PRC Scholar: Lack of Bottom Line Mires US in Predicament on Korean Nuclear Issue

PRC Scholar: Lack of Bottom Line Mires US in Predicament on Korean Nuclear Issue

CPP20090304710008 Beijing Huanqiu Shibao Online in Chinese 03 Mar 09

[Article by Zhang Liangui, professor at the Institute of International Strategic Studies of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee: "Lack of Bottom Line Mires United States in Korean Nuclear Predicament"]

Since it tried in vain to attend Barack Obama's inauguration, North Korea has made a series of moves called the "New Year offensive." Its toughness took the world by surprise. On 13 January North Korea published its terms for "nuclear abandonment"; on the 17th, it declared a state of "total confrontation" with South Korea; on the 30th, it further unilaterally announced the nullification of all agreements concluded with South Korea on stopping political and military confrontation and said it was on the "brink of war" with South Korea. In recent days it was stepping up preparations for launching a satellite to carry out "space exploration." By making these moves, North Korea precisely is taking advantage of the opportunity, where the Obama administration has not yet firmly established itself and had a clear "bottom line" on the nuclear issue, to implement a new stratagem of "taking two steps forward and one back."

North Korea's basic stratagem of winning security, time, and funds for its nuclear program through diplomacy precisely is a stratagem of "taking two steps forward and one back." That is to say North Korea would, by making full use of the United States and other countries' fatal weakness of not having set an untouchable bottom line for the nuclear issue, first push the issue to the extreme through big steps and then get everything it wants in return for going back a small step.

In his recently published book, The Legacy, a reporter of The New York Times says: Bush lost to Kim Jong Il [Kim Cho'ng-il] by the score of 0-8. In the confrontation between the United States, which advocates safeguarding non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and North Korea, which insists on developing nuclear weapons, the latter has done and gotten everything it wanted: it set off its nuclear weapons, declared itself a nuclear state, and received energy, food, and even large sums of money as "rewards." What about the United States? For all the time, energy, and US dollars it put in, it has gained nothing.

Technically speaking, there were two reasons why the Bush administration failed: 1. It held an absolute advantage in morality and strength on the issue of opposing nuclear proliferation but it failed to set a bottom line, thus leaving the proposition to which it adhered bereft of goals and principles and itself in "appeasement." 2. By wishful thinking, it framed a supposition that North Korea could be lured, by way of a buyout, into abandoning the nuclear program and made this illusory supposition its basis for the six-party talks. As a result, it was led by the nose by North Korea and caught in "opportunism" in the talks.

After the Korean nuclear issue became apparent, particularly following the formation in 2002 of the second Korean nuclear crisis, the United States and other relevant countries declared in all sincerity and seriousness that they were going to safeguard non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. At that time many thought that now that these powers claiming to be responsible to the international community had made such a declaration, nuclear possession by North Korea must be their bottom line on this issue. Yet, when North Korea in February 2005 announced that it already possessed nuclear weapons, there was no special reaction from the United States. With this encouragement, North Korea flagrantly conducted a nuclear test in October of the next year, dealing a fatal blow to the proposition of non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula; but there was still not much substantial reaction from the United States and other countries. Although the UN Security Council later adopted Resolution No. 1718 on implementing sanctions against North Korea, restrictions were attached in the resolution to "further sanctions," thus rendering it ineffective. Only by then did people realize that the United States actually had no untouchable bottom line on the Korean nuclear issue.

The six-party talks are the best way to bring about non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Even so, the talks are still a tool and means to pursue the aim and are not the aim in themselves. Anyone would know a tool would be changed during work if it were tested to be unhandy. The six-party talks have gone on for nearly six years now since they started in August 2003 but they rarely produced concrete results in safeguarding non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, North Korea made full use of these six years to vigorously advance its nuclear program, finally turning into a nuclear weapon state from a non-nuclear weapon state; it also developed its missile arsenal. Notwithstanding this, the United States has no intention of bravely declaring the six-party talks a failure. Although we do not know whether or not the United States intends to talk for another 50 years, we can see it has no bottom line in the negotiations with regard to time. The United States acts this way because, on the one hand, North Korea has applied the technique of diplomatic fishing by setting up a bait that seems so close yet is forever so elusive and enticing the United States into a pursuit and, on the other, the Americans are innocent and arrogant. The Americans think Western countries' experience that bread is always more important than a cannon likewise applies to North Korea. They think those in power in North Korea, which is economically underdeveloped and short of energy and foreign exchange and has a ill-fed populace, will be happy to give up nuclear weapons for economic development provided sufficient material benefits are offered to its government.

The United States subjectively believes that whether or not North Korea abandons its nuclear program no longer seems an issue facing the six-party talks and that the task of the talks is to find a deal price for the exchange of nuclear abandonment for "compensation." There are even people who believe the six-party talks have been difficult because the "compensations" are not enticing enough. They are not at all aware that what North Korea pursues really is not the outcome of the six-party talks but the value of the process. This line of thought fully reflects the United States' unfamiliarity with North Korea.

By summing up historical experiences, one can see North Korea's objective of taking the path of owning nuclear weapons and becoming a nuclear weapon state has always been firm and unshakable over the past few decades. Neither the signing with South Korea in 1992 of the Joint Declaration on Non-Nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula nor the signing with the United States in 1994 of the Framework Agreement nor even its participation in the six-party talks that started in 2003 has had any impact on North Korea's advancement of its nuclear program. The bottom line set by North Korea for these diplomatic activities is that they must not adversely affect the security of its nuclear program. On the other hand, North Korea requires that diplomacy serve its nuclear program by, first, winning security and time for the program and, second, securing energy, funds, food, etc. to facilitate its advancement.

Faced with the Obama administration, furthermore, North Korea has set its new best, second-best, and third-best goals. Its best goal is to establish diplomatic relations with the United States while keeping and advancing its nuclear program; its second-best goal is to improve relations with the United States under the precondition of keeping the existing nuclear weapons; and its third-best goal is to keep the six-party talks going, in an intermittent manner, for another 20 years until they end up with nothing settled and others have no choice but to accept its status as a nuclear state. Whether these stratagems will prove effective and how the Obama administration is going to respond will both directly affect the future situation on the Korean peninsula.


[Description of Source: Beijing Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times) Online in Chinese -- Website of a newspaper sponsored by Renmin Ribao, that updates daily and focuses on international issues and foreign reaction to developments in the PRC; URL: http://www.huanqiu.com]