Report of the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction

Today (January 11), Special Inspector General John F. Sopko unveiled SIGAR’s updated High-Risk List in a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). As a new Administration and a new Congress prepare to inherit America’s longest war and largest reconstruction effort, the High-Risk List calls attention to some of the greatest challenges facing Afghanistan today.  

See the list in an interactive, web-based format: https://www.sigar.mil/interactive-reports/high-risk-list/index.html

Watch Sopko’s remarks, webcast live:  https://www.csis.org/events/afghanistan-reconstruction-enduring-challenges-new-administration-and-congress

Speech highlights: 

-- The best spin the Afghan security forces can put on their activities is that they are able to re-take strategic areas after they temporarily fall. We may be defining success as the absence of failure.

-- Afghan commanders often pocket the paychecks of “ghost soldiers” for whom the U.S. is paying salaries. The number of ghost soldiers is significant, likely reaching into the tens of thousands.

-- There is evidence that the Taliban have instructed their field commanders to simply purchase U.S. supplied weapons, fuel, and ammunition from Afghan soldiers because to do so is both easier and less expensive.

-- A significant portion – perhaps as much as half – of U.S. purchased fuel is siphoned off at various stages of this compromised system, wasting U.S. taxpayer dollars and handicapping Afghan security forces.

-- Resolute Support estimates that as much as 60 percent of the Taliban’s funding comes from poppy production and cultivation, which has grown significantly despite the United States’ $8.5 billion investment in counternarcoticsefforts.

-- Given recent depreciation of the Afghan currency, the negative effect on the Afghan economy of the American military withdrawal, and a demographic youth bulge that drove many Afghans to try to reach Europe as refugees, future prospects look bleak.

-- I first witnessed the United States put in way too much, way too fast. More recently, I’ve watched the U.S. remove way too much, way too fast.

-- Withdraw, and the democratic government may well fall. Stay, and continue what we have been doing and we may be faced with what General Dunford has described as a stalemate.

-- Just as robust oversight of federal expenditures is critical here in the United States, whether purchasing a new presidential plane or a new fighter aircraft, aggressive oversight must be mission critical for reconstruction programs in Afghanistan.

Report highlights: 

-- Including U.S. war funding unrelated to reconstruction, U.S. appropriations for Afghanistan now total more than three quarters of a trillion dollars—not including the $43.7 billion requested for FY 2017.

-- 2,247 U.S. military personnel have died in support of operations there, while more than 20,000 others were wounded in action.

-- Though more than half of all U.S. reconstruction dollars have gone toward the ANDSF, it has lost territory to the insurgency. As of August 28, 2016, only 63.4% of the country’s districts were under Afghan government control or influence a reduction from the 72% as of November 27, 2015.

-- The number of armed groups opposing the Afghan government has increased since Afghan forces took responsibility for their country’s security in 2014. By 2016, General Nicholson reported 20 terrorist groups present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

-- The Afghan insurgency receives significant funding from participating in and taxing the illicit narcotics trade, raising the question of whether the Afghan government can ever prevail without tackling the narcotics problem.

-- Though contracting presents a high risk to the success of Afghanistan reconstruction, the Department of Defense had 26,435 contractors employed in Afghanistan in 2016—almost three times the number of U.S. troops still in the country.

-- The percentage of Afghans who believe corruption is a problem of daily life, now 90%, has steadily increased over time.

-- In 2016, Afghans paid more in bribes than the government is expected to generate in revenue from taxes, customs tariffs and other sources of income.

-- After 15 years, Afghanistan’s government is still in no position to support itself and will require donor assistance for the foreseeable future if it is to survive.

-- The World Bank estimates that Afghanistan’s aid dependence will continue beyond 2030.

Read the full High-Risk List: https://www.sigar.mil/PDF/spotlight/2017_High-Risk_List.pdf