow the regime to repress dissent outside of any form of legal constraint while distancing itself from the worst abuses. In essence, repression would deepen, becoming more brutal, and devoid of any legal or political constraint. With a deepening economic crisis and the possibility of rising discontent, the regime seems to be laying the groundwork for a potential confrontation between the people - pushed to the brink by Sisi’s economic malfeasance and folly - and his state and non-state security forces. In such a scenario the militias of El-Organi and Nakhnoukh will prove useful mercenaries in a war that Sisi wages against his own people.