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House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Benghazi and Beyond
November 15, 2012
Testimony by Ronald E. Neumann
Ambassador (ret)
President, American Academy of Diplomacy
Madam
Chairman, Representative Berman, thank you for asking me to testify.
Your hearing focuses on the future as well as the past. To address the
future well I believe one needs a perspective that embeds security
issues within the context of our larger diplomatic purpose. Thus, I
think my value added is in speaking about the issues of carrying on
diplomacy in a dangerous world. My credentials to do so are based on
my 40 years of Federal service in which I have been in one war as a
soldier and three—Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan--as a diplomat. I have
carried a weapon when under assassination threat in two other countries
and had my embassy stormed by mobs in yet another country. I note this
because in considering Benghazi it is useful to remember that this is
not a new world in which the diplomatic profession confronts dangers
never seen before. The dangers are real enough, and they evolve
tactically, but conceptually they are not new.
I have four basic points to make.
First,
there is no absolute security. We recently saw a full up Marine base
in Helmand suffer a perimeter breach, loss of life and destruction of
aircraft by around 15 attackers. When security breaks down there will
be many legitimate questions about what could have been done
differently. However, they need to be framed in the context of what was
known of threats and why risks were taken, not against a belief that we
should be able to foresee all threats.
This
brings me to my second point. The central issue that must repeatedly
be confronted is about balance; how much risk to take to accomplish what
mission and how important is that mission to our national purpose?
Many decisions of this type will need to be made in the field by senior
diplomats working with their security professionals.
My
third point touches on the role of the State Department in supporting
security. This is complex and there will be many detailed questions
that as a retired official I will not be able to answer. But one thing I
can tell you is that when security funding is tight you have a constant
tension between new security demands in evolving situations and the
difficulty of finding funding in budgets that have to be established
months or years earlier for presentation to Congress. I am not
proposing wasteful largess but I do think that the concept of reserve
funds and authorities needs serious consideration if security is to err
on the side of flexible response. State’s role also must include
security training for senior managers as well as security officers.
My
final point touches on the political responsibility of those in both
the executive branch and the congress. Personnel in the field must make
difficult decisions about risk to accomplish their mission. When
things go wrong it is reasonable to review those decisions, as the
Congress and the Accountability Review Board are now doing. However, if
the post facto examination becomes too politicized you will reinforce
at the political level in Washington a fear of taking risk that has
already gone too far in my judgment. Sound foreign policy judgments
require knowledge that can only be gained by interaction on the ground.
If our diplomats now retreat even further into their bunkers, if they
become even more hampered in their ability to actually understand the
local scene, and if as a result they cannot distinguish successful
policies from failing ones the fault will not be in some weak kneed
“diplomatic culture” but in the failure of political authorities in
Washington to assume their own responsibilities.
I would like to expand on these points.
No Absolute Security
To
observe that there is no absolute security is not the same as
justifying all risk. But it is important to understand that in many
countries there is a virtually continuous stream of threats. Some are
more serious. Some are too vague to help although in retrospect one may
see something that was missed at the time. My point is simply to
describe a complex environment in which there is a constant “white
noise” factor of security threats. That is the context in which real
decisions about security get made. Security can always be better. It
will never be perfect.
Risk vs. Benefit
In
the war situations of Iraq and Afghanistan we have needed and been able
to have military security or military back up of diplomatic security.
That is not going to be possible in much of the rest of the world.
Governments, even those that lack the capacity to provide full security
for diplomats, tend to be sensitive about their sovereignty. In many
cases they will not allow all the security measures that we deem
necessary. For example, in many countries our embassies are located
closer to streets than we would like in the age of car-bombs. And many
of these countries will not agree to close all the streets that we would
like closed. Sometimes we have ways to push, or prod, or threaten in
order to get the cooperation that we need but sometimes we don’t. So we
are constantly making decisions about how much risk to take in
countries all over the world. It may be that in some cases we should
decide to pull out rather than take risks. Those decisions are
difficult because often they are about degree of risk vs. the utility of
being on the ground. Consider two cases; the real one of Libya and the
likely future one of Syria.
In
Libya we have a weak but sensitive government, an extremely difficult
security situation and a national interest in trying to support more
moderate elements to help the country to a stable future free of
extremism and terrorism. In this fluctuating situation with a multitude
of players and political forces our policy interests absolutely require
on the ground work. That is the only way to know the people, to make
judgments about who to help and how, to identify risks and to make the
course corrections that will be essential to implement any policy in
such turbulent times. That is a situation in which military level force
protection may not be possible both because the Libyan government may
not agree to it and because too much of the appearance of an occupying
army might play into the hands of the very extremists whose influence we
want to weaken. I am not justifying the specific decisions made before
the attack nor commenting on the particulars of the security posture
now. Rather, these comments are simply to point out that to accomplish
America’s political purpose our diplomats are going to have to take some
risks.
I
suppose one could argue that for a variety of reasons the mission is
too difficult and the risks too great and therefore we shouldn’t be in
Libya at all.
But
even if you could make that case for Libya, and it is not one I would
agree with, consider Syria. When the day comes that Basher al Assad
leaves the situation in Syria is likely to be at least as dangerous and
chaotic as is the one in Libya. Actually, it will probably be more
dangerous because hostile outsiders like Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon
will probably be operating to preserve their interests. Israel will
have a strong interest in what happens inside Syria. So too will Iraq
and Turkey, all of whom share borders with Syria. Will it be wise to
say that this is just too dangerous so we have to leave the future to
others? I doubt it. In a country where personal relations and trust
are the bedrock of effectiveness we cannot operate only by cell phone
and internet with people we do not know and acquire the knowledge to
make wise policy choices. We will need to be on the ground in order to
influence people and policy outcomes. That will mean taking risks. How
will we judge which ones to take?
One level of judgment is a Washington issue. Should we be represented at all in Syria, or Libya, or Iraq or Afghanistan?
A
second level of judgment about risk vs. benefit will be in the
interaction of the Embassy and Washington. What resources need to be
provided? The situation may change, risks may grow. What was asked for
in Libya and what was or was not done lies outside my expertise. But
in the future as in the past ambassadors will have to make judgments
about whether and how to appeal decisions they don’t like or whether to
get on with their job with what they have. Washington officials will
have to consider whether to take a second look at how to spread
resources that will always be somewhat inadequate for the many demands.
Utility of a Reserve Fund
While
there can never be as much funding as every contingency will require I
do think it would be useful to look carefully at the concept of some
form of reserve fund. Budgets justified and prepared in advance will
not have full funding for all contingencies. But without a functioning
reserve new risks can only be responded to by cutting other programs.
This tension, between what to fund and what to cut, inevitably makes a
bureaucracy slower to change course. Again, this is absolutely not a
justification for decisions made about what resources to send to Libya.
Indeed, I have been on the other end of the problem when I had to
intervene very forcefully to overcome State Department resistance and
have an incompetent contractor blocked from taking over our perimeter
security in Kabul. But that said, without more room to maneuver
financially security costs will continue to pose the risk of making
responses to threats slower than they should be.
Field Judgments and Washington Responsibilities
A
third level of judgment is in the field. How much risk should one take
in travel to a particular meeting? How much is the meeting worth to
accomplishing a US national political purpose. If there are threats,
how can they be mitigated? There are often creative solutions. In
Baghdad we did many meetings in hotels in the so called “Red Zone” so
that contacts could meet with us without the risks of trying to enter
the “Green Zone” or being marked too much as friends of the Americans
because our heavily armored convoy was parked in front of their home.
In Algeria I told my security officer which districts I needed to visit
in monitoring an election but left him the freedom to decide on specific
polling places and routes. In Afghanistan there were innumerable
situations where I had to judge actions against risks.
I
have elaborated about the situation of making risk decisions in the
field. The reason is that it is important for you to understand their
complexity in order to understand two areas of responsibility; both of
which involve the Congress as well as the Executive branch.
One
involves resources and how they are used. State’s training of security
officers (RSOs and ARSOs in the jargon) has improved greatly in my
opinion. Diplomatic security (DS) is making an effort to include in its
training for ARSOs an understanding of how they must fit mission
accomplishment into security. The American Academy of Diplomacy, of
which I am president, has been pleased and honored to help in this.
I
do believe that more thought needs to be given to how we train
ambassadors and senior diplomatic managers to make decisions about
risk. It is wise that ambassadors should pay attention to the advice of
their RSO. But the ultimate responsibility for mission accomplishment
belongs to the ambassador. It neither can nor should it be subordinated
automatically to the security officer. The judgments are sometimes
difficult and often turn on delicate balances between threat and
possible mitigation. I have gotten experience through multiple
critical threat posts. I have been shot at more than many RSOs. The
average ambassador is unlikely to have the dubious benefit of this
experience. I recommend more training be given to ambassadors, deputy
chiefs of mission and principle officers of separate posts in how to
make such decisions and how to work with their RSO.
There
remains a critical area of responsibility to consider. That is the
need to leave space for decisions in the field about the balance between
risk and benefit. A zero risk approach, a search for fault that
becomes overly politicized and turns into a “gotcha” game will
increasingly create a political climate in Washington that is
counter-productive for achieving our foreign political goals. Senior
officials of this and future administrations, fearing responsibility for
whatever goes wrong, will reinforce the climate that is already too far
advanced in which our diplomatic personnel spend their time behind
walls and looking at computer screens rather than getting out acquiring
knowledge and exerting influence.
A
great many of my diplomatic colleagues are prepared to accept risk.
That is why the Foreign Service and USAID have been able for years to
fill their positions in Iraq and Afghanistan with volunteers. Many,
there and in other countries already feel their ability to do their jobs
is excessively hampered by our own security restrictions. Many are
willing to accept somewhat more risk to accomplish their mission. Not
every risk is worth taking. Diplomats are not soldiers. But neither
can America’s diplomatic interests be achieved from behind walls and
razor wire.
Making
the choices about how much risk to take is difficult. The price for
getting it wrong or simply for bad luck is serious enough as it is. It
should not be made more difficult by a Washington culture that stifles
field judgment in the interest of keeping Washington officials from
bureaucratic risk.
It
is correct to do a post mortem when a tragedy such as Benghazi occurs.
It is right to look at what officials knew and why they made the
judgments they did. After all, it was Ambassador Stevens who made the
judgment that he should travel to Benghazi.
But
if reasoned inquiry turns into domestic politics there will be long
term damage to our ability to execute foreign policy. A reasoned
inquiry asks how to adapt but must also ask how to avoid over-reaction.
The policy costs of security enhancements and restrictions need to be
weighed along with the risks to personnel. These are difficult
responsibilities to accept in Washington. They are even more difficult
in the field where the consequences of getting a decision wrong can be
paid in blood. Yet that is exactly why I believe the Congress and the
Executive have a mutual responsibility to support reasoned decision
making in the field by our senior diplomats as well as giving them the
resources to be as safe as possible.
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