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Thursday, October 4, 2007

"Buying the War" Bill Moyers

APRIL 25, 2007: "Buying the War"

http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcript1.html

BILL MOYERS: Four years ago this spring the Bush administration took leave of reality and plunged our country into a war so poorly planned it soon turned into a disaster. The story of how high officials misled the country has been told. But they couldn't have done it on their own; they needed a compliant press, to pass on their propaganda as news and cheer them on.

Since then thousands of people have died, and many are dying to this day. Yet the story of how the media bought what the White House was selling has not been told in depth on television. As the war rages into its fifth year, we look back at those months leading up to the invasion, when our press largely surrendered its independence and skepticism to join with our government in marching to war.

Our report was produced and directed by Kathleen Hughes and edited by Alison Amron.

ANNOUNCER (March 6, 2003): Ladies and Gentlemen: the President of the United States

PRESIDENT BUSH: Good evening, I'm pleased to take your questions tonight.

BILL MOYERS: Two weeks before he will order America to war, President Bush calls a press conference to make the case for disarming Haddam Hussein.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Iraq is a part of the war on terror. It's a country that trains terrorists, it's a country that could arm terrorists. Saddam Hussein and his weapons are a direct threat to this country.

BILL MOYERS: For months now, his administration has been determined to link Iraq to 9/11.

PRESIDENT BUSH: September the 11th should say to the American people that we're now a battle field.

BILL MOYERS: At least a dozen times during this press conference he will invoke 9/11 and Al Qaeda to justify a preemptive attack on a country that has not attacked America.

REPORTER: Mr. President, if you decide...

BILL MOYERS: But the White House press corps will ask no hard questions tonight about those claims. Listen to what the President says:

PRESIDENT BUSH: This is a scripted...(laughter)

REPORTER: Thank you Mr. President--

BILL MOYERS: Scripted. Sure enough, the President's staff has given him a list of reporters to call on.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Let's see here... Elizabeth... Gregory... April...Did you have a question or did I call upon you cold?

APRIL: No, I have a question (laughter)

PRESIDENT BUSH: Okay. I'm sure you do have a question

ERIC BOEHLERT: He sort of giggled and laughed. And, the reporters sort of laughed. And, I don't know if it was out of embarrassment for him or embarrassment for them because they still continued to play along. After his question was done. They all shot up their hands and pretended they had a chance of being called on.

APRIL: How is your faith guiding you?

PRESIDENT BUSH: My faith sustains me because I pray daily. I pray for guidance.

ERIC BOEHLERT: I think it just crystallized what was wrong with the press coverage during the run up to the war...I think they felt like the war was gonna happen. And, they-- the best thing for them to do was to get out of the way.

PRESIDENT BUSH: Thank you for your questions.

BILL MOYERS: Our story begins with the horror of 9/11....

CHARLES GIBSON: (ABC NEWS 9/11/01) Oh my God.

DIANE SAWYER: Oh my God. Oh my God.

CHARLES GIBSON: That looks like a second plane.

BILL MOYERS: Like everyone else journalists were stunned by the death and devestation.

REPORTER (ABC NEWS 9/11/01): This is as close as we can get to the base of the World Trade Center. You can see the firemen assembled here. The police officers, FBI agents. And you can see the two towers - a huge explosion -now raining debris on all of us - we better get out of the way!

AARON BROWN: (CNN LIVE 9/11/01): And there as you can see, perhaps the second tower, the front tower, the top portion of which is collapsing. Good Lord.

PAT DAWSON (NBC NEWS 9/11/01): If there is a war it's a war against terrorism that started, rather ongoing right now, it started here at about quarter to nine this morning.

DAN RATHER: There are no words that can describe this.

DAN RATHER: I was deeply moved by 9/11. I don't know of any American who wasn't. I think we all bought into that the world had changed.

BOB SIMON: I think the atmosphere in the United States after September 11th was so overwhelmingly patriotic. And overwhelmingly: "We must do something about this."

PRESIDENT BUSH (9/14/01 at ground zero): And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon.

CROWD CHANTING: USA! USA!

DAN RATHER (on LATE NIGHT WITH DAVID LETTERMAN (9/17/01): George Bush is the President, he makes the decisions and you know, as just one American wherever he wants me to line up, just tell me where.

DAN RATHER: I didn't mean it in a journalistic sense; I know it may have come across that way. I meant it in a sense as an individual citizen. Mr. President if you need me, if you need me to go to hell and back for my country, I will do it.

DAN RATHER (9/17/01): But I'll tell you this, if they could go down to ground zero here in lower Manhattan-and you referred to it earlier-and see the following, see those fireman....

DAVID LETTERMAN: OK I'll tell you what...

DAN RATHER: I can finish it.

DAVID LETTERMAN: No, no. Dan take care of yourself. We'll be right back here with Dan Rather

BILL MOYERS: What I was wrestling with that night listening to you is; once we let our emotions out as journalists on the air, once we say, we'll line up with the President, can we ever really say to the country the President's out of line.

DAN RATHER: Yes. Of course you can. Of course you can. No journalist should try to be a robot and say 'They've attacked my country, they've killed thousands of people but I don't feel it.' But what you can do and what should have been done in the wake of that is suck it up and say, okay, that's the way I feel. That's the way I feel as a citizen. And I can serve my country best by being the best journalist I can be. That's the way I can be patriotic.

By the way Bill, this is not an excuse. I don't think there is any excuse for, you know, my performance and the performance of the press in general in the roll up to the war. There were exceptions. There were some people, who, I think, did a better job than others. But overall and in the main there's no question that we didn't do a good job.

BILL MOYERS: As Americans reacted to the atrocities of a sneak attack, a powerful surge of solidary swept across the country.

AARON BROWN (CNN Live 9/14/01): One of the things that seems to be binding all Americans these days no matter their backgrounds, in the aftermath of this tragedy, is a renewed sense of patriotism.

BRENT BOZELL: (Fox News Channel, HANNITY AND COLMES 9/28/01) ... To see so many reporters just wearing a little American flag on the lapels, to see Tim Russert on MEET THE PRESS.

SEAN HANNITY: Yeah

BRENT BOZELL: With the red, white and blue ribbons. I think -- I think it's a human emotion there.

BILL MOYERS: And as the administration organized to strike back at the terrorists, there was little tolerance for critical scrutiny from journalists.

WALTER ISAACSON: There was a patriotic fervor and the administration used it so that if you challenged anything you were made to feel that there was something wrong with that.

BILL MOYERS: Walter Isaacson was then Chairman and Chief Executive Officer OF CNN.

WALTER ISAACSON: And there was even almost a patriotism police which, you know, they'd be up there on the internet sort of picking anything a Christiane Amanpour, or somebody else would say as if it were disloyal....

BILL MOYERS: We interviewed a former reporter at CNN who had been there through that period. And this reporter said this quote, "Everybody on staff just sort of knew not to push too hard to do stories critical of the Bush Administration."

WALTER ISAACSON: Especially right after 9/11. Especially when the war in Afghanistan is going on. There was a real sense that you don't get that critical of a government that's leading us in war time.

SOLDIER: Move out!

BILL MOYERS: When American forces went after the terrorist bases in Afghanistan, network and cable news reported the civilian casualties...the patriot police came knocking.

WALTER ISAACSON: We'd put it on the air and by nature of a 24 hour TV network, it was replaying over and over again. So, you would get phone calls. You would get advertisers. You would get the Administration.

BILL MOYERS: You said pressure from advertisers?

WALTER ISAACSON: Not direct pressure from advertisers, but big people in corporations were calling up and saying, 'You're being anti-American here.'

BILL MOYERS: So Isaacson sent his staff a memo, leaked to THE WASHINGTON POST: 'It seems perverse' he said, 'to focus too much on the casualties or hardship in Afghanistan,"

REPORTER: There's a body up here.

BILL MOYERS: And he ordered his reporters and anchors to balance the images of civilian devastation with reminders of September 11th.

WALTER ISAACSON: I felt if we put into context, we could alleviate the pressure of people saying, "Don't even show what's happening in Afghanistan."

BILL MOYERS: Newspapers were squeezed, too. This one in Florida told its editors: "Do not use photos on page 1a showing civilian casualties..." our sister paper ...has done so and received hundreds and hundreds of threatening e-mails ... "

And then there was Fox News: Whose chief executive — the veteran Republican operative and media strategist Roger Ailes — had privately urged the white house to use the harshest measures possible after 9/11...

WALTER ISSACSON: ... so we were caught between this patriotic fervor and a competitor who was using that to their advantage; they were pushing the fact that CNN was too liberal that we were sort of vaguely anti-American.

BILL MOYERS: Even as American troops were still chasing Osama bin Laden through the mountains of Afghanistan, Washington was moving toward a wider war. Within hours after the attacks on 9/11, Defense Secretary Rumsfield put Saddam Hussein on the hit list. An aide took notes.


DAN RATHER: I knew before 9/11 that many of the people who came into the administration were committed to toppling Saddam Hussein. And doing it with military force if necessary.

BILL MOYERS: Dan Rather is talking about prominent Washington figures in and outside of government...known as neoconservatives. They had long wanted to transform the Middle East, beginning with the removal of Saddam Hussein. The terrorist attacks gave them the chance they wanted. And the media gave them a platform.

JOHN KING (WAR ROOM WITH WOLF BLITZER,CNN 11/19/01): Richard Perle? Next phase Saddam Hussein?

RICHARD PERLE: Absolutely.

WILLIAM KRISTOL (FOX NEWS 11/24/01): One person close to the debate said to me this week that it's no longer a question of if, it's a question of how we go after Saddam Hussein.

BILL MOYERS: In the weeks after 9/11 they seemed to be on every channel, gunning for Hussein.

TED KOPPEL (NIGHTLINE 11/28/01): You are probably the hawkiest of the hawks on this. Why?

JAMES WOOLSEY: Well I don't know that I accept that characterization but it's probably not too far off. I think that the Baghdad regime is a serious danger to world peace.

RICHARD PERLE (ABC THIS WEEK 11/18/01): Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of Saddam Hussein, plus his known contact with terrorists, including Al Qaeda terrorists, is simply a threat too large to continue to tolerate.

BILL MOYERS: Among their leading spokesmen were Richard Perle and James Woolsey. Both sat on the Defense Policy Board advising Donald Rumsfeld. And they used their inside status to assure the press that overthrowing Hussein would be easy.

RICHARD PERLE (CNN 11/19/01): We would be seen as liberators in Iraq.

BILL MOYERS: Major newspapers and magazines gave them prime space to make their case, including the possibility that 9/11 had been "sponsored, supported and perhaps even ordered by Saddam Hussein." The president, they said, should take "Preemptive action."

WILLIAM KRISTOL (MEET THE PRESS, NBC, 10/7/01): The biggest mistake we have made-it's our mistake, it's not the mistake of the Arabs-- was not finishing off Saddam Hussein in 1991.

BILL MOYERS: No one got more air time from an arm chair than Bill Kristol, editor of THE WEEKLY STANDARD And a media savvy Republican strategist.

In the 1990s Kristol organized a campaign for increased military spending and a muscular foreign policy. In 1998 he and his allies wrote President Bill Clinton urging him 'to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

And now, just days after 9/11 with many of their allies serving in the administration, they wrote an open letter to President Bush calling for regime change in bagdad. Over the coming months Kristol's Weekly Standard kept up the drum beat.

FRED BARNES (BELTWAY BOYS, Fox 11/24/01): What are the consequences if the US does not finish off this Saddam Hussein as a second step in the war on terrorism?

WILLIAM KRISTOL: It would mean that the president having declared a global war on terrorism didn't follow through-- didn't take out the most threatening terrorist state in the world."

TIM RUSSERT (MEET THE PRESS, NBC 12/30/01): Safire will you wager Ms. Wright, right now that Saddam will be out of power by the end of 2002.

WILLIAM SAFIRE: Absolutely. I'll see you here a year from now.

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER: (FOX NEWS 9/22/01) If you go after Iraq you're gonna lose a lot of allies, but who cares.

BILL MOYERS: Charles Krauthammer and other top columnists at THE WASHINGTON POST also saw the hand of Saddam Hussein in the terrorist attacks...

Jim Hoagland implicated Hussein within hours after the suicide bombers struck on 9/11....

...and the POST's George Will fired away on the talk shows.

GEORGE WILL (ABC 10/28/01): The administration knows he's vowed-Hussein has vowed revenge, he has anthrax, he loves biological weapons, he has terrorist training camps, including 747's to practice on...

BILL MOYERS: It was proving difficult to distinguish the opinion of the pundits from the policies of the administration...but as the hullabaloo over Saddam grew in Washington, Bob Simon of CBS News '60 Minutes' was dumbfounded. He is based in the Middle East.

BOB SIMON: From overseas we had a clearer view. I mean we knew things or suspected things that-- perhaps the Washington press corps could not suspect. For example, the absurdity of putting up a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda.

BILL MOYERS: Absurdity. The Washington press corps cannot question an absurdity?

BOB SIMON: Well maybe the Washington press corps based inside the belt-- wasn't as aware as those of us who are based in the Middle East and who spend a lot of time in Iraq. I mean when the Washington press corps travels, it travels with the president or with the secretary of state. And--

BILL MOYERS: In a bubble.

BOB SIMON: Yeah in a bubble. Where as we who've spent weeks just walking the streets of Baghdad and in other situations in Baghdad-- just were scratching our heads. In ways that perhaps that the Washington press corps could not.

BILL MOYERS: Simon was under no illusions about Saddam Hussein. During the first Gulf War he and his camera crew were arrested by Iraqi forces, and brutalized for 40 days before being released.

BOB SIMON: We're going home, which is the, the place you go to after a war when, if you've been as lucky as we've been.

BILL MOYERS: It didn't make sense to Simon that the dictator would trust islamic terrorists.

BOB SIMON: Saddam as most tyrants, was a total control freak. He wanted total control of his regime. Total control of the country. And to introduce a wild card like Al Qaeda in any sense was just something he would not do. So I just didn't believe it for an instant.

JOHN WALCOTT: And some of the things that were said, many of the things that were said about Iraq didn't make sense. And that really prompts you to ask, "Wait a minute. Is this true? Does everyone agree that this is true? Does anyone think this is not true?"

JOHN WALCOTT: This is what we're going to do, this is plan A now...

BILL MOYERS: John Walcott Wasn't buying the official line, either. The Bureau Chief of Knight Ridder News Service, he and his reporters covered Washington for 32 newspapers spread across the country.

JOHN WALCOTT: Our readers aren't here in Washington. They aren't up in New York. They aren't the people who send other people's kids to war. They're the people who get sent to war.

And we felt an obligation to them, to explain why that might happen. We were determined to scrutinize the administration's case for war as closely as we possibly could. And that's what we set out to do.

BILL MOYERS: So as he listened to pundits and officials talking about Saddam Hussein's supposed connections to 9/11 Walcott was skeptical.

JOHN WALCOTT: It was not clear to us why anyone was asking questions about Iraq in the wake of an attack that had Al Qaeda written all over it.

BILL MOYERS: He assigned his two top reporters to investigate the claims. Between them, Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay, had more than 40 years experience reporting on foreign affairs and national security. They had lots of sources to call on.

WARREN STROBEL: We were basically I think hearing two different messages from-- there's a message-- the public message the administration was giving out about Iraq — it's WMD-- the fact there was an immediate threat-- grave threat-- gathering threat and — but the was so different from what we were hearing from people on the inside, people we had known in many cases for years and trusted.

BILL MOYERS: They went about their reporting the old-fashioned way — with shoe leather... tracking down and meeting with sources deep inside the intelligence community.

WARREN STROBEL: When you're talking to the working grunts, you know-- uniform military officers, intelligence professionals-- professional diplomats, those people are more likely than not-- not always, of course, but more likely than not to tell you some version of the truth, and to be knowledgeable about what they're talking about when it comes to terrorism or the Middle East, things like that.

BILL MOYERS: Strobel learned that within two weeks after 9/11, senior intelligence officers were growing concerned that the bush administration was stretching 'little bits and pieces of information....' to Connect Saddam Hussein to Al qaeda — with no hard evidence.

WARREN STROBEL: There was a lot of skepticism among our editors because what we were writing was so at odds with what most of the rest of the Washington press corps was reporting and some of our papers frankly, just didn't run the stories. They had access to the NEW YORK TIMES wire and the WASHINGTON POST wire and they chose those stories instead.

BILL MOYERS: Within the month Strobel found out the Pentagon had already dispatched James Woolsey to Europe looking for any shred of evidence to incriminate hussein....

WARREN STROBEL: He did this even knowing that the CIA had already analyzed this carefully and found no such links. So, the more I thought about that, the more it just didn't seem to make sense.

BILL MOYERS: Knight Ridder's early skepticism was a rarity inside the beltway bubble.....

JOHN WALCOTT: A decision to go to war, even against an eighth-rate power such as Iraq, is the most serious decision that a government can ever make. And it deserves the most serious kind of scrutiny that we in the media can give it. Is this really necessary? Is it necessary to send our young men and women to go kill somebody else's young men and women?

BILL MOYERS: That meant asking questions about the sources of information the press and government were relying on, including, notably, this man, Ahmed Chalabi.

After the first gulf war americans had installed Cchalabi as the leader of Iraqi exiles seeking regime change in Baghdad. Now he was all over Washington, as the administration's and the neo-conservatives' star witness against Saddam.

AHMED CHALABI: Hello... Yes, very well.

JOHN WALCOTT: Chalabi's motives were always perfectly clear in this and understandable. He was an Iraqi. He didn't want his country run by a thug and a murderer, a mass murderer-- and a crook. And everything he said had to be looked at in that light, and scrutinized in that light.

And why anyone would give him a free pass, or anyone else a free pass for that matter, on a matter as important as going to war, is beyond me.

JAMES BAMFORD: Chalabi was a creature of American propaganda to a large degree. It was a American company, the Rendon Group, that — working secretly with the CIA — basically created his organization, the Iraqi National Congress. And put Chalabi in charge basically.

BILL MOYERS: James Bamford is an independent journalist whose specialty is the intelligence world.

JAMES BAMFORD: From the very beginning Chalabi was paid a lot of money from the US taxpayers. The CIA paid him originally about 350,000 dollars a month, to Chalabi and his organization. The CIA finally caught on in the mid-90s that-- Chalabi was a conman basically. And, they dropped him.

BILL MOYERS: Chalabi's handlers in Washington were not deterred by that stain on his credibility. He charmed Congress out of millions more dollars for his cause, and had the press eating out of his hand.

JAMES BAMFORD: He made a lot of friends in the media. And, he convinced a lot of people that he was legitimate even though the CIA had dropped him.

BILL MOYERS: When Chalabi made selected iraqi defectors available to the press it was a win-win game: the defectors got a platform. Journalists got big scoops.

MICHAEL MASSING: There was a big effort, in fact, to find people who seemed to have credible evidence about what was going on inside Iraq. Because, in fact, if you could find somebody who was credible — talking about a nuclear program — in Iraq or chemical weapons, that would be a big story.

BILL MOYERS: And it worked. THE NEW YORKER. USA TODAY. THE WASHINGTON POST. THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS. THE NEW YORK TIMES. And on PBS just two months after 9/11, Frontline and the New York Times teamed up for a documentary on the defectors.

FRONTLINE NARRATOR (FRONTLINE, PBS, 11/8/01): Captain Sabah Khodada is a former army officer who defected from Iraq. He made a crude drawing of what he says is a terrorist training camp on the outskirts of Baghdad.

BILL MOYERS: There were caveats...

FRONTLINE NARRATOR: And a further caution: these defectors have been brought to FRONTLINE's attention by one group of Iraqi dissidents, the INC, The Iraqi National Congress.

BILL MOYERS: But the caveats couldn't compete with the spectacular tales told by defectors.

Before the invasion THE NEW YORK TIME's Judith Miller would write 6 prominent stories based on their testimony.

JUDITH MILLER: Ahmed Chalabi is a controversial leader of the Iraqi opposition...

BILL MOYERS: And still on the web, a report about the defectors, narrated By Judith Miller and produced By NEW YORK TIMES Television for THE NEWSHOUR on PBS...

JAMES BAMFORD: Well, Judy Miller had been an old friend of Chalabi. Did a lot of the stories on Chalabi. Was very favorable to Chalabi.

BILL MOYERS: James Bamford found out that in 2001 Chalabi had arranged for Miller to meet in Thailand with a defector from Iraq named Al-Haideri.

JAMES BAMFORD: So, Al-Haideri was in Bangkok. Judy Miller flew there to interview him.

JAMES BAMFORD: The NEW YORK TIMES ran a front page-- story-- basically confirming everything the administration had been saying about Iraq -

BILL MOYERS: Al-Haideri said he was a Kurd from northern Iraq. He told Miller the Iraqis had hidden chemical and biological weapons....Some.... miller reported...... Right under Saddam's "presidential sites."

BILL MOYERS: The story spread far and wide.

MICHAEL MASSING: THE NEW YORK TIMES is just-- remains immensely influential. People in the TV world read it every morning, and it's amazing how often you'll see a story go from the front page of the day's paper in the morning to the evening news cast at night. People in government-- of course read it, think tanks, and so on.

JONATHAN LANDAY: There were some red flags that the NEW YORK TIMES story threw out immediately, which caught our eye-- immediately. The first was the idea that a Kurd-- the enemy of Saddam had been allowed into his most top secret military facilities. I don't think so. That was, for me, the biggest red flag. And there were others, like the idea that Saddam Hussein would put a biological weapons facility under his residence. I mean, would you put a biological weapons lab under your living room? I don't think so.

WARREN STROBEL: The first rule of being an intelligence agent, or a journalist, and they're really not that different, is you're skeptical of defectors, because they have a reason to exaggerate. They want to increase their value to you. They probably want something from you. Doesn't mean they're lying, but you should be -- journalists are supposed to be skeptical, right? And I'm-afraid the NEW YORK TIMES reporter in that case and a lot of other reporters were just not skeptical of what these defectors were saying. Nor was the administration...

FOX NEWS ANCHOR (8/1/02): A former top Iraqi nuclear scientists tells congress Iraq could build three nuclear bombs by 2005.

CNN NEWS ANCHOR (12/21/01): Well, now another defector. A senior Iraqi intelligence official tells Vanity Fair in an exclusive interview that Saddam Hussein has trained an elite fighting force in sabotage, urban warfare, hijacking and murder. David Rose wrote the story, he joins us now from London.

BILL MOYERS: In VANITY FAIR's David Rose, defectors found another eager beaver for their claims. The glossy magazine, a favorite of media elites, gave him four big spreads to tell defector stories.

BILL MOYERS: The talk shows lapped it up.

DAVID ROSE: (MSNBC 12/21/01) What the defector Al-Qurairy, a former brigadier general in the Iraqi intelligence service, told me is that these guys, there are twelve hundred in all and they've been trained to hijack trains, buses, ships and so forth...

JONATHAN LANDAY: As you track their stories, they become ever more fantastic, and they're the same people who are telling these stories, 'til you get to the most fantastic tales of all, which appeared in Vanity Fair Magazine.

DAVID ROSE: The last training exercise was to blow up a full size mock up of a US destroyer in a lake in central Iraq.

JONATHAN LANDAY: Or jumping into pits of fouled water and having to kill a dog with your bare teeth. I mean, the-- and this was coming from people, who are appearing in all of these-- these stories, and as I-- and-- and-- and sometimes their rank would change.

LESLIE STAHL: (60 MINUTES, CBS 3/3/02)...Musawi told us that he has verified that this man was an officer in Iraq's ruthless intelligence service the Mukhabarat

JONATHAN LANDAY: And, you're saying, "Wait a minute. There's something wrong here, because in this story he was a Major, but in this story the guy's a Colonel. And, in this story this was his function, but now he says in this story he was doing something else.

LESLIE STAHL: The defector is telling Musawi that in order to evade the UN inspectors Saddam Hussein put his biological weapons laboratories in trucks that the defector told us he personally bought from Renault. >LESLIE STAHL: Refrigerator trucks?

DEFECTOR: Yeah, yeah.

LESLIE STAHL: And how many?

DEFECTOR: Seven.

BILL MOYERS: Leslie Stahl and CBS Retracted their story a year after the invasion when nearly all the evidence presented by defectors proved to be false.

VANITY FAIR's Rose later said high government officials had confirmed his stories. But these were the very officials who had bet on Chalabi as their favorite man o'war. To the Knight Ridder team it all smelled of a con game.

JOHN WALCOTT: What he did was reasonably clever but fairly obvious, which is he gave the same stuff to some reporters that, for one reason or another, he felt would simply report it. And then he gave the same stuff to people in the Vice President's office and in the Secretary of Defense's office. And so, if the reporter called the Department of Defense or the Vice President's office to check, they would've said, "Oh, I think that's-- you can go with that. We have that, too." So, you create the appearance, or Chalabi created the appearance, that there were two sources, and that the information had been independently confirmed, when, in fact, there was only one source. And it hadn't been confirmed by anybody.

JONATHAN LANDAY: And let's not forget how close these people were to this administration, which raises the question, was there coordination? I can't tell you that there was, but it sure looked like it.

BILL MOYERS: The administration was now stepping up efforts to nail down a tangible link between Saddam and 9/11. Journalists were tipped to a meeting that supposedly took place in Prague between Iraqi agents and the 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta. Pundits had a field day.

GEORGE WILL: (THIS WEEK, ABC 10/28/01) He has contacts outside in Sudan and Afghanistan with terrorists. He met... They did indeed have a contact between Atta and an Iraqi diplomat.

BILL MOYERS: In THE NEW YORK TIMES William Safire called the Prague meeting an 'undisputed fact'. He would write about the Atta connection ten times in his op-ed column.

BILL MOYERS: Just weeks after 9/11, Safire had predicted a 'quick war' ....With Iraqis cheering their liberators and leading 'the Arab world toward democracy."

BILL MOYERS: Between March 2002 and the invasion a year later Safire would write a total of 27 opinion pieces fanning the sparks of war.

BILL MOYERS: And on Tim Russert's MEET THE PRESS Safire kept it up.

TIM RUSSERT (MEET THE PRESS, NBC7/28/02): Bill Safire, the difference between sufficient provocation and a preemptive strike?

WILLIAM SAFIRE: I don't think we need any more provocation then we've had by ten years of breaking his agreement at the cease fire. He has been building weapons of mass destruction.

BILL MOYERS: In October his own paper ran a front page story by James Risen questioning the evidence.

BILL MOYERS: Then came this report from Bob Simon:

BOB SIMON (60 MINUTES 12/8/02): The administration has been trying to make the link to implicate Saddam Hussein in the attacks of September 11th and they've been pointing to an alleged meeting between Mohammed Atta, the lead hijacker, and an Iraqi intelligence officer in the Czech capital of Prague.

BOB SIMON: If we had combed Prague and found out that there was absolutely no evidence for a meeting between Mohammad Atta and the-- the Iraqi intelligence figure. If we knew that, you had to figure that the administration knew it. And yet they were selling the connection between Al Qaeda and Saddam.

BOB SIMON: (60 MINUTES) Bob Baer spent 16 years as an undercover agent for the CIA in the Middle East.

BILL MOYERS: How did you get to Bob Baer, the former CIA official who was such an important source for you?

BOB SIMON: We we called him.

BILL MOYERS: How did you find him? Did you know him?

BOB SIMON: I knew some friends of his. It was-- it wasn't a problem getting his phone number. I mean any reporter could get his phone number.

BILL MOYERS: Who was he? And what-- why was he important?

BOB SIMON: He was one of the guys who was sent to Prague to find that link. He was sent to find the link between Al Qaeda and Saddam

BILL MOYERS: He would have been a hero if he'd found the link.

BOB SIMON: Oh my heavens yes. I mean this was what-- everyone was looking for.

BILL MOYERS: But there was little appetite inside the networks for taking on a popular war time president. So Simon decided to wrap his story inside a more benign account of how the White House was marketing the war.

BOB SIMON (60 MINUTES 12/8/02): It's not the first time a president has mounted a sales campaign to sell a war.

BOB SIMON: And I think we all felt from the beginning that to deal with a subject as explosive as this, we should keep it in a way almost light., if that doesn't seem ridiculous.

BILL MOYERS: Going to war, almost light.

BOB SIMON: Not to-- not to present it as a frontal attack on the administration's claims. Which would have been not only premature, but we didn't have the ammunition to do it at the time. We did not know then that there were no mass-- weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

We only knew that the connection the administration was making between Saddam and Al Qaeda was very tenuous at best and that the argument it was making over the aluminum tubes seemed highly dubious. We knew these things. And therefore we could present the Madison Avenue campaign on these things. Which was a-- sort of softer, less confrontational way of doing it

BILL MOYERS: Did you go to any of the brass at CBS-- even at 60 MINUTES-- and say, "Look, we gotta dig deeper. We gotta connect the dots. This isn't right."

BOB SIMON: No in all-- in all honesty, with a thousand Mea Culpas-- I've done a few stories in Iraq. But-- nope I don't think we followed up on this.

ARI FLEISHER (9/18/02): Iraq is in possession of weapons of mass destruction contrary to their promises...

BILL MOYERS: What the White House was now marketing as fact would go virtually unchallenged.

DONALD RUMSFELD (Department of Defense Press Briefing, 9/26/02): We know they have weapons of mass destruction, we know they have active programs.

BILL MOYERS: As the WASHINGTON POST'S veteran reporter Walter Pincus would later report, the propaganda machine was run by the president's inner circle — officials who called themselves the White House Iraq Group, or WHIG.....

BILL MOYERS: You wrote that WHIG included Karl Rove, the chief of staff, Andrew Card, Mary Matalin, Condi Rice, Steven Hadley, Lewis Libby and they were in charge of selling the war.

WALTER PINCUS: Selling the war. Yeah.

PRESIDENT BUSH (9/11/02): Good evening. A long year has passed since enemies attacked our country.

BILL MOYERS: Their chief salesman had the best props at his disposal

PRESIDENT BUSH (9/11/02): ...and we will not allow any terrorist or tyrant to threaten civilization with weapons of mass murder.

WALTER PINCUS: They created that link.

BILL MOYERS: The marketing group?

WALTER PINCUS: The marketing group. And the link was a twofold link. One, he had weapons of mass destruction. And two, he supported terrorists. And they repeated it everyday. anybody who watches-- television these days knows you sell a product, not just by saying it once, by saying it over and over again with new spokesmen two, three times a day and it sinks into the public.

BILL MOYERS: But is there anything unusual about an administration marketing its policy?

WALTER PINCUS: It's, I think each administration has learned from the other, and with this group is just the cleverest I've ever seen-- and took it to new heights.

NORM SOLOMON: The TV, radio, print, other media outlets are as crucial to going to war as the bombs and the bullets and the planes. They're part of the arsenal, the propaganda weaponry, if you will. And that's totally understood across the board, at the Pentagon, the White House, the State Department.

COLIN POWELL (9/26/02): A proven menace like Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction

PRESIDENT BUSH (Discussion with Congressional Leaders, 9/26/02): The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons

DONALD RUMSFELD (DOD Press Briefing 9/26/02): We do have solid evidence of the presence in Iraq of Al Qaeda members.

PRESIDENT BUSH: The regime has long standing and continuing ties to terrorist organizations.

BOB SIMON: Just repeat it and repeat it and repeat it. Repeat Al Qaeda, Iraq. Al Qaeda, Iraq. Al Qaeda, Iraq. Just keep it going. Keep that drum beat going.

And it was effective because long after it was well established that there was no link between Al Qaeda and the government of Iraq and the Saddam regime, the polls showed that an overwhelming majority of Americans believed that Al Qaeda-- that Iraq was responsible for September 11th.

JONATHAN LANDAY: Most people actually believed and accepted that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. I have to admit that until we really started burrowing into the story-- that I believed it, too.

JONATHAN LANDAY: Is this something that they could go along with...

BILL MOYERS: Landay found plenty of evidence to contradict the official propaganda, and the facts quickly changed his mind.

JONATHAN LANDAY: I -- simply spent basically a month familiarizing myself, with what Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs had been and what had happened to them. And, there was tons of material available on that from the UN weapons inspectors. I mean, they got into virtually everything, and their reports were online.

JONATHAN LANDAY: If you go down here the Iraq Nuclear Verification Office, they put up regular-here you go-key findings, what they found out about Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. It's all here in the open for anybody who wants to read it.

BILL MOYERS: International inspectors had gone into Iraq after the first Gulf War to search for and to destroy Saddam Hussein's weapons systems....Late in 1998, the inspections came to an abrupt halt after the iraqi government refused to cooperate...but that hardly meant no one was watching.

JONATHAN LANDAY: During the period of time between when the inspectors left Iraq, which was in 1998-- the end of 1998 and then, the United States had covered the place with spy satellites and-- U2 over flights, and-- you know, the-- other intelligence services had their eyeballs on this place.

DICK CHENEY: (Speech to the VFW 8/26/02) There is a great danger that...

BILL MOYERS: That's why Landay was surprised by what Vice President Cheney told a group of veterans in late august 2002.

DICK CHENEY: (Speech to the VFW 8/26/02) Many of us are convinced that Saddam Hussein will acquire nuclear weapons fairly soon.

JONATHAN LANDAY: ...And I looked at that and I said, "What is he talking about?" Because, to develop a nuclear weapon you need specific infrastructure and in particular the way the Iraqi's were trying to produce a nuclear weapon was through enrichment of uranium.

Now, you need tens of thousands of machines called "centrifuges" to produce highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon. You've gotta house those in a fairly big place, and you've gotta provide a huge amount of power to this facility. Could he really have done it with all of these eyes on his country?

DICK CHENEY: (Speech to the VFW 8/26/02) But we now know that Saddam has resumed his efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

JONATHAN LANDAY: So, when Cheney said that, I got on the phone to people, and one person said to me-- somebody who watched proliferation as their job-said, "The Vice President is lying."

BILL MOYERS: On the basis of his intelligence sources Landay wrote there was little evidence to back up the Vice President's claims.

BILL MOYERS: But the story Landay wrote didn't run In New York or Washington - Knight Ridder, remember, has no outlet in either city. So it couldn't compete with a blockbuster that appeared two days later on the front page of the nation's paper of record, with a familiar by-line....

BILL MOYERS: Quoting anonymous administration officials, the TIMES reported that Saddam Hussein had launched a worldwide hunt for materials to make an atomic bomb using specially designed aluminimum tubes...

And there on MEET THE PRESS that same morning was Vice President Cheney.

DICK CHENEY (MEET THE PRESS NBC 9/8/02): There's a story in the NEW YORK TIMES this morning, this is-- and I want to attribute this to the TIMES -- I don't want to talk about obviously specific intelligence sources, but--

JONATHAN LANDAY: Now, ordinarily information-- like the aluminum tubes would-- wouldn't appear-it was top secret intelligence, and the Vice President and the National Security Advisor would not be allowed to talk about this on the Sunday talk shows. But, it appeared that morning in the NEW YORK TIMES and, therefore, they were able to talk about it.

DICK CHENEY (MEET THE PRESS NBC 9/8/02): It's now public that in fact he has been seeking to acquire and we have been able to intercept to prevent him from acquiring through this particular channel the kinds of tubes that are necessary to build a centrifuge and the centrifuge is required to take low grade uranium and enhance it into highly enriched uranium which is what you have to have in order to build a bomb."

BILL MOYERS: Did you see that performance?

BOB SIMON: I did.

BILL MOYERS: What did you think?

BOB SIMON: I thought it was remarkable.

BILL MOYERS: Why?

BOB SIMON: Remarkable. You leak a story, and then you quote the story. I mean, that's a remarkable thing to do.

BILL MOYERS: And that's only part of it. Using the identical language of the anonymous sources quoted in the TIMES, top officials were now invoking the ultimate spectre of nuclear war -- the smoking gun as mushroom cloud.

CONDOLEEZA RICE (CNN 9/8/02): There will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire a nuclear weapon. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud."

ERIC BOEHLERT: Those sorts of stories when they-- appear on the front page of the so called liberal NEW YORK TIMES. It absolutely comes with a stamp of approval. I mean if the NEW YORK TIMES thinks Saddam is on the precipice of-- some mushroom clouds. Then, there's really no debate.

BOB SCHEIFFER: (FACE THE NATION, CBS 9/8/02) We read in the NEW YORK TIMES today a story that says that Saddam Hussein is closer to acquiring nuclear weapons... Does he have nuclear weapons, is there a smoking gun here?

DONALD RUMSFELD: The smoking gun is an interesting phrase.

COLIN POWELL: Then as we saw in reporting just this morning...

TIM RUSSERT: What specifically has he obtained that you believe will enhance his nuclear development program.

BILL MOYERS: Was it just a coincidence in your mind that Cheney came on your show and others went on the other Sunday shows, the very morning that that story appeared?

TIM RUSSERT: I don't know. The NEW YORK TIMES is a better judge of that than I am.

BILL MOYERS: No one tipped you that it was going to happen?

TIM RUSSERT: No, no. I mean-

BILL MOYERS: The-- the Cheney-- office didn't make any-- didn't leak to you that there's gonna be a big story?

TIM RUSSERT: No. No. I mean, I don't-- I don't have the-- this is, you know, on MEET THE PRESS, people come on and there are no ground rules. We can ask any question we want. I did not know about the aluminum-tube story until I read it in the NEW YORK TIMES.

BILL MOYERS: Critics point to September eight, 2002 and to your show in particular, as the classic case of how the press and the government became inseparable.

Someone in the administration plants a dramatic story in the NEW YORK TIMES And then the Vice President comes on your show and points to the NEW YORK TIMES. It's a circular, self-confirming leak.

TIM RUSSERT: I don't know how Judith Miller and Michael Gordon reported that story, who their sources were. It was a front-page story of the NEW YORK TIMES. When Secretary Rice and Vice President Cheney and others came up that Sunday morning on all the Sunday shows, they did exactly that.

TIM RUSSERT: What my concern was, is that there were concerns expressed by other government officials. And to this day, I wish my phone had rung, or I had access to them.

BILL MOYERS: Bob Simon didn't wait for the phone to ring.

BILL MOYERS: When you said a moment ago when we started talking to people who knew about aluminum tubes. What people-who were you talking to?

BOB SIMON: We were talking to people - to scientists - to scientists and to researchers and to people who had been investigating Iraq from the start.

BILL MOYERS: Would these people have been available to any reporter who called or were they exclusive sources for 60 minutes?

BOB SIMON: No, I think that many of them would have been available to any reporter who called.

BILL MOYERS: And you just picked up the phone?

BOB SIMON: Just picked up the phone.

BILL MOYERS: Talked to them?

BOB SIMON: Talked to them and then went down with the cameras.

BILL MOYERS: Few journalists followed suit. And throughout the fall of 2002 high officials were repeating apocaplyptic warnings with virtually no demand from the establishment press for evidence.

PRESIDENT BUSH (Cincinnati Speech, 10/7/02): Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final proof-the smoking gun -that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.

BILL MOYERS: Could members of the press have known at that point that the administration was exaggerating?

WALTER PINCUS: Individuals did it. There were specialists who were raising questions. And one of our reporters, Joby Warrick wrote a very tough piece about not just the disagreement, but-- but how doubtful it was that these tubes were for nuclear weapons. It was a one-day piece in our paper. And it wasn't picked up.

BILL MOYERS: But Warrick's story appeared on page 18, not page one.

HOWARD KURTZ: The front page of THE WASHINGTON POST or any newspaper is a billboard of what the editors are telling you, these are the most important stories of the day. And stories that don't run on the front page, the reader sort of gets that, well, these are of secondary importance.

BILL MOYERS: Howard Kurtz is the WASHINGTON POST media critic.

HOWARD KURTZ: I went back and did the math. From August 2002 until the war was launched in March of 2003 there were about 140 front page pieces in THE WASHINGTON POST making the administration's case for war.

It was, "The President said yesterday." "The Vice President said yesterday." The Pentagon said yesterday." Well, that's part of our job. Those people want to speak. We have to provide them a platform. I don't have anything wrong with that. But there was only a handful-- a handful of stories that ran on the front page. Some more that ran inside the pages of the paper that made the opposite case. Or, if not making the opposite case, raised questions.

Was this really true? What was the level of proof? Did the CIA really know? What were those aluminum tubes? Those stories, and some reporters worked hard on them, had a harder time getting on the front page. Why because they weren't definitive.

BILL MOYERS: But who defines definitive? Reporter Walter Pincus' sources deep inside the government questioned how the intelligence was being used. But his stories were mostly relegated to the back pages. Across the media world the bellicose but uncomfirmed claims made the big headlines. The cautionary stories did not.

WALTER PINCUS: And I believe honestly, people don't have a fear of irritating the White House-- certainly not at the WASHINGTON POST. But-- they do worry about sort of getting out ahead of something.

BILL MOYERS: Isn't that supposed to be scoop journalism?

WALTER PINCUS: Well but you could be wrong.

NORM SOLOMEN: It's a truism that individual journalists, and in fact the top rank media outlets they work for, really want to be ahead of the curve but not out on a limb. And, if you took seriously the warning flags that were profuse before the invasion of Iraq, that the administration's story was a bunch of nonsense about WMDs, you would not just be ahead of the curve a little, you would have been way out on a limb.

WALTER ISAACSON: I don't think there was enough skepticism because I think most of us kind of believed that Saddam Hussein was building-- biological, chemical, and perhaps even, nuclear weapons.

BILL MOYERS: Isn't it the role of the fourth estate, though, to be critical of group think?

WALTER ISAACSON: It definitely is and I think we in the press, we're not critical enough. We didn't question our sources enough.

DAN RATHER: We weren't smart enough, we were alert enough, we didn't dig enough. And we shouldn't have been fooled in this way.

BILL MOYERS: Even Oprah got in on the act, featuring in October 2002 NEW YORK TIMES reporter Judith Miller.

JUDITH MILLER: (OPRAH 10/9/02) The US intelligence community believes that Saddam Hussein has deadly stocks of anthrax, of botulinium toxin, which is one of the most virulent poisons known to man.

BILL MOYERS: Liberal hawk Kenneth Pollak.

KENNETH POLLAK: And what we know for a fact from a number of defectors who've come out of Iraq over the years is that Saddam Hussein is absolutely determined to acquire nuclear weapons and is building them as fast as he can.

BILL MOYERS: And the right hand man to Ahmed Chalabi.

OPRAH: And so do the Iraqi people want the American people to liberate them?

QUANBAR: Absolutely. In 1991 the Iraqi people were....

WOMAN: I hope it doesn't offend you...

BILL MOYERS: When one guest dared to express doubt Oprah would have none of it

WOMAN: I just don't know what to believe with the media and..

OPRAH: Oh, we're not trying to propaganda -show you propaganda. ..We're just showing you what is.

WOMAN: I understand that, I understand that.

OPRAH: OK, but Ok. You have a right to your opinion.

BILL MOYERS: Contrary opinions weren't very popular in Washington either, as ambitious democrats embraced the now conventional but unconfirmed wisdom.

JOHN KERRY (Senate Floor 10/09/02): In the wake of September 11, who among us can say with any certainty to anybody that the weapons might not be used against our troops or against allies in the region.

HILLARY CLINTON (Senate Floor 10/10/02): It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons.

BILL MOYERS: When Democrats did go against the grain, they were denounced by the partisan press and largely ignored by the mainstream press.

ROBERT BYRD (Senate Floor 10/10/02): And before we put this great nation on the track to war I want to see more evidence, hard evidence, not more presidential rhetoric...

SENATOR TED KENNEDY (9/27/02): I have heard no persuasive evidence that Saddam is on the threshold of acquiring the nuclear weapons he has sought for more than 20 years. And the administration has offered no persuasive evidence that Saddam would transfer chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction to Al Qaeda."

ERIC BOEHLERT: Ted Kennedy gave-- a passionate speech in 2002 raising all sorts of questions about the war. And what the aftermath would be.

SENATOR TED KENNEDY (9/27/02): War with Iraq before a genuine attempt at inspection and disarmament, without genuine international support, could swell the ranks of Al Qaeda with sympathizers and trigger an escalation in terrorist acts.

ERIC BEOHLERT: WASHINGTON POST gave that speech one sentence. 36 words. I calculated in 2002 THE WASHINGTON POST probably published 1,000 articles and columns about-- about Iraq. Probably one million words. In excess of one million words. And one of the most famous democrats in the country raised questions about the war...the WASHINGTON POST set aside 36 words.

BILL MOYERS: It had now become unfashionable to dissent from the official line — Unfashionable and risky.

BILL O'REILLY: (Fox 2/26/03) Anyone who hurts this country in a time like this. Well let's just say you will be spotlighted

NORM SOLOMON: If you're a journalist or a politician, and you're swimming upstream-- so to speak-- you're gonna encounter a lot of piranha, and they are voracious. There's a notion that this is the person that we go after this week.

ERIC BOEHLERT: Fox news and-- and talk radio and the Conservative bloggers. I mean, they were bangin' those drums very loud. And-- and, everyone in the press could hear it. -- not only was it just liberal bias, it was an anti-American bias, an unpatriotic bias and that these journalists were really not part of America.

DAN RATHER: And every journalist knew it. They had and they have a very effective slam machine. The way it works is you either report the news the way we want it reported or we're going to hang a sign around your neck.

BILL O'REILLY (2/27/03): I will call those who publicly criticize their country in a time of military crisis, which this is, bad Americans.

MICHAEL MASSING: There's a level of vitriol, and vindictiveness that is very scary to listen to. And, you think the millions of people listening to them. The media have become sort of like the-- the whipping boy, because they know that the press can provide information that runs counter to what the government is claiming, to what the Bush administration is claiming.

ANNOUNCER: (MSNBC 12/16/02) Now, Donahue.

BILL MOYERS: On his new MSNBC talk show Phil Donahue, discovered just what could happen when you stepped out of line.

PHIL DONAHUE (MSNBC, 1/13/03): Tonight: Anti-war protestors taking on the government, is there a place for them in this post 9/11 world or are they just downright unpatriotic.

PHIL DONOHUE: And I just felt-- you know, what would be wrong with having one show (LAUGHTER) a night, you know, say, "Hold it. Wait a minute. Can we afford this? Do we have enough troops? And what about General Shinseki? And where are all-- you know, what is Guantanamo? I mean, what's wrong with this?"

I thought people who didn't like my message would watch me. Because the-- no one else was doing it. That's why I-- I couldn't get over the unanimity of opinion on cable. The drum was beating. Everybody wanted to bomb somebody. And I'm thinking, "Wait a minute." So here I go-- I mean fool that I am. I rushed in.

PHIL DONOHUE: Scott Ritter is here and so is Ambassador...

BILL MOYERS: You had Scott Ritter, former weapons inspector. Who was saying that if we invade, it will be a historic blunder-

PHIL DONOHUE: You didn't have him alone. He had to be there with someone else who supported the war. In other words, you couldn't have Scott Ritter alone. You could have Richard Perle alone.

BILL MOYERS: You could have the conservatives-

PHIL DONOHUE: You could have the supporters of the President alone. And they would say why this war is important. You couldn't have a dissenter alone. Our producers were instructed to feature two conservatives for every liberal.

BILL MOYERS: You're kidding.

PHIL DONOHUE: No this is absolutely true-

BILL MOYERS: Instructed from above?

PHIL DONOHUE: Yes. I was counted as two liberals. And so-

BILL MOYERS: They're under selling you.

PHIL DONOHUE: --I had to-- I had to have two-- there's just a terrible fear. And I think that's the right word.

BILL MOYERS: Eric Sorenson, who was the president of MSNBC, told the NEW YORK TIMES quote: "Any misstep and you can get into trouble with these guys and have the patriotism police hunt you down."

PHIL DONOHUE: He's the management guy. So his phone would ring. Nobody's going to call Donahue and tell him to shut up and support the war. Nobody's that foolish. It's a lot more subtle than that.

MICHAEL MASSING: I think that what happened in the months leading up to the war is that there was a sort of acceptable mainstream opinion that got set. And I think that people who were seen as outside that mainstream were viewed as sort of 'fringe.' And they were marginalized.

MICHAEL MASSING: You saw that in the demonstrators.

DEMONSTRATORS: (chanting) One, two, three, four, we don't want no Iraq war

MICHAEL MASSING: How people demonstrating did not get much play.

DEMONSTRATORS: (chanting) Five, six, seven, eight, stop the bombing, stop the hate.

DEMONSTRATORS: (drum beat) We don't want no Iraq war; throw Dick Cheney through the door.

ERIC BOEHLERT: So in October of 2002, 100,000 people in Washington, the-- one of the largest, you know, peace demonstrations in-- in-- in years in the United States. And the press just-- you know, the WASHINGTON POST put a photo on its Metro page.

BILL MOYERS: The photographs ran with an article but the paper's ombudsman later criticized the post for not giving the story more prominence.

BILL MOYERS: Meanwhile, in the six months leading up to the invasion THE WASHINGTON POST Would editorialze in favor of the war at least 27 times.

BILL MOYERS: What got even less ink than the protestors, was the release of something called the national intelligence estimate. Before voting to give the President war powers, Congress asked the administration to detail all the top secret evidence it was using to justify an invasion.

The press got a declassified version. Most of the media gave it a cursory reading, but jonathan landay examined the text closely...

JONATHAN LANDAY: I got my copy, and I opened it up...

JONATHAN LANDAY: This is the white paper that...

JONATHAN LANDAY: And I came to the part that talked about the aluminum tubes. Now, it said that the majority of analysts believed that those tubes were for the nuclear weapons program. It turns out, though, that that majority of intelligence analysts were-- had no background in nuclear weapons.

BILL MOYERS: Knight Ridder was on top of the most important story of the runup to the invasion....The manipulation of intelligence to make the case for war.


JONATHAN LANDAY: So, here was yet another building block in this chain of building blocks that we had collected over these months about what they were saying to the public, and what the intelligence was actually telling them. And, there were differences. Some of them were-- were nuanced. Some of them were quite large. But, it became quite apparent that they were grabbing just about anything they could to make the case for going to war in Iraq.

BILL MOYERS: Over a dozen sources told Knight Ridder that the pentagon was pressuring analysts to "cook the intelligence books" -- deep throats were talking.... But few in the press were listening.

JONATHAN LANDAY: There are people within the U.S. government who object when they perceive that their government isn't being straight with the people. And when they perceive that an administration is veering away from the principles on which this country was built, they become more ready to talk about things that perhaps they ordinarily shouldn't.

HOUSE SPEAKER (Congressional Vote 10/10/02): Aye's are 296. The nays are 133. The Joint Resolution is passed.

BILL MOYERS: Ignoring the reports of flawed intelligence, Congress gave the president the go-ahead for use of force. Knight Ridder's team just kept on digging. By the end of the month, their reporting had come full circle. Sources confirmed that the Pentagon was preparing for war based on information from ahmed chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, despite objections from experts inside the CIA...

WALTER PINCUS: The administration can withstand the Knight Ridder critique because it-- it wasn't reverberating inside Washington. And therefore people weren't picking it up.

13 comments:

Michele Kearney said...

Wrong on Iraq? Not Everyone
Four in the mainstream media who got it right

By Steve Rendall
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2847

When former U.N. chief weapons inspector David Kay told the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 2004, “We were all wrong,” he was admitting that officials had been wrong to claim Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. The we-were-all-wrong trope entered the political lexicon as a mea culpa, but today the White House and its media defenders employ it as a defense of a war started over phantom weapons. We may have been wrong, they argue, but so were the Clinton administration, congressmembers of both parties and other Western intelligence agencies.

As George W. Bush’s approval ratings languished last fall, due in part to the unpopular war, the administration was searching for a “push-back” strategy against Democrats. The White House came up with a variant of the we-were-all-wrong theme, which George W. Bush delivered in a November 11 speech pointing out that while he had been wrong about the weapons, many Democrats had made the same blunder based on the same information.

“That’s why more than 100 Democrats in the House and the Senate, who had access to the same intelligence,” Bush told a Pennsylvania audience, “voted to support removing Saddam Hussein from power.” The day before, Bush National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley told reporters: “Seventy–seven senators, representing both sides of the aisle . . . believed, based on the same intelligence, that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and imposed [sic] an enormous threat to his neighbors and to the world at large.”

Following Bush’s speech, the White House’s media supporters took to the airwaves to echo his defense. Wall Street Journal columnist John Fund, appearing on CNN’s Lou Dobbs Tonight (11/11/05), told the host: “One of the things we have to recall here is, every leading Democrat, including the Democrats who had access to the same intelligence information like Jay Rockefeller, approved of the war in Iraq.” National Review editor Rich Lowry told PBS’s NewsHour host Jim Lehrer (11/11/05), “Many Democrats were saying the same thing because they were all looking at the same body of intelligence.” On November 13 Fox News Sunday anchor Chris Wallace declared (11/13/05), “Democrats saw basically the same intelligence the president did and made statements, by and large, that were just as alarmist.”

Though the Washington Post (11/12/05) and Knight Ridder (11/15/05) debunked this partisan version of the claim, showing that the White House had access to far more extensive intelligence, the we-were-all-wrong theme does have a grain of truth to it—particularly when it comes to mainstream journalism. New York Times Baghdad bureau chief John Burns made a valid point when he told a U.C. Berkeley conference on Iraq and the media (3/18/04): “We failed the American public by being insufficiently critical about elements of the administration’s plan to go to war.” Strong cases for the general failure of mainstream journalism regarding Iraq were featured in the Columbia Journalism Review (5–6/03) and the New York Review of Books (2/26/04).

But the fact that mainstream media in general suspended critical judgment when it came to reporting on pre-war Iraq claims should not be viewed as an excuse—because, in fact, not all mainstream journalists and pundits got it wrong. Some got it right—simply by carrying out the basic journalistic tasks of checking facts and holding the powerful to account.

Scott Ritter

Scott Ritter was a media darling in 1998. A tough talking ex-Marine officer who’d just resigned as chief U.N. weapons inspector, he criticized the Clinton White House and the U.N. for failing to support continued aggressive Iraq inspections. In the wake of his resignation, he portrayed Iraq as largely disarmed but still a continuing serious threat.

Two days after his August 26, 1998 resignation, he appeared on all three network morning shows (ABC’s Good Morning America, CBS’s Morning Show, NBC’s Today, 8/28/98). An editorial in the Washington Post (8/27/98) was typical of many others across the country that lionized the former inspector: “Yesterday’s resignation by Scott Ritter, perhaps the most determined and courageous of the U.N. weapons inspectors . . . stands as a damning indictment of U.S. policy on Iraq.”

As long as he was perceived as an Iraq hardliner, Ritter was a popular news source. In the years following his resignation, however, Ritter’s thinking on Iraq changed—“evolved” was the word he used in a prominent New York Times Magazine profile (11/24/02). As a result, Ritter became something of a journalist and advocate for peace. In the course of putting out two books, a documentary film and several op-ed columns, he came to believe Iraq was not the mortal threat he’d once described. It wasn’t that he thought Iraq was harmless; in fact, he remained the forceful advocate for inspections that he’d always been. But while insisting on tough inspections was once considered a hawkish position, under the Bush administration anyone who thought Saddam Hussein could be contained by anything short of a full-scale invasion was marked as a dove.

In September 2002, Scott Ritter stepped in the path of the White House’s PR blitz, challenging the administration and quickly becoming one of very few prominent critics of the looming war. In a Chicago Tribune op-ed (9/10/02), Ritter exposed a deception on the part of Vice President Dick Cheney that should have sent reporters scurrying to catch up. Cheney claimed in an August 2002 speech (8/26/02) that the Iraqi regime had been “very busy enhancing its capabilities in the field of chemical and biological agents,” and continued “to pursue the nuclear program they began so many years ago.” To back this up, Cheney added, “We’ve gotten this from the firsthand testimony of defectors, including Saddam’s own son-in-law”—a reference to Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel, the former Iraqi weapons chief and Iraq’s highest ranking defector. (See Extra!, 5–6/03.)

Ritter pointed out that Cheney was omitting an inconvenient part of Kamel’s story:


Throughout his interview with UNSCOM, a U.N. special commission, Hussein Kamal reiterated his main point—that nothing was left. “All chemical weapons were destroyed,” he said. “I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear—were destroyed.”


In a Baltimore Sun column (9/1/02) calling for the resumption of inspections, Ritter pointed out that earlier inspections had been able to verify a “90 percent to 95 percent level of disarmament,” including “all of the production facilities involved with WMD” and “the great majority of what was produced by these facilities.”

As for the remainder, Ritter told the Guardian (9/19/02), “We have to remember that this missing 5 to 10 percent doesn’t necessarily constitute a threat.” Chemical and biological weapons such as sarin and tabun, he explained, “have a shelf-life of five years.” “Even if Iraq had somehow managed to hide this vast number of weapons,” said Ritter, “what they are now storing is nothing more than useless, harmless goo.”

Ritter summed up his alternative to war on CNN’s American Morning (9/9/02):


I’m not giving Iraq a clean bill of health. But, again, we’re talking about war here. . . . Let’s get the inspectors back in, let’s get them to find out what the ultimate disposition of these weapons programs are, and if Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction program, thank goodness, we just defused a war.


Ritter’s dissent from the war program put him back in the public eye, but he was no longer a media darling (See Extra!, 9–10/03). Ritter may have changed his mind about the Iraq threat, but elites had had a similar conversion about the value of inspections; Ritter alone, however, was dubbed a “flip-flopper” (Chicago Tribune, 9/23/02). A trip to Baghdad where he urged Iraqi officials to allow inspections and warned Americans that attacking Iraq would be a “historic mistake” was singled out in a critical profile in the New York Times Magazine (11/24/02). At CBS Evening News (9/30/02), correspondent Tom Fenton said that Ritter “is now what some would call a loose cannon.”

CNN was especially harsh. Appearing on CNN’s Sunday Morning (9/8/02), CNN news executive Eason Jordan told Catherine Callaway: “Well, Scott Ritter’s chameleon-like behavior has really bewildered a lot of people. . . . U.S. officials no longer give Scott Ritter much credibility.” When Paula Zahn interviewed Ritter (CNN American Morning, 9/13/02), she suggested he was in league with Saddam Hussein: “People out there are accusing you of drinking Saddam’s Kool-Aid.”

Though the absence of WMDs vindicated his views on the Iraq threat and the value of inspections, it didn’t result in his media rehabilitation. Instead of being sought out and consulted for how he got things right, he became largely invisible. Ritter appeared 19 times on the three major networks’ news broadcasts in the year before the war started (3/20/02–3/19/03). In the year following the attack (3/20/03– 3/20/04), he appeared just once (CBS, 8/20/03).

Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay

Knight Ridder’s Washington bureau didn’t take the White House propaganda campaign at face value either. In a September 6, 2002 story, “Lack of Hard Evidence of Iraqi Weapons Worries Top U.S. Officials,” the newspaper chain’s Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay reported, “Senior U.S. officials with access to top-secret intelligence on Iraq say they have detected no alarming increase in the threat that Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein poses to American security and Middle East stability.” Throughout the run-up to the war, the Knight Ridder reporters filed story after story raising questions about Bush administration claims, with headlines like “Some in Bush Administration Have Misgivings About Iraq Policy” (10/8/02) and “Infighting Among U.S. Intelligence Agencies Fuels Dispute Over Iraq” (10/27/02).

Knight Ridder’s skeptical reporting stood apart from the more credulous coverage regularly put forth by most other mainstream outlets. When the New York Times reported on the aluminum tubes story, “U.S. Says Hussein Intensified Quest for A-Bomb Parts” (9/8/02), it emphasized the White House view that the tubes were hard evidence of an Iraqi nuclear program, and downplayed dissenting views. Knight Ridder published a very different piece, “CIA Report Reveals Analysts’ Split Over Extent of Iraqi Nuclear Threat” (10/4/02), recording strong dissent by prominent experts and portraying the tubes’ purpose as anything but a settled issue. Indeed, in the end, the dissenters were right.

Strobel and Landay received accolades for their tough reporting from some journalism establishment outlets. “Almost alone among national news organizations, Knight Ridder had decided to take a hard look at the administration’s justifications for war,” wrote Michael Massing in the New York Review of Books (2/26/04). Writing in the American Journalism Review (8–9/04), Steve Ritea commended the Knight Ridder reporters:


For about a year and a half, the pair had filed compelling stories on the issue and, on many occasions, it seemed like they were banging the drum alone. It wasn’t until earlier this year, when it became increasingly apparent Hussein had not been stockpiling weapons of mass destruction, that other news outlets grew more critical of the administration.


But when it counted, Knight Ridder’s reporting too often went unnoticed—in part because more powerful media outlets were too timid or arrogant to attempt to build on Knight Ridder’s many scoops.

Charles J. Hanley

Charles J. Hanley has had his hand in some big stories. He was the lead Associated Press reporter on the No Gun Ri story (9/29/99), a dramatic Pulitzer Prize–winning 1999 investigative report documenting a massacre of civilians by American soldiers during the Korean War (Extra!, 9–10/00). He was also part of a team of AP reporters that published the first media survey of Iraq’s civilian dead in June 2003 (6/11/03). But some of Hanley’s most important reporting occurred as he covered the weapons inspections in the run-up to the Iraq War.

The centerpiece of Hanley’s reporting on the inspections was a special analysis published on January 18, 2003, “Inspectors Have Covered CIA’s Sites of ‘Concern’ and Reported No Violations.” Hanley’s story documented several Iraqi facilities where Bush administration claims had failed to hold up to inspection.

For instance, in October 2002 the CIA warned that commercial satellite photos showed that Iraq was reconstituting its clandestine nuclear weapons program at Al Tuwaitha, a former nuclear weapons complex. The “intelligence” found its way into the White House’s case for war. On October 7, 2002 George W. Bush told a Cincinnati audience (New York Times, 10/8/02), “Satellite photographs reveal that Iraq is rebuilding facilities at sites that have been part of his nuclear program in the past.”

As Hanley reported, when inspectors returned to Iraq, they visited the Al Tuwaitha site and found no evidence to support Bush’s claim. “Since December 4 inspectors from [Mohamed] ElBaradei’s International Atomic Energy Agency have scrutinized that vast complex almost a dozen times, and reported no violations.” The same was true of site after site, as Hanley reported:


In almost two months of surprise visits across Iraq, U.N. arms monitors have inspected 13 sites identified by U.S. and British intelligence agencies as major “facilities of concern,” and reported no signs of revived weapons building, an Associated Press analysis shows.


Hanley’s story should have been one of the most important of the pre-war period. By debunking the very claims that had been advanced as proof of an Iraqi threat, Hanley’s analysis ought to have cast severe doubt on the White House’s entire evaluation of the Iraqi threat.

Instead, less than a month after the analysis was published, when Secretary of State Colin Powell made his big war pitch to the U.N. Security Council on February 5, 2003, repeating claims about the Iraq threat that would be debunked in the coming months and years, the press largely accepted Powell’s claims at face value and applauded his performance (Extra!, 3–4/03). One of the few pieces to subject the speech to critical scrutiny: Hanley’s February 7, 2003 report, which began, “Iraqi officials on Friday took foreign journalists to missile assembly and test sites spotlighted in Colin Powell’s anti-Iraq U.N. presentation, to underscore the fact that the installations have been under U.N. scrutiny for months.”

Michele Kearney said...

Here is the second half of the trasncript:

http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/btw/transcript1.html

JOHN WALCOTT: We were under the radar most of the time at Knight Ridder. We were not a company-- that-- I think Karl Rove and others cared deeply about, even though in terms of readers, we're much bigger than the NEW YORK TIMES and THE WASHINGTON POST. We're less influential. There's no way around that.

WARREN STROBEL: But there was a period when we were sittin' out there and I had a lotta late night gut checks where I was just like, "Are we totally off on some loop here? That we--"

JONATHAN LANDAY: Yeah. We-- we would--

WARREN STROBEL: "--are we-- we wrong? Are we gonna be embarrassed?"

JONATHAN LANDAY: --everyday we would lo-- everyday we'd look at each other and say-- lit-- literally-- One of us would find something out and I'd look at him and say -- What's going on here?

ERIC BOEHLERT: But I think it's telling that they didn't really operate by that beltway game the way the networks, the cable channels, NEWSWEEK, TIME, NEW YORK TIMES, WASHINGTON POST. They seem to sort of operate outside that bubble. And look at what the benefits were when they operated outside that bubble. They actually got the story right.

What's important is it's proof positive that that story was there. And it could have been gotten. And some people did get it. But the vast majority chose to ignore it or-- or not even try.

WARREN STROBEL: How many times did I get invited on the talk-- how many times did you get invited on a talk show?

JONATHAN LANDAY: I think maybe on-

WARREN STROBEL: Yeah, not the big talk shows.

JONATHAN LANDAY: Actually-

WARREN STROBEL: Not the big Sunday shows-

JONATHAN LANDAY: You know what? I'll tell you who invited me on-- on a talk-- on a talk shows- C-Span.

HOWARD KURTZ: Television, especially cable television has a sort of Cross-Fire mentality. You put on the pro-Bush cast and the anti-Bush cast and they go at it. You put on the let's go into Iraq and let's not go into Iraq and they go at it.

Well, that's what they do. They're pundits. But that's not a debate that's particularly well-suited to shedding light on whether or not the Bush administration's case for war-- rested on some kind of factual basis. That's not what pundits do.

PETER BEINART: (CNN 4/29/02) I mean, I really think the reason the United States has a bad reputation in the Arab world is that we have been on the side of dictatorships. We've been on the side of very corrupt, very backward governments.

BILL MOYERS: Peter Beinart became editor of THE NEW REPUBLIC at age 28. During the run-up to the invasion he was one of the hottest young pundits in town, a liberal hawk, accusing opponents of the war of being "intellectually incoherent and echoing the official line that Hussein would soon possess a nuclear weapon.

PETER BEINART: (CNN 4/29/02) We need a little bit of logistical support, but we don't need the moral support of anyone, because we're on the side of the angels in this.

BILL MOYERS: Had you been to Iraq?

PETER BEINART: No.

BILL MOYERS: So what made you present yourself, if you did, as-- as-- as a Middle East expert?

PETER BEINART: I don't think that I presented myself as a Middle East expert per se. I was a political journalist. I was a-- a columnist writing about all kinds of things. Someone in my-- in my position is not a Middle East expert in the way that somebody who studies this at a university is, or even at a think tank. But I consumed that stuff.

I was relying on people who did that kind of reporting and people who had been in the government who had-- who had access to classified material for their assessment.

BILL MOYERS: And you would talk to them and they would, in effect, brief you, the background on what they knew?

PETER BEINART: Sometimes, but--

BILL MOYERS: I'm trying to help the audience understand. How does-- you described yourself as a political-- a reporter of political opinion, or a journalist--

PETER BEINART: Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: --political opinion. How do you-- how do you get the information that enables you to reach the conclusion that you draw as a political journalist?

PETER BEINART: Well, I was doing mostly, for a large part it was reading, reading the statements and the things that people said. I was not a beat reporter. I was editing a magazine and writing a column. So I was not doing a lot of primary reporting. But what I was doing was a lot of reading of other people's reporting and reading of what officials were saying.

BILL MOYERS: If we journalists get it wrong on the facts what is there to be right about?

PETER BEINART: Well I think that's a good point, but the argument in the fall of 2002 was not mostly about the facts it was about a whole series of ideas about what would happen if we invaded.

BILL MOYERS: What I'm trying to get at is how does the public sort all of this out from out there beyond the beltway. Far more people saw you, see Bill Kristol on television, than will ever read the Associated Press reports or the Knight RIdder reporters. Isn't there an imbalance then on what the public is going to perceive about a critical issue of life and death like, like war.

PETER BEINART: I think it's important for people, look, would it be better if television were not the primary medium through which people got their news? Yes. That's why I'm not, I do television, but I'm primarily in the business of writing and editing because I believe ultimately that words can convey more, richer information than television. Wouldn't we be a better society if people got most of their news from print rather than television, yes I think we would.

WALTER ISAACSON: One of the great pressures we're facing in journalism now is it's a lot cheaper to hire thumb suckers and pundits and have talk shows on the air than actually have bureaus and reporters. And in the age of the internet when everybody's a pundit, we're still gonna need somebody there to go talk to the colonels, to be on the ground in Baghdad and stuff and that's very expensive.

DAN RATHER: Reporting is hard. The substitute for reporting far too often has become let's just ring up an expert. Let's see. These are experts on-- international armaments. And I'll just go down the list here and check Richard Perle.

RICHARD PERLE (HARDBALL MSNBC 2/25/03): Once it begins to look as though he is relinquishing his grip on power I think he's toast.

WILLIAM KRISTOL: (INSIDE POLITICS, CNN 2/14/03) The choice is disarming him by war or letting him have his weapons of mass destruction.

DAN RATHER: This is journalism on the cheap if it's journalism at all. Just pick up the phone, call an expert, bring an expert into the studio. Easy. Not time consuming. Doesn't take resources. And-- if you-- if you're lucky and good with your list of people, you get an articulate person who will kind of spark up the broadcast.

WALTER ISAACSON: The people at Knight Ridder were calling the colonels and the lieutenants and the people in the CIA and finding out, ya know, that intelligence is not very good. We should've all been doing that.

BILL MOYERS: How do you explain that the further you get away from official Washington, the closer you get to reality...

WALTER ISAACSON: That's one of the hazards in this business is when you rely on top level sources too much, you can lose out on getting the real information.

REPORTER: (CNN "Line in the Sand: Tough Talk on Iraq" 1/19/03): The president's top national security advisors fanned out on the talk shows with a coordinated message.

DONALD RUMSFELD: (1/19/03)The test here is not whether they can find something. The test is whether or not Iraq is going to cooperate.

CONDOLEEZA RICE: (1/19/03) This is about the disarmament of Iraq, not about weapons inspectors hunting and pecking all over the country.

COLIN POWELL: (1/19/03) Time is running out and we just can't keep hunting and pecking and looking and...

JOHN WALCOTT: The people at the top generally are political rather than professional. And their first loyalty is to a political party or to a person, not to a bureaucracy, not to a job. And so, what you get from them is spin.

TIM RUSSERT: I-- look, I'm a blue-collar guy from Buffalo. I know who my sources are. I work 'em very hard. It's the mid-level people that tell you the truth. Now-

BILL MOYERS: They're the ones who know the story?

TIM RUSSERT: Well, they're working on the problem. And they understand the detail much better than a lotta the so-called policy makers and-- and-- and political officials.

BILL MOYERS: But they don't get on the Sunday talk shows--

TIM RUSSERT: No. You-- I mean-- they don't want to be, trust me. I mean, they can lose their jobs, and they know it. But they're-- they can provide information which can help in me challenging or trying to draw out-- sometimes their bosses and other public officials.

BILL MOYERS: What do you make of the fact that of the 414 Iraq stories broadcast on NBC, ABC and CBS nightly news, from September 2002 until February 2003, almost all the stories could be traced back to sources from the White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department?

TIM RUSSERT: It's important that you have a-- an oppos-- opposition party. That's our system of government.

BILL MOYERS: So, it's not news unless there's somebody-

TIM RUSSERT: No, no, no. I didn't say that. But it's important to have an opposition party, your opposit-- opposing views.

WALTER PINCUS: More and more, in the media, become, I think, common carriers of administration statements, and critics of the administration. And we've sort of given up being independent on our own.

ANNOUNCER: (3/6/1981) Ladies and Gentlemen, the President of the United States.

WALTER PINCUS: We used to do at the Post something called truth squading. --President would make a speech. We used to do it with Ronald Reagan the first five or six months because he would make so many-- factual errors, particularly in his press conference. PRESIDENT REAGAN: (3/6/1981) From 10 thousand to 60 thousand dollars a year...

WALTER PINCUS: And after-- two or three weeks of it-- the public at large, would say, "Why don't you leave the man alone? He's trying to be honest. He makes mistakes. So what?" and we stopped doing it.

BILL MOYERS: You stopped being the truth squad.

WALTER PINCUS: We stopped truth squading every sort of press conference, or truth squading. And we left it then-- to the democrats. In other words, it's up to the democrats to catch people, not us.

BILL MOYERS: So if the democrats challenged-- a statement from the president, you could-- quote both sides.

WALTER PINCUS: We then quote-- both sides. Yeah.

BILL MOYERS: Now, that's called objectivity by many standards isn't it?

WALTER PINCUS: Well, that's-- objectivity if you think there are only two sides. and if you're not interested in-- the facts. And the facts are separate from, you know, what one side says about the other.

BILL MOYERS: By late November 2002 the press had yet another chance to get the facts right. Facing intense international pressure, The White House agreed to hold off military action until Saddam Hussein permited a team of un inspectors to return to iraq and take a closer look.

The first inspections began on November 27th

Charles Hanley, a prize winning reporter for the Associated Press, with more than 30 years experience reporting on weapons issues, went along to cover their work.

CHARLES HANLEY: What we did was-- go out everyday with the inspectors. These guys would roar out on these motorcades at very high speed and roar through towns and do sudden U-turns and-- and drive over land and do all of these things to confuse the Iraqis about where they were going-- so that there wouldn't be a call ahead telling-- telling them to put away all the bad stuff.

CHARLES HANLEY: The inspectors then would issue a daily report. And-- as it turned out, of course, inspection after inspection, it turned out to be clean. They had nothing to report, no violations to report.

BILL MOYERS: In January of '03 Hanley wrote about the suspicious sites that the us and British governments had earlier identified as major concerns. "No smoking guns in...Almost 400 inspections." He reported. It ought to have cast serious doubt on the white house's entire evaluation of the iraqi threat. But reporting like this was overshadowed by the drumbeat from Washington -- which is why, Hanley says, sometimes his editors balked when he wrote that the White House lacked firm evidence on WMDS.

CHARLES HANLEY: And that would be stricken from my copy because it would strike some editors as a-- as tendentious. As sort of an attack or a-- some sort of-- allegation rather than a fact. You know and we don't want our reporters alleging things. We, you know, we just report the facts. Well it was a fact. It was a very important fact that seemed to be lost on an awful lot of journalists unfortunately.

BILL MOYERS: Six weeks before the invasion, with the facts still in short supply, the American Secretary of State went before the United Nations.

COLIN POWELL (UN Security Council 2/5/03): I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling.

CHARLES HANLEY: One major problem was that-- Secretary Powell barely acknowledged that there were inspections going on. It got to ridiculous points such as-- his complaining about the fact that they'd put a roof over this open air shed where they were testing missiles.

COLIN POWELL (Security Council 2/5/03): This photograph was taken in April of 2002. Since then, the test stand has been finished and a roof has been put over it so it will be harder for satellites to see what's going on underneath the test stand.

CHARLES HANLEY: What he neglected to mention was that the inspectors were underneath, watching what was going on.

COLIN POWELL (Security Council 2/5/03): A single drop of VX on the skin will kill in minutes. Four tons!

CHARLES HANLEY: he didn't point out that most of that had already been destroyed. And-- on point after point he failed to point out that these facilities about which he was raising such alarm-- were under repeated inspections by-- by good-- expert people with very good equipment, and who were leaving behind cameras and other monitoring equipment to keep us-- a continuing eye on it

COLIN POWELL (Security Council 2/5/03): Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.

ERIC BOEHLERT: The holes in the-- his presentation became immediate within days if not hours.

COLIN POWELL: But what I want to bring to your attention today is the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of murder.

ERIC BOEHLERT: One of the first big embarrassments was-- Powell had talked about this British intelligence report.

COLIN POWELL: I would call my colleagues attention to the fine paper that United Kingdom distributed yesterday, which describes in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities.

BILL MOYERS: Supposedly that 'exquisite detail' from British intelligence came from a top secret dossier

ERIC BOEHLERT: Literally within a day or two it was-- it was proven in the-- in the British press that that had simply been-- downloaded off the internet. And was plagiarized. And it actually contains the typos that were in the original.

BRITISH REPORTER: (2/7/03): The British government dossier is supposed to be about Iraqi deception and concealment. It says it draws upon a number of sources including intelligence material. Well, actually what it largely draws on is a thesis written by a Californian post graduate student...

ERIC BOEHLERT: That was just the first of many embarrassments that were to come. But within days-- the British press was going crazy over this-- over this revelation.

BRITISH REPORTER: As for the student himself, he's accused the government of plagiarism.

BRITISH REPORTER: If the government is reduced to trawling academic journals then how good is the rest of its case for war against Iraq?

BILL MOYERS: Few prominent American broadcasters would ask such pointed questions:

FOX NEWS: The Secretary of State Colin Powell has made the case against Iraq. TOM BROKAW (NBC "Making the Case" 2/5/03): Secretary of State Colin Powell has given a lot of important speeches in his lifetime to a lot of large audiences but no speech was more important then the one he gave today.

PETER JENNINGS (ABC 2/5/03): In the United Nation Security Council this morning, the secretary of state Colin Powell took almost an hour and a half to make the Bush administration's case against Saddam Hussein.

CBS EVENING NEWS (2/5/03): Making the case for war, Secretary Powell shows the world what he calls "Undeniable Proof."

DAN RATHER: Colin Powell was trusted. Is trusted, I'd put it-in a sense. He, unlike many of the people who made the decisions to go to war, Colin Powell has seen war. He knows what a green jungle hell Vietnam was. He knows what the battlefield looks like. And when Colin Powell says to you, "I, Colin Powell, am putting my personal stamp on this information. It's my name, my face, and I'm putting it out there," that did make a difference.

BILL MOYERS: And you were impressed.

DAN RATHER: I was impressed. And who wouldn't be?

NORM SOLOMON: And you look at the response from-- forget about the right-wing media-- from the so-called liberal press the next morning. You pick up the WASHINGTON POST, on the op-ed page, there's Jim Hoagland saying, obviously from what Powell said, there are weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. You go a few inches away to Richard Cohen, a vowed liberal, he says, obviously there are weapons of mass destruction. I mean it's a fair paraphrase to say, these pundits and many others were asserting, if you don't think there are WMDs in Iraq, you are an idiot.

BILL MOYERS: Across the country editorial writers bought what Powell was selling. "A Masterful Legal Summary." "A Strong, Credible and Persuasive Case." "A Powerful Case." "An Ironclad Case...Succinct and Damning Evidence." "A Detailed and Convincing Argument." "An Overwhelming Case." "A Compelling Case." "A Persuasive, Detailed Accumulation of Information."

NORM SOLOMON: These were supposed to be the most discerning, sophisticated journalists in the country writing this stuff, and they were totally bamboozled.

MICHAEL MASSING: And, sure enough, in the newspapers, if you look very hard inside in the next few days in the coverage-- you could find really serious questions that were raised about this. But, they were very much pushed aside.

BILL MOYERS: This gets us right to the heart of the debate that's going on now in our craft. We lean heavily in reporting on what they say.

DAN RATHER: That's right.

BILL MOYERS: We want no wider war. I'm not a crook. Mushroom cloud. Weapons of mass destruction. We really give heavy weight to what public officials say. .

DAN RATHER: Well, that's true. And we need to address that. In the end, it was, look, the President himself says these things are so. He-- he stands before the Congress with the question of war and peace hanging in the balance and says these things. And there was a feeling, not just with myself, given all that, who am I to say; you know what, I think it's all-- a Machiavellian scheme to take us into Iraq.

ALAN COLMES (HANNITY AND COLMES, FOX NEWS 2/25/03): Big news today in the cable world Ellen, Phil Donahue, cancelled, by that other, uh, network.

BILL MOYERS: Twenty two days before the invasion, your show was canceled.

PHIL DONOHUE: It should be said that we did fairly well in the ratings. We did not burn the town down. Nobody on MSNBC did. But we were certainly as good as anybody else on the network. And often-- often we led the network.

BILL MOYERS: In dumping Donahue, NBC cited ratings. But a blogger got his hands on an internal memo and the press picked it up.

BILL MOYERS: Now that memo said, "Donohue presents a difficult public face for NBC in a time of war. At the same time our competitors are waving the flag at every opportunity." Did you know about that memo at the time?

PHIL DONOHUE: No. No. I didn't know about that till I read about it in The NEW YORK TIMES.

BILL MOYERS: What did you think-- what-- what does that say to you? That dissent is unpatriotic?

PHIL DONOHUE: Well, not only unpatriotic, but it's not good for business.

ANNOUNCER (MSNBC): Tonight, the case for war!

ANNOUNCER: Showdown Iraq, with Wolf Blitzer.

NORM SOLOMON: I think these executives were terrified of being called soft on terrorism. They absolutely knew that the winds were blowing at hurricane force politically and socially in the United States. And rather than stand up for journalism, they just blew with the wind.

And-- Dan Rather, and others who say, yeah, you know. I was carried away back then. Well, sure. That's when it matters. When it matters most is when you can make a difference as a journalist

DAN RATHER: Fear is in every newsroom in the country. And fear of what? Well, it's the fear-- if-- it's a combination of; if you don't go along to get along, you're going to get the reputation of being a troublemaker.

There's also the fear that, you know, particularly in networks, they've become huge, international conglomerates. They have big needs, legislative needs, repertory needs in Washington. Nobody has to send you a memo to tell you that that's the case.

You know. And that puts a seed in your mind; of well, if you stick your neck out, if you take the risk of going against the grain with your reporting, is anybody going to back you up?

CHARLES HANLEY: The media just continued on this path of reporting, "Well-- the Bush administration alleges that there are WMD," and never really stopped and said-- "It doesn't look like there are. There's no evidence." That should have been the second sentence in any story about the allegations of WMD. The second sentence should have been, "But they did not present any evidence to back this up."

JOHN WALCOTT: You know, we're sending young men and women, and nowadays not so young men and women, to risk their lives. And everyone wants to be behind them. And everyone should be behind them. The question for us in journalism is, are we really behind them when we fail to do our jobs? Is that really the kinda support that they deserve? Or are we really, in the long run, serving them better by asking these hard questions about what we've asked them to do?

ANNOUNCER: ("Target Iraq Today," NBC 3/22/03) Good Morning. Shock and Awe.

ANNOUNCER: (NIGHTLY NEWS, NBC 3/20/03) Operation Iraqi freedom reports of secret surrender talks as US bombs hit Baghdad.

ANNOUNCER: (CBS 3/20/03) This CBS news special report is part of our continuing coverage of America At War

BILL MOYERS: Four years after shock and awe, the press has yet to come to terms with its role in enabling the Bush administration to go to war on false pretenses.

Peter Beinert is almost alone in admitting he was mistaken.

PETER BEINERT: Where I think I was tragically wrong was not to see in February, March 2003 after we got the inspectors back in on the ground and we began to learn much more about what had been going on in Iraq than we had known in 2002 when we had no one on the ground that that assumption was being proven wrong.

BILL MOYERS: You say tragically wrong.

PETER BEINART: Because I think the war has been a tragic disaster. I mean-- the Americans killed, the Iraqis killed. It's true, life under Saddam was hell. But can one really say that life for Iraqis is better today?

BILL MOYERS: We wanted to talk to some others in the media about their role in the run up to war....

Judith Miller, who left the TIMES after becoming embroiled in a White House leak scandal declined our request...on legal grounds.

The TIMES' liberal hawk Thomas Friedman also said no.

So did Bill Safire, who had predicted Iraq would now be leading the Arab world to democracy. President Bush recently awarded him the Medal of Freedom.

THE WASHINGTON POST's Charles Krauthammer also turned us down...so did Roger Ailes the man in charge of FOX NEWS.. He declined because, an assistant told us, he's writing a book on how Fox has changed the face of American broadcasting and doesn't want to scoop himself.

William Kristol led the march to Bagdad behind a battery of Washington microphones. He has not responded to any of our requests for an interview...but he still shows up on tv as an expert, most often on FOX NEWS.

WILLIAM KRISTOL: (Fox 1/10/07) And he's got to begin to show progress in three, four, five months, once the US troops get in.

NORM SOLOMON: Being a pro-war pundit means never having to say you're sorry.

ERIC BOEHLERT: I mean these were people who were laying out the blueprint for the war about how it was gonna unfold. And, it turns out, couldn't have been more wrong every which way.

WILLIAM SAFIRE: You have a president...

ERIC BOEHLERT: And it's astonishing to see them still on TV invited on as experts in the region.

BILL MOYERS: It's true, so many of the advocates and apologists for the war are still flourishing in the media...

Bill Kristol and Peter Beinart, for example, are now regular contributors to TIME magazine, which has been laying off dozens of reporters.

BILL MOYERS: And remember this brilliant line?

PRESIDENT BUSH: We cannot wait for the final proof: the smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.

BILL MOYERS: The man who came up with it was Michael Gerson. President Bush's top speechwriter. He has left the White House and has been hired by THE WASHINGTON POST as a columnist.

The American number of troops killed in Iraq now exceeds the number of victims on 9/11. We have been fighting there longer than it took us to defeat the Nazis in World War II. The costs of the war are reckoned at one trillion dollars and counting. The number of Iraqis killed -- over thirty-five thousand last year alone-- is hard to pin down. The country is in chaos...

Michele Kearney said...

This is so devestating --- because it reveals that not only was the evidence available to the CIA -- the Bush Administration and Congress if they looked for it -- pre-Iraq war --- but it was available to the media...if they only looked for it and did their research...

Volume 52, Number 12 · July 14, 2005

http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18131

Exchange
'The Secret Way to War': An Exchange
By John Walcott, Reply by Mark Danner
Hans Blix
(click for larger image)
In response to The Secret Way to War (June 9, 2005)

To the Editors:

Mark Danner's excellent article on the Bush administration's path to war in Iraq ["The Secret Way to War," NYR, June 9] missed a couple of important signposts.

On October 11, 2001, Knight Ridder reported that less than a month after the September 11 attacks senior Pentagon officials who wanted to expand the war against terrorism to Iraq had authorized a trip to Great Britain in September by former CIA director James Woolsey in search of evidence that Saddam Hussein had played a role in the September 11 terrorist attacks.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Then, on February 13, 2002, nearly six months before the Downing Street memo was written, Knight Ridder reported that President Bush had decided to oust Saddam Hussein and had ordered the CIA, the Pentagon, and other agencies to devise a combination of military, diplomatic, and covert steps to achieve that goal. Six days later, former Senator Bob Graham of Florida reports in his book, he was astounded when General Tommy Franks told him during a visit to the US Central Command in Tampa that the administration was shifting resources away from the pursuit of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan to prepare for war in Iraq.

John Walcott
Washington Bureau Chief
Knight Ridder

Mark Danner replies:
John Walcott is proud of his bureau's reporting, and he should be. As my colleague Michael Massing has written in these pages, during the lead-up to the Iraq war Knight Ridder reporters had an enviable and unexampled record of independence and success.[1] But Mr. Walcott's statement that in my article "The Secret Way to War" I "missed a couple of important signposts" brings up an obvious question: Signposts on the way to what? What exactly does the Downing Street memo (which is simply an official account of a British security cabinet meeting in July 2002) and related documents that have since appeared, prove? And why has the American press in large part still resisted acknowledging the story the documents tell?

As I wrote in my article,

The great value of the discussion recounted in the memo...is to show, for the governments of both countries, a clear hierarchy of decision-making. By July 2002 at the latest, war had been decided on; the question at issue now was how to justify it—how to "fix," as it were, what Blair will later call "the political context." Specifically, though by this point in July the President had decided to go to war, he had not yet decided to go to the United Nations and demand inspectors; indeed, as "C" [the chief of MI6, the British equivalent of the CIA] points out, those on the National Security Council—the senior security officials of the US government—"had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record." This would later change, largely as a result of the political concerns of these very people gathered together at 10 Downing Street.
Those "political concerns" centered on the fact that, as British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw points out, "the case [for going to war] was thin" since, as the Attorney General points out, "the desire for regime change [in Iraq] was not a legal base for military action." In order to secure such a legal base, the British officials agree, the allies must contrive to win the approval of the United Nations Security Council, and the Foreign Secretary puts forward a way to do that: "We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors." Prime Minister Tony Blair makes very clear the point of such an ultimatum: "It would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the inspectors."

On February 13, 2002—five months before this British cabinet meeting, and thirteen months before the war began—the second of the articles Mr. Walcott mentions had appeared, under his and Walter P. Strobel's byline and the stark headline "Bush Has Decided to Overthrow Hussein." The article concludes this way:

Many nations...can be expected to question the legality of the United States unilaterally removing another country's government, no matter how distasteful. But a senior State Department official, while unable to provide the precise legal authority for such a move, said, "It's not hard to make the case that Iraq is a threat to international peace and security."...
A diplomatic offensive aimed at generating international support for overthrowing Saddam's regime is likely to precede any attack on Iraq....
The United States, perhaps with UN backing, is then expected to demand that Saddam readmit inspectors to root out Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs....
If Baghdad refuses to readmit inspectors or if Saddam prevents them from carrying out their work, as he has in the past, Bush would have a pretext for action.
Thus the stratagem that the British would successfully urge on their American allies by late that summer was already under discussion within the State Department—five months before the Downing Street meeting in July 2002, and more than a year before the war began.

Again, what does all this prove? From the point of view of "the senior State Department official," no doubt, such an admission leaked to a Knight Ridder reporter was an opening public salvo in the bureaucratic struggle that reached a climax that August, when President Bush finally accepted the argument of his secretary of state, and his British allies, and went "the United Nations route." Just in the way that unnoticed but prophetic intelligence concealed in a wealth of "chatter" is outlined brightly by future events, this leak now seems like a clear prophetic disclosure about what was to come, having been confirmed by what did in fact happen. But the Downing Street memo makes clear that at the time the "senior State Department official" spoke to the Knight Ridder reporters the strategy had not yet been decided. The memo, moreover, is not an anonymous statement to reporters but a record of what Britain's highest security officials actually said. It tells us much about how the decision was made, and shows decisively that, as I wrote in my article, "the idea of UN inspectors was introduced not as a means to avoid war, as President Bush repeatedly assured Americans, but as a means to make war possible."

The Knight Ridder pieces bring up a larger issue. It is a source of some irony that one of the obstacles to gaining recognition for the Downing Street memo in the American press has been the largely unspoken notion among reporters and editors that the story the memo tells is "nothing new." I say irony because we see in this an odd and familiar narrative from our current world of "frozen scandal"—so-called scandals, that is, in which we have revelation but not a true investigation or punishment: scandals we are forced to live with.[2] A story is told the first time but hardly acknowledged (as with the Knight Ridder piece), largely because the broader story the government is telling drowns it out. When the story is later confirmed by official documents, in this case the Downing Street memorandum, the documents are largely dismissed because they contain "nothing new."

Part of this comes down to the question of what, in our current political and journalistic world, constitutes a "fact." How do we actually prove the truth of a story, such as the rather obvious one that, as the Knight Ridder headline had it, "Bush has decided to overthrow Hussein" many months before the war and the congressional resolution authorizing it, despite the President's protestations that "no decision had been made"? How would one prove the truth of the story that fully eight months before the invasion of Iraq, as the head of British intelligence reports to his prime minister and his cabinet colleagues upon his return from Washington in July 2002, "the facts and the intelligence were being fixed around the policy"? Michael Kinsley, in a recent article largely dismissing the Downing Street memo, remarks about this sentence:

Of course, if "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," rather than vice versa, that is pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right. And we know now that was true and a half. Fixing intelligence and facts to fit a desired policy is the Bush II governing style, especially concerning the war in Iraq. But C offered no specifics, or none that made it into the memo. Nor does the memo assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts.[3]
Consider for a moment this paragraph, which strikes me as a perfect little poem on our current political and journalistic condition. Kinsley accepts as "true and a half" that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy"—that is, after all, "the Bush II governing style"—but rejects the notion that the Downing Street memo actually proves this, since, presumably, the head of British intelligence "does [not] assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts." Kinsley does not say from whom he thinks the chief of British intelligence, in reporting to his prime minister "on his recent talks in Washington," might have derived that information, if not "actual decision makers." (In fact, as the London Sunday Times reported, among the people he saw was his American counterpart, director of central intelligence George Tenet.) Kinsley does say that if the point, which he accepts as true—indeed, almost blithely dismissing all who might doubt it—could in fact be proved, it would be "pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right."

One might ask what would convince this writer, and many others, of the truth of what, apparently, they already know, and accept, and acknowledge that they know and accept. What could be said to establish "truth"—to "prove it"? Perhaps a true congressional investigation of the way the administration used intelligence before the war—an investigation of the kind that, as I wrote in my article, was promised by the Senate Intelligence Committee, then thoughtfully postponed until after theelection—though one might think the question might have had some relevance to Americans in deciding for whom to vote—then finally, and quietly, abandoned. Instead, the Senate committee produced a report that, while powerfully damning on its own terms, explicitly excluded the critical question of how administration officials made use of the intelligence that was supplied them.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Still, Kinsley's column, and the cynical and impotent attitude it represents, suggests that such an investigation, if it occurred, might still not be adequate to make a publicly acceptable fact out of what everyone now knows and accepts. The column bears the perfect headline "No Smoking Gun," which suggests that failing the discovery of a tape recording in which President Bush is quoted explicitly ordering then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet that he should "fix the intelligence and facts around the policy," many will never regard the case as proved—though all the while accepting, of course, and admitting that they accept, that this is indeed what happened. The so-called "rules of objective journalism" dovetail with the disciplined functioning of a one-party government to keep the political debate willfully opaque and stupid.

So: if the excellent Knight Ridder articles by Mr. Walcott and his colleagues do indeed represent "signposts," then signposts on the way to what? American citizens find themselves on a very peculiar road, stumbling blindly through a dark wood. Having had before the war rather clear evidence that the Bush administration had decided to go to war even as it was claiming it was trying to avert war, we are now confronted with an escalating series of "disclosures" proving that the original story, despite the broad unwillingness to accept it, was in fact true.

Many in Congress, including many leading Democrats who voted to give the President the authority to go to war—fearing the political consequences of opposing him—and thus welcomed his soothing arguments that such a vote would enable him to avoid war rather than to undertake it, now find themselves in an especially difficult position, claiming, as Senator John Kerry did during the presidential campaign, that they were "misled" into supporting a war that they believed they were voting to help prevent. This argument is embarrassingly thin but it remains morally incriminating enough to go on confusing and corrupting a nascent public debate on Iraq that is sure to become more difficult and painful.

Whether or not the Downing Street memo could be called a "smoking gun," it has long since become clear that the UN inspections policy that, given time, could in fact have prevented war—by revealing, as it eventually would have, that Saddam had no threatening stockpiles of "weapons of mass destruction"—was used by the administration as a pretext: a means to persuade the country to begin a war that need never have been fought. It was an exceedingly clever pretext, for every action preparing for war could by definition be construed to be an action intended to avert it—as necessary to convince Saddam that war was imminent. According to this rhetorical stratagem, the actions, whether prepar-ing to wage war or seeking to avert it, merge, become indistinguishable. Failing the emergence of a time-stamped recording of President Bush declaring, "I have today decided to go to war with Saddam and all this inspection stuff is rubbish," we are unlikely to recover the kind of "smoking gun" that Kinsley and others seem to demand.

Failing that, the most reliable way to distinguish the true intentions of Bush and his officials is by looking at what they actually did, and the fact is that, despite the protestations of many in the United Nations and throughout the world, they refused to let the inspections run their course. What is more, the arguments of the President and others in his administration retrospectively justifying the war after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq—stressing that Saddam would always have been a threat because he could have "reconstituted" his weapons programs—make a mockery of the proposition that the administration would have been willing to leave him in power, even if the inspectors had been allowed sufficient time to prove before the war, as their colleagues did after it, that no weapons existed in Iraq.

We might believe that we are past such matters now. Alas, as Americans go on dying in Iraq and their fellow citizens grow ever more impatient with the war, the story of its beginning, clouded with propaganda and controversy as it is, will become more important, not less. Consider the strong warning put forward in a recently released British Cabinet document dated two days before the Downing Street memo (and eight months before the war), that "the military occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." On this point, as the British document prophetically observes, "US military plans are virtually silent."[4] So too were America's leaders, and we live with the consequences of that silence. As support for the war collapses, the cost will become clear: for most citizens, 1,700 American dead later—tens of thousands of Iraqi dead later—the war's beginning remains as murky and indistinct as its ending.

Notes
[1] See Michael Massing, "Now They Tell Us," The New York Review, February 26, 2004.

[2] See my essay, "What Are You Gong To Do With That?" The New York Review, June 23, 2005.

[3] The Washington Post, August 12, 2005.

[4] See "Cabinet Office Paper: Conditions for Military Action," The Sunday Times, June 12, 2005; www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2089-1648758,00.html



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Letters
August 11, 2005: Michael Kinsley, The Memo, the Press, and the War: An Exchange

Michele Kearney said...

The New York Review of Books

The Iraq Pretext: Why the Memo Matters

http://www.markdanner.com/articles/print/18

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

By Mark Danner
July 14, 2005

In response to The Secret Way to War (June 9, 2005)

To the Editors:

Mark Danner's excellent article on the Bush administration's path to war in Iraq ["The Secret Way to War," NYR, June 9] missed a couple of important signposts.

On October 11, 2001, Knight Ridder reported that less than a month after the September 11 attacks senior Pentagon officials who wanted to expand the war against terrorism to Iraq had authorized a trip to Great Britain in September by former CIA director James Woolsey in search of evidence that Saddam Hussein had played a role in the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Then, on February 13, 2002, nearly six months before the Downing Street memo was written, Knight Ridder reported that President Bush had decided to oust Saddam Hussein and had ordered the CIA, the Pentagon, and other agencies to devise a combination of military, diplomatic, and covert steps to achieve that goal. Six days later, former Senator Bob Graham of Florida reports in his book, he was astounded when General Tommy Franks told him during a visit to the US Central Command in Tampa that the administration was shifting resources away from the pursuit of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan to prepare for war in Iraq.

John Walcott
Washington Bureau Chief
Knight Ridder


Mark Danner replies:
John Walcott is proud of his bureau's reporting, and he should be. As my colleague Michael Massing has written in these pages, during the lead-up to the Iraq war Knight Ridder reporters had an enviable and unexampled record of independence and success.[1] But Mr. Walcott's statement that in my article "The Secret Way to War" I "missed a couple of important signposts" brings up an obvious question: Signposts on the way to what? What exactly does the Downing Street memo (which is simply an official account of a British security cabinet meeting in July 2002) and related documents that have since appeared, prove? And why has the American press in large part still resisted acknowledging the story the documents tell?

As I wrote in my article,

The great value of the discussion recounted in the memo...is to show, for the governments of both countries, a clear hierarchy of decision-making. By July 2002 at the latest, war had been decided on; the question at issue now was how to justify it—how to "fix," as it were, what Blair will later call "the political context." Specifically, though by this point in July the President had decided to go to war, he had not yet decided to go to the United Nations and demand inspectors; indeed, as "C" [the chief of MI6, the British equivalent of the CIA] points out, those on the National Security Council—the senior security officials of the US government—"had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record." This would later change, largely as a result of the political concerns of these very people gathered together at 10 Downing Street.
Those "political concerns" centered on the fact that, as British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw points out, "the case [for going to war] was thin" since, as the Attorney General points out, "the desire for regime change [in Iraq] was not a legal base for military action." In order to secure such a legal base, the British officials agree, the allies must contrive to win the approval of the United Nations Security Council, and the Foreign Secretary puts forward a way to do that: "We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors." Prime Minister Tony Blair makes very clear the point of such an ultimatum: "It would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the inspectors."

On February 13, 2002—five months before this British cabinet meeting, and thirteen months before the war began—the second of the articles Mr. Walcott mentions had appeared, under his and Walter P. Strobel's byline and the stark headline "Bush Has Decided to Overthrow Hussein." The article concludes this way:

Many nations...can be expected to question the legality of the United States unilaterally removing another country's government, no matter how distasteful. But a senior State Department official, while unable to provide the precise legal authority for such a move, said, "It's not hard to make the case that Iraq is a threat to international peace and security."...
A diplomatic offensive aimed at generating international support for overthrowing Saddam's regime is likely to precede any attack on Iraq....
The United States, perhaps with UN backing, is then expected to demand that Saddam readmit inspectors to root out Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and missile programs....
If Baghdad refuses to readmit inspectors or if Saddam prevents them from carrying out their work, as he has in the past, Bush would have a pretext for action.
Thus the stratagem that the British would successfully urge on their American allies by late that summer was already under discussion within the State Department—five months before the Downing Street meeting in July 2002, and more than a year before the war began.

Again, what does all this prove? From the point of view of "the senior State Department official," no doubt, such an admission leaked to a Knight Ridder reporter was an opening public salvo in the bureaucratic struggle that reached a climax that August, when President Bush finally accepted the argument of his secretary of state, and his British allies, and went "the United Nations route." Just in the way that unnoticed but prophetic intelligence concealed in a wealth of "chatter" is outlined brightly by future events, this leak now seems like a clear prophetic disclosure about what was to come, having been confirmed by what did in fact happen. But the Downing Street memo makes clear that at the time the "senior State Department official" spoke to the Knight Ridder reporters the strategy had not yet been decided. The memo, moreover, is not an anonymous statement to reporters but a record of what Britain's highest security officials actually said. It tells us much about how the decision was made, and shows decisively that, as I wrote in my article, "the idea of UN inspectors was introduced not as a means to avoid war, as President Bush repeatedly assured Americans, but as a means to make war possible."

The Knight Ridder pieces bring up a larger issue. It is a source of some irony that one of the obstacles to gaining recognition for the Downing Street memo in the American press has been the largely unspoken notion among reporters and editors that the story the memo tells is "nothing new." I say irony because we see in this an odd and familiar narrative from our current world of "frozen scandal"—so-called scandals, that is, in which we have revelation but not a true investigation or punishment: scandals we are forced to live with.[2] A story is told the first time but hardly acknowledged (as with the Knight Ridder piece), largely because the broader story the government is telling drowns it out. When the story is later confirmed by official documents, in this case the Downing Street memorandum, the documents are largely dismissed because they contain "nothing new."

Part of this comes down to the question of what, in our current political and journalistic world, constitutes a "fact." How do we actually prove the truth of a story, such as the rather obvious one that, as the Knight Ridder headline had it, "Bush has decided to overthrow Hussein" many months before the war and the congressional resolution authorizing it, despite the President's protestations that "no decision had been made"? How would one prove the truth of the story that fully eight months before the invasion of Iraq, as the head of British intelligence reports to his prime minister and his cabinet colleagues upon his return from Washington in July 2002, "the facts and the intelligence were being fixed around the policy"? Michael Kinsley, in a recent article largely dismissing the Downing Street memo, remarks about this sentence:

Of course, if "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy," rather than vice versa, that is pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right. And we know now that was true and a half. Fixing intelligence and facts to fit a desired policy is the Bush II governing style, especially concerning the war in Iraq. But C offered no specifics, or none that made it into the memo. Nor does the memo assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts.[3]
Consider for a moment this paragraph, which strikes me as a perfect little poem on our current political and journalistic condition. Kinsley accepts as "true and a half" that "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy"—that is, after all, "the Bush II governing style"—but rejects the notion that the Downing Street memo actually proves this, since, presumably, the head of British intelligence "does [not] assert that actual decision makers had told him they were fixing the facts." Kinsley does not say from whom he thinks the chief of British intelligence, in reporting to his prime minister "on his recent talks in Washington," might have derived that information, if not "actual decision makers." (In fact, as the London Sunday Times reported, among the people he saw was his American counterpart, director of central intelligence George Tenet.) Kinsley does say that if the point, which he accepts as true—indeed, almost blithely dismissing all who might doubt it—could in fact be proved, it would be "pretty good evidence of Bush's intentions, as well as a scandal in its own right."

One might ask what would convince this writer, and many others, of the truth of what, apparently, they already know, and accept, and acknowledge that they know and accept. What could be said to establish "truth"—to "prove it"? Perhaps a true congressional investigation of the way the administration used intelligence before the war—an investigation of the kind that, as I wrote in my article, was promised by the Senate Intelligence Committee, then thoughtfully postponed until after theelection—though one might think the question might have had some relevance to Americans in deciding for whom to vote—then finally, and quietly, abandoned. Instead, the Senate committee produced a report that, while powerfully damning on its own terms, explicitly excluded the critical question of how administration officials made use of the intelligence that was supplied them.

Still, Kinsley's column, and the cynical and impotent attitude it represents, suggests that such an investigation, if it occurred, might still not be adequate to make a publicly acceptable fact out of what everyone now knows and accepts. The column bears the perfect headline "No Smoking Gun," which suggests that failing the discovery of a tape recording in which President Bush is quoted explicitly ordering then Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet that he should "fix the intelligence and facts around the policy," many will never regard the case as proved— though all the while accepting, of course, and admitting that they accept, that this is indeed what happened. The so-called "rules of objective journalism" dovetail with the disciplined functioning of a one-party government to keep the political debate willfully opaque and stupid.

So: if the excellent Knight Ridder articles by Mr. Walcott and his colleagues do indeed represent "signposts," then signposts on the way to what? American citizens find themselves on a very peculiar road, stumbling blindly through a dark wood. Having had before the war rather clear evidence that the Bush administration had decided to go to war even as it was claiming it was trying to avert war, we are now confronted with an escalating series of "disclosures" proving that the original story, despite the broad unwillingness to accept it, was in fact true.

Many in Congress, including many leading Democrats who voted to give the President the authority to go to war—fearing the political consequences of opposing him —and thus welcomed his soothing arguments that such a vote would enable him to avoid war rather than to undertake it, now find themselves in an especially difficult position, claiming, as Senator John Kerry did during the presidential campaign, that they were "misled" into supporting a war that they believed they were voting to help prevent. This argument is embarrassingly thin but it remains morally incriminating enough to go on confusing and corrupting a nascent public debate on Iraq that is sure to become more difficult and painful.

Whether or not the Downing Street memo could be called a "smoking gun," it has long since become clear that the UN inspections policy that, given time, could in fact have prevented war—by revealing, as it eventually would have, that Saddam had no threatening stockpiles of "weapons of mass destruction"—was used by the administration as a pretext: a means to persuade the country to begin a war that need never have been fought. It was an exceedingly clever pretext, for every action preparing for war could by definition be construed to be an action intended to avert it—as necessary to convince Saddam that war was imminent. According to this rhetorical stratagem, the actions, whether prepar-ing to wage war or seeking to avert it, merge, become indistinguishable. Failing the emergence of a time-stamped recording of President Bush declaring, "I have today decided to go to war with Saddam and all this inspection stuff is rubbish," we are unlikely to recover the kind of "smoking gun" that Kinsley and others seem to demand.

Failing that, the most reliable way to distinguish the true intentions of Bush and his officials is by looking at what they actually did, and the fact is that, despite the protestations of many in the United Nations and throughout the world, they refused to let the inspections run their course. What is more, the arguments of the President and others in his administration retrospectively justifying the war after the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq— stressing that Saddam would always have been a threat because he could have "reconstituted" his weapons programs— make a mockery of the proposition that the administration would have been willing to leave him in power, even if the inspectors had been allowed sufficient time to prove before the war, as their colleagues did after it, that no weapons existed in Iraq.

We might believe that we are past such matters now. Alas, as Americans go on dying in Iraq and their fellow citizens grow ever more impatient with the war, the story of its beginning, clouded with propaganda and controversy as it is, will become more important, not less. Consider the strong warning put forward in a recently released British Cabinet document dated two days before the Downing Street memo (and eight months before the war), that "the military occupation of Iraq could lead to a protracted and costly nation-building exercise." On this point, as the British document prophetically observes, "US military plans are virtually silent."[4] So too were America's leaders, and we live with the consequences of that silence. As support for the war collapses, the cost will become clear: for most citizens, 1,700 American dead later—tens of thousands of Iraqi dead later—the war's beginning remains as murky and indistinct as its ending.

Michele Kearney said...

6-20-05

How We Went to War: What the Downing Street Memos Demonstrate
By Tom Engelhardt and Mark Danner
Mr. Engelhardt is the author of The End of Victory Culture and co-editor of History Wars, the Enola Gay and Other Battles for the American Past. Mr. Danner, a longtime New Yorker Staff writer and frequent contributor to the New York Review of Books, is Professor of Journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and Henry R. Luce Professor at Bard College. His most recent book is Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror, which collects his pieces on torture and Iraq that first appeared in the New York Review of Books. His work can be found at markdanner.com.

http://hnn.us/articles/12554.html

Editor's Note: These two articles appear together on the website of www.tomdispatch.com, a weblog of the Nation Institute, which is run by Mr. Engelhardt. The article by Mr. Danner will appear separately in the forthcoming edition of the New York Review of Books.

Smoking Signposts to Nowhere

By Tom Engelhardt

Imagine that the Pentagon Papers or the Watergate scandal had broken out all over the press -- no, not in the New York Times or the Washington Post, but in newspapers in Australia or Canada. And that, facing their own terrible record of reportage, of years of being cowed by the Nixon administration, major American papers had decided that this was not a story worthy of being covered. Imagine that, initially, they dismissed the revelatory documents and information that came out of the heart of administration policy-making; then almost willfully misread them, insisting that evidence of Pentagon planning for escalation in Vietnam or of Nixon administration planning to destroy its opponents was at best ambiguous or even nonexistent; finally, when they found that the documents wouldn't go away, they acknowledged them more formally with a tired ho-hum, a knowing nod on editorial pages or in news stories. Actually, they claimed, these documents didn't add up to much because they had run stories just like this back then themselves. Yawn.

This is, of course, something like the crude pattern that coverage in the American press has followed on the Downing Street memo, then memos. As of late last week, four of our five major papers (the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, the New York Times, and USA Today) hadn't even commented on them in their editorial pages. In my hometown paper, the New York Times, complete lack of interest was followed last Monday by a page 11 David Sanger piece (Prewar British Memo Says War Decision Wasn't Made) that focused on the second of the Downing Street memos, a briefing paper for Tony Blair's "inner circle," and began: "A memorandum written by Prime Minister Tony Blair's cabinet office in late July 2002 explicitly states that the Bush administration had made ‘no political decisions' to invade Iraq, but that American military planning for the possibility was advanced."

Compare that to the front-page lead written a day earlier by Michael Smith of the British Sunday Times, who revealed the existence of the document and has been the Woodstein of England on this issue (Ministers were told of need for Gulf war ‘excuse'):


"Ministers were warned in July 2002 that Britain was committed to taking part in an American-led invasion of Iraq and they had no choice but to find a way of making it legal. The warning, in a leaked Cabinet Office briefing paper, said Tony Blair had already agreed to back military action to get rid of Saddam Hussein at a summit at the Texas ranch of President George W Bush three months earlier."

The headlines the two papers chose more or less tell it all. It's hard to believe that they are even reporting on the same document. Sanger was obviously capable of reading Smith's piece and yet his report makes no mention of the April meeting of the two leaders in Crawford explicitly noted in the memo and offers a completely tendentious reading of those supposedly unmade "political decisions." Read the document yourself. It's clear, when the Brits write, for instance, "[L]ittle thought has been given [in Washington] to creating the political conditions for military action," that they are talking about tactics, about how to move the rest of the world toward an already agreed-upon war. After all, though it's seldom commented on, this document was entitled, "Cabinet Office paper: Conditions for military action," and along with the previously released memo was essentially a war-planning document. Both, for instance, discuss the American need for British bases in Cyprus and on the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. It was, as well, focused on the creation of "an information campaign" and suggested that "[t]ime will be required to prepare public opinion in the UK that it is necessary to take military action against Saddam Hussein."

We are talking here about creating the right political preconditions for moving populations toward a war, quite a different matter from not having decided on the war. To write as if this piece reflected a situation in which no "political decisions" had been made (taking that phrase out of all context), without even a single caveat, a single mention of any alternative possible explanation, was bizarre, to say the least.

A day later, the New York Times weighed in with another piece. Written by Todd Purdum and this time carefully labeled "news analysis," it was placed on page 10 and arrived practically exhausted. "But the memos," wrote the world-weary Purdum, "are not the Dead Sea Scrolls. There has been ample evidence for many months, and even years, that top Bush administration figures saw war as inevitable by the summer of 2002."

The Times editors at least had the decency to hide both their pieces deep inside the paper (and the paper remained editorially silent on the subject of the memos). The Washington Post did them one better. On its editorial page, its writers made Purdum look like the soul of cautious reason by publishing Iraq, Then and Now, which had the following dismissal of the memos:


War opponents have been trumpeting several British government memos from July 2002, which describe the Bush administration's preparations for invasion, as revelatory of President Bush's deceptions about Iraq. Bloggers have demanded to know why "the mainstream media" have not paid more attention to them. Though we can't speak for The Post's news department, the answer appears obvious: The memos add not a single fact to what was previously known about the administration's prewar deliberations. Not only that: They add nothing to what was publicly known in July 2002.

Of course, the editorial writers might at least have pointed out that, before March 2003, the Post editorial page, now so eager to tell us that we knew it all then, was generally beating the drums for war. If they knew it all then, they evidently couldn't have cared less that the administration's "prewar deliberations" bore remarkably little relationship to its prewar statements and claims. Nor did they bother to repeat another boringly obvious point -- that the best of the Post's reporting on the subject of the administration's prewar deliberations from journalists like Walter Pincus had, in those prewar days, generally been consigned to the inside pages of the paper, while the administration's bogus claims about Iraq (which, they now imply, they knew perfectly well were bogus) were regularly front-paged.

Let's just add that if Post editorialists and Times journalists can't tell the difference between scattered, generally anonymously sourced, pre-war reports that told us of early Bush administration preparations for war and actual documents on the same subject emerging from the highest reaches of the British government, from the highest intelligence figure in that government who had just met with some of the highest figures in the U.S. government, and was immediately reporting back to what, in essence, was a "war cabinet" -- well, what can you say? To return to the Pentagon Papers and Watergate affairs, long before news on the Papers was broken in 1971 by the Times, you could certainly have pieced together -- as many did -– much about the nature of American war planning in Vietnam, just as long before the Watergate affair became recognizably itself (only months after the 1972 election), you could have read the lonely Woodstein pieces in the Post (and scattered pieces elsewhere) and had a reasonable sense of where the Nixon administration was going. But material from the horse's mouth, so to speak, directly from Pentagon documents or from Deep Throat himself, that was a very different matter, as is true with the Downing Street memos.

Let Sunday Times reporter Michael Smith -- by his own admission, a British conservative and a supporter of the invasion of Iraq -- explain this, as he did in a recent on-line chat at the Washington Post website, with a bluntness inconceivable for an American reporter considering the subject:


"It is one thing for the New York Times or The Washington Post to say that we were being told that the intelligence was being fixed by sources inside the CIA or Pentagon or the NSC and quite another to have documentary confirmation in the form of the minutes of a key meeting with the Prime Minister's office. Think of it this way, all the key players were there. This was the equivalent of an NSC [National Security Council] meeting, with the President, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, Condi Rice, George Tenet, and Tommy Franks all there. They say the evidence against Saddam Hussein is thin, the Brits think regime change is illegal under international law so we are going to have to go to the U.N. to get an ultimatum, not as a way of averting war but as an excuse to make the war legal, and oh by the way we aren't preparing for what happens after and no-one has the faintest idea what Iraq will be like after a war. Not reportable, are you kidding me?"

Similarly, on the line in the initial Downing Street memo that has been much hemmed and hawed about here -- "But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy." -- he has this to say:


"There are number of people asking about fixed and its meaning. This is a real joke. I do not know anyone in the UK who took it to mean anything other than fixed as in fixed a race, fixed an election, fixed the intelligence. If you fix something, you make it the way you want it. The intelligence was fixed and as for the reports that said this was one British official. Pleeeaaassee! This was the head of MI6 [the British equivalent of the CIA]. How much authority do you want the man to have? He has just been to Washington, he has just talked to [CIA director] George Tenet. He said the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy."

But does all of this even qualify as a news story today? For that you need a tad of context, so here in full is the President's response when, at a recent news conference with Tony Blair, he was asked about that facts-being-"fixed" reference in the Downing Street memo:


"PRESIDENT BUSH: Well, I -- you know, I read kind of the characterizations of the memo, particularly when they dropped it out in the middle of [Tony Blair's election] race. I'm not sure who "they dropped it out" is, but -- I'm not suggesting that you all dropped it out there. (Laughter.) And somebody said, well, you know, we had made up our mind to go to use military force to deal with Saddam. There's nothing farther from the truth.

"My conversation with the Prime Minister was, how could we do this peacefully, what could we do. And this meeting, evidently, that took place in London happened before we even went to the United Nations -- or I went to the United Nations. And so it's -- look, both us of didn't want to use our military. Nobody wants to commit military into combat. It's the last option. The consequences of committing the military are -- are very difficult. The hardest things I do as the President is to try to comfort families who've lost a loved one in combat. It's the last option that the President must have -- and it's the last option I know my friend had, as well.

"And so we worked hard to see if we could figure out how to do this peacefully, take a -- put a united front up to Saddam Hussein, and say, the world speaks, and he ignored the world. Remember, 1441 passed the Security Council unanimously. He made the decision. And the world is better off without Saddam Hussein in power."


So even today, our President gets up and, in response to these memos, denies that he or Tony Blair made a decision to go to war until the last second ("There's nothing farther from the truth."), something our papers are now saying we all knew wasn't so back when. So he lied then, and he lies today on this matter, and somehow this isn't considered a news story because somewhere, sometime, some reporters on some major papers actually published pieces contradicting him before the Downing Street documents themselves were written? The logic is fascinating. It is also shameful.

As ever, to hear this discussed in a blunt fashion, you have to repair to the Internet, where, at Salon, for instance, you can read Juan Cole writing in The Revenge of Baghdad Bob:


"Bush is trying to give the impression that his going to the United Nations showed his administration's good faith in trying to disarm Saddam by peaceful means. It does nothing of the sort. In fact, the memo contains key evidence that the entire U.N. strategy was a ploy, dreamed up by the British, to justify a war that Bush had decided to wage long ago... The docile White House press corps, which until the press conference had never asked the president about the Downing Street memo, predictably neglected to press Bush and Blair on those issues, allowing them to get away with mere obfuscation and meaningless non-answers."

I swear, if the American equivalents of the Downing Street memos were to leak (as they will sooner or later), there would be stories all over the world, while our papers would be saying: No news there; we knew it all along. So how have the various memos defied a mainstream media consensus and over these weeks risen, almost despite themselves, into the news, made their way into Congress, onto television, into consciousness?

Well, for one thing, the political Internet simply wouldn't stop yammering about them. Long before they were discussed in print, they were already up and being analyzed at sites like the War in Context and Antiwar.com. So credit the blogosphere with this one, at least in part. But let's not create too heroic a tale of the Internet's influence to match the now vastly overblown tale of the role of the press in the Watergate affair. Part of the answer also involves a shift in the wind -- the wind being, in the case of politics, falling polling figures for the President and Congress. Can't you feel it? The Bush administration seems somehow to be weakening.

The mainstream media can feel it, too, and weakness is irresistible. Before we're done, if we're not careful, we'll have a heroic tale of how the media saved us all from the Bush administration.

Sadly, the overall story of American press coverage of this administration and its Iraqi war has been a sorry one indeed, though there are distinct exceptions, one of which has been the work done by the Knight Ridder news service. Its reporters in Washington -- Warren Strobel, John Wolcott, and Jonathan Landay among others -- seemed remarkably uncowed by the Bush administration at a time when others were treading lightly indeed. Even now, compare Strobel's recent piece published under the very un-American sounding headline British documents portray determined U.S. march to war with the reporting norm. It begins: "Highly classified documents leaked in Britain appear to provide new evidence that President Bush and his national security team decided to invade Iraq much earlier than they have acknowledged and marched to war without dwelling on the potential perils." As it happens, Knight Ridder doesn't have a flagship paper among the majors that would have highlighted its fine reporting, and so its work was essentially buried.

About a month ago, to accompany a forceful analysis by Mark Danner (posted on May 15 at Tomdispatch), the New York Review of Books would become the first publication in this country to put the initial Downing Street memo in print (a striking act for a "review of books" and an indication of just how our major papers have let us down). Recently, John Wolcott of Knight Ridder wrote Danner a brief response and in the July 14th issue of the Review, Danner, who has been on fire this year, considers what to make of the strange media coverage of the memo in this country and why it is important.

Michele Kearney said...

Paul Right, Romney Wrong on Iraq and 9/11
By Gary Benoit
Published: 2007-08-08 19:04 Email this page | printer friendly version


ARTICLE SYNOPSIS:
Ron Paul was right during the Des Moines Republican debate when he said that our going into Iraq had nothing to do with al-Qaeda. And Mitt Romney was wrong when he interrupted him.

Follow this link to the original source: "Abortion, Iraq war drive jabs in GOP debate"

COMMENTARY:

http://www.jbs.org/node/5072

At the Republican debate in Des Moines, Iowa, on August 5, Congressman Ron Paul made clear that our going to war against Iraq had nothing to do with going after al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that attacked us on 9/11.

"The neoconservatives promoted this war many, many years before it was started," Paul said during the debate. "It had nothing to do with al-Qaeda. There was no al-Qaeda in Iraq." As Ron Paul elaborated on how wrong the neocons have been, Governor Romney, apparently attempting to telegraph his disgust with the congressman’s remarks, snidely said to the audience, "Has he forgotten about 9/11?" as he gestured with his hands. A couple seconds later, Romney again rudely interrupted — "Have you forgotten about..." — as Paul continued using the time allotted to him.

Later in the debate, Paul revisited the subject of al-Qaeda. "I supported going after the al-Qaeda into Afghanistan," he said, "but, lo and behold, the neocons took over. They forgot about Osama bin Laden. And what they did, they went into nation- building, not only in Afghanistan, they went unjustifiably over into Iraq. And that’s why we’re in this mess today."

Put simply, Ron Paul does not believe we went into Iraq because of 9/11. But Mitt Romney obviously believes we did. So who’s right?

It is true that President Bush and other neocons in his administration have repeatedly juxtaposed references to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq to those of 9/11 in their public statements. In so doing, they have created the impression among many Americans — apparently including Romney — that Saddam Hussein had attacked us on 9/11. But the administration did not explicitly say this and did not even present evidence supporting this allegation. As President Bush himself said on September 17, 2003: "We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th [attacks]."

The administration did portray an al-Qaeda/Iraq connection as a concrete fact. Yet in a January 8, 2004 press conference, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell acknowledged: "There is not — you know, I have not seen smoking-gun, concrete evidence about the connection, but I think the possibility of such connections did exist and it was prudent to consider them at the time that we did." In truth, the evidence simply was not there.

By interrupting Congressman Paul with his "Has he forgotten about 9/11?" protestation, Governor Romney not only made himself appear less than presidential, he also confirmed that, where Iraq is concerned, he does not know what he’s talking about.

Gary Benoit
Gary is the Editor of The New American magazine, a publication of the John Birch Society.

Michele Kearney said...

Published on Monday, August 7, 2006 by the Associated Press
Half of U.S. Still Believes Iraq Had WMD
by Charles J. Hanley

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0807-05.htm

-- Do you believe in Iraqi "WMD"? Did Saddam Hussein's government have weapons of mass destruction in 2003?
Half of America apparently still thinks so, a new poll finds, and experts see a raft of reasons why: a drumbeat of voices from talk radio to die-hard bloggers to the Oval Office, a surprise headline here or there, a rallying around a partisan flag, and a growing need for people, in their own minds, to justify the war in Iraq.

People tend to become "independent of reality" in these circumstances, says opinion analyst Steven Kull.

The reality in this case is that after a 16-month, $900-million-plus investigation, the U.S. weapons hunters known as the Iraq Survey Group declared that Iraq had dismantled its chemical, biological and nuclear arms programs in 1991 under U.N. oversight. That finding in 2004 reaffirmed the work of U.N. inspectors who in 2002-03 found no trace of banned arsenals in Iraq.

Despite this, a Harris Poll released July 21 found that a full 50 percent of U.S. respondents _ up from 36 percent last year _ said they believe Iraq did have the forbidden arms when U.S. troops invaded in March 2003, an attack whose stated purpose was elimination of supposed WMD. Other polls also have found an enduring American faith in the WMD story.

"I'm flabbergasted," said Michael Massing, a media critic whose writings dissected the largely unquestioning U.S. news reporting on the Bush administration's shaky WMD claims in 2002-03.

"This finding just has to cause despair among those of us who hope for an informed public able to draw reasonable conclusions based on evidence," Massing said.

Timing may explain some of the poll result. Two weeks before the survey, two Republican lawmakers, Pennsylvania's Sen. Rick Santorum and Michigan's Rep. Peter Hoekstra, released an intelligence report in Washington saying 500 chemical munitions had been collected in Iraq since the 2003 invasion.

"I think the Harris Poll was measuring people's surprise at hearing this after being told for so long there were no WMD in the country," said Hoekstra spokesman Jamal Ware.

But the Pentagon and outside experts stressed that these abandoned shells, many found in ones and twos, were 15 years old or more, their chemical contents were degraded, and they were unusable as artillery ordnance. Since the 1990s, such "orphan" munitions, from among 160,000 made by Iraq and destroyed, have turned up on old battlefields and elsewhere in Iraq, ex-inspectors say. In other words, this was no surprise.

"These are not stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction," said Scott Ritter, the ex-Marine who was a U.N. inspector in the 1990s. "They weren't deliberately withheld from inspectors by the Iraqis."

Conservative commentator Deroy Murdock, who trumpeted Hoekstra's announcement in his syndicated column, complained in an interview that the press "didn't give the story the play it deserved." But in some quarters it was headlined.

"Our top story tonight, the nation abuzz today ..." was how Fox News led its report on the old, stray shells. Talk-radio hosts and their callers seized on it. Feedback to blogs grew intense. "Americans are waking up from a distorted reality," read one posting.

Other claims about supposed WMD had preceded this, especially speculation since 2003 that Iraq had secretly shipped WMD abroad. A former Iraqi general's book _ at best uncorroborated hearsay _ claimed "56 flights" by jetliners had borne such material to Syria.

But Kull, Massing and others see an influence on opinion that's more sustained than the odd headline.

"I think the Santorum-Hoekstra thing is the latest 'factoid,' but the basic dynamic is the insistent repetition by the Bush administration of the original argument," said John Prados, author of the 2004 book "Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War."

Administration statements still describe Saddam's Iraq as a threat. Despite the official findings, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has allowed only that "perhaps" WMD weren't in Iraq. And Bush himself, since 2003, has repeatedly insisted on one plainly false point: that Saddam rebuffed the U.N. inspectors in 2002, that "he wouldn't let them in," as he said in 2003, and "he chose to deny inspectors," as he said this March.

The facts are that Iraq _ after a four-year hiatus in cooperating with inspections _ acceded to the U.N. Security Council's demand and allowed scores of experts to conduct more than 700 inspections of potential weapons sites from Nov. 27, 2002, to March 16, 2003. The inspectors said they could wrap up their work within months. Instead, the U.S. invasion aborted that work.

As recently as May 27, Bush told West Point graduates, "When the United Nations Security Council gave him one final chance to disclose and disarm, or face serious consequences, he refused to take that final opportunity."

"Which isn't true," observed Kathleen Hall Jamieson, a scholar of presidential rhetoric at the University of Pennsylvania. But "it doesn't surprise me when presidents reconstruct reality to make their policies defensible." This president may even have convinced himself it's true, she said.

Americans have heard it. A poll by Kull's WorldPublicOpinion.org found that seven in 10 Americans perceive the administration as still saying Iraq had a WMD program. Combine that rhetoric with simplistic headlines about WMD "finds," and people "assume the issue is still in play," Kull said.

"For some it almost becomes independent of reality and becomes very partisan." The WMD believers are heavily Republican, polls show.

Beyond partisanship, however, people may also feel a need to believe in WMD, the analysts say.

"As perception grows of worsening conditions in Iraq, it may be that Americans are just hoping for more of a solid basis for being in Iraq to begin with," said the Harris Poll's David Krane.

Charles Duelfer, the lead U.S. inspector who announced the negative WMD findings two years ago, has watched uncertainly as TV sound bites, bloggers and politicians try to chip away at "the best factual account," his group's densely detailed, 1,000-page final report.

"It is easy to see what is accepted as truth rapidly morph from one representation to another," he said in an e-mail. "It would be a shame if one effect of the power of the Internet was to undermine any commonly agreed set of facts."

The creative "morphing" goes on.

As Israeli troops and Hezbollah guerrillas battled in Lebanon on July 21, a Fox News segment suggested, with no evidence, yet another destination for the supposed doomsday arms.

"ARE SADDAM HUSSEIN'S WMDS NOW IN HEZBOLLAH'S HANDS?" asked the headline, lingering for long minutes on TV screens in a million American homes.

Michele Kearney said...

WMD existed in "virtual reality"

By CHARLES J. HANLEY
The Associated Press

http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/P...p;date=20050904

The story of the weapons that weren't there, the "WMD" tale, is still unfolding in a long post-mortem — of lingering questions about accountability, of revelations from investigations, leaks, first-person accounts.

More than two years after their nation went to war in Iraq, 52 percent of Americans believe the Bush administration deliberately misled them about the presence of weapons of mass destruction there, according to a Washington Post-ABC News poll taken in June.

Hans Blix, United Nations inspector, calls it Washington's "virtual reality," which he says eventually collided with "our old-fashioned ordinary reality."

Now, drawing from findings of the Iraq Survey Group and other official investigations, from U.N., U.S., Iraqi and British documents, from Associated Press interviews and on-scene reporting, from books by Blix and others, it's possible to reconstruct, step by step, much of the "ordinary reality" of this extraordinary story, one that changed the course of history.

The story unfolds

May 1991 — U.N. inspectors entered postwar Iraq and began destroying chemical weapons and dismantling Iraq's nuclear-weapons program, which never built a bomb.

August 1995 — Defector Hussein Kamel, in charge of Baghdad's unconventional arms, detailed the secrets of Iraq's former biological-weapons program for U.N. interrogators. He insisted all chemical and biological arms were destroyed in 1991.

December 1998 — The U.N. inspectors withdrew from Iraq in a dispute with President Saddam Hussein's government over access to sites. Questions remained about possible hidden stockpiles of chemical arms or bioweapons.

Jan. 20, 2001 — As George W. Bush was inaugurated president, the CIA was reporting, "We do not have any direct evidence" that Baghdad was rebuilding its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs.

Jan. 30, 2001 — Bush focused his first National Security Council meeting on Iraq, ordering Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to study possible military action, according to ex-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill.

April 10, 2001 — A classified CIA report said Iraq was shopping for thousands of high-strength aluminum tubes, said to be potential cores for centrifuges to enrich uranium to nuclear-bomb strength.

April 11, 2001 — The U.S. Energy Department's centrifuge experts disagreed, saying the tubes' dimensions weren't well-suited for centrifuges. Department analysts suggested they were meant for making conventional artillery rockets. The U.N. nuclear agency later told U.S. officials the same.

May 20, 2001 — Iraqi diplomats in Kenya informed Baghdad that a Ugandan businessman offered uranium for sale, but they turned him away, saying U.N. sanctions forbade it.

June 2001 — A shipment of Iraq's aluminum tubes was intercepted in Jordan. The news upset Baghdad's military industry chief, Abdel Tawab Huweish, who needed them to make artillery rockets. He then ordered tubes of a different metal be found, he later told U.S. arms inspectors.

June 2001 — Northern Iraq's al-Kindi factory got a government order for trailer units to make hydrogen for weather balloons. An Iraqi defector code-named "Curveball" had been telling German intelligence Iraq was building bioweapons labs atop truck trailers. But the Germans informed U.S. intelligence that Curveball was a possible alcoholic and "out of control."

Sept. 12, 2001 — The day after the Sept. 11 terror attacks, White House talk was of "getting Iraq," even though U.S. agencies found no Iraqi link to the al-Qaida terrorists, according to Richard Clarke, ex-White House anti-terrorism chief.

Oct. 7, 2001 — U.S. forces attack Afghanistan.

Feb. 6, 2002 — CIA Director George Tenet told Congress his agency believes Saddam "never abandoned his nuclear-weapons program," but he cited no evidence of an imminent threat.

Feb. 12, 2002 — In a classified report, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said a purported Niger government document told of an Iraqi deal to buy 500 tons of uranium concentrate from that central African state. A transcription of the document contained errors, suggesting forgery, that should have been easily detectable.

March 2002 — Ex-diplomat Joseph Wilson, sent to Niger by the CIA to investigate the uranium allegation, reported back that he found no basis for it. State Department intelligence said the alleged transaction was implausible.

March 2002 — U.S. analysts, apparently unaware satellite reconnaissance was doubled over suspected Iraqi chemical-weapons factories, thought they were seeing increased activity at the sites, rather than increased surveillance.

April 2002 — Workers in Iraq's western desert smelted down the last equipment from a long-defunct uranium-enrichment project.

July 23, 2002 — In London, Prime Minister Tony Blair's inner Cabinet was told by Britain's intelligence chief, fresh from high-level Washington talks, that war against Iraq had become inevitable and U.S. intelligence was being "fixed" around this policy. Blair had pledged British support for war, if the U.S. first tried to get U.N. inspectors back into Iraq.

Mid-2002 — U.S. air attacks on Iraqi defenses were sharply stepped up, under cover of patrols over Iraq's "no-fly zones."

Aug. 26, 2002 — Vice President Dick Cheney told a veterans' convention, "There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction."

September 2002 — A classified DIA report said there was no reliable information on any Iraqi chemical or biological weapons.

Sept. 8, 2002 — The aluminum-tubes story was revived in a front-page New York Times article, in which unnamed U.S. officials said Iraq sought the equipment for uranium centrifuges. It said nothing about U.S. and U.N. experts who believed the tubes were meant for rocket casings.

Sept. 12, 2002 — Bush, at the United Nations, called on the world body to take action on Iraq. He, too, cited the tubes as proof of danger.

Sept. 16, 2002 — Saddam announced U.N. inspectors could return to Iraq.

Sept. 24, 2002 — Britain published an intelligence assessment saying Iraq "has made progress on WMD," but offering no conclusive evidence. Senior British government analyst Brian Jones later said leaders told the experts there was "other intelligence" they couldn't see, but none ever emerged.

Oct. 1, 2002 — U.S. agencies produced a National Intelligence Estimate that concluded, "Iraq has continued its weapons-of-mass-destruction programs," but offered no conclusive evidence.

Oct. 10-11, 2002 — Congress voted overwhelmingly to authorize Bush to use military force against Iraq.

Nov. 27, 2002 — U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq.

December 2002 — Saddam informed his senior generals in secret meetings that Iraq had no chemical or biological weapons.

January 2003 — Over two months, U.N. experts in Iraq had inspected 13 "facilities of concern" from the U.S.-British intelligence assessments and found no signs of weapons-making.

Jan. 28, 2003 — In his State of the Union address, Bush claimed Iraq sought African uranium, sought aluminum tubes for centrifuges, and built bioweapons trailers. But State Department intelligence called the "Niger uranium document" a probable hoax. State had joined Energy Department experts in viewing the tubes as likely rocket casings. And German intelligence had warned the CIA that Curveball, source of the trailers story, was an unreliable "waste of time."

Feb. 5, 2003 — Secretary of State Colin Powell, in a presentation to the U.N. Security Council, repeated many of the same questionable claims.

March 7, 2003 — The U.N. nuclear agency exposed the "Niger document" as a forgery. Its experts earlier, in a firsthand inspection, found Iraq's aluminum tubes to be poor candidates for centrifuges.

March 17, 2003 — On national television, Bush told the American people there was "no doubt" Iraq had "some of the most lethal weapons ever devised."

March 20, 2003 — U.S. armed forces bombed and invaded Iraq. Rumsfeld said of Iraqi WMD, "We know where they are." But none was found.

April 19, 2003 — An equipment-packed trailer seized in northern Iraq was said by the CIA to be one of Curveball's supposed bioweapons trailers. But tests found no trace of pathogens or toxins. It was one of the hydrogen-making trailers built under the 2001 al-Kindi contract.

Mid-2003 — The Bush administration line shifted from claiming Iraq had WMD to claiming it had WMD "programs."

May-December 2003 — David Kay's Iraq Survey Group arms hunters, poring over documents and suspect sites, interrogating scientists, found neither weapons nor programs.

December 2003 — In a Washington meeting with CIA chiefs, Kay ran into "an absolutely closed mind," he says, especially on the subjects of tubes and trailers.

Jan. 23, 2004 — Kay resigned as chief inspector, saying, "The weapons do not exist."

Feb. 12, 2004 — Tenet flew secretly to Baghdad, telling U.S. arms hunters, now under Charles Duelfer, that Iraq has WMD and they should find them, said senior inspector Rod Barton.

March 2004 — British intelligence urged Duelfer to put nine "nuggets," past unsupported allegations, into an interim report, Barton said. Duelfer rejected them as "fool's gold," Barton said.

Sept. 30, 2004 — In an election debate, Bush maintained, "Saddam Hussein had no intention of disarming."

Oct. 6, 2004 — Duelfer's final report, conveyed to the CIA on Sept. 23, is made public. It says Iraq disarmed 13 years earlier, in 1991.

Michele Kearney said...

his is based upon evidence available before we went into Iraq --- not after.

Bush deceptions -- lies, delusions, and mistakes

Iraq: WMD evidence
presented to U.N. by Colin Powell

http://www.sierrafoot.org/soapbox/Bush_lies_iraq_powell.html

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Evidence for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction:
Colin Powell's address to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003
Organization of this presentation is based mainly on a summary article by Charles J. Hanley, Asociated Press. In some cases additional information from other sources is included
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chemical weapons: Satellite photos of buildings, bunkers, and trucks
Powell: Satellite photos of industrial buildings, bunkers, and trucks were interpreted as showing covert movement to hide missiles and chemical/biological weapons. He reported that trucks at two sites were "decontamination vehicles" for use with chemical weapons.
Fact: These sites had been inspected about 500 times by U.N. inspectors in months prior to Powell's address. Hans Blix reported that his inspectors were well-equipped and had found neither contraband nor evidence that contraband had been evacuated. Since that time there have been no reports of anything being found.

Chemical weapons: Satellite photos of "decontamination vehicles"
Powell: Satellite photos were asserted to show trucks which were used "decontamination vehicles" for use with chemical weapons.
Fact: Norwegian U.N. inspector Jorn Siljeholm told AP that they had followed up on similar intelligence forwarded by the U.S. They found that the vehicles in question were ordinary fire trucks and water trucks.

Chemical weapons: Audio tapes
Powell: Satellite photos were asserted to show trucks which were used "decontamination vehicles" for use with chemical weapons.
Fact: Two tapes could possibly have represented the assertions, but this could not be concluded without additional context information. It was not apparent whether the "modified vehicle" was banned, and the reference to "nerve agents" was unclear, it could only be interpreted by speculation. The third tape issued an order to inspect dump and scrap areas for "forbidden" ammo and reportedly to clear it out. The Iraqis did in fact tell U.N. inspectors that they would do such a search for years-old materials, and they turned over four old chemical warheads to inspectors. The actual translation from Arabic of the end of the third tape gave only an order to inspect dump areas, not to clear them out.

Chemical weapons: VX
Powell: Iraq produced 4 tons of VX, a nerve agent. Powell emphasized that a single drop on the skin is fatal within minutes.
Fact: Most of the 4 tons of VX was destroyed in the 1990s under U.N. supervision.Iraq tried to prove shortly before the war began that the rest had been destroyed by chemically analyzing soil samples at the VX dump site.British experts indicated that pre-1991 VX probably would have degraded to a safe compound by now, and there has been no post-war report that VX has been found.

Chemical weapons: "500 tons" of chemical agent
Powell: "Our conservative estimate is that Iraq today has a stockpile of between 100 and 500 tons of chemical weapons agent." A CIA report from October, 2002 made a similar statement without specific evid
Fact: A CIA report from October, 2002 made a similar statement without specific evidence to support it but suggesting that Iraq "probably" concealed precursor chemicals. A DIA report from September, 2002 said that there "is no reliable information on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons."

Chemical weapons: Deployed for use
Powell: "Saddam Hussein has chemical weapons. ... And we have sources who tell us that he recently has authorized his field commanders to use them."
Fact: No such weapons were used and none have been reported to have been found.

Chemical weapons: Embedded production capability
Powell: Powell said, "We know that Iraq has embedded key portions of its illicit chemical weapons infrastructure within its legitimate civilian industry."
Fact: No such capability as been reported to have been found. A confidential DIA report in September, 2002, indicated that there was "no reliable information" on where Iraq has, or might establish, chemical agent production.

Chemical weapons: Shells and warheads
Powell: U.N. inspections found 11 unused 122-mm shells designed to carry chemical agents. Powell said these might be the "tip of the iceberg".
Fact: No reports indicate that additional shells or warheads have been found. Those found through U.N. inspections were from the 1980s and were empty, still crated and never used.

Biological weapons: Rockets and warheads in western desert (directly quoting AP)
Powell: '...Unidentified sources said that the Iraqis dispersed rocket launchers and warheads holding biological weapons to the western desert, hiding them in palm groves and moving them every one to four weeks.'
Fact: 'Nothing has been reported found, after months of searching by U.S. and Australian troops in the near-empty desert. Iraqi presidential science adviser Lt. Gen. Amer al-Saadi suggested the story of palm groves and weekly-to-monthly movement was lifted whole from an Iraqi general's written account of hiding missiles in the 1991 war.'

Biological weapons: Anthrax
Powell: Iraq declared that it produced 8,500 liters of anthrax before 1991. U.N. inspectors estimated it could have made up to 25,000 liters. Powell said that none has been "verifiably accounted for".
Fact: No anthrax has been found. A confidential DIA report from September, 2002, said that the agency believed Iraq had biological weapons but had no information on types, quantities, or readiness for use. 3 weeks before the war began Iraq reported that soil samples confirmed its contention that a particular site had been used to dispose of anthrax stocks, and it supplied a list of witnesses to verify quantities. The war began before these witnesses could be interviewed.

Biological weapons: Trailers
Powell: Defectors reportedly described mobile "biological weapons factories" using trucks and train cars. Powell displayed an artist's conception of one.
Fact: After the war two semitrailers were found which the Bush administration says were such labs. The Iraqis say they were used to manufacture hydrogen for artillery weather balloons. Various U.S. and British intelligence teams disagree with identification of these as the suggested mobile labs. One of the most credible reports came from a Defense Intelligence Agency engineering team, which concluded that the trailers were in fact small-scale hydrogen factories. Records in England showed that British Marconi sold the type of equipment in the trailers to Iraq in 1987 for production of hydrogen.

Aircraft for chemical/biological weapons delivery
Powell: Powell showed a video of an Iraqi Mirage F-1 simlating delivery of anthrax by spraying from a belly tank. He said that four tanks were unaccounted for and that Iraq was building small unmanned aircraft (drones) for delivery of chemical and biological weapons.
Fact: U.N. inspectors reported that the Mirage video predated the 1991 war, the Mirage was destroyed in that war, and 3 of the 4 spray tanks were destroyed in the 1990s. No drones have been found with capability to deliver chem/bio weapons.The known Iraqi drones are small, with an 8-meter wingspan. Iraq declared their range as 34 miles, but said that two had been modified to fly 62 miles. U.N. inspectors did not have time to verify their range before the war started.

Nuclear weapons: Hidden documents (directly quoting the AP article)
Powell: 'Powell said "classified" documents found at a nuclear scientist's Baghdad home were "dramatic confirmation" of intelligence saying prohibited items were concealed this way.'
Fact: 'U.N. nuclear inspectors later said the documents were old and "irrelevant" -- some administrative material, some from a failed and well-known uranium enrichment program of the 1980s.'

Nuclear weapons: Revived nuclear program
Powell: "We have no indication that Saddam Hussein has ever abandoned his nuclear weapons program."
Fact: Mohammed ElBaradei reported to the United Nations Security Council that the International Atomic Energy Agency had "to date found no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq." Since then no additional evidence has been reported to support a current or recent nuclear program. One centrifuge for uranium enrichment was unearthed, after having been buried in 1991. Former Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri reported that Iraq's nuclear program was shut down in 1991.

Nuclear weapons: Attempts to acquire uranium from Africa
This item was not part of Powell's presentation to the U.N., its best known presentation was by George Bush in his 2003 State of the Union address. It is included here for convenience in producing a single reference for the most important points of the Bush administration's WMD assertions.
Bush: "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Fact: This claim was based on forged documents portraying an attempt by Iraq to buy uranium from Niger. The documents were easily identified as a forgery, the IAEI reached this conclusion only hours after it was granted access to the documents. Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson went to Niger at the request of Vice President Cheney's office and the CIA in February, 2002 -- a year earlier -- to investigate the validity of this source. He reported that U.S. ambassador Barbro Owens-Kirkpatrick felt that she had already refuted these claims in reports to Washington based on her factual knowledge.

Nuclear weapons: Aluminum tubes
Powell: Aluminum tubes purchased by Iraq were for use in centrifuges for uranium enrichment, for nuclear weapons.
Fact: IAEA inspectors, Energy Department experts, and the State Department's intelligence bureau did not believe this was likely. Substantial modification would be needed to adapt the tubes to centrifuge use, but their specifications precisely match those used in for the Italian Medusa 81 artillery rocket. Identically matched characteristics include alloy, length, diameter, wall thickness, and anodized coating. IAEA inspectors observed a factory in Iraq which was using these tubes to manufacture artillery rockets.

Nuclear weapons: Magnets
Powell: Multiple intelligence sources indacted that Iraq was trying to buy magnets for use in uranium-enrichment centrifuges.
Fact: IAEA inspectors traced about a dozen types of imported magnets to their end users. Neither the inspectors nor post-war investigators have found magnets for use in centrifuges for uranium enrichment.

Nuclear weapons: Scuds and new missiles
Powell: Intelligence sources say Iraq has a secret force of up to a few dozen prohibited Scud-type missiles, a program to build newer missiles with 600-mile range, and had put a roof over a rocket test stand to block view from spy satellites.
Fact: No Scud-type missiles have been found. In the 1990s U.N. inspectors accounted for all except two Scuds formerly possessed by Iraq. No program to build new, longer-range missiles has been found. The Iraqis reported that the roofed test stand had been converted from vertical firing to horizontal firing and was roofed for the obvious reason: Things get very hot in the sun. (This site's author found a photo on the web at that time showing what appears to be this particular test stand being used in a horizontal-firing rocket motor test.)

Inspections: U-2 reconnaissance
Powell: Iraq was violating a U.N. resolution by rejecting U-2 reconnaissance flights.
Fact: Iraq did object to U-2 overflights at the time of Powell's presentation. However, it authorized U-2 overflights 5 days later, on February 10, 2003. U-2 reconnaissance flights began on February 17, about a month before the war started.

Inspections: Interviews with scientists
Powell: Iraq was violating a U.N. resolution by rejecting private interviews with scientists by U.N. inspectors. Powell suggested that scientists withheld information on weapons of mass destruction due to fear of Saddam Hussein's regime.
Fact: When interviews with scientists began news reports typically indicated that the scientists themselves had requested presence of Iraqi "minders". Fear of the regime probably was involved, but by early March 12 scientists had been interviewed privately. Since Saddam Hussein was deposed all known reports indicate that scientists have continued to insist that no WMD programs had been active for a minimum of several years, with most shut down in 1991.One former Iraqi nuclear scientist who defected to Canada in 1998, Imad Khadduri, has always insisted that the nuclear program never recovered from the 1991 war, and was stopped at that time.

Michele Kearney said...

Keeping the truth
from us peons

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted: September 10, 2005
1:00 a.m. Eastern

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article....RTICLE_ID=46254

Drawing upon the findings of the a) Iraq Survey Group, cool.gif U.S. and British official investigations, c) contemporary Iraqi official documents, and d) personal memoirs of U.N. officials and others, Associated Press reporter Charles Hanley has constructed a highly regarded "post mortem" of Saddam's non-existent "weapons of mass destruction" threat to us.

Hanley begins his post-mortem – appropriately enough – in August 1995.

Gen. Hussein Kamal, director of Saddam's nuke and chem-bio weapons programs (and also Saddam's son-in-law), had defected to Jordan and was extensively "debriefed" by U.N. officials, the CIA and the Brit equivalent (MI6).


Kamal revealed that Iraq – at his direction – had destroyed all chemical and biological agents and weapons, including the missiles to deliver them, in 1991.

Upon entering Iraq after the Gulf War, the International Atomic Energy Agency had discovered and destroyed what remained of the unsuccessful Iraqi nuke program.

Quoth Kamal of Iraq's WMD programs: "Nothing remained."

What Kamal revealed was kept secret from Saddam – and from us peons – but was shared with high-level U.S. and Brit officials.

By 1998, U.N. inspectors were able to verify Kamal's claims in every detail. Hence, the Security Council was informed that Saddam was substantively disarmed and that the "sanctions" imposed on Iraq in 1991 could be lifted.

Clinton "vetoed" it, claiming he had "intelligence" there were WMD stockpiles hidden beneath Saddam's palaces. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that, even if Saddam had been disarmed, the U.S. would never allow the sanctions to be lifted so long as Saddam was in power.

So, Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a four-day extensive bombing campaign of Saddam's "palaces" in Baghdad, obviously meant to "remove" Saddam.

Understandably, when Clinton failed, Saddam wouldn't let U.N. inspectors back into Iraq.

We now know that President Bush came into office also looking for an excuse to "remove" Saddam. He went to Congress in September 2002 seeking "specific statutory authorization" to resume the Gulf War, basing his case on the National Intelligence Estimate of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, hurriedly prepared by Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet for Bush in the summer of 2002.

But, NIE to the contrary, Bush and various congressional leaders knew that, as of 1999, Saddam had no WMD programs and was not a threat to the U.S.

Of course, they still didn't let us peons in on that.

We now know that by the summer of 2002 Prime Minister Tony Blair had agreed to support Bush's pre-emptive war of aggression against Iraq, but insisted that Bush get the Security Council to demand that Saddam let the U.N. inspectors back into Iraq to conduct totally intrusive inspections. Blair was confident that Saddam would refuse and Bush-Blair would then have their casus belli.

To their surprise, Saddam readily agreed to every Security Council demand. U.N. inspectors returned to Iraq in November 2002.

Then, in February 2003, Newsweek magazine – and also Sherrie Gossett of WorldNetDaily – published excerpts from the Kamal "debriefing" documents, kept secret since 1995.

Finally, with Bush's pre-emptive invasion already secretly under way, the rest of us peons found out what a) Bush-Blair, cool.gif CIA-MI6, and c) Congress-Parliament had known since at least 1998 – Saddam had destroyed all his "weapons of mass destruction" way back in 1991.

So, Bush-Cheney-Rice-Powell launched a frantic last-minute media blitz to convince us Saddam had been resurrecting his WMD programs while the U.N. inspectors had been absent.

But, alas, U.N. Monitoring and Verification Commission Chairman Hans Blix and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei were already reporting each month to the Security Council that they could find no "indication" that Saddam had made any attempt to reconstruct his WMD programs since 1991, much less 1998.

What's a poor bunch of naked aggressors – and their media sycophants – to do?

Brazen it out!

Consequently, according to the "determination" Bush sent to Congress – as required – on March 19, 2003, we had to launch a pre-emptive invasion because Iraq posed a continuing threat to the national security of the United States by:


continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations.
Of course, Bush-Cheney-Rice-Blair couldn't admit they had known about what Kamal had revealed back in 1995 and had to discredit Blix and ElBaradei.

The final report of the Iraq Survey Group concluded that Saddam – as Kamal and Blix and ElBaradei maintained – had no WMDs and posed no threat to anyone. A week after that report was filed, Bush was still telling all us peons that Saddam did.

Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. He also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico.

Michele Kearney said...

This is an excellent rebuttal of the phony Bush Administration efforts to tie itself to the World War II legacy ---

Truth
The History Boys
David Halberstram

http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/feature...currentPage=all

In the twilight of his presidency, George W. Bush and his inner circle have been feeding the press with historical parallels: he is Harry Truman—unpopular, besieged, yet ultimately to be vindicated—while Iraq under Saddam was Europe held by Hitler. To a serious student of the past, that's preposterous. Writing just before his untimely death, David Halberstam asserts that Bush's "history," like his war, is based on wishful thinking, arrogance, and a total disdain for the facts.
by David Halberstam August 2007 We are a long way from the glory days of Mission Accomplished, when the Iraq war was over before it was over—indeed before it really began—and the president could dress up like a fighter pilot and land on an aircraft carrier, and the nation, led by a pliable media, would applaud. Now, late in this sad, terribly diminished presidency, mired in an unwinnable war of their own making, and increasingly on the defensive about events which, to their surprise, they do not control, the president and his men have turned, with some degree of desperation, to history. In their view Iraq under Saddam was like Europe dominated by Hitler, and the Democrats and critics in the media are likened to the appeasers of the 1930s. The Iraqi people, shorn of their immensely complicated history, become either the people of Europe eager to be liberated from the Germans, or a little nation that great powerful nations ought to protect. Most recently in this history rummage sale—and perhaps most surprisingly—Bush has become Harry Truman.

We have lately been getting so many history lessons from the White House that I have come to think of Bush, Cheney, Rice, and the late, unlamented Rumsfeld as the History Boys. They are people groping for rationales for their failed policy, and as the criticism becomes ever harsher, they cling to the idea that a true judgment will come only in the future, and history will save them.

Ironically, it is the president himself, a man notoriously careless about, indeed almost indifferent to, the intellectual underpinnings of his actions, who has come to trumpet loudest his close scrutiny of the lessons of the past. Though, before, he tended to boast about making critical decisions based on instinct and religious faith, he now talks more and more about historical mandates. Usually he does this in the broadest—and vaguest—sense: History teaches us … We know from history … History shows us. In one of his speaking appearances in March 2006, in Cleveland, I counted four references to history, and what it meant for today, as if he had had dinner the night before with Arnold Toynbee, or at the very least Barbara Tuchman, and then gone home for a few hours to read his Gibbon.

I am deeply suspicious of these presidential seminars. We have, after all, come to know George Bush fairly well by now, and many of us have come to feel—not only because of what he says, but also because of the sheer cockiness in how he says it—that he has a tendency to decide what he wants to do first, and only then leaves it to his staff to look for intellectual justification. Many of us have always sensed a deep and visceral anti-intellectual streak in the president, that there was a great chip on his shoulder, and that the burden of the fancy schools he attended—Andover and Yale—and even simply being a member of the Bush family were too much for him. It was as if he needed not only to escape but also to put down those of his peers who had been more successful. From that mind-set, I think, came his rather unattractive habit of bestowing nicknames, most of them unflattering, on the people around him, to remind them that he was in charge, that despite their greater achievements they still worked for him.

He is infinitely more comfortable with the cowboy persona he has adopted, the Texas transplant who has learned to speak the down-home vernacular. "Country boy," as Johnny Cash once sang, "I wish I was you, and you were me." Bush's accent, not always there in public appearances when he was younger, tends to thicken these days, the final g's consistently dropped so that doing becomes doin', going becomes goin', and making, makin'. In this lexicon al-Qaeda becomes "the folks" who did 9/11. Unfortunately, it is not just the speech that got dumbed down—so also were the ideas at play. The president's world, unlike the one we live in, is dangerously simple, full of traps, not just for him but, sadly, for us as well.

When David Frum, a presidential speechwriter, presented Bush with the phrase "axis of evil," to characterize North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, it was meant to recall the Axis powers of World War II. Frum was much praised, for it is a fine phrase, perfect for Madison Avenue. Of course, the problem is that it doesn't really track. This new Axis turned out to contain, apparently much to our surprise, two countries, Iraq and Iran, that were sworn enemies, and if you moved against Iraq, you ended up de-stabilizing it and involuntarily strengthening Iran, the far more dangerous country in the region. While "axis of evil" was intended to serve as a sort of historical banner, embodying the highest moral vision imaginable, it ended up only helping to weaken us.

Despite his recent conversion to history, the president probably still believes, deep down, as do many of his admirers, that the righteous, religious vision he brings to geopolitics is a source of strength—almost as if the less he knows about the issues the better and the truer his decision-making will be. Around any president, all the time, are men and women with different agendas, who compete for his time and attention with messy, conflicting versions of events and complicated facts that seem all too often to contradict one another. With their hard-won experience the people from the State Department and the C.I.A. and even, on occasion, the armed forces tend to be cautious and short on certitude. They are the kind of people whose advice his father often took, but who in the son's view use their knowledge and experience merely to limit a president's ability to act. How much easier and cleaner to make decisions in consultation with a higher authority.

Therefore, when I hear the president cite history so casually, an alarm goes off. Those who know history best tend to be tempered by it. They rarely refer to it so sweepingly and with such complete confidence. They know that it is the most mischievous of mistresses and that it touts sure things about as regularly as the tip sheets at the local track. Its most important lessons sometimes come cloaked in bitter irony. By no means does it march in a straight line toward the desired result, and the good guys do not always win. Occasionally it is like a sport with upsets, in which the weak and small defeat the great and mighty—take, for instance, the American revolutionaries vanquishing the British Army, or the Vietnamese Communists, with their limited hardware, stalemating the mighty American Army.

There was, I thought, one member of the first President Bush's team who had a real sense of history, a man of intellectual superiority and enormous common sense. (Naturally, he did not make it onto the Bush Two team.) That was Brent Scowcroft, George H. W. Bush's national-security adviser. Scowcroft was so close to the senior Bush that they collaborated on Bush's 1998 presidential memoir, A World Transformed. Scowcroft struck me as a lineal descendant of Truman's secretary of state George Catlett Marshall, arguably the most extraordinary of the postwar architects of American foreign policy. Marshall was a formidable figure, much praised for his awesome sense of duty and not enough, I think, for his intellect. If he lacked the self-evident brilliance of George Kennan (the author of Truman's Communist-containment policy), he had a remarkable ability to shed light on the present by extrapolating from the the past.

Like Marshall, I think, Scowcroft has a sense of history in his bones, even if his are smaller lessons, learned piece by piece over a longer period of time. His is perhaps a more pragmatic and less dazzling mind, but he saw all the dangers of the 2003 move into Iraq, argued against the invasion, and for his troubles was dismissed as chairman of the prestigious President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

I. The Truman Analogy
Recently, Harry Truman, for reasons that would surely puzzle him if he were still alive, has become the Republicans' favorite Democratic president. In fact, the men around Bush who attempt to feed the White House line to journalists have begun to talk about the current president as a latter-day Truman: Yes, goes the line, Truman's rise to an ever more elevated status in the presidential pantheon is all ex post facto, conferred by historians long after he left office a beleaguered man, his poll numbers hopelessly low. Thus Bush and the people around him predict that a similar Trumanization will ride to the rescue for them.

I've been living with Truman on and off for the last five years, while I was writing a book on the Korean War, The Coldest Winter [to be published in September by Hyperion], and I've been thinking a lot about the differences between Truman and Bush and their respective wars, Korea and Iraq. Yes, like Bush, Truman was embattled, and, yes, his popularity had plummeted at the end of his presidency, and, yes, he governed during an increasingly unpopular war. But the similarities end there.

Even before Truman sent troops to Korea, in 1950, the national political mood was toxic. The Republicans had lost five presidential elections in a row, and Truman was under fierce partisan assault from the Republican far right, which felt marginalized even within its own party. It seized on the dubious issue of Communist subversion—especially with regard to China—as a way of getting even. (Knowing how ideological both Bush and Cheney are, it is easy to envision them as harsh critics of Truman at that moment.)

Truman had inherited General Douglas MacArthur, "an untouchable," in Dwight Eisenhower's shrewd estimate, a man who was by then as much myth and legend as he was flesh and blood. The mastermind of America's victory in the Pacific, MacArthur was unquestionably talented, but also vainglorious, highly political, and partisan. Truman had twice invited him to come home from Japan, where, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, he was supervising the reconstruction, to meet with him and address a joint session of Congress. Twice MacArthur turned him down, although a presidential invitation is really an order. MacArthur was saving his homecoming, it was clear, for a more dramatic moment, one that might just have been connected to a presidential run. He not only looked down on Truman personally, he never really accepted the primacy of the president in the constitutional hierarchy. For a president trying to govern during an extremely difficult moment in international politics, it was a monstrous political equation.

Truman had been forced into the Korean War in 1950 when the Chinese authorized the North Koreans to cross the 38th parallel and attack South Korea. But MacArthur did not accept the president's vision of a limited war in Korea, and argued instead for a larger one with the Chinese. Truman wanted none of that. He might have been the last American president who did not graduate from college, but he was quite possibly our best-read modern president. History was always with him. With MacArthur pushing for a wider war with China, Truman liked to quote Napoleon, writing about his disastrous Russian adventure: "I beat them in every battle, but it does not get me anywhere."

In time, MacArthur made an all-out frontal challenge to Truman, criticizing him to the press, almost daring the president to get rid of him. Knowing that the general had title to the flag and to the emotions of the country, while he himself merely had title to the Constitution, Truman nonetheless fired him. It was a grave constitutional crisis—nothing less than the concept of civilian control of the military was at stake. If there was an irony to this, it was that MacArthur and his journalistic boosters, such as Time-magazine owner Henry Luce, always saw Truman as the little man and MacArthur as the big man. ("MacArthur," wrote Time at the moment of the firing, "was the personification of the big man, with the many admirers who look to a great man for leadership.… Truman was almost a professional little man.") But it was Truman's decision to meet MacArthur's challenge, even though he surely knew he would be the short-term loser, that has elevated his presidential stock.

George W. Bush's relationship with his military commander was precisely the opposite. He dealt with the ever so malleable General Tommy Franks, a man, Presidential Medal of Freedom or no, who is still having a difficult time explaining to his peers in the military how Iraq happened, and how he agreed to so large a military undertaking with so small a force. It was the president, not the military or the public, who wanted the Iraq war, and Bush used the extra leverage granted him by 9/11 to get it. His people skillfully manipulated the intelligence in order to make the war seem necessary, and they snookered the military on force levels and the American public on the cost of it all. The key operative in all this was clearly Vice President Cheney, supremely arrogant, the most skilled of bureaucrats, seemingly the toughest tough guy of them all, but eventually revealed as a man who knew nothing of the country he wanted to invade and what that invasion might provoke.

II. The New Red-Baiting
If Bush takes his cues from anyone in the Truman era, it is not Truman but the Republican far right. This can be seen clearly from one of his history lessons, a speech the president gave on a visit to Riga, Latvia, in May 2005, when, in order to justify the Iraq intervention, he cited Yalta, the 1945 summit at which Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met. Hailing Latvian freedom, Bush took a side shot at Roosevelt (and, whether he meant to or not, at Churchill, supposedly his great hero) and the Yalta accords, which effectively ceded Eastern Europe to the Soviets. Yalta, he said, "followed in the unjust tradition of Munich and the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Once again, when powerful governments negotiated, the freedom of small nations was somehow expendable. Yet this attempt to sacrifice freedom for the sake of stability left a continent divided and unstable. The captivity of millions in Central and Eastern Europe will be remembered as one of the greatest wrongs of history."

This is some statement. Yalta is connected first to the Munich Agreement of 1938 (in which the Western democracies, at their most vulnerable and well behind the curve of military preparedness, ceded Czechoslovakia to Hitler), then, in the same breath, Bush blends in seamlessly (and sleazily) the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the temporary and cynical agreement between the Soviets and Nazis allowing the Germans to invade Poland and the Soviets to move into the Baltic nations. And from Molotov-Ribbentrop we jump ahead to Yalta itself, where, Bush implies, the two great leaders of the West casually sat by and gave away vast parts of Europe to the Soviet Union.

After some 60 years Yalta has largely slipped from our political vocabulary, but for a time it was one of the great buzzwords in American politics, the first shot across the bow by the Republican right in their long, venomous, immensely destructive assault upon Roosevelt (albeit posthumously), Truman, and the Democratic Party as soft on Communism—just as today's White House attacks Democrats and other critics for being soft on terrorism, less patriotic, defeatists, underminers of the true strength of our country. Crucial to the right's exploitation of Yalta was the idea of a tired, sick, and left-leaning Roosevelt having given away too much and betraying the people of Eastern Europe, who, as a result, had to live under the brutal Soviet thumb—a distortion of history that resonated greatly with the many Eastern European ethnic groups in America, whose people, blue-collar workers, most of them, had voted solidly Democratic.

The right got away with it, because, of all the fronts in the Second World War, the one least known in this country—our interest tends to disappear for those battles in which we did not participate—is ironically the most important: the Eastern Front, where the battle between the Germans and Russians took place and where, essentially, the outcome of the war was decided. It began with a classic act of hubris—Hitler's invasion of Russia, in June 1941, three years before we landed our troops in Normandy. Some three million German troops were involved in the attack, and in the early months the penetrations were quick and decisive. Minsk was quickly taken, the Germans crossed the Dnieper by July 10, and Smolensk fell shortly after. Some 700,000 men of the Red Army, its leadership already devastated by the madness of Stalin's purges, were captured by mid-September 1941. The Russian troops fell back and moved as much of their industry back east as they could. Then, slowly, the Russian lines stiffened, and the Germans, their supply lines too far extended, faltered as winter came on. The turning point was the Battle of Stalingrad, which began in late August 1942. It proved to be the most brutal battle of the war, with as many as two million combatants on both sides killed and wounded, but in the end the Russians held the city and captured what remained of the German Army there.

In early 1943, the Red Army was on the offensive, the Germans in full retreat. By the middle of 1944, the Russians had 120 divisions driving west, some 2.3 million troops against an increasingly exhausted German Army of 800,000. By mid-July 1944, as the Allies were still trying to break out of the Normandy hedgerows, the Red Army was at the old Polish-Russian border. By the time of Yalta, they were closing in on Berlin. A month earlier, in January 1945, Churchill had acknowledged the inability of the West to limit the Soviet reach into much of Eastern and Central Europe. "Make no mistake, all the Balkans, except Greece, are going to be Bolshevized, and there is nothing I can do to prevent it. There is nothing I can do for Poland either."

Yalta reflected not a sellout but a fait accompli.

President Bush lives in a world where in effect it is always the summer of 1945, the Allies have just defeated the Axis, and a world filled with darkness for some six years has been rescued by a new and optimistic democracy, on its way to becoming a superpower. His is a world where other nations admire America or damned well ought to, and America is always right, always on the side of good, in a world of evil, and it's just a matter of getting the rest of the world to understand this. One of Bush's favorite conceits, used repeatedly in his speeches, is that democracies are peaceful and don't go to war against one another. Most citizens of the West tend to accept this view without question, but that is not how most of Africa, Asia, South America, and the Middle East, having felt the burden of the white man's colonial rule for much of the past two centuries, see it. The non-Western world does not think of the West as a citadel of pacifism and generosity, and many people in the U.S. State Department and the different intelligence agencies (and even the military) understand the resentments and suspicions of our intentions that exist in those regions. We are, you might say, fighting the forces of history in Iraq—religious, cultural, social, and inevitably political—created over centuries of conflict and oppressive rule.

The president tends to drop off in his history lessons after World War II, especially when we get to Vietnam and things get a bit murkier. Had he made any serious study of our involvement there, he might have learned that the sheer ferocity of our firepower created enemies of people who were until then on the sidelines, thereby doing our enemies' recruiting for them. And still, today, our inability to concentrate such "shock and awe" on precisely whom we would like—causing what is now called collateral killing—creates a growing resentment among civilians, who may decide that whatever values we bring are not in the end worth it, because we have also brought too much killing and destruction to their country. The French fought in Vietnam before us, and when a French patrol went through a village, the Vietminh would on occasion kill a single French soldier, knowing that the French in a fury would retaliate by wiping out half the village—in effect, the Vietminh were baiting the trap for collateral killing.

III. The Perils of Empire
You don't hear other members of the current administration citing the lessons of Vietnam much, either, especially Cheney and Karl Rove, both of them gifted at working the bureaucracy for short-range political benefits, both highly partisan and manipulative, both unspeakably narrow and largely uninterested in understanding and learning about the larger world. As Joan Didion pointed out in her brilliant essay on Cheney in The New York Review of Books, it was Rumsfeld and Cheney who explained to Henry Kissinger, not usually slow on the draw when it came to the political impact of foreign policy, that Vietnam was likely to create a vast political backlash against the liberal McGovern forces. The two, relatively junior operators back then, were interested less in what had gone wrong in Vietnam than in getting some political benefit out of it. Cheney still speaks of Vietnam as a noble rather than a tragic endeavor, not that he felt at the time—with his five military deferments—that he needed to be part of that nobility.

Still, it is hard for me to believe that anyone who knew anything about Vietnam, or for that matter the Algerian war, which directly followed Indochina for the French, couldn't see that going into Iraq was, in effect, punching our fist into the largest hornet's nest in the world. As in Vietnam, our military superiority is neutralized by political vulnerabilities. The borders are wide open. We operate quite predictably on marginal military intelligence. The adversary knows exactly where we are at all times, as we do not know where he is. Their weaponry fits an asymmetrical war, and they have the capacity to blend into the daily flow of Iraqi life, as we cannot. Our allies—the good Iraqi people the president likes to talk about—appear to be more and more ambivalent about the idea of a Christian, Caucasian liberation, and they do not seem to share many of our geopolitical goals.

The book that brought me to history some 53 years ago, when I was a junior in college, was Cecil Woodham-Smith's wondrous The Reason Why, the story of why the Light Brigade marched into the Valley of Death, to be senselessly slaughtered, in the Crimean War. It is a tale of such folly and incompetence in leadership (then, in the British military, a man could buy the command of a regiment) that it is not just the story of a battle but an indictment of the entire British Empire. It is a story from the past we read again and again, that the most dangerous time for any nation may be that moment in its history when things are going unusually well, because its leaders become carried away with hubris and a sense of entitlement cloaked as rectitude. The arrogance of power, Senator William Fulbright called it during the Vietnam years.

I have my own sense that this is what went wrong in the current administration, not just in the immediate miscalculation of Iraq but in the larger sense of misreading the historical moment we now live in. It is that the president and the men around him—most particularly the vice president—simply misunderstood what the collapse of the Soviet empire meant for America in national-security terms. Rumsfeld and Cheney are genuine triumphalists. Steeped in the culture of the Cold War and the benefits it always presented to their side in domestic political terms, they genuinely believed that we were infinitely more powerful as a nation throughout the world once the Soviet empire collapsed. Which we both were and very much were not. Certainly, the great obsessive struggle with the threat of a comparable superpower was removed, but that threat had probably been in decline in real terms for well more than 30 years, after the high-water mark of the Cuban missile crisis, in 1962. During the 80s, as advanced computer technology became increasingly important in defense apparatuses, and as the failures in the Russian economy had greater impact on that country's military capacity, the gap between us and the Soviets dramatically and continuously widened. The Soviets had become, at the end, as West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt liked to say, Upper Volta with missiles.

At the time of the collapse of Communism, I thought there was far too much talk in America about how we had won the Cold War, rather than about how the Soviet Union, whose economy never worked, simply had imploded. I was never that comfortable with the idea that we as a nation had won, or that it was a personal victory for Ronald Reagan. To the degree that there was credit to be handed out, I thought it should go to those people in the satellite nations who had never lost faith in the cause of freedom and had endured year after year in difficult times under the Soviet thumb. If any Americans deserved credit, I thought it should be Truman and his advisers—Marshall, Kennan, Dean Acheson, and Chip Bohlen—all of them harshly attacked at one time or another by the Republican right for being soft on Communism. (The right tried particularly hard to block Eisenhower's nomination of Bohlen as ambassador to Moscow, in 1953, because he had been at Yalta.)

After the Soviet Union fell, we were at once more powerful and, curiously, less so, because our military might was less applicable against the new, very different kind of threat that now existed in the world. Yet we stayed with the norms of the Cold War long after any genuine threat from it had receded, in no small part because our domestic politics were still keyed to it. At the same time, the checks and balances imposed on us by the Cold War were gone, the restraints fewer, and the temptations to misuse our power greater. What we neglected to consider was a warning from those who had gone before us—that there was, at moments like this, a historic temptation for nations to overreach.

David Halberstam was a Vanity Fair contributing editor and the Pulitzer Prize–winning author of The Best and the Brightest and The Fifties. He was killed in a car accident on April 23.

Michele Kearney said...

Published on Tuesday, February 10, 2004 by Knight-Ridder
Doubts, Dissent Stripped from Public Version of Iraq Assessment
by Jonathan S. Landay

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0210-02.htm

WASHINGTON - The public version of the U.S. intelligence community's key prewar assessment of Iraq's illicit arms programs was stripped of dissenting opinions, warnings of insufficient information and doubts about deposed dictator Saddam Hussein's intentions, a review of the document and its once-classified version shows.

As a result, the public was given a far more definitive assessment of Iraq's plans and capabilities than President Bush and other U.S. decision-makers received from their intelligence agencies.

The stark differences between the public version and the then top-secret version of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate raise new questions about the accuracy of the public case made for a war that's claimed the lives of more than 500 U.S. service members and thousands of Iraqis.

The two documents are replete with differences. For example, the public version declared that "most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program" and says "if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade."

But it fails to mention the dissenting view offered in the top-secret version by the State Department's intelligence arm, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, known as the INR.

That view said, in part, "The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment."

The alternative view further said "INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening."

Both versions were written by the National Intelligence Council, a board of senior analysts who report to CIA Director George Tenet and prepare reports on crucial national security issues. Stuart Cohen, a 30-year CIA veteran, was the NIC's acting chairman at the time.

The CIA didn't respond officially to requests to explain the differences in the two versions. But a senior intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity, explained them by saying a more candid public version could have revealed U.S. intelligence-gathering methods.

Last week, Tenet defended the intelligence community's reporting on Iraq, telling an audience at Georgetown University that differences over Iraq's capabilities "were spelled out" in the October 2002 intelligence estimate.

But while top U.S. officials may have been told of differences among analysts, those disputes were kept from the American public in key areas, including whether Saddam was stockpiling biological and chemical weapons and whether he might dispatch poison-spraying robot aircraft to attack the United States.

Both documents have been available to the public for months. The CIA released the public version, titled "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," in October 2002, when the Bush administration was making its case for war. The White House declassified and released portions of the NIE's key findings in July 2003.

Knight Ridder compared the documents in light of Tenet's speech and continuing controversy over the intelligence that President Bush used to justify the invasion last April. There are currently seven separate official inquiries into the issue.

What that comparison showed is that while the top-secret version delivered to Bush, his top lieutenants and Congress was heavily qualified with caveats about some of its most important conclusions about Iraq's illicit weapons programs, those caveats were omitted from the public version.

The caveats included the phases "we judge that," "we assess that" and "we lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD (weapons of mass destruction) programs."

These phrases, according to current and former intelligence officials, long have been used in intelligence reports to stress an absence of hard information and underscore that judgments are extrapolations or estimates.

Among the most striking differences between the versions were those over Iraq's development of small, unmanned aircraft, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles.

The public version said Iraq's UAVs "especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents - could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland."

The classified version showed there was major disagreement on the issue from the agency with the greatest expertise on such aircraft, the Air Force. The Air Force "does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents," it said. "The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability."

There was substantial difference between the public version of the estimate and the classified version on the issue of Iraq's biological weapons program.

The public version contained the alarming warning that Iraq was capable of quickly developing biological warfare agents that could be delivered by "bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland."

No such warning that Iraq's biological weapons could be delivered to United States appeared in the classified version.

In a section on chemical weapons, the top-secret findings said the intelligence community had "little specific information on Iraq's CW (chemical weapons) stockpile." That caveat was deleted from the public version.

The classified report went on to say that Iraq "probably has stocked at least 100 metric tons (MT) and possibly as much as 500 MT of CW agents - much of it added last year."

"Saddam probably has stocked a few hundred metric tons of CW agents," said the public report.


Deleted from the public version was a line in the classified report that cast doubt on whether Saddam was prepared to support terrorist attacks on the United States, a danger that Bush and his top aides raised repeatedly in making their case for war.

"Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war," the top-secret report said.

Also missing from the public report were judgments that Iraq would attempt "clandestine attacks" on the United States only if an American invasion threatened the survival of Saddam's regime or "possibly for revenge."

John Walcott contributed to this article.

Following are excerpts from the public and classified versions of the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's weapons capabilities. The first set of quotes is from the classified version of the report; the second set of quotes is from the public version, "Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," which the CIA released in October 2002.
Unmanned aircraft

Classified version

" ... The Director, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, US Air Force, does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents. The small size of Iraq's new UAV strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance, although CBW delivery is an inherent capability."

Public version

"Baghdad's UAVs — especially if used for delivery of chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agents — could threaten Iraq's neighbors, US forces in the Persian Gulf, and the United States if brought close to, or into, the US Homeland."

WMDs

Classified version

"We judge that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade. (See INR alternative view at the end of these Key Judgments.)"

Public version

"Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it probably will have a nuclear weapon within this decade."

Classified version

"We judge that we are seeing only a portion of Iraq's WMD efforts, owing to Baghdad's vigorous denial and deception efforts. ... We lack specific information on many key aspects of Iraq's WMD programs."

Public version

"Iraq hides large portions of Iraq's WMD efforts."

Nuclear program

Classified version

"The activities we have detected do not, however, add up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons. Iraq may be doing so, but INR considers the available evidence inadequate to support such a judgment. Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons programs, INR is unwilling to ... project a timeline for the completion of activities it does not now see happening."

Public version

" ... most analysts assess Iraq is reconstituting its nuclear weapons program."

Biological weapons

Classified version

"We judge Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives.

"... Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington with a stronger case for making war.

"Iraq probably would attempt clandestine attacks against the US Homeland if Baghdad feared an attack that threatened the survival of the regime were imminent or unavoidable, or possibly for revenge.

" ... we have no specific intelligence information that Saddam's regime has directed attacks against US territory."

Public version

"Iraq has some lethal and incapacitating BW agents and is capable of quickly producing and weaponizing a variety of such agents, including anthrax, for delivery by bombs, missiles, aerial sprayers, and covert operatives, including potentially against the US Homeland."

Michele Kearney said...

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines06/0327-05.htm

Published on Monday, March 27, 2006 by the New York Times
Bush Was Set on Path to War, Memo by British Adviser Says
by Don Van Natta Jr.

LONDON — In the weeks before the United States-led invasion of Iraq, as the United States and Britain pressed for a second United Nations resolution condemning Iraq, President Bush's public ultimatum to Saddam Hussein was blunt: Disarm or face war.

But behind closed doors, the president was certain that war was inevitable. During a private two-hour meeting in the Oval Office on Jan. 31, 2003, he made clear to Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain that he was determined to invade Iraq without the second resolution, or even if international arms inspectors failed to find unconventional weapons, said a confidential memo about the meeting written by Mr. Blair's top foreign policy adviser and reviewed by The New York Times.

"Our diplomatic strategy had to be arranged around the military planning," David Manning, Mr. Blair's chief foreign policy adviser at the time, wrote in the memo that summarized the discussion between Mr. Bush, Mr. Blair and six of their top aides.

"The start date for the military campaign was now penciled in for 10 March," Mr. Manning wrote, paraphrasing the president. "This was when the bombing would begin."

The timetable came at an important diplomatic moment. Five days after the Bush-Blair meeting, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell was scheduled to appear before the United Nations to present the American evidence that Iraq posed a threat to world security by hiding unconventional weapons.

Although the United States and Britain aggressively sought a second United Nations resolution against Iraq — which they failed to obtain — the president said repeatedly that he did not believe he needed it for an invasion.

Stamped "extremely sensitive," the five-page memorandum, which was circulated among a handful of Mr. Blair's most senior aides, had not been made public. Several highlights were first published in January in the book "Lawless World," which was written by a British lawyer and international law professor, Philippe Sands. In early February, Channel 4 in London first broadcast several excerpts from the memo.

Since then, The New York Times has reviewed the five-page memo in its entirety. While the president's sentiments about invading Iraq were known at the time, the previously unreported material offers an unfiltered view of two leaders on the brink of war, yet supremely confident.

The memo indicates the two leaders envisioned a quick victory and a transition to a new Iraqi government that would be complicated, but manageable. Mr. Bush predicted that it was "unlikely there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups." Mr. Blair agreed with that assessment.

The memo also shows that the president and the prime minister acknowledged that no unconventional weapons had been found inside Iraq. Faced with the possibility of not finding any before the planned invasion, Mr. Bush talked about several ways to provoke a confrontation, including a proposal to paint a United States surveillance plane in the colors of the United Nations in hopes of drawing fire, or assassinating Mr. Hussein.

Those proposals were first reported last month in the British press, but the memo does not make clear whether they reflected Mr. Bush's extemporaneous suggestions, or were elements of the government's plan.

Consistent Remarks

Two senior British officials confirmed the authenticity of the memo, but declined to talk further about it, citing Britain's Official Secrets Act, which made it illegal to divulge classified information. But one of them said, "In all of this discussion during the run-up to the Iraq war, it is obvious that viewing a snapshot at a certain point in time gives only a partial view of the decision-making process."

On Sunday, Frederick Jones, the spokesman for the National Security Council, said the president's public comments were consistent with his private remarks made to Mr. Blair. "While the use of force was a last option, we recognized that it might be necessary and were planning accordingly," Mr. Jones said.

"The public record at the time, including numerous statements by the President, makes clear that the administration was continuing to pursue a diplomatic solution into 2003," he said. "Saddam Hussein was given every opportunity to comply, but he chose continued defiance, even after being given one final opportunity to comply or face serious consequences. Our public and private comments are fully consistent."

The January 2003 memo is the latest in a series of secret memos produced by top aides to Mr. Blair that summarize private discussions between the president and the prime minister. Another group of British memos, including the so-called Downing Street memo written in July 2002, showed that some senior British officials had been concerned that the United States was determined to invade Iraq, and that the "intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy" by the Bush administration to fit its desire to go to war.

The latest memo is striking in its characterization of frank, almost casual, conversation by Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair about the most serious subjects. At one point, the leaders swapped ideas for a postwar Iraqi government. "As for the future government of Iraq, people would find it very odd if we handed it over to another dictator," the prime minister is quoted as saying.

"Bush agreed," Mr. Manning wrote. This exchange, like most of the quotations in this article, have not been previously reported.

Mr. Bush was accompanied at the meeting by Condoleezza Rice, who was then the national security adviser; Dan Fried, a senior aide to Ms. Rice; and Andrew H. Card Jr., the White House chief of staff. Along with Mr. Manning, Mr. Blair was joined by two other senior aides: Jonathan Powell, his chief of staff, and Matthew Rycroft, a foreign policy aide and the author of the Downing Street memo.

By late January 2003, United Nations inspectors had spent six weeks in Iraq hunting for weapons under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 1441, which authorized "serious consequences" if Iraq voluntarily failed to disarm. Led by Hans Blix, the inspectors had reported little cooperation from Mr. Hussein, and no success finding any unconventional weapons.

At their meeting, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair candidly expressed their doubts that chemical, biological or nuclear weapons would be found in Iraq in the coming weeks, the memo said. The president spoke as if an invasion was unavoidable. The two leaders discussed a timetable for the war, details of the military campaign and plans for the aftermath of the war.

Discussing Provocation

Without much elaboration, the memo also says the president raised three possible ways of provoking a confrontation. Since they were first reported last month, neither the White House nor the British government has discussed them.

"The U.S. was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in U.N. colours," the memo says, attributing the idea to Mr. Bush. "If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."

It also described the president as saying, "The U.S. might be able to bring out a defector who could give a public presentation about Saddam's W.M.D," referring to weapons of mass destruction.

A brief clause in the memo refers to a third possibility, mentioned by Mr. Bush, a proposal to assassinate Saddam Hussein. The memo does not indicate how Mr. Blair responded to the idea.

Mr. Sands first reported the proposals in his book, although he did not use any direct quotations from the memo. He is a professor of international law at University College of London and the founding member of the Matrix law office in London, where the prime minister's wife, Cherie Blair, is a partner.

Mr. Jones, the National Security Council spokesman, declined to discuss the proposals, saying, "We are not going to get into discussing private discussions of the two leaders."

At several points during the meeting between Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair, there was palpable tension over finding a legitimate legal trigger for going to war that would be acceptable to other nations, the memo said. The prime minister was quoted as saying it was essential for both countries to lobby for a second United Nations resolution against Iraq, because it would serve as "an insurance policy against the unexpected."

The memo said Mr. Blair told Mr. Bush, "If anything went wrong with the military campaign, or if Saddam increased the stakes by burning the oil wells, killing children or fomenting internal divisions within Iraq, a second resolution would give us international cover, especially with the Arabs."

Running Out of Time

Mr. Bush agreed that the two countries should attempt to get a second resolution, but he added that time was running out. "The U.S. would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would twist arms and even threaten," Mr. Bush was paraphrased in the memo as saying.

The document added, "But he had to say that if we ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway."

The leaders agreed that three weeks remained to obtain a second United Nations Security Council resolution before military commanders would need to begin preparing for an invasion.

Summarizing statements by the president, the memo says: "The air campaign would probably last four days, during which some 1,500 targets would be hit. Great care would be taken to avoid hitting innocent civilians. Bush thought the impact of the air onslaught would ensure the early collapse of Saddam's regime. Given this military timetable, we needed to go for a second resolution as soon as possible. This probably meant after Blix's next report to the Security Council in mid-February."

Mr. Blair was described as responding that both countries would make clear that a second resolution amounted to "Saddam's final opportunity." The memo described Mr. Blair as saying: "We had been very patient. Now we should be saying that the crisis must be resolved in weeks, not months."

It reported: "Bush agreed. He commented that he was not itching to go to war, but we could not allow Saddam to go on playing with us. At some point, probably when we had passed the second resolutions — assuming we did — we should warn Saddam that he had a week to leave. We should notify the media too. We would then have a clear field if Saddam refused to go."

Mr. Bush devoted much of the meeting to outlining the military strategy. The president, the memo says, said the planned air campaign "would destroy Saddam's command and control quickly." It also said that he expected Iraq's army to "fold very quickly." He also is reported as telling the prime minister that the Republican Guard would be "decimated by the bombing."

Despite his optimism, Mr. Bush said he was aware that "there were uncertainties and risks," the memo says, and it goes on, "As far as destroying the oil wells were concerned, the U.S. was well equipped to repair them quickly, although this would be easier in the south of Iraq than in the north."

The two men briefly discussed plans for a post-Hussein Iraqi government. "The prime minister asked about aftermath planning," the memo says. "Condi Rice said that a great deal of work was now in hand.

Referring to the Defense Department, it said: "A planning cell in D.O.D. was looking at all aspects and would deploy to Iraq to direct operations as soon as the military action was over. Bush said that a great deal of detailed planning had been done on supplying the Iraqi people with food and medicine."

Planning for After the War

The leaders then looked beyond the war, imagining the transition from Mr. Hussein's rule to a new government. Immediately after the war, a military occupation would be put in place for an unknown period of time, the president was described as saying. He spoke of the "dilemma of managing the transition to the civil administration," the memo says.

The document concludes with Mr. Manning still holding out a last-minute hope of inspectors finding weapons in Iraq, or even Mr. Hussein voluntarily leaving Iraq. But Mr. Manning wrote that he was concerned this could not be accomplished by Mr. Bush's timeline for war.

"This makes the timing very tight," he wrote. "We therefore need to stay closely alongside Blix, do all we can to help the inspectors make a significant find, and work hard on the other members of the Security Council to accept the noncooperation case so that we can secure the minimum nine votes when we need them, probably the end of February."

At a White House news conference following the closed-door session, Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair said "the crisis" had to be resolved in a timely manner. "Saddam Hussein is not disarming," the president told reporters. "He is a danger to the world. He must disarm. And that's why I have constantly said — and the prime minister has constantly said — this issue will come to a head in a matter of weeks, not months."

Despite intense lobbying by the United States and Britain, a second United Nations resolution was not obtained. The American-led military coalition invaded Iraq on March 19, 2003, nine days after the target date set by the president on that late January day at the White House.