The
19 page report is dense, bureaucratic reading, but it also is highly informative
and important. It reveals yet
another chapter in the ongoing saga of problems in the F-35 program.
Most problems remain unresolved; some are getting worse, and some reveal
how little the F-35's advocates can be trusted.
To
supplement what they wrote, I found the following to be the salient points. They appear below in rough ascending
order of importance - at least to me.
·
Test
Points: Although Lockheed Martin and others keep on telling us that the F-35
flight test program is ahead of schedule on flight test hours and test flights,
it is behind schedule on why those test flight are flown: planned test
points. The discussion and table
on page 34 of the attached shows the flight test program "accomplished" only
5,464 of 7,180 of the planned "baseline" (originally planned for 2013) test
points. That's 24 percent fewer
than were originally planned; the "mission systems" (software) test points are
46 percent behind. Other test
points were also "accomplished," but they were added to the program once it was
determined all planned test points could not be flown.
Note that "accomplished" does not mean the F-35 passed-just that the test
was flown.
·
Bubbling/Peeling
Stealth Coatings: The previous problem of stealth coatings degrading on the tail
sections of all variants at high speed after extended afterburner use was not
fixed by new coatings. The test program will collect new data; in the meantime,
"non-instrumented" aircraft will have restrictions on their flight envelope and
use of afterburners.
·
Buffet
and trans-sonic roll-off (TRO): All F-35 variants are experiencing turbulence
and uncommanded "wing drop:" put simply, the aircraft is not flying as designed,
and the aircraft sometimes does things on its own, uncommanded.
We were told in congressional testimony this was fixed by changes in the
flight computer's control laws. It
seems that is not so; the bad aerodynamic behavior was reduced, but it was not
eliminated, and the computerized flight control changes have been exhausted as a
solution. The only possible
solution is a hardware change to the wing (very costly) or computer-directed
limitations restricting various pilot maneuvers (also very costly-in pilots'
lives in combat).
·
Helmet-Mounted
Display System (HMDS): The overpriced, foolishly complicated helmet system
continues to have problems with "jitter," "swimming" images, unacceptable night
vision, "double vision" and alignment with the real world.
Other fixes, including latency and light leakage have either not been
tested realistically or impose a higher pilot work load.
Nonetheless, last year there were reports, including from GAO, that all
these problems were on the mend.
·
Software:
As discussed by Eric Palmer below and Reuters last week, F-35 software
development is falling well behind schedule, and although the DOT&E report
does not make it explicit in plain language, the delays are beginning to
seriously threaten the Marine Corps and Air Force plans to declare "initial
operational capability" (IOC) in 2015 and 2016, respectively.
The quote on page 40 says "Initial results with the new increment of
Block 2B software indicate deficiencies still exist in fusion, radar, electronic
warfare, navigation, EOTS, Distributed Aperture System (DAS), Helmet-Mounted
Display System (HMDS) and datalink."
That says a lot.
·
Reliability/Availability/Maintainability:
Reliability is poor and ranges from 30 to 39 percent behind the current
objective. The table on page 47
shows that the "availability" of the existing fleet is getting worse and has
never reached, is receding from, its quite modest threshold of 50 percent at
this stage in the program. The
amount of time needed to repair failures "has increased over the past
year." (Page 48.)
The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) "is immature and behind
schedule," and fixes applied to date are not working (Page
49.)
·
Survivability: There are several problems that make it
clear the F-35 is highly vulnerable, the following passage is one example of a
real problem: "The fuel ingestion tests did not simulate engagements by
ground-based or aircraft gun systems that are possible during low-altitude
close-air support missions and within-visual-range air-to-air combat. A Concept Demonstrator Aircraft engine
test in 2005 showed the engine could not tolerate fuel ingestion events
representative of such conditions (i.e., low-altitude, high speed, high-engine
thrust, and higher leak rates). The program made no design changes in response
to those earlier test results and this vulnerability remains in the final
production engine design. A
ballistic liner in the fuel tank could mitigate this vulnerability, but the
program removed this feature during its weight-reduction efforts, saving 48
pounds."
There
are other details, none of them happy, such as the newly revealed cracks in the
airframe.
The
report ends with a recommendation that should attract much positive attention,
although it will almost certainly be roundly ignored, especially by the F-35
program office, Lockheed Martin and-therefore-Secretary of Defense Hagel.
The
report recommends on page 52 that the F-35 with its block 2B software should be
tested in direct comparison with legacy aircraft.
In other words, it should be empirically established if the F-35 is a
step forward, or a step backward.
For
example, testing in direct comparison to the A-10 for which aircraft should
perform the close air support role would be a particularly interesting
exercise. Is there a single
performance characteristic that is central to the close air support mission
where the F-35 can outperform the A-10?
Is there even a close air support performance criterion where it can
match the A-10?
Is
there someone in authority, either in DOD or Congress, who would like to find
out and insist on such comparative testing?
__________________
Winslow
T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Project On
Government Oversight
301 791-2397 (home office)
301 221-3897
(cell)
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