Pages

Search This Blog

Monday, March 2, 2009

Which Gates Is Secretary of Defense?

The political games surrounding the defense budget give President Obama's secretary of defense, Robert Gates, an opportunity to show he understands the problems and has the character to address them. Some of the complexities Gates faces, however, are the various punts and tricks left on his doorstep by President Bush's last secretary of defense - the very same Robert Gates. Pierre Sprey and I explain in a new article just published in the March 9 issue of The American Conservative Magazine.



The article is reprinted below. It can also be found at The American Conservative website at http://www.amconmag.com/

The American Conservative

March 9, 2009



Page 18

Playing Defense
Cutting military spending is politically unpopular,
but more dollars don’t make a better Army.

By Winslow T. Wheeler and Pierre M. Sprey

UNTIL LAST SUMMER, just about everyone on Wall Street was dismissing the indicators of coming financial collapse. Similarly, no one in the lobbyist infested halls of Congress and the Pentagon wants to see the signposts of our impending defense meltdown. But consider four ugly facts:

• Defense is being showered with more dollars today than at any time since the end of World War II.

• The forces the Pentagon has been buying with those growing dollars have been shrinking steadily since 1946.

• These shrinking forces are more and more antiquated: the average age of our aircraft, ships, and tanks has been increasing relentlessly since the ’50s.

• Despite all the extra money, training is shrinking, too. Key combat units are being sent to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan with less and less training.

How did the Bush administration deal with these uncomfortable truths? On their way out of town, they left a five year plan that exacerbates each of the four harbingers. Re-appointed by Obama and now stuck with that plan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates needs to decide if he wants to be Bush’s holdover or morph into Barack Obama’s new broom, bringing change to bad old Pentagon ideas, some of them his own.

In his farewell article in last fall’s Foreign Affairs and in his welcome-back testimony to the House and Senate in January, Gates decried a defense budget riddled with “baroque” and irrelevant weapons at unaffordable cost. He warned, “the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing.”

This is important, perhaps prophetic, rhetoric. But if, like Greenspan’s “irrational exuberance,” Gates’s ringing words remain untainted by action, they will simply mask festering problems. If, on the other hand, he decides to act, his first task must be to control the root of the evil, the money.

To understand, we need only to look at what we’ve spent and the forces those dollars have bought. According to Defense Department budget plans and records, at over $670 billion for 2009, we will be spending more on the Pentagon than at any point since 1946. In inflation adjusted dollars, the Pentagon budget is higher today than at its peaks for either Korea or Vietnam—though both of those were far larger than our current wars.

This significantly expanded budget only buys us dramatically shriveled forces. The major combat units that make up our Army, Navy, and Air Force are at their lowest ebb since 1946.

Specifically, at just over ten Army division equivalents, we have the smallest combat Army in the last 60 years, at the highest budget since the end of World War II. For past modern conflicts, there were major Army expansions, but for Iraq and Afghanistan, a very modest plan to add 60,000 soldiers for new combat formations has not even begun to show up in Army records, though the $100+ billion cost has.

Similarly, we now have a smaller Navy, under 300 combat ships, than at any point since 1946, but the Navy’s budget is now above the historic norm for the post-World War II era. In the same way, the number of wings of fighters and tactical bombers in the Air Force has collapsed from 61 in 1957 to just ten today. The budget? Also well above the historic norm.

The five-year plan Gates dropped on Obama’s doorstep continues this shrinkage, according to the Congressional Budget Office, leaving us with key weapons that are older and scarcer than ever.

Symptoms of our unpreparedness abound: tank drivers get fewer training miles today than they did during the readiness-cutting Clinton administration. Fighter pilots get fewer training hours in the air than during the hollow defense years of the Carter administration. And the latest public readiness ratings reveal that not one major Army combat unit in the U.S. was rated fully ready to go to war—not even the ones sent to battle in Iraq and Afghanistan.

More money has not solved these problems. Quite the contrary: it enables the Pentagon and the Congress to make them worse. Beyond the extra $800 billion appropriated since 2001 ostensibly to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the non-war Pentagon budget has been showered with an additional $750 billion.

That money was squandered by a defense acquisition system that sheds the feeble reforms of witless Pentagon officials like a Labrador shakes off water. Squandering at least as much, Congressmen heaved billions more in pork, pandering to the hordes of defense contractors seeking handouts.

A classic example of how more money leads to force decay is our Air Force, now in the final stages of spending $65 billion for the F-22 fighter aircraft. All that money bought a disgracefully puny inventory of 184 at an unconscionable $355 million per fighter—about three times the price initially promised. These will replace less than half of the 450 F-15 fighters now in the Air Force and obviously cannot reverse the aging of the fleet.

But isn’t the F-22 a vastly superior fighter? Won’t all that hyper-expensive technology offset the small numbers?

No. The F-22’s widely advertised prowess depends on a fantasy concocted by high tech big spenders shortly after the Korean War: “beyond visual range” air combat. The plan was to identify the enemy as a blip on the radar, lock on with a 15-mile radar missile, fire, and watch the blip disappear.

The ugly reality is that every time we’ve tried that, from Vietnam to Iraq, with more than a handful of friendly and enemy fighters in the air the “identify the enemy blip” part fails and we wind up shooting at friends. The engagement rules have to be changed to “eyeball identification required,” and we’re back to hard
maneuvering dogfights.

The F-22 is the distillation of that failed dream. The huge weight, drag, and complexity burden of its stealth-compromised skin, big-ticket radar, and belly-fattening radar missile load have swollen it to bomber size, wrecked its maneuvering performance, and run its cost through the roof. The radar is useless because turning it on makes the F-22 an instant target. The stealth fails against World War II-technology search radars and against enemy fighters savvy enough to turn off their radars. The F-22’s vaunted effectiveness is based only on peacetime exercises using rigged ground rules and missile lethality numbers unrelated to actual combat results or real enemy countermeasures. Even more telling is the number of combat sorties the F-22 has flown to help the fights in Iraq or Afghanistan since going operational in 2006: zero.

And how do the Pentagon and Congress deal with the crushing cost and ineffectiveness of the F-22? In Bush’s Pentagon last year, Gates found the pros and cons of spending yet more on the F-22 to be such a “close call” that he punted the decision to the new secretary of defense. Now in receipt of his own punt, Gates is huddling with Obama’s “new” Pentagon team (mainly retreaded Clintonites) cogitating over the fate of the F-22.

Insiders say that they’re coming up with a classic compromise guaranteed to make everything worse: buy a few more F-22s now and pay for them by “saving” money out of the clearly unraveling F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program.

The F-35, still in its early stages, is headed for major cost overruns, schedule delays, and performance calamities, perhaps even surpassing the F-22 mess.

But will the new Gates team really save money in the F-35 program? Not a chance. The business-as-usual plan doesn’t terminate the F-35, which would save serious money; it just delays production. That allows temporary transfer of the money needed now to keep the F-22 slurping at the public trough and kicks the can down the road for the F-35. The stretch-out only makes the F-35 more expensive, which in turn further reduces the force size—all to keep alive a deeply flawed, unfixable design.

Multiply this approach by the thousands of hardware programs then raid the personnel, maintenance, and training accounts to pay for the hardware overruns and presto: you get our shrinking, aging, less ready to fight defense forces.

And how do they react in the halls of Congress and the Pentagon? Send more money.

Civilian and military politicians learned from their experience with Clinton that Democrats can be cowed by labeling them “anti-defense” if they dare to deny the Pentagon anything. The military services, contractors, and their media propagandists hammered away at Clinton until he coughed up annual budgets well in excess of what Bush 41 and his secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, planned for the 1990s. Meanwhile, Republicans in Congress larded those bloated Clinton budget requests with add-on appropriations. Uninterested in spending on battlefield necessities for the troops such as training, maintenance, ammunition, body armor, and the like, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress piled on pricey items like the F-22. Come 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our grunts were painfully short of what they needed most in real war—and paid the price in blood.

Now we are seeing exactly the same games—and the same game players— being trotted out to force Obama to run up the defense budget. Here are a few of the gambits:

The Add-Fat-Before-Cutting Scheme: Last summer, Secretary Gates and the Pentagon conjured up a preemptive fattening of the budget they were handing to the next president, adding a $60 billion nest egg. In February 2009, Obama’s Office of Management and Budget blocked the play and restored the pumped-up 2010 Pentagon budget to its original figure, a not inconsiderable $527 billion, a $12 billion increase over 2009. Not surprisingly, the big spenders are calling this an Obama defense budget “cut.”

The Prime-the-Pump Scheme: Like Wall Street and its economist spinmeisters, the defense contractors and their Pentagon allies are jumping on the stimulus bandwagon, asking for $30 billion. Of course, DOD spending generates jobs. Unfortunately, it does so more slowly, less efficiently, and with much more overhead than other government spending—or even tax cuts. We’d be hard-pressed to come up with a worse way of stimulating the economy than pouring extra dollars into outrageously expensive Pentagon programs already in trouble.

The Unforeseen-Emergency Scheme: The Gates Pentagon has yet to submit its money plan for war spending, as opposed to its plan for “normal” Pentagon spending, for the rest of 2009 and for 2010. Since the Vietnam War, these “emergency supplementals” have been hiding holes for superfluous spending unrelated to the wars, stuffed in by both the Pentagon and Congress. Will the Obama administration bring “change” to the hidden abuse of war funding?

The Unapproved-Wish-List Scheme: Each year for the last 15 or so, the military services have sent Congress a list of spending programs euphemistically called “unfunded requirements,” amounting to tens of billions of dollars. None of these additional billions are reviewed by a secretary of defense or a president. They constitute an end-run by the military services for unapproved spending, with Congress

acting as a willing enabler. It would be a sign that the spigot overflow of 9/11 is indeed drying up if Gates puts an end to this flouting of his and the president’s
authority.

The unending proliferation of such schemes has rotted America’s defenses to the core. We’ve had 45 years of reform initiatives, and each has fizzled. We’ll know that the Obama administration has snipped this unbroken string of failures when Secretary Gates translates his rhetoric into actions that change the money flow. And there’s no better place to start than by axing a few of these Pentagon budget-busters—his own included.

Winslow T. Wheeler is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information. PierreM. Sprey was a major participant in the formulation of the F-16 and the A-10. Both contributed chapters to the recently released book America’s Defense Meltdown.
_____________________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397

CDI | 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW | Washington, DC 20036 | US

1 comment:

Michele Kearney said...

At his on-line defense and acquisition website, "DoD Buzz," journalist Colin Clark has published an article by others that US Air Force devotees can only regard as apostasy: decades of adherence to Douhet-ist dogma has resulted in a weakened, mostly irrelevant, and vastly overpriced air force. Its future promises only more shrinkage, aging, and irrelevance - at even higher cost. The authors of the article that Clark has published, Pierre Sprey and Robert Dilger, also further their heresy by showing how to make the Air Force a much more effective, war winning entity - at far, far lower cost.

Find the article and Clark's summary of it at http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/03/02/insurgents-offer-tough-air-critique/, or below.

This article encapsulates the Dilger-Sprey chapter, "Reversing the Decay of American Air Power," in CDI's new anthology, "America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress." The book is now available in "Kindle" at Amazon.com; a hard copy will be available there at the end of the month from Stanford University Press.

Insurgents Offer Tough Air Critique


By Commentary Monday, March 2nd, 2009 2:25 pm
Posted in Air

Tough love remains one of those concepts our society embraces mostly in the negative. It’s just, well, too tough. The following commentary certainly constitutes a fine example of tough love, coming from two of the country’s more distinguished military and airpower analysts. Essentially, Robert Dilger and Pierre Sprey argue that the country should scrap plans for the F-35 and F-22 and build what they call “austerely-designed and affordable aircraft tailored to missions that actually win wars…” The fleet would include: a new close air support plane to replace the A-10; a “forward controller spotter plane;” a “small, affordable dirt-strip airlifter;” and a “super-maneuverable new air-to-air dogfighter with all–passive electronics.”

Dilger and Sprey argue that their approach would give the country 10,000 highly adaptable planes wiithin current budgetary constraints, compared to what they say is the unsupportable approach of fielding a fleet of roughly 2,000 very expensive planes. Can you hear the Air Force groaning? The full piece follows:

Their title: “Reversing the Decay of American Air Power”

Today the U.S. Air Force is spending about $10 billion above its Cold War average. Curiously, this amount buys us an Air Force smaller, more antiquated, and more combat-irrelevant than at any time since the 1930s.

Thirteen of our fifteen major aircraft types began development 30 to 60 years ago. Even our newest type, the F-22, entered design 25 years ago– and is too expensive to risk in our current wars. The few aging fighters the USAF has committed to these wars have helped enemy recruiting more than they have eased our troops’ burdens.

Adding money to our present way of buying aircraft has consistently accelerated the aging and the combat irrelevance of the fleet. Escaping this death spiral takes a painstaking, brutally honest look at how we’ve spent our air power money and what it bought us in combat results. We tackle that job in detail in Chapter 7 of “America’s Defense Meltdown”.

The lessons learned are clear and damning. In the 1920s, the Army Air Corps’ leaders espoused a new theory, advocated in 1921 by Italian airpower theologian Giulio Douhet: massive strategic bombardment of enemy civilians will lead to quick, crushing victories without the need for armies. In pursuit of that untested notion, our Air Force leaders spent 80% of their World War II European theater warplane budgets buying bombers (60,000 of them) and 20% buying fighters. The results were in inverse proportion to the costs.

The campaigns against eight of the nine bomber target categories examined by the prestigious United States Strategic Bombing Survey clearly failed to shorten the war or decrease casualties. The survey found “…city attacks by the RAF (and U.S.) prior to August 1944 did not substantially affect the course of German war production…” Not only were the dollar costs of bombing enormous (thereby displacing far more effective weapons), the human costs were unanticipated and appalling. US and British bomber aircrew casualties were well over 145,000, ten times the fighter casualties.

Contrary to the bomber generals’ long-repeated claims (”…300 bombers can effectively attack any German target and return without excessive or uneconomical losses”) unescorted bombers failed to get through. By August 1943, disastrous losses to German fighters forced us to suspend bomber raids deep into Germany for five months–until January 1944 when the first P-51 long range escort fighters (procured over the strong objections of the Air Force bureaucracy) became available in theater.

In contrast, the 20% spent on fighters paid off handsomely. In early 1944, 8th Air Force’s 1100 P-51s quickly established air superiority over Germany, a crucial pre-requisite for the D-Day landings. Before, during and after D-Day, General “Pete” Quesada’s 1,200 rugged P-47s unleashed his pioneering battlefield interdiction and close support tactics over the Normandy beach head area to save the day by keeping the 23 German reinforcing divisions from pushing the Allies back into the sea. Because of the constant, ubiquitous P-47 strafing, those divisions arrived shattered and as much as 6 weeks late.

A month later, those same P-47s facilitated the crucial St. Lo breakout from the Normandy quagmire–and then flew the continuous close support patrols on Third Army’s right flank that helped make possible Patton’s spectacular plunge across France, 600 miles in two weeks. Within four years after the war, Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg and his predecessors had relegated to the bone yard all but 265 of the 16,000 P-47s produced. He slashed the overall fighter force to less than 1,000, then stripped Gen. Quesada’s Tactical Air Command of all its aircraft and thereby drove the Air Force’s greatest close support innovator and combat leader into retirement. Nevertheless, the Air Force found the money to maintain 550 active heavy bombers, pay for an additional 400 B-29s, start producing 400 ridiculously expensive B-36s, and fund R&D for the all-jet B-47 and the much pricier B-52–all in the name of nuclear bombardment.

The decimation of fighters following the war proved a disaster when the Korean War broke out in June 1950. A small U.S. Army task force was being overwhelmed by the North Korean onslaught. The troops had an immediate and desperate need for close support. The Air Force instead rushed in a force of 90 B-29s with a Douhet-style plan to force instant surrender by firebombing five North Korean cities. Under duress from General MacArthur, the B-29s were diverted to supporting the Army; delivering 13 hopelessly inadequate so-called “close support” sorties per day—albeit at an average of 3 miles distance from our troops.

The bomber generals persisted: over the next years, every North Korean city of any size was duly firebombed. Of the 150 B-29 bombers assigned, 107 were lost. Once again, city bombing had little military effect–nor did it bring the enemy to the peace table. But our beleaguered infantrymen paid in blood for this appalling lack of close support: in their crucial first two-and-a-half months, the grunts suffered over 12,000 ground casualties.

Early in the Korean conflict, the Air Force assigned a token 150 P-51s to provide ground support. Predictably, the liquid-cooled P-51s suffered excessive losses since even small caliber or shrapnel holes in their radiators or cooling jackets were inevitably fatal. As a result, the theater air commander requested an emergency deployment of a mere squadron of active-duty P-47s because they were the Air Force’s most rugged, effective and survivable close support plane. Gen. Vandenberg denied the request.

In contrast, the Marines and the Navy provided first-rate close support with their highly effective and survivable World War II-vintage prop-driven fighters, the F-4U Corsair and the A-1 Skyraider (that served so admirably again in Vietnam). Army troops had high praise for the quality of their close support, greatly preferring it to the untimely, unresponsive Air Force support.

The most dramatic and important close support effort of the war saved the fighting retreat of the 1st Marine Division and the Army’s Regimental Combat Team 31, trapped by seven Chinese divisions at the Chosin Reservoir in the winter of 1951. Four Marine squadrons of Corsairs and a Navy A-1 squadron flew continuous strafing missions, hundreds per day, against the encircling Chinese onslaught. The Americans escaped the trap, albeit with heavy losses. The infantry and the five prop squadrons crippled three Chinese divisions and severely mauled the remaining four, inflicting an estimated 37,500 casualties.

U.S. air superiority over North Korea was not threatened until China entered the war in November, 1951 with 500 MiG-15s based in Manchuria. The high performing MiGs caused the Air Force to rush in 90 new F-86s of comparable dogfight performance–the number was so puny because only 11 per month had been funded. Nevertheless, the better-trained American F-86 pilots soon exacted a 10:1 exchange ratio in dogfights and quickly defeated the Chinese attempt to control the air near the Manchurian border.

The Chinese, with Soviet aid, continued to build up towards 1,300 MiGs; the Air Force responded by doling out 60 more F-86s. Despite being so outnumbered, the 150 F-86s easily outfought the 1,300 MiGs, even after the entry of Russian pilots.

The Korean War had tripled the Air Force’s budget, but the lion’s share of that windfall was diverted away from needs of the theater into nuclear bombers and nuclear bomber interceptors for Europe, all of them unusable in Korean combat. By 1960 the Air Force had shrunk the active tactical fighters down to about 1,000. Yet, in the same 1950 to 1960 period, the bomber generals found plenty of money to build 3,000 extremely expensive nuclear jet bombers and all-weather interceptors.

By the time the Vietnam War heated up in 1964, the Air Force had not a single tactical fighter in production. Scraping together their on-hand “fighters”, the Air Force deployed 270 aging, nuclear-wired F-100C/Ds and 110 sluggish F-105 single engine nuclear bombers. Both proved highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft guns and MiGs; 243 F-100s and 397 F-105s were lost.

Soon the Air Force was forced by Secretary McNamara to start replacing their rapidly attriting combat fleet with the only alternative in active production, the Navy’s F-4 nuclear-bomber interceptor. Hastily converted to the bomber role, the F-4 fleet eventually grew to 285 aircraft in-theater and suffered almost equally high loss rates: 445 were lost by the war’s end.

Six years of bombing North Vietnam with fighter-bombers–with losses exceeding a thousand aircraft–failed to bring the enemy to the negotiating table and failed to prevent the North from supplying the war in the South. A last-gasp effort by the heavy bomber advocates sent 724 B-52 sorties to pound Hanoi; 15 were promptly lost (nine times the fighter loss rate) with no bending of the enemy’s will.

In contrast, the Air Force provided a token close support effort in the South (only about 100 sorties per day in 1965), assigned through an astonishingly cumbersome control system and using mostly unsuitable high speed jets. Slow response (circa 40 minutes average); inadequate loiter time and poor accuracy led to unimpressive results. In addition, “friendly fire” complaints from the troops were a common problem.

The only close support standouts were the 55 prop-driven A-1s (forced on the Air Force by Secretary McNamara). The army troops were uniformly grateful for the A-1’s 4 to 5 hour loiter time, the pinpoint accuracy and lethality of its 20mm cannons, and the 5 to 10 gun attacks available on each sortie. Accuracy was better than 20 feet. Friendly fire tragedies were almost unheard of. The A-1s even had remarkable success in night close support. Strafing under the illumination of simple flares, they saved scores of remote Special Forces camps about to be overrun under cover of darkness by massive Viet Cong assaults.

Soon after the end of the Vietnam War, the Air Force received an unasked-for bonanza: sizable production runs of three new fighters, all designed in the late ’60s over the strong opposition of the mainstream Air Force: the 40,000 pound air-to-air F-15 instead of the 80,000 pound swing-wing fighter bomber the Air Force really wanted; the 20,000 pound super-agile air-to-air F-16 which the bomber generals promptly saddled with a bombing mission and 3 tons of added weight; and the devastatingly effective and survivable close support A-10, a plane the Air Force’s bomber advocates tried to scuttle every year that it was in production.

Thirty years later, these three unwanted aircraft now constitute 90% of the combat force –and completely dominate the Air Force’s air-to-air and air-to-ground effectiveness.

For the 1991 Gulf War, Air Force planners devised and launched yet another Douhet-style 39-day bombardment campaign to precede the ground assault, predicting that the enemy was likely to surrender in six days. The bombing of Baghdad, centerpiece of the strategic bombing campaign, ended precipitously on the 20th day with a typical targeting blunder: 2 F-117s bombed an abandoned command bunker that had been converted into a civilian bomb shelter, killing 300 women and children–the world witnessed the gore and mayhem on the evening news.

Militarily, the 20 days of Baghdad bombing had little effect on the Iraqi army in Kuwait. Likewise, the cancellation of the bombing made no noticeable difference. The real stars of the air war–132 A-10s and 12 forward controller OA-10s–were brought into the war only because General Schwarzkopf overrode the strong objections of the Air Force’s planners. Twelve days into the war, two A-10s and an AC-130 destroyed the spearhead of a large Iraqi armored task force invading Saudi Arabia to capture the town of Khafji. Each A-10 had enough 30 mm rounds onboard for 20 attack passes and put them to good use. Over the next two days, hundreds of A-10 sorties per day (plus other aircraft) mauled the remainder of the Iraqi force. The Iraqi Army never again ventured from its defensive positions.

A few days later, deep in the Western Desert, two A-10s, called in by a ground forward controller, annihilated 20 Scud missile launchers preparing to bombard Israel. Overall, the 132 A-10s flew the highest sortie rate in the theater and, based on fleet-wide pilot claims, accounted for more tactical targets destroyed than the Coalition’s entire remaining force of 2000 high speed fighters and bombers.

The Air Force’s air commander, Lt. Gen. Horner, an opponent of deploying A-10s, summed it up: “I take back all the bad things I’ve said about the A-10s. I love them. They are saving our asses.”

To reward this outstanding achievement, the Air Force mothballed half the A-10 fleet within a year. That ostensible cost saving measure coincided with the Air Force’s generous funding of the huge cost overruns being incurred by the B-1, the B-2 and the hyper-inflating F-22.

In Kosovo, the USAF provided about 340 out of a NATO total of 720 combat aircraft intended to bomb President Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbs into submission within two days. After 78 days, the strategic bombardment ended, not because the Serbs capitulated to the bombing, but because the Russians intervened and NATO offered terms better than the ones Serbia had proposed (and we had rejected) before the bombing started. Under Air Force leadership, the NATO bombers attacked the same old “strategic” targets: bridges, factories, power plants, telecommunications, missile batteries, so-called high value targets, etc.

Many targeting blunders (including bombing the Chinese embassy) and 38,000 sorties later, Serbian officials on the ground found that, despite Air Force claims of crippling damage, we had shut down only 3 out of 80 missile batteries, destroyed 14 armored vehicles (against claims of 120 tanks), and inflicted 387 military casualties (versus 5,000 to 10,000 claimed.)

In summary, over the last 60 years of combat, our Air Force has, at higher and higher cost, demonstrated less and less effect on the outcome of each succeeding war. The root causes are equally clear: first, the blind insistence on procuring and planning for little besides the failed strategic bombardment mission; and second, the ingrained development incentives that reward increasing unit cost and complexity without regard to the effect on actual combat effectiveness and force size. If the new Administration follows the “business as usual” pattern, the sequence of events and outcomes is easy to project.

First, the Secretary of Defense will be presented with the usual, impossibly expensive Air Force “wish list.” Today’s wish list amounts to 3,000 planes and $1 trillion in R&D plus procurement over the next 20 years, according to our detailed cost calculations. The Secretary will then haggle this down, with plenty of under-the-table pork-motivated advice from the Congress, to roughly current spending levels, about $12 billion per year.

This will pay for no more than about 50 aircraft a year (or, over the next 20 years, $.25 trillion and about 1,000 new planes.) So “business as usual” leads us, 20 years hence, to a force of about half the size of today’s 4,000 aircraft and 5 to 10 years older than today’s average 20 year age, a force that leaves America with no air option other than bombing the enemy’s heartland and civilians.

Our nation’s defenses–not to mention the lives of those who defend us—urgently depend on a fresh approach. A good start would be to replace the Air Force’s wish list with an effectiveness-based set of austerely-designed and affordable aircraft tailored to missions that actually win wars–for example, the following set of four designs:

* A new close support aircraft smaller, more survivable, and more lethal than the A-10, one that is affordable in vastly larger numbers. (The Air Force plans to use small numbers of the unmaneuverable, highly vulnerable and ineffective F-35, at $150 million each, for this mission.)

* A forward controller spotter plane dramatically more survivable, longer-loitering and far lower cost in than a helicopter, able to land next to the tents of the supported troops. (The Air Force suffers from the delusion that close support can be called in using drones, satellites, and other “high tech” sensors, contrary to the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan.)

* A small, affordable dirt strip airlifter to meet the real emergency needs of beleaguered battalions in the boonies. (The Air Force always short-changes this in-the-mud prop mission in favor of large jet transports.)

* A super-maneuverable new air-to-air dogfighter with all–passive electronics, far smaller with far higher maneuvering performance than the best of the F-16s and thus able to outfight the F-22 or any other advanced fighter in the world. (Emitting no radio/radar signals whatsoever, this new fighter will obsolete the F-22’s electronics, defeat any enemy fighter’s passive warning/identification-friend-or-foe system, and render useless the enemy’s radar-homing missiles which rely on seeking our fighter radars.)

These four aircraft are eminently practical designs, each based on existing engines and requiring no technological breakthroughs. We have done the necessary conceptual design work to establish the size, performance and cost of each–and we have priced out the effectiveness-based program that acquires all four of these planes.

This effectiveness-based program delivers, not 2,000 antiquated, bombing-oriented relics, but a balanced force of 10,000 all-new fighters, airlifters, tankers, close support and forward controller aircraft—all within the current spending levels of $.25 trillion over 20 years. Such a force could actually deliver–right at the outset of any future conflict–devastating close support for the troops, guaranteed by crushing air superiority. And that would be a first in US air history.

The authors:

Col. Robert Dilger (USAF, ret.), an F-4 fighter tactician in Vietnam (187 missions) and then chief air-to-air instructor at the Fighter Weapons School, became A-10 Armament Director in charge of the 30mm cannon, the massive 30mm ammo war reserve production program (reducing its costs by a factor of 8), and the pioneering live fire effectiveness tests of the 30mm against loaded Soviet tanks in formation.

Pierre Sprey, an OSD weapons analyst and engineer, together with Cols. John Boyd and Everest Riccioni, started and then brought the F-16 to fruition by dint of five years of bureaucratic guerilla warfare. He also led the technical side of the A-10’s conceptual design team and, as part of the Fighter Mafia, helped implement the program in spite of implacable AF opposition.

_____________________________
Winslow T. Wheeler
Director
Straus Military Reform Project
Center for Defense Information
301 791-2397

CDI | 1779 Massachusetts Ave, NW | Washington, DC 20036 | US
Unsubscribe from future marketing messages from CDI
Email marketing delivered by Bronto