Syria on a cliff edge
Summary: fighting continues, mainly in and around Idlib between the Syrian army and jihadis. International complications.
Fighting, sometimes heavy fighting, continues in Syria, as does the human
suffering.
The situation on the ground is complex, and so is the alignment of
various outside powers. Reading and summarising the whole picture is
made more difficult by propaganda from all sides, so pervasive that all
reports need to be looked at with a sceptical eye. With the best part of
3 million cooped up in the north-western province of Idlib the
possibility of a
humanitarian catastrophe on an even more horrific scale remains – but it hasn't happened yet.
The fighting is mainly between the Syrian army which is seeking to
extend government control over the whole of the country, and jihadi
forces numbering many thousands who have been progressively expelled
from their other strongholds but have been able to move to Idlib and
retain control over large parts of it.
The Syrian government forces have support from Russia, though not
unconditional support. The jihadis have support, also qualified, from
Turkey, reportedly backed up by financial support from Qatar. In a
typically obscure development, Russians sources reported on 12 June that
Russia and Turkey had brokered a complete
ceasefire
in Idlib which had led to a significant reduction in violence. The
following day the Turkish Foreign Minister said that after a
Turkish observation point
had been shelled by Syrian government forces it was not possible to say
that a ceasefire had been established, and Turkey would do what was
necessary and expected Russia to put pressure on the Syrian government.
The Russian ministry of defence said the attack had been by
rebels,
not the Syrian army, and Russia had carried out airstrikes against
"militants" after the Turkish army had asked for its help. Yesterday 16
June the Turkish defence ministry said the Syrian army had made a
second attack on a Turkish observation post; Turkey replied with heavy weapons, and made representations to Moscow.
With the possibility that the civil war may come to an end, there is
no international agreement on how to handle Syria after it is over. Arab
states are divided; Syria has not been readmitted into the Arab league
but the UAE and a few others have re-established diplomatic links.
Russia wants to retain Syria as something like an ally; Washington wants
that to end, and even more urgently wants to end Iranian influence and
penetration in Syria. The country has been devastated and will
desperately need funding for reconstruction. Ideally Russia would like
to take a lead in doing the work, paid for by others – that does not
appeal to Washington, which has discouraged any move to raise funding
internationally.
With the reservations implied in the first paragraph above, we draw
attention to two recent articles which address the internal and external
situations. The
first
(of 4 June) is an attempt by former British ambassador to Damascus
Peter Ford to summarise the situation in Idlib, commenting also on
chemical weapons and the possibility of US withdrawal. Ford has gone out
on a limb many times casting doubt on media reports and government
statements from Washington and elsewhere, particularly on the vexed
question of chemical weapons, on which the jury is still out. Last month
a number of UK-based academics challenged allegations that the Syrian
government used chemical weapons in
Douma
in April 2018. Last week Syria refused visas for a chemical weapons
investigation team created last year by the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons against Syrian and Russian opposition.
The
second
article, published in the Abu Dhabi-based The National, is by the
London based investigative journalist Faisal Al Yafai. He considers US
attempts to isolate Syria and the Russian push for normalisation, and
argues that Arab states have differing interests which they will quite
rightly follow although the result will be untidy.
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