Bitterlemons-International Middle East Roundtable: The future of Al-Qaeda in Iraq

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Middle East Roundtable



Edition 35 Volume 5 - September 06, 2007

The future of al-Qaeda in Iraq

• The empty core in al-Qaeda's vision for Iraq - Hrach Gregorian
No political organization can long survive with all guns and no butter.

• A second generation of Iraqi politicians - Safa A. Hussein
The first conclusion from the Anbar success against AQI is that the latter has no future in Iraq.

• Looking at alternatives - Waleed Sadi
Hamas and Hizballah could be utilized to checkmate al-Qaeda

• Iraqi theater is urban war training ground - Hussein Solomon
Iraq is increasingly becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism.

• On dangerous ground - Judith S. Yaphe
In Iraq, the struggle is about identity and power. In the US, it is all about the next election.

The empty core in al-Qaeda's vision for Iraq
Hrach Gregorian

The June 7, 2006 US air strike that killed Abu Musab al- Zarqawi had a far more profound impact on the status and prospects for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) than might have been appreciated at the time by many commentators. Zarqawi was a talented strategist and charismatic leader--as well as a criminal and psychopathic killer--who was able to effectively reconcile the many contradictions that plague al-Qaeda in its efforts to build support, particularly among secular and tribal Sunnis, while operating as a secretive terrorist band of jihadi-salafists.

Zarqawi, like Osama bin Laden, was also a magnet for media coverage who could focus attention on AQI, in the Arab world as well as the West, in a manner that no strike against coalition forces or the Shi'ite in Iraq has been able to accomplish. Perhaps most ominous for AQI's future in Iraq is the fact that US, Iraqi and Jordanian intelligence were able to penetrate sufficiently deep into AQI's organizational structure to identify where to score an exact hit. The effectiveness of AQI's new leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, to at once tighten internal security, maintain operational flexibility, increase recruitment and build mass appeal among the Sunnis in Iraq, will go a long way in determining the future of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The prospects are not terribly promising.

Ironically, AQI faces some of the same dilemmas as the coalition forces in Iraq (and let it be known up front that this is by no means an argument for moral equivalency). Both are driven by ideologies that are for the most part alien particularly to Sunni tribal sheikhs. Neither the advocates of western-style democracy nor the champions of strict Islamic orthodoxy offer an appealing vision for the country's future. Both are led by foreigners and viewed by the majority as occupiers, not liberators. Both are condemned for what is viewed by locals as the indiscriminate killing and brutalization of a civilian population caught in the crossfire of a conflict over which they have little say. Both are well financed and view Iraq as the battlefield for a global struggle that leaves no room for compromise.

Where AQI suffers in this equation is in the number of top tier fighters it can call into service, the military resources it has at its disposal and now a diminution in the internal cohesion it enjoyed under the leadership of Zarqawi. Its key asset, and this must not be underestimated, is time. It does not operate under the same political restrictions as coalition (read US) forces nor is there an imperative for quick victory. It has no exit strategy because it plans to stay.

Nevertheless, it must give pause to AQI ideologists that Sunni tribal leaders are increasingly distancing themselves from the organization and renouncing former alliances. This, along with battlefield victories and successful counterinsurgency programs spearheaded by the US, has contributed to a significant decline in the number of attacks mounted by AQI. Furthermore, to the continuing consternation of the top al-Qaeda leadership in and around Pakistan, a large part of Zarqawi's legacy is an organization that terrorizes a population it needs for support and cover. Rape and brutal murders of locals, including children, with absolutely no system for accountability, are not the most effective tactics in a national liberation campaign. As far back as 2005, al- Qaeda's second in command, Ayman al-Zawahri, was warning Zarqawi against such grotesqueries as beheadings and their subsequent broadcast.

Where AQI has been more effective, of course, is in stoking the fires of sectarian violence in an effort to radicalize Iraqi Sunnis. Whether such violence will lead to the realization of its larger political ambitions is no more known to AQI than to those who are desperately struggling to prevent the dismemberment of Iraq.

AQI's immediate future will be determined in large part by the degree of success the so-called Islamic State of Iraq has in absorbing likeminded groups and intimidating would-be competitors into submission. As of the moment, Iraqi insurgents and tribes appear too weak to defeat AQI fighters without help from the US and Iraqi government forces. Witness the case of Diyala Province, where the insurgent group, the 1920s Revolution Brigade, which had previously been on the other side of the battle lines, actually teamed up with US forces to successfully counter an AQI threat.

AQI's larger challenge is how to convert submission borne out of terror into support for an ideology that has at its core no discernable program for governance and economic development beyond the all too vague call for the return of the Caliphate and the establishment of the Ummah Wahid. No political organization can long survive with all guns and no butter. Paying fighters and buying suicide bombers is a dead end as far as a future vision for Iraq is concerned.- Published 6/9/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Dr. Hrach Gregorian is president of the Washington, DC-based Institute of World Affairs, a partner in the consulting firm Gettysburg Integrated Solutions, and associate professor in the Graduate Program in Conflict Analysis at Royal Roads University in Victoria, Canada.

A second generation of Iraqi politicians
Safa A. Hussein

In 2005, a violent conflict started between Albo Mahal and al-Karabla, two major Sunni Arab tribes populating the remote area around al-Qaam town in al-Anbar province. One of these tribes supported AQI (al-Qaada in Iraq) terrorists. Both tribes were hostile to the Americans and to the Iraqi government. The Americans and the Iraqi government assessed this to be a normal tribal conflict. Later developments revealed that neither AQI nor the Iraqi government nor the Americans recognized that it reflected a drastic change in the political dynamics that would shape the new phase of the Iraqi crisis.

Only a few months later, AQI assassinated tribal leaders in Anbar and Kirkuk provinces because they called on their followers to join the Iraqi security forces. In a letter from a local AQI leader to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, he described those assassinations as having the anticipated intimidating effect. AQI went further by carrying out a suicide attack against a police recruiting station, killing dozens of recruits. It was at this point that the Americans made up their minds to support the tribes against AQI. The Iraqi government followed up on this effort. However, even then the relevant Arab countries did not anticipate the potentially significant political outcome of the conflict between the Anbar tribes and AQI.

It was only months later when a group of tribal leaders, supported by the Americans and the Iraqi government, publicly challenged AQI. They announced the formation of a tribal or salvation council with the primary objective of "liberating" al-Anbar from AQI. Sunni political parties and groups such as the Muslim Scholars Association (a hard-line Sunni organization that supports insurgents and refuses to participate in the political process), and al-Tawafuk front (the biggest Sunni political bloc in the Iraqi Council of Representatives) sharply criticized the members of this council and predicted its failure. They were mostly motivated by the threat posed by the salvation council to their position as sole representatives of the Iraqi Sunni community, of which the population of Anbar constitutes a principal component.

After months of clashes, it was clear that AQI was losing the battle in Anbar. Peace and stability were brought back to the province in almost no time. The success in Anbar has stimulated other tribes and groups to challenge and fight AQI in other parts of Iraq. Local tribes and insurgent groups like the Islamic Army and the 1920s Brigades in Sunni-dominated Baghdad districts, Salahadin province and Diala province entered the fight against AQI. By the fall of 2007, it was clear that there was a significant shift in the Sunni community position against AQI.

There are many reasons behind this shift. First, Iraqi culture and Islamic practice do not tolerate AQI's extremism and its narrow interpretation of Islam. True, at one point some distressed Sunnis welcomed AQI, but it was only a matter of months before they concluded that it was better to participate in a Shi'ite-dominated government than to be under AQI control.

Second, AQI strategy is to incite sectarian violence in Iraq. The aftermath of the Samara Golden Mosque blast in 2006 was ironic. AQI succeeded in that attack to provoke the Shi'ite militia Jaish al-Mahdi. But the latter's retaliation attacks proved to the Sunnis that although AQI could attack Shi'ites it could not protect the Sunnis from Shi'ite counterattacks.

Third, the sectarian attacks and counterattacks incited by AQI caused the Sunni areas to become isolated from Shi'ite areas, thereby damaging the Sunni economy. Lastly, military operations in AQI -controlled areas caused huge losses in property and nearly brought daily life to a halt.

Thus, the first conclusion that comes from the Anbar success against AQI is that the latter has no future in Iraq. Yes, it can exploit the presence of foreign troops and sectarian strife to gain support in some areas of Iraq. Further, it can and did deliberately "engineer" sectarian strife to increase its support. Yet it cannot sustain itself for long in Iraqi society.

The second conclusion is that new local political leaders are emerging more quickly than many observers have anticipated. Sheikh Sattar, chair of the salvation council of Anbar, is playing politics now. He is trying to reach politically beyond al-Anbar. Some Arab countries like the UAE, seeing this potential, are supporting him as a possible new player. Jordan sees in the success of the tribes in al-Anbar an opportunity to create a "moderate" Sunni buffer zone to shield it against the spillover of AQI in its direction and, incidentally, to stop any Shi'ite expansion toward its borders.

Although Sattar's background as a warrior is a matter of concern, he is nevertheless a member of the second generation of Iraqi politicians. The first generation played the sectarian game to rally support, whereas the second has earned respect for defeating AQI and providing security. But is this enough to meet the challenges of state-building? And can this new generation resist the temptation of seeking the support of neighboring countries and instead rely on its own interests?- Published 6/9/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Safa A. Hussein is a former deputy member of the dissolved Iraqi Governing Council. Prior to joining the Transitional Government he served as a brigadier general in the Iraqi Air Force and worked in the military industry as director of a research and development center. Currently he works in the Iraqi National Security Council.

Looking at alternatives
Waleed Sadi

Al-Qaeda is generally viewed as a global threat bent on changing the world order at any cost. This hybrid movement has its distant and various roots in the Muslim Brotherhood movement that the late Hasan al-Bana founded in Egypt more than half a century ago and in Wahabism and perhaps Sufism. It will be recalled that all these three Islamic movements condoned militancy to further their political aims and serve their religious agendas.

Al-Bana, for example, was revolted by the western way of life and determined to rid his people and fellow Muslims of all vestiges of this "decadence". His ultimate aim and objective was to cleanse Muslims from non-Muslim modes of life. Both Wahabism and Sufism share similar outlooks.

Al-Qaeda appears to follow in the footsteps of these conservative movements by adopting a posture of cleansing Muslims and the Muslim world from all western mores even if that entails the elimination of fellow Muslims as seems to be the case in Iraq. Yet, neither the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt nor the Wahabis and Sufis of Saudi Arabia ever preached or condoned indiscriminate killing even if they utilized violence in the name of religion. Al-Qaeda, however, appears to thrive on indiscriminate killing including of its own people in order to score political points or promote its own version of Islam.

The Iraqi theater is a good example of the methods adopted by al-Qaeda. Children, women and innocent and non-combatant men are purposely targeted on a daily basis to worsen conditions in the country. While al-Qaeda aims to make life more difficult for the US and its forces deployed in Iraq, it is also making life miserable for the Iraqi people.

Al-Qaeda's primary tactic appears to be to drive a wedge between the Shi'ite and Sunni communities in a bid to make the conditions in the country--and perhaps beyond--ungovernable for Washington and its allies and unbearable for fellow Muslims who do not share its version of Islam. Judging by unfolding events in Iraq, al-Qaeda even prides itself on killing the innocent because it calculates that through chaos and lawlessness it will gain not only more strength in different parts of the Arab and Islamic worlds, but it also cleanses Islam of Muslims who disagree with its message. Killing fellow Muslims who do not adhere to al-Qaeda's understanding of Islam has become necessary in the minds of al-Qaeda leaders because this fits in with their cleansing policy.

It is counter intuitive that such nihilism should win many adherents. Yet al-Qaeda appears to be winning new supporters in far-flung places and all attempts at eradicating the group have failed.

The list of options has not been exhausted, however. What better way to arrest the expansion of al- Qaeda's ideology than for another Islamic movement to compete with it for the hearts and minds of Muslims? There are two that fit the bill perfectly: Hamas and Hizballah. Both have proved their Islamic credentials in ideology and conduct. Both are moderate with respect to their understanding of social relations. Both have proven their mettle in their armed resistance to Israel. Neither has the same creed of indiscriminate killing and nihilism of al-Qaeda.

Hamas and Hizballah therefore must not be written off as evildoers or spoilers of peace in the region. Rather they should be viewed against the backdrop of the bigger picture in the Middle East. Both of these Islamic groups could be utilized to checkmate al-Qaeda and end its monopoly and supremacy in attracting the support of zealots and hardliners. In order to be so, however, they must not be placed in the same bracket as al-Qaeda.

Perhaps this is a long shot but it is worth considering as an effective way to arrest the advances of al-Qaeda in the war for the hearts and minds of Muslim people around the world. Of course this does not mean the two Islamic factions fight al-Qaeda head on. What Hamas and Hizballah can do is prevent the further expansion of the al-Qaeda network to areas under their control. By so doing the international community can expect to contain al-Qaeda and erode its designs for expansion. Once the tide has turned, then perhaps the battle can be taken to al-Qaeda's own turf in Iraq.- Published 6/9/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Waleed Sadi is a former Jordanian ambassador to Turkey and the UN and other international organizations in Geneva. He is currently a columnist for the Jordan Times and Al Rai newspapers.

Iraqi theater is urban war training ground
Hussein Solomon

Following the invasion of Afghanistan, al-Qaeda was in a very weak position. It was isolated, the Muslim Ummah was not supportive of its cause and mainstream Muslim clerics like Sheikh Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar University in Cairo, urged Muslim youth not to heed calls from al-Qaeda to seek martyrdom in Afghanistan. Many of its senior leadership were either killed or captured and it lost the sanctuary of a friendly state while the upper echelons of the organization's hierarchy were on the run. In the process, al- Qaeda's command and control capabilities were severely disrupted.

All this changed on that fateful day in 2003 when US President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq and, in so doing, provided al-Qaeda's leadership with a new lease on life. Most Muslims, indeed most people, knew that there could hardly be a relationship between the brutally secular Baathists of Saddam Hussein and the religious extremists of al-Qaeda. It was at this point that Muslim public opinion felt that the "Global War on Terror" was not one directed against terrorists but against Muslims. The excesses of the United States in the form of the Abu Ghraibs and Guantanamo Bays also served to radicalize Muslim public opinion. As a result, thousands of foreign jihadists joined to fight in Iraq and all of this served to reinvigorate al-Qaeda, allowing it to recruit a second generation of veterans (the veterans who had fought the Soviet Union were getting older and fewer).

While al-Qaeda has certainly benefited from the US invasion of Iraq, we need to acknowledge four important points. First, the group only constitutes five to 10 percent of insurgent violence in Iraq. Most of the perpetrators of violence remain the various indigenous Sunni and Shi'ite militias as well as marauding criminal gangs. Second, despite its problems, the US "surge" is resulting in the death and capture of more al-Qaeda members. For instance, in July 2007 Haitham al-Badri, the al -Qaeda leader in Salahuddin province was killed by US forces and Iraqi forces captured Talaal al- Baazi, the al-Qaeda leader in Tikrit. Third, the violent and indiscriminate tactics of al-Qaeda in Iraq both during and after the reign of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi has resulted in public opinion having turned against the group. Earlier this year in Anbar province, local tribal leaders turned their guns against al-Qaeda. Fourth, the tactics adopted by al-Qaeda in Iraq have also become a source of concern for the al-Qaeda leadership. In July 2005, for example, al-Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahri wrote a letter to Zarqawi accusing him of alienating Arab public opinion. Zawahri argued that, "in the absence of this popular support, the jihadist movement would be crushed in the shadows."

Nevertheless, although al-Qaeda may become an increasingly marginalized bit-player in the Iraqi theatre, its impact may be greater outside Iraq and on two fronts. First, the sectarian strife that al-Qaeda has ignited so successfully in Iraq is already showing signs of spilling over into neighboring countries, engulfing the entire region into a lethal Sunni-Shi'ite conflagration. Second, Iraq is increasingly becoming a breeding ground for international terrorism. The June 2005 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assessment report on Iraq points to the fact that the country is increasingly playing the role that Afghanistan played in the 1980s and 1990s--attracting tens of thousands of jihadists from all over the world. Moreover, unlike Afghanistan, Iraq could be a better training ground "because it acts as a real-world laboratory for urban combat". We should not be surprised then that tactics learned in Iraq have found their way into Afghanistan and onto the streets of London and Algiers.- Published 6/9/2007 © bitterlemons- international.org

Professor Hussein Solomon lectures in the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria where he is also director of the Centre for International Political Studies.

On dangerous ground
Judith S. Yaphe

As the chattering classes in Washington await the arrival of the September reports on progress--or the lack thereof--in Iraq, the war of words has already begun. Without waiting for the Petraeus and Crocker reports and without reading the reports from the various think tankers and politicians just returned from their latest day trip to the Green Zone, hard-liners and soft-liners have already announced their willingness to accept or, more likely, reject any report that does not conform to preconceived notions. In this rush to condemn without considering the unintended consequences of a US withdrawal, Americans seem to have their eyes more on the 2008 US presidential and congressional elections, and none on Iraq. It is a point not missed by embattled Iraqi politicians and Iraqis exhausted by the four-year siege on their security and their country's existence.

Why did the United States opt for a surge tactic militarily? This is an issue for military strategists. Of greater concern is the political equivalent of the surge strategy, its objectives and potential consequences. For those searching for coherency and consistency in American policy toward Iraq, the political surge strategy is confusing. Is it intended to reinforce the Maliki government or remove it? Is it intended to strengthen the ability of the central government to provide security, enact national reconciliation and govern Iraq or to prove that the weak decentralized government created by constitutional design cannot function and should be ignored? Is Maliki the problem or is it the system? Should he be removed for the system's failure or is something wrong with a system that perpetuates ethnic, sectarian, tribal and family values over the rule of law, contained corruption and meritocracy? In Iraq, the struggle is all about identity and power. In the US, it is all about the next election.

This is not to say that the US should remain in Iraq for the long years it takes to end insurgencies. Americans should not be involved in determining Iraq's internal political quarrels, insurgencies or foreign relations. Regardless of how one feels about the reasons we went to war in Iraq, the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal cannot be ignored. Iraq will face greater chaos and uncertainty, violence will spread, mass killings of those deemed insufficiently Iraqi or Muslim will continue, extremist factions in both Sunni and Shi'ite camps will thrive and the politicians will remain self-absorbed in carving out their version of al-Iraq al-Jadid. What Iraq will resemble is clear enough: one need only look at the Shi'ite factions fighting each other for control of Basra, the sectarian and ethnic cleansing of Baghdad and other mixed communities, the attempted genocide of the Yazidis, the Kurds' rush to settle Kirkuk quickly, the sharp increase in Iraqi casualties and the four million Iraqis now living as refugees abroad or in internal exile.

If the intention of the surge was to target Sunni and Shi'ite extremists, then it has achieved significant success. Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar cooperate with US forces out of self-interest and not because they have suddenly decided to endorse the government or become America's new allies in building Iraq or opposing Iran. Passage of legislation rolling back de-Baathification and equitable distribution of oil revenues will not mollify Sunni Arabs. Like other political factions, they are settling in for a season of hard bargaining and probably assume the US will repay their cooperation against al-Qaeda with support.

If, however, the political surge in Iraq is intended to redraw the lines of authority and governance and deconstruct Iraq along Sunni-Shi'ite or Arab-Persian lines, then there is danger. Iraq's Sunni- led neighbors--in particular, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia--warn of a coming clash of civilizations as Shi'ite empowerment spreads from Iran and Iraq throughout the region. They have little interest in Iraq as a failed state or as a successful state--either way, they see risk.

How should the US respond?


* Take steps to sustain the elected government in Baghdad and help it act decisively to establish its authority through a consensual exercise of power. Threats from Washington will not strengthen Maliki's hand or enhance the ability of his government to act. Efforts to destabilize the elected government, even if it is unpopular with Iraqis and Americans, or to encourage regime change by unconstitutional means will drive a further wedge between the US and Iraq. Miscalculation of America's ability to influence Baghdad could push the Maliki government--or its successor--into the arms of Tehran. Similarly, over-confidence on Iran's part regarding its influence in Iraq could tilt public and official opinion to favor US support.

* Stop insisting on unrealistic benchmarks for Iraq's government that it is inherently unable to meet. Iraq needs a more responsive, transparent and inclusive political system, but demanding that the government approve specific measures intended to create national reconciliation by fiat will not work. Encouraging electoral reform could achieve this goal. The current electoral process of national lists and a nation-wide election only strengthens sectarian and ethnic factionalism. Provincial elections and electoral districts based on geography should produce candidates from local communities and responsible to them.

* Use the uncertain outcome of US elections in 2008 and prospect of a drawdown of forces to underscore the need for political progress. Make clear to Iraqis that we are serious about long-term withdrawal and that our policy is not dependent on the status of the insurgencies in Iraq; it is based on protecting our national interests. The risk here is two-fold: following through on the threat and precipitating a government collapse that could usher in even greater conflict or total collapse.

* Engage Iraq's neighbors in supporting the government in Baghdad. This includes talks with Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia on the need for a united Iraq with secure borders and the need to limit foreign intervention. Iraq's neighbors do not see resolution of its crises in the same terms as Iraqis. Like the factions in Anbar, they are acting defensively. They have little interest in direct engagement in Iraq or redesigning borders to absorb Iraq's troublesome tribes and political issues.

- Published 6/9/2007 © bitterlemons-international.org

Judith S. Yaphe is distinguished research fellow in the Institute of National Strategic Studies at National Defense University and professorial lecturer at The Elliot School, George Washington University in Washington, DC. These comments are hers alone and do not reflect the views of the NDU, the Department of Defense or any government agency.



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