Financial Parasites Have Killed the American Economy
A Review of Economist Michael Hudson
- by Washington's Blog - 2009-08-27
http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14922
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Thursday, August 27, 2009
Would Eric Holder Have Prosecuted the Nazis? by Jacob G. Hornberger
Would Eric Holder Have Prosecuted the Nazis?
by Jacob G. Hornberger
Let’s assume that a U.S. president authorizes the CIA to rape the family members of suspected terrorists as a way to get them to talk. He also authorizes his subordinates to place the suspected terrorists on a rack that stretches them apart until they confess and disclose all details of their suspected terrorism.
Before he issues the authorization order, however, the president secures a good-faith legal memo from Justice Department lawyers stating that suspected terrorists, as illegal combatants, are not entitled to any legal protections, including protection from torture and rape.
Under U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s new order authorizing a preliminary investigation into torture by CIA personnel, those CIA agents who have raped and tortured suspected terrorists would apparently be immune from prosecution.
Why?
Because Holder obviously feels that if CIA personnel are following the guidelines established by their superiors, it would be unfair to prosecute them for torturing the suspects or raping members of their family.
What about the president or others who authorized the rape and torture? According to Holder’s reasoning, apparently they too would be immune from prosecution if they were relying in good faith on legal opinions issued by Justice Department lawyers establishing the legality of the torture and the rape.
What about the attorneys who wrote the legal opinions? Would they be subject to prosecution? No, because they would simply be attorneys rendering good-faith legal opinions in response to a request from their superiors.
So, isn’t that nice? Everyone who rapes and tortures, everyone who authorizes the rapes and torture, and everyone who opined that the rapes and torture were legal would apparently go scot-free under Holder’s reasoning.
I know that there are those who get upset over comparisons to Nazi Germany but it seems to me that a comparison is in order.
When Hitler and his cohorts issued the order authorizing the Gestapo to round up Jews, incarcerate them in concentration camps, and kill them, the personnel who actually committed such acts could not be prosecuted under Holder’s rationale. The Gestapo agents would claim that they were simply following the orders of their superiors and show that their conduct fell within the guidelines established by their higher-ups.
Could Hitler and other higher-ups have been prosecuted for the Holocaust? No, at least not if they would have been able to produce legal opinions from Nazi lawyers opining that rounding up Jews, incarcerating them, and killing them was legal given the exigencies of war.
What about the Nazi lawyers? Could they have been prosecuted? No, because they would have just been lawyers delivering good-faith legal opinions that they knew would make their superiors happy, not the people who actually did the round-ups, incarcerations, and killings.
What a crock.
When people break the law, they need to be prosecuted whether they are German, American, British, Japanese, or any other nationality and whether their victims are Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, atheist, or a
The “I was just following orders” defense should be disallowed. If people are too weak psychologically to say no to unlawful orders, then they shouldn’t be working for the CIA, the Gestapo, or any other government agency with the power to initiate force against others.
Higher-ups who authorize or order unlawful conduct should not be permitted to get off the hook simply because they have succeeded in securing legal opinions from sycophantic lawyers falsely opining that such conduct is lawful.
And sycophantic lawyers who issue false legal opinions to high government officials opining that unlawful conduct is legal should be subject to prosecution as well.
Otherwise, the United States is no different from any other country whose officials are immune from prosecution for torture, murder, rape, and other crimes.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
by Jacob G. Hornberger
Let’s assume that a U.S. president authorizes the CIA to rape the family members of suspected terrorists as a way to get them to talk. He also authorizes his subordinates to place the suspected terrorists on a rack that stretches them apart until they confess and disclose all details of their suspected terrorism.
Before he issues the authorization order, however, the president secures a good-faith legal memo from Justice Department lawyers stating that suspected terrorists, as illegal combatants, are not entitled to any legal protections, including protection from torture and rape.
Under U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s new order authorizing a preliminary investigation into torture by CIA personnel, those CIA agents who have raped and tortured suspected terrorists would apparently be immune from prosecution.
Why?
Because Holder obviously feels that if CIA personnel are following the guidelines established by their superiors, it would be unfair to prosecute them for torturing the suspects or raping members of their family.
What about the president or others who authorized the rape and torture? According to Holder’s reasoning, apparently they too would be immune from prosecution if they were relying in good faith on legal opinions issued by Justice Department lawyers establishing the legality of the torture and the rape.
What about the attorneys who wrote the legal opinions? Would they be subject to prosecution? No, because they would simply be attorneys rendering good-faith legal opinions in response to a request from their superiors.
So, isn’t that nice? Everyone who rapes and tortures, everyone who authorizes the rapes and torture, and everyone who opined that the rapes and torture were legal would apparently go scot-free under Holder’s reasoning.
I know that there are those who get upset over comparisons to Nazi Germany but it seems to me that a comparison is in order.
When Hitler and his cohorts issued the order authorizing the Gestapo to round up Jews, incarcerate them in concentration camps, and kill them, the personnel who actually committed such acts could not be prosecuted under Holder’s rationale. The Gestapo agents would claim that they were simply following the orders of their superiors and show that their conduct fell within the guidelines established by their higher-ups.
Could Hitler and other higher-ups have been prosecuted for the Holocaust? No, at least not if they would have been able to produce legal opinions from Nazi lawyers opining that rounding up Jews, incarcerating them, and killing them was legal given the exigencies of war.
What about the Nazi lawyers? Could they have been prosecuted? No, because they would have just been lawyers delivering good-faith legal opinions that they knew would make their superiors happy, not the people who actually did the round-ups, incarcerations, and killings.
What a crock.
When people break the law, they need to be prosecuted whether they are German, American, British, Japanese, or any other nationality and whether their victims are Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, atheist, or a
The “I was just following orders” defense should be disallowed. If people are too weak psychologically to say no to unlawful orders, then they shouldn’t be working for the CIA, the Gestapo, or any other government agency with the power to initiate force against others.
Higher-ups who authorize or order unlawful conduct should not be permitted to get off the hook simply because they have succeeded in securing legal opinions from sycophantic lawyers falsely opining that such conduct is lawful.
And sycophantic lawyers who issue false legal opinions to high government officials opining that unlawful conduct is legal should be subject to prosecution as well.
Otherwise, the United States is no different from any other country whose officials are immune from prosecution for torture, murder, rape, and other crimes.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
Get Out of Afghanistan and Everywhere Else by Jacob G. Hornberger
Hornberger’s Blog
Get Out of Afghanistan and Everywhere Else
by Jacob G. Hornberger
If there was ever a classic example of a quagmire, it has got to be Afghanistan. Hey, they’re going on 8 or 9 years of killing the terrorists and just now getting a good start. What began out as a quest to kill or capture Osama bin Laden has morphed into long-term occupation of the country.
Hardly a week goes by without reports of new deaths, including Afghani citizens and U.S. soldiers or allied foreign soldiers.
Yet, despite the constant death toll and the lack of a well-defined mission, the Pentagon insists on the importance of continuing the occupation of Afghanistan.
Why?
Because the Pentagon knows that if the troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Middle East, Americans might well begin asking the questions they should have asked in 1989, when the Berlin Wall came crashing down and the Soviet Empire disintegrated: What do we need a huge standing military force for? What do we need an overseas empire for? What do we need the enormous expanse of military bases across America for? Indeed, what do we need the Pentagon for?
The fact is that despite deeply seeded fears and anxieties that the federal government has succeeded in engendering within the psyches of the American people, there is no nation on earth that has the military capability of invading and occupying the United States. To cross either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans with an invasion force would require tens of thousands of ships and planes, a capability that is nonexistent among all foreign nations.
Of course, the big bugaboo that the Pentagon now uses to justify its existence (along with the enormous tax burden necessary to sustain its enormous military) is terrorism (as compared to communism, which was the bugaboo prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Empire).
But the threat of terrorism is a direct result of what the Pentagon did both prior to and after 9/11 as part of its aggressive, interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East. That threat has remained constant, of course, given the continuous killing of people in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last 8 years.
But the Pentagon knows that by withdrawing from Afghanistan and the Middle East, that constant threat of terrorist retaliation plummets. At that point, the only risk of terrorist retaliation would be from some disgruntled person whose family members or friends were killed by the U.S. military sometime in the past. There’s no need for an enormous military to deal with that possibility, and the Pentagon knows it.
If the Pentagon withdrew from the Middle East, military officials know that people might well ask, Why stop there? Why not withdraw from Europe? After all, the Cold War ended long ago. Why not withdraw from Japan. It surrendered soon after the atomic bombs were dropped. Why not withdraw from Korea? The war there ended decades ago. Why not withdraw from Africa? What business do the troops have there?
In fact, the only argument that the Pentagon will have left is the one it was making in 1989 to justify its continued existence: the drug war, especially in Latin America.
The Pentagon knows, however, that there are risks with that justification. One big risk is that people all over the world, including the United States, might finally decide to bring an end to this decrepit old war by legalizing drugs. Reputable and credible people from all over the world are now arguing that that is the only solution to the drug-war horror. In fact, in a move toward legalization Mexico recently legalized possession of small quantities of illicit drugs.
Moreover, the Pentagon knows that one of these days Latin Americans might start asking a discomforting question: If the American people will not permit the U.S. military to wage the war on drugs in the United States, why should Latin Americans permit it to wage the drug war in their countries?
The best way to avoid having Americans asking why we still need a big military force is simply to continue the occupation of Afghanistan. Not only does the occupation provide constant proof that there are still terrorists to kill, it also generates its own never-ending supply of terrorists. The Pentagon knows that under those circumstance people are less likely to question the existence of an enormous military, along with all the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to support it.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
Get Out of Afghanistan and Everywhere Else
by Jacob G. Hornberger
If there was ever a classic example of a quagmire, it has got to be Afghanistan. Hey, they’re going on 8 or 9 years of killing the terrorists and just now getting a good start. What began out as a quest to kill or capture Osama bin Laden has morphed into long-term occupation of the country.
Hardly a week goes by without reports of new deaths, including Afghani citizens and U.S. soldiers or allied foreign soldiers.
Yet, despite the constant death toll and the lack of a well-defined mission, the Pentagon insists on the importance of continuing the occupation of Afghanistan.
Why?
Because the Pentagon knows that if the troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Middle East, Americans might well begin asking the questions they should have asked in 1989, when the Berlin Wall came crashing down and the Soviet Empire disintegrated: What do we need a huge standing military force for? What do we need an overseas empire for? What do we need the enormous expanse of military bases across America for? Indeed, what do we need the Pentagon for?
The fact is that despite deeply seeded fears and anxieties that the federal government has succeeded in engendering within the psyches of the American people, there is no nation on earth that has the military capability of invading and occupying the United States. To cross either the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans with an invasion force would require tens of thousands of ships and planes, a capability that is nonexistent among all foreign nations.
Of course, the big bugaboo that the Pentagon now uses to justify its existence (along with the enormous tax burden necessary to sustain its enormous military) is terrorism (as compared to communism, which was the bugaboo prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the Soviet Empire).
But the threat of terrorism is a direct result of what the Pentagon did both prior to and after 9/11 as part of its aggressive, interventionist foreign policy in the Middle East. That threat has remained constant, of course, given the continuous killing of people in Iraq and Afghanistan for the last 8 years.
But the Pentagon knows that by withdrawing from Afghanistan and the Middle East, that constant threat of terrorist retaliation plummets. At that point, the only risk of terrorist retaliation would be from some disgruntled person whose family members or friends were killed by the U.S. military sometime in the past. There’s no need for an enormous military to deal with that possibility, and the Pentagon knows it.
If the Pentagon withdrew from the Middle East, military officials know that people might well ask, Why stop there? Why not withdraw from Europe? After all, the Cold War ended long ago. Why not withdraw from Japan. It surrendered soon after the atomic bombs were dropped. Why not withdraw from Korea? The war there ended decades ago. Why not withdraw from Africa? What business do the troops have there?
In fact, the only argument that the Pentagon will have left is the one it was making in 1989 to justify its continued existence: the drug war, especially in Latin America.
The Pentagon knows, however, that there are risks with that justification. One big risk is that people all over the world, including the United States, might finally decide to bring an end to this decrepit old war by legalizing drugs. Reputable and credible people from all over the world are now arguing that that is the only solution to the drug-war horror. In fact, in a move toward legalization Mexico recently legalized possession of small quantities of illicit drugs.
Moreover, the Pentagon knows that one of these days Latin Americans might start asking a discomforting question: If the American people will not permit the U.S. military to wage the war on drugs in the United States, why should Latin Americans permit it to wage the drug war in their countries?
The best way to avoid having Americans asking why we still need a big military force is simply to continue the occupation of Afghanistan. Not only does the occupation provide constant proof that there are still terrorists to kill, it also generates its own never-ending supply of terrorists. The Pentagon knows that under those circumstance people are less likely to question the existence of an enormous military, along with all the hundreds of billions of dollars necessary to support it.
Jacob Hornberger is founder and president of The Future of Freedom Foundation.
http://fff.org/blog/index.asp
Ray McGovern Closing in on the Torturers
Ray McGovern
Closing in on the Torturers
http://www.counterpunch.org/mcgovern08272009.html
Orange Suits for Tenet and Rumsfeld, Too
Do you think the wardens will let George Tenet wear his Presidential Medal of Freedom over the orange coverall?
Perhaps he and Donald Rumsfeld will end up doing time together in one of the prisons also slated to host what Rumsfeld called “the worst of the worst” from Guantanamo.
That would be poetic justice of a most ironic kind. And if the two former leaders do end up in prison they can count themselves fortunate for having dodged execution for their roles in a slew of capital offenses.
You see, punishments for violations of the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441), applicable in their case, include the death penalty—often the sentence of choice if detainees die in their custody. And countless have.
Closing in on the Torturers
http://www.counterpunch.org/mcgovern08272009.html
Orange Suits for Tenet and Rumsfeld, Too
Do you think the wardens will let George Tenet wear his Presidential Medal of Freedom over the orange coverall?
Perhaps he and Donald Rumsfeld will end up doing time together in one of the prisons also slated to host what Rumsfeld called “the worst of the worst” from Guantanamo.
That would be poetic justice of a most ironic kind. And if the two former leaders do end up in prison they can count themselves fortunate for having dodged execution for their roles in a slew of capital offenses.
You see, punishments for violations of the War Crimes Act (18 U.S.C. 2441), applicable in their case, include the death penalty—often the sentence of choice if detainees die in their custody. And countless have.
The ElBaradei Legacy
The ElBaradei Legacy (PDF)
Mark Hibbs and Andreas Persbo, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
As the International Atomic Energy Agency's director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei stood up to the United States, prevented a widening Middle East conflict, and won the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet as he prepares to leave, the future of the agency is in doubt.
Full Article
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/pdf/elbaradei-legacy.pdf
Mark Hibbs and Andreas Persbo, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
As the International Atomic Energy Agency's director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei stood up to the United States, prevented a widening Middle East conflict, and won the Nobel Peace Prize. Yet as he prepares to leave, the future of the agency is in doubt.
Full Article
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/pdf/elbaradei-legacy.pdf
Gross Domestic Income Down 2.1% in 2nd Quarter With Record 4.6% Annual Decline Housing and Durable Goods Not Signaling Recovery
JOHN WILLIAMS’ SHADOW GOVERNMENT STATISTICS
FLASH UPDATE
August 27, 2009
__________
Gross Domestic Income Down 2.1% in 2nd Quarter
With Record 4.6% Annual Decline
Housing and Durable Goods Not Signaling Recovery
__________
PLEASE NOTE: The next scheduled Flash Update is for next Friday (September 4th), following release of the August employment and unemployment data. There also will be an interim communication updating the money supply situation, the systemic solvency crisis and the outlook for the employment report.
– Best wishes to all, John Williams
Economy Remains in Deepening Downturn. Aside from a one-time upside blip from the Cash-for Clunkers Program, which has still to surface meaningfully in series such as retail sales and durable goods orders, there is little on the horizon promising improved economic data. Highly touted monthly gains seen in new and existing home sales and in new orders for durable goods either were statistically meaningless (the Census Bureau release on the 9.6% monthly July gain in new home sales again included the caution that "The Census Bureau does not have sufficient statistical evidence to conclude that the actual change is different from zero.") Further, distortions from the extreme nature of the current downturn have made meaningful interpretation of data from series such as home sales extremely difficult. The National Association of Realtors, for example touted a strong monthly gain in July existing home sales, but stopped reporting its estimate of sales generated by foreclosures, which purportedly accounted for nearly a third of the activity in June. The durable goods numbers are covered below. The nature of the ongoing downturn and still-deepening systemic solvency crisis will be reviewed in the next update.
More at:
http://www.shadowstats.com/article/flash-20090827?
FLASH UPDATE
August 27, 2009
__________
Gross Domestic Income Down 2.1% in 2nd Quarter
With Record 4.6% Annual Decline
Housing and Durable Goods Not Signaling Recovery
__________
PLEASE NOTE: The next scheduled Flash Update is for next Friday (September 4th), following release of the August employment and unemployment data. There also will be an interim communication updating the money supply situation, the systemic solvency crisis and the outlook for the employment report.
– Best wishes to all, John Williams
Economy Remains in Deepening Downturn. Aside from a one-time upside blip from the Cash-for Clunkers Program, which has still to surface meaningfully in series such as retail sales and durable goods orders, there is little on the horizon promising improved economic data. Highly touted monthly gains seen in new and existing home sales and in new orders for durable goods either were statistically meaningless (the Census Bureau release on the 9.6% monthly July gain in new home sales again included the caution that "The Census Bureau does not have sufficient statistical evidence to conclude that the actual change is different from zero.") Further, distortions from the extreme nature of the current downturn have made meaningful interpretation of data from series such as home sales extremely difficult. The National Association of Realtors, for example touted a strong monthly gain in July existing home sales, but stopped reporting its estimate of sales generated by foreclosures, which purportedly accounted for nearly a third of the activity in June. The durable goods numbers are covered below. The nature of the ongoing downturn and still-deepening systemic solvency crisis will be reviewed in the next update.
More at:
http://www.shadowstats.com/article/flash-20090827?
The Dark Years are here by Egon von Greyerz – Matterhorn Asset Management
The Dark Years are here
by Egon von Greyerz – Matterhorn Asset Management
In this newsletter we will outline what is likely to be the devastating effect of the credit bubbles, government money printing and of the disastrous actions that governments are taking. Starting in the next 6 months and culminating in 2011-12 the world will experience a series of tumultuous events which will be life changing for most people in the world. But 2011-12 will not be the beginning of an upturn in the world economy but instead the start of a long period of economic, political and social upheaval that could last for a couple of decades.
We will discuss the three areas that we for some time have argued will determine the fate of the world for the foreseeable future, namely the coming unemployment explosion, the next and much more serious phase in the credit markets and finally the likely hyperinflationary or just inflationary effect this will have on the world economy and investments.
Continue at:
http://matterhornassetmanagement.com/newsletter/?newsletter=20
by Egon von Greyerz – Matterhorn Asset Management
In this newsletter we will outline what is likely to be the devastating effect of the credit bubbles, government money printing and of the disastrous actions that governments are taking. Starting in the next 6 months and culminating in 2011-12 the world will experience a series of tumultuous events which will be life changing for most people in the world. But 2011-12 will not be the beginning of an upturn in the world economy but instead the start of a long period of economic, political and social upheaval that could last for a couple of decades.
We will discuss the three areas that we for some time have argued will determine the fate of the world for the foreseeable future, namely the coming unemployment explosion, the next and much more serious phase in the credit markets and finally the likely hyperinflationary or just inflationary effect this will have on the world economy and investments.
Continue at:
http://matterhornassetmanagement.com/newsletter/?newsletter=20
A sham vote for a sham war of necessity
A sham vote for a sham war of necessity
from War in Context by Paul Woodward
The ultimate burden By Bob Herbert, New York Times, August 25, 2009 If we had a draft — or merely the threat of a draft — we would not be in Iraq or Afghanistan. But we don’t have a draft so it’s safe for most of the nation to be mindless about waging war. Other people’s children [...]
http://warincontext.org/2009/08/26/a-sham-vote-for-a-sham-war-of-necessity/
from War in Context by Paul Woodward
The ultimate burden By Bob Herbert, New York Times, August 25, 2009 If we had a draft — or merely the threat of a draft — we would not be in Iraq or Afghanistan. But we don’t have a draft so it’s safe for most of the nation to be mindless about waging war. Other people’s children [...]
http://warincontext.org/2009/08/26/a-sham-vote-for-a-sham-war-of-necessity/
The "safe haven" myth from Stephen M. Walt
The "safe haven" myth
from Stephen M. Walt by Stephen M. Walt
At an appearance before the Veterans of Foreign Wars yesterday, President Obama defended U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, calling it a "war of necessity." He claimed that "our new strategy has a clear mission and defined goals -- to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies," and he declared that “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people.”
This is a significant statement. In effect, the president was acknowledging that the only strategic rationale for an increased commitment in Afghanistan is the fear that if the Taliban isn't defeated in Afghanistan, they will eventually allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself there, which would then enable it to mount increasingly threatening attacks on the United States.
This is the kind of assertion that often leads foreign policy insiders to nod their heads in agreement, but it shouldn't be accepted uncritically. Here are a few reasons why the "safe haven" argument ought to be viewed with some skepticism.
First, this argument tends to lump the various groups we are contending with together, and it suggests that all of them are equally committed to attacking the United States. In fact, most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis seeking to overthrow Arab monarchies, establish a Muslim caliphate, or mount attacks on U.S. soil. Their agenda is focused on local affairs, such as what they regard as the political disempowerment of Pashtuns and illegitimate foreign interference in their country. Moreover, the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the "safe haven" argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does.
Second, while it is true that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden a sanctuary both before and after 9/11, it is by no means clear that they would give him free rein to attack the United States again. Protecting al Qaeda back in 2001 brought no end of trouble to Mullah Omar and his associates, and if they were lucky enough to regain power, it is hard to believe they would give us a reason to come back in force.
Third, it is hardly obvious that Afghan territory provides an ideal "safe haven" for mounting attacks on the United States. The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany to make sure there aren't "safe havens" operating there. In fact, if al Qaeda has to hide out somewhere, I’d rather they were in a remote, impoverished, land-locked and isolated area from which it is hard to do almost anything. The "bases" or "training camps" they could organize in Pakistan or Afghanistan might be useful for organizing a Mumbai-style attack, but they would not be particularly valuable if you were trying to do a replay of 9/11 (not many flight schools there), or if you were trying to build a weapon of mass destruction. And in a post-9/11 environment, it wouldn’t be easy for a group of al Qaeda operatives bent on a Mumbia-style operation get all the way to the United States. One cannot rule this sort of thing out, of course, but does that unlikely danger justify an open-ended commitment that is going to cost us more than $60 billion next year?
Fourth, in the unlikely event that a new Taliban government did give al Qaeda carte blanche to prepare attacks on the United States or its allies, the United States isn't going to sit around and allow them to go about their business undisturbed. The Clinton administration wasn't sure it was a good idea to go after al Qaeda's training camps back in the 1990s (though they eventually did, albeit somewhat half-heartedly), but that was before 9/11. We know more now and the U.S. government is hardly going to be bashful about attacking such camps in the future. (Remember: we are already doing that in Pakistan, with the tacit approval of the Pakistani government). Put differently, having a Taliban government in Kabul would hardly make Afghanistan a "safe haven" today or in the future, because the United States has lots of weapons it can use against al Qaeda that don’t require a large U.S. military presence on the ground.
Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid.
Sixth, one might also take comfort from the Soviet experience. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the mujaheddin didn't "follow them home." Were the United States to withdraw from Aghanistan and the Taliban to regain power (or end up sharing power, which is more likely), going after the United States won't even be on their "to do" list.
One can of course make a moral argument for an extended commitment in Afghanistan, but that's not the argument Obama made (and it probably wouldn't sell very well here at home). For a realist, the "safe haven" argument is the only possible rationale for a large military commitment in Afghanistan. But the case is actually quite dubious, and somebody in the administration really ought to take a hard look at it. I doubt anyone will, however, because Obama is now committed, and his administration is filled with "can-do" types who never saw an international problem they didn't think the United States could fix.I sure hope they're right and I'm wrong, but I also wish that I didn’t have that feeling quite as often as I seem to these days.
Joe Raedle/Getty Images
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth
from Stephen M. Walt by Stephen M. Walt
At an appearance before the Veterans of Foreign Wars yesterday, President Obama defended U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, calling it a "war of necessity." He claimed that "our new strategy has a clear mission and defined goals -- to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies," and he declared that “If left unchecked, the Taliban insurgency will mean an even larger safe haven from which al Qaeda would plot to kill more Americans. So this is not only a war worth fighting. This is fundamental to the defense of our people.”
This is a significant statement. In effect, the president was acknowledging that the only strategic rationale for an increased commitment in Afghanistan is the fear that if the Taliban isn't defeated in Afghanistan, they will eventually allow al Qaeda to re-establish itself there, which would then enable it to mount increasingly threatening attacks on the United States.
This is the kind of assertion that often leads foreign policy insiders to nod their heads in agreement, but it shouldn't be accepted uncritically. Here are a few reasons why the "safe haven" argument ought to be viewed with some skepticism.
First, this argument tends to lump the various groups we are contending with together, and it suggests that all of them are equally committed to attacking the United States. In fact, most of the people we are fighting in Afghanistan aren't dedicated jihadis seeking to overthrow Arab monarchies, establish a Muslim caliphate, or mount attacks on U.S. soil. Their agenda is focused on local affairs, such as what they regard as the political disempowerment of Pashtuns and illegitimate foreign interference in their country. Moreover, the Taliban itself is more of a loose coalition of different groups than a tightly unified and hierarchical organization, which is why some experts believe we ought to be doing more to divide the movement and "flip" the moderate elements to our side. Unfortunately, the "safe haven" argument wrongly suggests that the Taliban care as much about attacking America as bin Laden does.
Second, while it is true that Mullah Omar gave Osama bin Laden a sanctuary both before and after 9/11, it is by no means clear that they would give him free rein to attack the United States again. Protecting al Qaeda back in 2001 brought no end of trouble to Mullah Omar and his associates, and if they were lucky enough to regain power, it is hard to believe they would give us a reason to come back in force.
Third, it is hardly obvious that Afghan territory provides an ideal "safe haven" for mounting attacks on the United States. The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to Germany to make sure there aren't "safe havens" operating there. In fact, if al Qaeda has to hide out somewhere, I’d rather they were in a remote, impoverished, land-locked and isolated area from which it is hard to do almost anything. The "bases" or "training camps" they could organize in Pakistan or Afghanistan might be useful for organizing a Mumbai-style attack, but they would not be particularly valuable if you were trying to do a replay of 9/11 (not many flight schools there), or if you were trying to build a weapon of mass destruction. And in a post-9/11 environment, it wouldn’t be easy for a group of al Qaeda operatives bent on a Mumbia-style operation get all the way to the United States. One cannot rule this sort of thing out, of course, but does that unlikely danger justify an open-ended commitment that is going to cost us more than $60 billion next year?
Fourth, in the unlikely event that a new Taliban government did give al Qaeda carte blanche to prepare attacks on the United States or its allies, the United States isn't going to sit around and allow them to go about their business undisturbed. The Clinton administration wasn't sure it was a good idea to go after al Qaeda's training camps back in the 1990s (though they eventually did, albeit somewhat half-heartedly), but that was before 9/11. We know more now and the U.S. government is hardly going to be bashful about attacking such camps in the future. (Remember: we are already doing that in Pakistan, with the tacit approval of the Pakistani government). Put differently, having a Taliban government in Kabul would hardly make Afghanistan a "safe haven" today or in the future, because the United States has lots of weapons it can use against al Qaeda that don’t require a large U.S. military presence on the ground.
Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid.
Sixth, one might also take comfort from the Soviet experience. When the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the mujaheddin didn't "follow them home." Were the United States to withdraw from Aghanistan and the Taliban to regain power (or end up sharing power, which is more likely), going after the United States won't even be on their "to do" list.
One can of course make a moral argument for an extended commitment in Afghanistan, but that's not the argument Obama made (and it probably wouldn't sell very well here at home). For a realist, the "safe haven" argument is the only possible rationale for a large military commitment in Afghanistan. But the case is actually quite dubious, and somebody in the administration really ought to take a hard look at it. I doubt anyone will, however, because Obama is now committed, and his administration is filled with "can-do" types who never saw an international problem they didn't think the United States could fix.I sure hope they're right and I'm wrong, but I also wish that I didn’t have that feeling quite as often as I seem to these days.
Joe Raedle/Getty Images
http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth
bitterlemons-international.org Middle East Roundtable: Egypt-Israel: upgrading strategic relations? August 27, 2009
bitterlemons-international.org
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 33 Volume 7 - August 27, 2009
Egypt-Israel: upgrading strategic relations?
• Interests aligning - Ashraf Khalil
It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever.
• Overcoming the constraints - James A. Larocco
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces.
• Egypt wants to remain a regional player - an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
The tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza.
• The elusive alliance - Ephraim Sneh
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a shared strategy for ending Hamas rule in Gaza.
Interests aligning
Ashraf Khalil
The Israelis like to call it the "cold peace". The Egyptians would rather not call it anything at all because that would admit there's actually something there to name.
For years the exact extent of political and economic cooperation between the two neighbors has been a subject of hot-button speculation and the occasional press campaign in Cairo. The government of President Hosni Mubarak, whose predecessor Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 Camp David accords, generally tries to keep the specifics of the two countries' relationship low-key, only admitting it when things become too obvious to deny.
"An Israeli is not the type of person that you want all your neighbors to know you're dating," chuckled Menachim Klein, a former Israeli negotiator and Bar-Ilan University political science professor.
Several years ago, a former agriculture minister fended off a prolonged opposition media campaign calling him a secret normalizer for his ministry's working relationship with its Israeli counterpart. Popular reaction was straight out of the movie Casablanca: people were shocked to discover something that most regional observers already saw as patently obvious. More recently, the local press has accused the government of selling natural gas to Israel for sweetheart prices.
Egyptians in general do know that there are extensive economic and agricultural ties with Israel, but prefer not to think too hard about it. (A personal example: when I first moved to Jerusalem in February 2008 as a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, my Egyptian relatives were genuinely curious as to what route I used to visit Cairo. They honestly had no idea that there are multiple EgyptAir and El Al flights every week between Cairo and Tel Aviv.)
But now, something seems to be changing in the usual don't ask/don't tell nature of the Egyptian-Israeli partnership. It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever. The main source of common ground is a mutual desire to contain Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions. Both governments have arrived at this place via different routes. Israel fears an Iranian nuclear capability will challenge its own (nominally secret) nuclear arsenal and open the door to a devastating attack on the Jewish state. Egypt doesn't fear Iran militarily, but dreads the gradual expansion of revolutionary Shi'ite ideology into the Sunni sphere.
Egypt's own bilateral relations with Tehran are fraught with tension--partially stemming from Iran's insistence on glorifying Sadat's assassins. "The way Iran acts has actually pulled (Egypt and Israel) closer together," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli political analyst.
This common interest has already produced some interesting public displays of cooperation. Earlier this summer, an Israeli submarine passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, touching off a weeklong media firestorm in Egypt. Israeli warships have traversed the canal for years, but this was the first submarine passage. The hype surrounding the event was only intensified by the fact that no one seems to know for sure the exact capabilities of the German-made Dolphin class sub.
Egyptian officials were generally tight-lipped, saying that the two countries have a peace treaty and the canal is open for all nations. But Israeli media openly declared the passage a coordinated message aimed directly at Tehran. "They want Iran to realize that nothing is impossible," Javedanfar said. Does that include a scenario where Egypt actively assists an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran? Nobody is sure and Javedanfar says that is exactly how both governments want it.
The submarine passage was far more than a symbolic show of cooperation. Usage of the Suez Canal would enable the Israeli navy to quickly get in position for a naval strike or blockade against Iranian ports. Without the canal, Israeli ships would have to make a weeks-long voyage around Africa in order to attack Iranian shores.
Emad Gad, an expert on Israeli policy with Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, warns not to read too much into the submarine incident. "There may be some Egyptian cooperation," with Israel, he says. "But it hasn't reached the level of joint planning." Gad believes Egypt's permitting the submarine to use the canal, "was more for the Americans than for the Israelis".
The two countries still have just as many points of conflict as they do areas of common interest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a sore spot, with each government seemingly pulling in opposite directions. Egypt has worked (unsuccessfully) for years to produce a reconciliation and unity government between Hamas and Fateh--something that Israel staunchly opposes.
Earlier this month, President Mubarak lobbied US President Barack Obama to push Israel for an immediate jump to final status negotiations with the Palestinians. That would essentially be a direct repudiation of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plan to delay final status talks for years while building up the economy and infrastructure of the occupied West Bank.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ashraf Khalil is the news editor for the English-language edition of Al Masry Al Youm newspaper.
Overcoming the constraints
James A. Larocco
Egypt and Israel currently have a confluence of strategic interests unparalleled in their histories as nation-states. And those shared interests are increasing, driven by events and trends, both positive and negative, within the region and elsewhere.
These shared strategic interests also happen to be among the top priorities of both nations: Iran; Gaza/Hamas; border control (smuggling, including and especially weapons, trafficking in persons, infiltration); counterterrorism (including and especially Hizballah and al-Qaeda); and Israeli/Egyptian/Palestinian relations and the peace process.
The natural conclusion one might draw from the above is that Egypt and Israel, acting in their own national interests, have been working assiduously to upgrade their strategic relations. To be sure, there have been some notable achievements in recent years, and the current period is arguably the most productive. In my own review, however, the record indicates that these efforts are episodic, marked by profound distrust on both sides, an unwillingness by some in the senior political and military leaderships to accept any upgrading and a weakness in the bilateral institutional framework that thwarts efforts to build on achievements.
There are a number of major constraints on translating these shared interests into concrete actions. For one, leaders and citizens of both nations remain deeply distrustful of the intentions of the other side. This is so visceral that it colors virtually every conversation, every private meeting and every public commentary. While Egyptians understand the strategic value of their cold peace with Israel, they are extremely reluctant to deal with Israelis on anything beyond their most important interests. To Israelis, Egyptians remain a frustrating enigma. As for Egypt's leadership, Israelis feel they can trust President Hosni Mubarak but wonder what will happen when he leaves the scene.
Then too, Egypt cannot be seen publicly as doing Israel's bidding. This constraint limits dramatically what Egypt is prepared to do. It therefore is no surprise that Egyptian-Israeli intelligence cooperation is by far the most developed, the most frequent, the most institutionalized, the most personalized and without question the most productive of all bilateral ties. It is largely outside public scrutiny, and there is always plausible deniability by either side. Military-to-military ties have some institutional framework, but they are extremely weak and limited largely to liaison. There is no ongoing cooperation in this area of any major significance.
Further, Israel does not devote priority to nurturing the relationship with Egypt. Israeli leaders occasionally "rediscover" Egypt, but all too often that does not come from anything positive that has happened, but rather from negative trends in the relationship. Ties are simply not pursued on a sustained basis. And even when they are pursued by individual Israeli leaders, the Egyptian leaders, who stay in place for decades, see their Israeli counterparts shifting seemingly at the blink of an eye as political coalitions keep changing. There are no parliamentary ties, and comments from the Knesset, when they are made about Egypt at all, are usually negative.
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces. This may seem a harsh assessment, but it's a fact. The IDF spends the majority of its attention on Israel's northern border, with longer-range concerns like Iran gobbling up senior attention. Particularly devastating was a downsizing of the IDF three years ago that led to the shifting of the liaison staff from the Operations Directorate to the Planning Directorate and the abolishment of the only flag-rank officer devoted exclusively to liaison. In fact, because of the crushing demands on the understaffed Planning Directorate, even the colonel ostensibly assigned for liaison is often required to devote time to other tasks. In contrast, the Egyptian liaison staff recently had three flag-rank officers at the top; it currently has two.
Personal relationships are also lacking. It is not mere conventional wisdom that personal relationships are vital both for mutual understanding and for any hope of sustained achievements. While such relationships do exist between some key intelligence officials, they rarely exist elsewhere. Israeli officers and officials at all levels rotate far too quickly.
Despite these constraints, some of which cannot or will not be overcome, I believe there is an urgent imperative to move as far and as quickly as politically possible to strengthen the strategic relationship. I am concerned that with the frequent transitions in Israel and the lack of an institutionalized dialogue, Egypt cannot benefit fully from achievements in its interest. Similarly, this lack of institutionalization of security ties as well as the failure on Israel's part to place very high priority on upgrading security ties may well prove a costly mistake for Israel's interests as Egypt draws closer to its first senior leadership transition in a generation.
With these thoughts in mind, both sides need to act:
* The Israeli leadership must make clear that upgrading the security relationship with Egypt is a key short- and long-term national security priority, and be prepared to devote the necessary time and human resources on a sustained basis. There should be a holistic approach, starting with the leaders themselves but bringing together all elements at all levels, within and outside the government.
* The IDF should establish a true liaison office, in the Operations Directorate, headed by a flag-rank officer. That office should retain key staff as long as possible, allowing for the building and maintaining of personal and professional relationships with their Egyptian counterparts. If necessary, retired officers with existing ties should be brought into the office.
* Egypt should accept the institutionalization of military-to-military ties, especially between operational officers at all levels, recognizing this is not only key to building trust during a time of transition but is also essential for any prospect of achieving the longer-term goal of replicating what Israel has with Jordan: no demilitarized zone and no foreign forces.
* Egypt should be open to expanding bilateral intelligence cooperation, to include intelligence agencies that have a key role in the Sinai and other border areas.
* Israel should consider ways to ease the burden of Gaza on Egypt, perhaps through the establishment of a border crossing regime that ensures that Gazans have sustained access to needed goods and services. In exchange, Egypt must convincingly do all it can to stop smuggling of certain items into Gaza.
* Both sides should expand their dialogue on their shared border, with regular biannual meetings chaired by senior operational military leadership and quarterly meetings at the technical level.
All of the above should be carried out with a full appreciation for the sensitivities of both sides. While maximum secrecy should be the watchword for ongoing discussions, it must be conveyed to outside observers when any steps are agreed upon and implemented that they are in each country's individual national interest.
In conclusion, we have already entered a historic window of opportunity for a meaningful and sustained upgrading of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation based on shared and individual interests. Let there be no misunderstanding: significant constraints will limit the scope of this cooperation. That said, there are steps that can be taken within those constraints today to fulfill what so many had hoped would be key fruits of the Camp David treaty.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ambassador James A. Larocco served from 2004 until July 2009 as director general of the MFO in Sinai. Since August 3 he is distinguished professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
Egypt wants to remain a regional player
an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
BI: Egypt appears to be stepping up its mediation between Hamas and Israel over a prisoner exchange. What can Cairo offer the two sides to secure such an exchange and are Egypt's assurances seen as strong enough?
Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt doesn't have anything to offer anymore. That's why it sought German intervention to exert pressure on Israel. Egypt doesn't possess any means of pressure on Israel to accomplish such a deal. Neither Egypt nor any other country in the region can offer strong assurances. Israel can only be held to its word by force and it will take a powerful side to oblige Israel to commit to any exchange deal, otherwise Israel will simply re-arrest prisoners or assassinate them.
BI: Why is Egypt interested in mediating between Israel and Hamas?
Al-Sawwaf: Egypt wants to achieve some success with some of the issues in its hands. The prisoner swap is one of those. Indeed, Egypt considers the whole Gaza Strip an Egyptian issue. Thus, to achieve some success with one of the Gaza-related issues is a way for Egypt to show the US administration and European public opinion that Cairo is capable of solving regional crises. This has become especially important to Cairo after the decline of Egypt's regional role and attempts by others to step into that role. In other words, Egypt wants to prove, first to itself, then to others, that it remains an important regional player that can fulfill a unique regional role. To prove this Cairo needs to secure success on a prisoner exchange deal, on Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation and/or on the ceasefire issue between Hamas and Israel.
BI: There has been a lot of talk about Egypt and Israel deepening their strategic relations in view of what some see as a joint interest in countering Iran as well as recent military maneuvers, including Israeli submarines crossing the Suez. Do you think this is true, and if so, why?
Al-Sawwaf: This is not a case of joint interests, rather of individual interests that happen to have some commonalities. First, if Iran comes to possess nuclear weapons, it will immediately become the strongest country in the region. Accordingly, this will pull the carpet out from under the Egyptian government and Egypt's traditional regional role. Egypt thus seeks to undermine Iranian power and prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons in order to maintain the regional equilibrium that sees Egypt as the most powerful country on the North African side of the Middle East and Iran the most powerful on the Asian side of the Middle East. But in spite of some passive Egyptian positions on the Palestinian issue, I don't think we can really talk about joint Egyptian-Israeli interests, since Egypt's motivation vis-a-vis policy on Iran differs from Israel's.
BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Gaza border issues and trade restrictions?
Al-Sawwaf: Egypt deals with Gaza according to its own evaluation of its interests. This relationship is constantly under American and European scrutiny and pressure, because Egypt receives a significant amount of aid from there and Cairo is wary of in any way endangering that support. The Egyptian leadership is aware that if the US should seek to change any regime in the region it could do so and, consequently, the Egyptian regime is careful to protect itself.
BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Egypt relations?
Al-Sawwaf: I don't want to put Israel in the middle between Hamas and Egypt. The relationship between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is the same as that between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has both direct and indirect links to the global Muslim Brotherhood. Hence the tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza. In consequence, some of the suffering of the people of Gaza is due to the poor relations between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood there. Egypt considers Hamas a danger to itself because it sees in Hamas a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and worries that the popularity of Hamas, as reflected in the 2006 parliamentary elections, could be replicated in Egypt.
BI: In view of Egypt-Israel relations, can Egypt act as a neutral mediator with Hamas over Gaza?
Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt has never been and will never be neutral when it comes to domestic Palestinian issues. But when it comes to Palestinian-Israeli issues, Egypt will, of course, support the Palestinians.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Mustafa al-Sawwaf is editor-in-chief of the Gaza-based Falasteen daily newspaper.
The elusive alliance
Ephraim Sneh
The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has withstood tough tests throughout its three decades. Two wars in Lebanon and two Palestinian intifadas caused neither its cancellation nor its suspension. Yet the treaty has never reached the level of an Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance.
Such an alliance is objectively justified; it emerges from the confluence of the two countries' existential interests. The stability of Egypt's secular regime is a supreme Israeli interest. Israel is not and will never be an Arab country. Despite its military power and per capita economic production that is ten times that of Egypt, Israel does not contest Egypt's preeminent status in the Arab world. It neither seeks nor is able to replace Egypt in its regional role.
Thus there is room here for a partnership without competition. As each of the partners is strengthened economically and militarily, it would strengthen its counterpart. Sadly, though, the Egyptian establishment is not interested in such an alliance. Why?
The Egyptian political, military and intellectual establishment has yet to internalize the change that is taking place in the region. This establishment lives and breathes the old fault line, the one that separated Israel on one side from all the Arab states on the other. Yet this line ceased to exist years ago. It has been replaced by a new fault line: on one side Iran and its proxies and on the other the rest of the countries in the region.
The refusal to recognize the fact that Israel and Egypt are on the same side of the regional divide has deep emotional roots, particularly in the Egyptian intellectual establishment that was cultivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president who believed in pan-Arabism and led the Arab world's war on Israel. Yet this is not the only emotional factor preventing important senior Egyptians from confronting the objective imperative for a strategic alliance with Israel.
There are some in Egypt who believe if there is even the shadow of a confrontation hovering permanently over the region, Egypt can maintain its preeminence better than when there is no longer a trace of Arab-Israel confrontation. Egypt's military power (built up over the past three decades with generous American help) is more necessary and significant in a tense region than in one where states are tested primarily on the basis of their economic prowess. This distorted approach holds that Israel's strategic capabilities detract from Egypt's regional Arab preeminence: that Israel is a competitor.
There is no other way to explain the obsessive struggle led by Egypt, inspired personally by former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, against Israel's nuclear capabilities. That Israel's opaque nuclear policy deters Egypt's enemies as well as Israel's is extremely difficult for the Egyptian political and diplomatic establishment to internalize.
Here we must note--a reality no Israeli can ignore--that the continued existence of the Israel-Arab conflict and our control over the Palestinian people in the West Bank provide an effective excuse for the Egyptian opponents of rapprochement with Israel. Yet I am not certain that even if we do what we should do and reach agreement with the Palestinians, the stand of those hostile toward us in Egypt would change for the better.
When Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, I thought this would trigger a reversal of the Egyptian position. I reasoned that the precedent of Muslim Brotherhood rule (in the guise of the Palestinian Hamas) on Egypt's border would constitute a kind of wake-up call and catalyze change in the Egyptian approach.
Unfortunately, this was not the case. In the course of the ensuing two years, Egypt has not acted to eliminate Hamas rule in Gaza as its shared interest with the Palestinian Authority and Israel would appear to dictate. Instead, Egypt has made every effort to conciliate between the Hamas leadership in Gaza and the rest of the world. Egypt has mediated between Hamas and Israel and in particular has tried energetically to reconcile Hamas with Fateh. Were this ever accomplished, it would completely eliminate any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. From the standpoint of Egypt's real interests, Hamas-Fateh reconciliation would invigorate the rule of extremist Islam in Gaza, not eliminate it.
Some 1,400 tunnels currently link Egypt with Gaza. Everything finds its way through them--not just Iranian funds for Hamas. Yet in recent months, something has begun to happen, something that could finally have a positive effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations. The capture of Hizballah's anti-Egyptian espionage and sabotage network may have shaken the Egyptian government by demonstrating exactly where the regional fault line lies and against which shared enemy we need to join hands.
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a strategy shared by Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel for ending Hamas rule in Gaza. It was Palestinian incompetence, Egyptian negligence and Israeli indifference that enabled the Hamas takeover in the first place. Now the three parties responsible for this disaster must cooperate in order to eliminate the Iranian outpost on the Israeli-Egyptian border and bring freedom and economic salvation to 1.5 million Gazans.
It is from this joint effort that a future Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance might possibly emerge.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ephraim Sneh, a retired IDF general, served in Israeli governments as minister of health, minister of transportation and deputy minister of defense. He is currently chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at the Netanya Academic College.
Middle East Roundtable
Edition 33 Volume 7 - August 27, 2009
Egypt-Israel: upgrading strategic relations?
• Interests aligning - Ashraf Khalil
It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever.
• Overcoming the constraints - James A. Larocco
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces.
• Egypt wants to remain a regional player - an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
The tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza.
• The elusive alliance - Ephraim Sneh
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a shared strategy for ending Hamas rule in Gaza.
Interests aligning
Ashraf Khalil
The Israelis like to call it the "cold peace". The Egyptians would rather not call it anything at all because that would admit there's actually something there to name.
For years the exact extent of political and economic cooperation between the two neighbors has been a subject of hot-button speculation and the occasional press campaign in Cairo. The government of President Hosni Mubarak, whose predecessor Anwar Sadat signed the 1978 Camp David accords, generally tries to keep the specifics of the two countries' relationship low-key, only admitting it when things become too obvious to deny.
"An Israeli is not the type of person that you want all your neighbors to know you're dating," chuckled Menachim Klein, a former Israeli negotiator and Bar-Ilan University political science professor.
Several years ago, a former agriculture minister fended off a prolonged opposition media campaign calling him a secret normalizer for his ministry's working relationship with its Israeli counterpart. Popular reaction was straight out of the movie Casablanca: people were shocked to discover something that most regional observers already saw as patently obvious. More recently, the local press has accused the government of selling natural gas to Israel for sweetheart prices.
Egyptians in general do know that there are extensive economic and agricultural ties with Israel, but prefer not to think too hard about it. (A personal example: when I first moved to Jerusalem in February 2008 as a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, my Egyptian relatives were genuinely curious as to what route I used to visit Cairo. They honestly had no idea that there are multiple EgyptAir and El Al flights every week between Cairo and Tel Aviv.)
But now, something seems to be changing in the usual don't ask/don't tell nature of the Egyptian-Israeli partnership. It's becoming harder for Cairo to hide the fact that its foreign policy interests are more in line with Tel Aviv than ever. The main source of common ground is a mutual desire to contain Iran's regional and nuclear ambitions. Both governments have arrived at this place via different routes. Israel fears an Iranian nuclear capability will challenge its own (nominally secret) nuclear arsenal and open the door to a devastating attack on the Jewish state. Egypt doesn't fear Iran militarily, but dreads the gradual expansion of revolutionary Shi'ite ideology into the Sunni sphere.
Egypt's own bilateral relations with Tehran are fraught with tension--partially stemming from Iran's insistence on glorifying Sadat's assassins. "The way Iran acts has actually pulled (Egypt and Israel) closer together," said Meir Javedanfar, an Iranian-born Israeli political analyst.
This common interest has already produced some interesting public displays of cooperation. Earlier this summer, an Israeli submarine passed through the Suez Canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, touching off a weeklong media firestorm in Egypt. Israeli warships have traversed the canal for years, but this was the first submarine passage. The hype surrounding the event was only intensified by the fact that no one seems to know for sure the exact capabilities of the German-made Dolphin class sub.
Egyptian officials were generally tight-lipped, saying that the two countries have a peace treaty and the canal is open for all nations. But Israeli media openly declared the passage a coordinated message aimed directly at Tehran. "They want Iran to realize that nothing is impossible," Javedanfar said. Does that include a scenario where Egypt actively assists an Israeli preemptive strike on Iran? Nobody is sure and Javedanfar says that is exactly how both governments want it.
The submarine passage was far more than a symbolic show of cooperation. Usage of the Suez Canal would enable the Israeli navy to quickly get in position for a naval strike or blockade against Iranian ports. Without the canal, Israeli ships would have to make a weeks-long voyage around Africa in order to attack Iranian shores.
Emad Gad, an expert on Israeli policy with Cairo-based Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, warns not to read too much into the submarine incident. "There may be some Egyptian cooperation," with Israel, he says. "But it hasn't reached the level of joint planning." Gad believes Egypt's permitting the submarine to use the canal, "was more for the Americans than for the Israelis".
The two countries still have just as many points of conflict as they do areas of common interest. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a sore spot, with each government seemingly pulling in opposite directions. Egypt has worked (unsuccessfully) for years to produce a reconciliation and unity government between Hamas and Fateh--something that Israel staunchly opposes.
Earlier this month, President Mubarak lobbied US President Barack Obama to push Israel for an immediate jump to final status negotiations with the Palestinians. That would essentially be a direct repudiation of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's plan to delay final status talks for years while building up the economy and infrastructure of the occupied West Bank.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ashraf Khalil is the news editor for the English-language edition of Al Masry Al Youm newspaper.
Overcoming the constraints
James A. Larocco
Egypt and Israel currently have a confluence of strategic interests unparalleled in their histories as nation-states. And those shared interests are increasing, driven by events and trends, both positive and negative, within the region and elsewhere.
These shared strategic interests also happen to be among the top priorities of both nations: Iran; Gaza/Hamas; border control (smuggling, including and especially weapons, trafficking in persons, infiltration); counterterrorism (including and especially Hizballah and al-Qaeda); and Israeli/Egyptian/Palestinian relations and the peace process.
The natural conclusion one might draw from the above is that Egypt and Israel, acting in their own national interests, have been working assiduously to upgrade their strategic relations. To be sure, there have been some notable achievements in recent years, and the current period is arguably the most productive. In my own review, however, the record indicates that these efforts are episodic, marked by profound distrust on both sides, an unwillingness by some in the senior political and military leaderships to accept any upgrading and a weakness in the bilateral institutional framework that thwarts efforts to build on achievements.
There are a number of major constraints on translating these shared interests into concrete actions. For one, leaders and citizens of both nations remain deeply distrustful of the intentions of the other side. This is so visceral that it colors virtually every conversation, every private meeting and every public commentary. While Egyptians understand the strategic value of their cold peace with Israel, they are extremely reluctant to deal with Israelis on anything beyond their most important interests. To Israelis, Egyptians remain a frustrating enigma. As for Egypt's leadership, Israelis feel they can trust President Hosni Mubarak but wonder what will happen when he leaves the scene.
Then too, Egypt cannot be seen publicly as doing Israel's bidding. This constraint limits dramatically what Egypt is prepared to do. It therefore is no surprise that Egyptian-Israeli intelligence cooperation is by far the most developed, the most frequent, the most institutionalized, the most personalized and without question the most productive of all bilateral ties. It is largely outside public scrutiny, and there is always plausible deniability by either side. Military-to-military ties have some institutional framework, but they are extremely weak and limited largely to liaison. There is no ongoing cooperation in this area of any major significance.
Further, Israel does not devote priority to nurturing the relationship with Egypt. Israeli leaders occasionally "rediscover" Egypt, but all too often that does not come from anything positive that has happened, but rather from negative trends in the relationship. Ties are simply not pursued on a sustained basis. And even when they are pursued by individual Israeli leaders, the Egyptian leaders, who stay in place for decades, see their Israeli counterparts shifting seemingly at the blink of an eye as political coalitions keep changing. There are no parliamentary ties, and comments from the Knesset, when they are made about Egypt at all, are usually negative.
Egypt is not even a priority to the Israel Defense Forces. This may seem a harsh assessment, but it's a fact. The IDF spends the majority of its attention on Israel's northern border, with longer-range concerns like Iran gobbling up senior attention. Particularly devastating was a downsizing of the IDF three years ago that led to the shifting of the liaison staff from the Operations Directorate to the Planning Directorate and the abolishment of the only flag-rank officer devoted exclusively to liaison. In fact, because of the crushing demands on the understaffed Planning Directorate, even the colonel ostensibly assigned for liaison is often required to devote time to other tasks. In contrast, the Egyptian liaison staff recently had three flag-rank officers at the top; it currently has two.
Personal relationships are also lacking. It is not mere conventional wisdom that personal relationships are vital both for mutual understanding and for any hope of sustained achievements. While such relationships do exist between some key intelligence officials, they rarely exist elsewhere. Israeli officers and officials at all levels rotate far too quickly.
Despite these constraints, some of which cannot or will not be overcome, I believe there is an urgent imperative to move as far and as quickly as politically possible to strengthen the strategic relationship. I am concerned that with the frequent transitions in Israel and the lack of an institutionalized dialogue, Egypt cannot benefit fully from achievements in its interest. Similarly, this lack of institutionalization of security ties as well as the failure on Israel's part to place very high priority on upgrading security ties may well prove a costly mistake for Israel's interests as Egypt draws closer to its first senior leadership transition in a generation.
With these thoughts in mind, both sides need to act:
* The Israeli leadership must make clear that upgrading the security relationship with Egypt is a key short- and long-term national security priority, and be prepared to devote the necessary time and human resources on a sustained basis. There should be a holistic approach, starting with the leaders themselves but bringing together all elements at all levels, within and outside the government.
* The IDF should establish a true liaison office, in the Operations Directorate, headed by a flag-rank officer. That office should retain key staff as long as possible, allowing for the building and maintaining of personal and professional relationships with their Egyptian counterparts. If necessary, retired officers with existing ties should be brought into the office.
* Egypt should accept the institutionalization of military-to-military ties, especially between operational officers at all levels, recognizing this is not only key to building trust during a time of transition but is also essential for any prospect of achieving the longer-term goal of replicating what Israel has with Jordan: no demilitarized zone and no foreign forces.
* Egypt should be open to expanding bilateral intelligence cooperation, to include intelligence agencies that have a key role in the Sinai and other border areas.
* Israel should consider ways to ease the burden of Gaza on Egypt, perhaps through the establishment of a border crossing regime that ensures that Gazans have sustained access to needed goods and services. In exchange, Egypt must convincingly do all it can to stop smuggling of certain items into Gaza.
* Both sides should expand their dialogue on their shared border, with regular biannual meetings chaired by senior operational military leadership and quarterly meetings at the technical level.
All of the above should be carried out with a full appreciation for the sensitivities of both sides. While maximum secrecy should be the watchword for ongoing discussions, it must be conveyed to outside observers when any steps are agreed upon and implemented that they are in each country's individual national interest.
In conclusion, we have already entered a historic window of opportunity for a meaningful and sustained upgrading of bilateral Egyptian-Israeli security cooperation based on shared and individual interests. Let there be no misunderstanding: significant constraints will limit the scope of this cooperation. That said, there are steps that can be taken within those constraints today to fulfill what so many had hoped would be key fruits of the Camp David treaty.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ambassador James A. Larocco served from 2004 until July 2009 as director general of the MFO in Sinai. Since August 3 he is distinguished professor, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
Egypt wants to remain a regional player
an interview with Mustafa al-Sawwaf
BI: Egypt appears to be stepping up its mediation between Hamas and Israel over a prisoner exchange. What can Cairo offer the two sides to secure such an exchange and are Egypt's assurances seen as strong enough?
Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt doesn't have anything to offer anymore. That's why it sought German intervention to exert pressure on Israel. Egypt doesn't possess any means of pressure on Israel to accomplish such a deal. Neither Egypt nor any other country in the region can offer strong assurances. Israel can only be held to its word by force and it will take a powerful side to oblige Israel to commit to any exchange deal, otherwise Israel will simply re-arrest prisoners or assassinate them.
BI: Why is Egypt interested in mediating between Israel and Hamas?
Al-Sawwaf: Egypt wants to achieve some success with some of the issues in its hands. The prisoner swap is one of those. Indeed, Egypt considers the whole Gaza Strip an Egyptian issue. Thus, to achieve some success with one of the Gaza-related issues is a way for Egypt to show the US administration and European public opinion that Cairo is capable of solving regional crises. This has become especially important to Cairo after the decline of Egypt's regional role and attempts by others to step into that role. In other words, Egypt wants to prove, first to itself, then to others, that it remains an important regional player that can fulfill a unique regional role. To prove this Cairo needs to secure success on a prisoner exchange deal, on Palestinian-Palestinian reconciliation and/or on the ceasefire issue between Hamas and Israel.
BI: There has been a lot of talk about Egypt and Israel deepening their strategic relations in view of what some see as a joint interest in countering Iran as well as recent military maneuvers, including Israeli submarines crossing the Suez. Do you think this is true, and if so, why?
Al-Sawwaf: This is not a case of joint interests, rather of individual interests that happen to have some commonalities. First, if Iran comes to possess nuclear weapons, it will immediately become the strongest country in the region. Accordingly, this will pull the carpet out from under the Egyptian government and Egypt's traditional regional role. Egypt thus seeks to undermine Iranian power and prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons in order to maintain the regional equilibrium that sees Egypt as the most powerful country on the North African side of the Middle East and Iran the most powerful on the Asian side of the Middle East. But in spite of some passive Egyptian positions on the Palestinian issue, I don't think we can really talk about joint Egyptian-Israeli interests, since Egypt's motivation vis-a-vis policy on Iran differs from Israel's.
BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Gaza border issues and trade restrictions?
Al-Sawwaf: Egypt deals with Gaza according to its own evaluation of its interests. This relationship is constantly under American and European scrutiny and pressure, because Egypt receives a significant amount of aid from there and Cairo is wary of in any way endangering that support. The Egyptian leadership is aware that if the US should seek to change any regime in the region it could do so and, consequently, the Egyptian regime is careful to protect itself.
BI: How do Israel-Egypt relations affect Hamas-Israel and Hamas-Egypt relations?
Al-Sawwaf: I don't want to put Israel in the middle between Hamas and Egypt. The relationship between Egypt and the Gaza Strip is the same as that between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip, has both direct and indirect links to the global Muslim Brotherhood. Hence the tense relations between the Egyptian leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt are reflected in relations between Egypt and Gaza. In consequence, some of the suffering of the people of Gaza is due to the poor relations between the Egyptian regime and the Muslim Brotherhood there. Egypt considers Hamas a danger to itself because it sees in Hamas a reflection of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and worries that the popularity of Hamas, as reflected in the 2006 parliamentary elections, could be replicated in Egypt.
BI: In view of Egypt-Israel relations, can Egypt act as a neutral mediator with Hamas over Gaza?
Al-Sawwaf: I believe Egypt has never been and will never be neutral when it comes to domestic Palestinian issues. But when it comes to Palestinian-Israeli issues, Egypt will, of course, support the Palestinians.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Mustafa al-Sawwaf is editor-in-chief of the Gaza-based Falasteen daily newspaper.
The elusive alliance
Ephraim Sneh
The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has withstood tough tests throughout its three decades. Two wars in Lebanon and two Palestinian intifadas caused neither its cancellation nor its suspension. Yet the treaty has never reached the level of an Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance.
Such an alliance is objectively justified; it emerges from the confluence of the two countries' existential interests. The stability of Egypt's secular regime is a supreme Israeli interest. Israel is not and will never be an Arab country. Despite its military power and per capita economic production that is ten times that of Egypt, Israel does not contest Egypt's preeminent status in the Arab world. It neither seeks nor is able to replace Egypt in its regional role.
Thus there is room here for a partnership without competition. As each of the partners is strengthened economically and militarily, it would strengthen its counterpart. Sadly, though, the Egyptian establishment is not interested in such an alliance. Why?
The Egyptian political, military and intellectual establishment has yet to internalize the change that is taking place in the region. This establishment lives and breathes the old fault line, the one that separated Israel on one side from all the Arab states on the other. Yet this line ceased to exist years ago. It has been replaced by a new fault line: on one side Iran and its proxies and on the other the rest of the countries in the region.
The refusal to recognize the fact that Israel and Egypt are on the same side of the regional divide has deep emotional roots, particularly in the Egyptian intellectual establishment that was cultivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian president who believed in pan-Arabism and led the Arab world's war on Israel. Yet this is not the only emotional factor preventing important senior Egyptians from confronting the objective imperative for a strategic alliance with Israel.
There are some in Egypt who believe if there is even the shadow of a confrontation hovering permanently over the region, Egypt can maintain its preeminence better than when there is no longer a trace of Arab-Israel confrontation. Egypt's military power (built up over the past three decades with generous American help) is more necessary and significant in a tense region than in one where states are tested primarily on the basis of their economic prowess. This distorted approach holds that Israel's strategic capabilities detract from Egypt's regional Arab preeminence: that Israel is a competitor.
There is no other way to explain the obsessive struggle led by Egypt, inspired personally by former Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, against Israel's nuclear capabilities. That Israel's opaque nuclear policy deters Egypt's enemies as well as Israel's is extremely difficult for the Egyptian political and diplomatic establishment to internalize.
Here we must note--a reality no Israeli can ignore--that the continued existence of the Israel-Arab conflict and our control over the Palestinian people in the West Bank provide an effective excuse for the Egyptian opponents of rapprochement with Israel. Yet I am not certain that even if we do what we should do and reach agreement with the Palestinians, the stand of those hostile toward us in Egypt would change for the better.
When Hamas took over Gaza in June 2007, I thought this would trigger a reversal of the Egyptian position. I reasoned that the precedent of Muslim Brotherhood rule (in the guise of the Palestinian Hamas) on Egypt's border would constitute a kind of wake-up call and catalyze change in the Egyptian approach.
Unfortunately, this was not the case. In the course of the ensuing two years, Egypt has not acted to eliminate Hamas rule in Gaza as its shared interest with the Palestinian Authority and Israel would appear to dictate. Instead, Egypt has made every effort to conciliate between the Hamas leadership in Gaza and the rest of the world. Egypt has mediated between Hamas and Israel and in particular has tried energetically to reconcile Hamas with Fateh. Were this ever accomplished, it would completely eliminate any chance of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. From the standpoint of Egypt's real interests, Hamas-Fateh reconciliation would invigorate the rule of extremist Islam in Gaza, not eliminate it.
Some 1,400 tunnels currently link Egypt with Gaza. Everything finds its way through them--not just Iranian funds for Hamas. Yet in recent months, something has begun to happen, something that could finally have a positive effect on Egyptian-Israeli relations. The capture of Hizballah's anti-Egyptian espionage and sabotage network may have shaken the Egyptian government by demonstrating exactly where the regional fault line lies and against which shared enemy we need to join hands.
The immediate order of the day is to formulate a strategy shared by Egypt, the Palestinians and Israel for ending Hamas rule in Gaza. It was Palestinian incompetence, Egyptian negligence and Israeli indifference that enabled the Hamas takeover in the first place. Now the three parties responsible for this disaster must cooperate in order to eliminate the Iranian outpost on the Israeli-Egyptian border and bring freedom and economic salvation to 1.5 million Gazans.
It is from this joint effort that a future Israeli-Egyptian strategic alliance might possibly emerge.- Published 27/8/2009 © bitterlemons-international.org
Ephraim Sneh, a retired IDF general, served in Israeli governments as minister of health, minister of transportation and deputy minister of defense. He is currently chairman of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Strategic Dialogue at the Netanya Academic College.
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Neoconservative Resurgence in the Age of Obama By Daniel Luban
Neoconservative Resurgence in the Age of Obama
By Daniel Luban
Despite their political plunge, neoconservatives—and the think tanks that sustain them—have been surprisingly skilled at reinventing themselves and forcing the Obama administration to give them a seat at the table. They have choreographed a clever “carrots and sticks” dance—throwing support behind the president when he has taken positions compatible with their dogma, and excoriating him when he has contravened it. They have also proved adept at making alliances with the liberal interventionists, like those at the Center for a New American Security, who are strikingly influential in and out of the Obama administration. Read full story.
http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/neoconservative_resurgence_in_the_age_of_obama
By Daniel Luban
Despite their political plunge, neoconservatives—and the think tanks that sustain them—have been surprisingly skilled at reinventing themselves and forcing the Obama administration to give them a seat at the table. They have choreographed a clever “carrots and sticks” dance—throwing support behind the president when he has taken positions compatible with their dogma, and excoriating him when he has contravened it. They have also proved adept at making alliances with the liberal interventionists, like those at the Center for a New American Security, who are strikingly influential in and out of the Obama administration. Read full story.
http://www.rightweb.irc-online.org/articles/display/neoconservative_resurgence_in_the_age_of_obama
Planted News Stories Show New Bid by West to Say Iran Seeks Nuclear Weapons The Leaking Game By GARETH PORTER
August 26, 2009
Planted News Stories Show New Bid by West to Say Iran Seeks Nuclear Weapons
The Leaking Game
By GARETH PORTER
http://www.counterpunch.org/porter08262009.html
Planted News Stories Show New Bid by West to Say Iran Seeks Nuclear Weapons
The Leaking Game
By GARETH PORTER
http://www.counterpunch.org/porter08262009.html
Endgame: The Great American Purge
Endgame: The Great American Purge
by Justin O'Connell / August 26th, 2009 (1)
Rise like lions after slumber
in unvanquishable number!
Shake your chains to earth, like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you—
Ye are many, they are few!
– Percy Bysshe Shelley “Mask of Anarchy”
If you don’t know your history it’s as if you were born yesterday.
– Howard Zinn
In a recent article, famed trend forecaster, Gerald Celente, wrote:
The natives are restless. The third shot of the “Second American Revolution” has been fired. History is being made. But just as with the first two shots, the third shot is not being heard. America is seething. Not since the Civil War has anything …
(Full article …)
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/endgame-...american-purge/
by Justin O'Connell / August 26th, 2009 (1)
Rise like lions after slumber
in unvanquishable number!
Shake your chains to earth, like dew
Which in sleep had fallen on you—
Ye are many, they are few!
– Percy Bysshe Shelley “Mask of Anarchy”
If you don’t know your history it’s as if you were born yesterday.
– Howard Zinn
In a recent article, famed trend forecaster, Gerald Celente, wrote:
The natives are restless. The third shot of the “Second American Revolution” has been fired. History is being made. But just as with the first two shots, the third shot is not being heard. America is seething. Not since the Civil War has anything …
(Full article …)
http://dissidentvoice.org/2009/08/endgame-...american-purge/
Middle East arms buys top $100 billion
Middle East arms buys top $100 billion
Beirut, Lebanon (UPI) Aug 25, 2009 - Middle Eastern countries are expected to spend more than $100 billion over the next five years, largely because of growing fears about Iran's nuclear program and its perceived ambition to undermine Sunni-led Arab regimes, according to an assessment by a U.S.-based consultancy. Most of the procurement will be carried out by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Israel, the New ... more
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Middle_East_arms_buys_top_100_billion_999.html
Beirut, Lebanon (UPI) Aug 25, 2009 - Middle Eastern countries are expected to spend more than $100 billion over the next five years, largely because of growing fears about Iran's nuclear program and its perceived ambition to undermine Sunni-led Arab regimes, according to an assessment by a U.S.-based consultancy. Most of the procurement will be carried out by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Israel, the New ... more
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Middle_East_arms_buys_top_100_billion_999.html
Vice President Cheney Comments On The CIA Investigation
Vice President Cheney Comments On The CIA Investigation
Cheney Statement On CIA Documents/Investigation -- Weekly Standard
Former Vice President Dick Cheney gave The Weekly Standard a statement Monday night about the CIA documents and the coming Justice Department investigation.
The documents released Monday clearly demonstrate that the individuals subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques provided the bulk of intelligence we gained about al Qaeda. This intelligence saved lives and prevented terrorist attacks. These detainees also, according to the documents, played a role in nearly every capture of al Qaeda members and associates since 2002. The activities of the CIA in carrying out the policies of the Bush Administration were directly responsible for defeating all efforts by al Qaeda to launch further mass casualty attacks against the United States. The people involved deserve our gratitude. They do not deserve to be the targets of political investigations or prosecutions. President Obama’s decision to allow the Justice Department to investigate and possibly prosecute CIA personnel, and his decision to remove authority for interrogation from the CIA to the White House, serves as a reminder, if any were needed, of why so many Americans have doubts about this Administration’s ability to be responsible for our nation’s security.
More News On Vice President Cheney's Remarks On The CIA Investigation
Cheney criticizes "political" CIA probe plan -- Yahoo News/Reuters
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090825/us_nm/us_usa_cia_cheney;_ylt=AuGiLWeEgnnGaYnm9V52ImWs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTMwbDkzcXZwBGFzc2V0A25tLzIwMDkwODI1L3VzX3VzYV9jaWFfY2hlbmV5BGNwb3MDMwRwb3MDMTIEcHQDaG9tZV9jb2tlBHNlYwN5bl90b3Bfc3RvcnkEc2xrA2NoZW5leWNyaXRpYw--
Dick Cheney: new doubts about President Obama -- Politico
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/26418.html
Cheney rejoins battle over interrogations -- Boston.com
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/08/cheney_rejoins.html
Cheney Criticizes Obama Over CIA Probe -- Voice of America
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-25-voa39.cfm
Cheney Slams Obama Administration Decision -- ABC News
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8409637
Reading Cheney's Response To The New CIA Documents -- Time Magazine
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/08/25/reading-cheney%E2%80%99s-response-to-the-new-cia-documents/
Cheney Slams Obama Over CIA Investigations -- CBS
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/08/25/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5264504.shtml
Cheney says documents show interrogations prevented attacks -- CNN
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/25/terror.interrogations/
Holes In Cheney's Defense -- The Atlantic
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/08/holes-in-cheneys-defense.html
Cheney Statement On CIA Documents/Investigation -- Weekly Standard
Former Vice President Dick Cheney gave The Weekly Standard a statement Monday night about the CIA documents and the coming Justice Department investigation.
The documents released Monday clearly demonstrate that the individuals subjected to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques provided the bulk of intelligence we gained about al Qaeda. This intelligence saved lives and prevented terrorist attacks. These detainees also, according to the documents, played a role in nearly every capture of al Qaeda members and associates since 2002. The activities of the CIA in carrying out the policies of the Bush Administration were directly responsible for defeating all efforts by al Qaeda to launch further mass casualty attacks against the United States. The people involved deserve our gratitude. They do not deserve to be the targets of political investigations or prosecutions. President Obama’s decision to allow the Justice Department to investigate and possibly prosecute CIA personnel, and his decision to remove authority for interrogation from the CIA to the White House, serves as a reminder, if any were needed, of why so many Americans have doubts about this Administration’s ability to be responsible for our nation’s security.
More News On Vice President Cheney's Remarks On The CIA Investigation
Cheney criticizes "political" CIA probe plan -- Yahoo News/Reuters
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20090825/us_nm/us_usa_cia_cheney;_ylt=AuGiLWeEgnnGaYnm9V52ImWs0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTMwbDkzcXZwBGFzc2V0A25tLzIwMDkwODI1L3VzX3VzYV9jaWFfY2hlbmV5BGNwb3MDMwRwb3MDMTIEcHQDaG9tZV9jb2tlBHNlYwN5bl90b3Bfc3RvcnkEc2xrA2NoZW5leWNyaXRpYw--
Dick Cheney: new doubts about President Obama -- Politico
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/26418.html
Cheney rejoins battle over interrogations -- Boston.com
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/politicalintelligence/2009/08/cheney_rejoins.html
Cheney Criticizes Obama Over CIA Probe -- Voice of America
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-08-25-voa39.cfm
Cheney Slams Obama Administration Decision -- ABC News
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=8409637
Reading Cheney's Response To The New CIA Documents -- Time Magazine
http://swampland.blogs.time.com/2009/08/25/reading-cheney%E2%80%99s-response-to-the-new-cia-documents/
Cheney Slams Obama Over CIA Investigations -- CBS
http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2009/08/25/politics/politicalhotsheet/entry5264504.shtml
Cheney says documents show interrogations prevented attacks -- CNN
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/25/terror.interrogations/
Holes In Cheney's Defense -- The Atlantic
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/08/holes-in-cheneys-defense.html
Could Obama Lose Afghanistan? -- A Commentary
Could Obama Lose Afghanistan? -- A Commentary
From The Wall Street Journal:
Why support is wavering for the "good war."
It was like an unwelcome specter from an unhappy past: "Could Afghanistan Become Obama's Vietnam?" asked the New York Times headline this past Sunday.
"President Obama had not even taken office before supporters were etching his likeness onto Mount Rushmore as another Abraham Lincoln or the second coming of Franklin D. Roosevelt," wrote the paper's Peter Baker:
Read more ....
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203706604574372691482587678.html
A long and thoughtful analysis. This is a must read.
So .... could President Obama lose Afghanistan?
Hmmm .... from where I stand .... he (we) already have.
A few days ago another commentary suggested why we have already lost Afghanistan .... Saturday, August 22, 2009
Could Afghanistan Become Obama’s Vietnam? -- A Commentary From The WNU Editor
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.com/2009/08/could-afghanistan-become-obamas-vietnam.html
From The Wall Street Journal:
Why support is wavering for the "good war."
It was like an unwelcome specter from an unhappy past: "Could Afghanistan Become Obama's Vietnam?" asked the New York Times headline this past Sunday.
"President Obama had not even taken office before supporters were etching his likeness onto Mount Rushmore as another Abraham Lincoln or the second coming of Franklin D. Roosevelt," wrote the paper's Peter Baker:
Read more ....
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203706604574372691482587678.html
A long and thoughtful analysis. This is a must read.
So .... could President Obama lose Afghanistan?
Hmmm .... from where I stand .... he (we) already have.
A few days ago another commentary suggested why we have already lost Afghanistan .... Saturday, August 22, 2009
Could Afghanistan Become Obama’s Vietnam? -- A Commentary From The WNU Editor
http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.com/2009/08/could-afghanistan-become-obamas-vietnam.html
Foreign views of the US
Analysis: The Puzzling Impact of Obama's 'Glasnost' - Ernest Corea, Global Perspectives · Kommunikation Global:
http://www.global-perspectives.info/news/news.php?key1=2009-08-24%2008:16:00&key2=1
"The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project 2009 interviewed 26,397 people in 25 countries in the period May 18-June 18, 2009. Here's the Pew Project's snapshot of how the world views America in the time of Obama:
'The image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office.' … Pew Research Center President Andrew Kohut … pointed out … that Obama's popularity as recorded in a number of countries across the globe cannot be discounted. He felt that Obama's popularity would persuade foreign audiences to listen to what America has to say. This, one should add, is a great change from reactions across a wide swath of the world's population to US public diplomacy in most of the preceding years." Image from
The Pakistani People Are Our Friends? Really? - Ampersand, Alas, a blog!
http://www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/2009/08/25/the-pakistani-people-are-our-friends-really/
: "Back in February, Dave Kilcullen said this in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/crunch-time-in-afghanistanpaki/
[']All this suggests that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy is to identify, within Pakistan, our friends and allies (civilian democratic political leaders, some officials, and much of the Pakistani people) … ['] . Kilcullen is an actual expert who has been to the region, so it’s likely he knows something I don’t. But I find that claim more than a little odd. Contrast what Kilcullen is saying to this news story:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/world/asia/20holbrooke.html?_r=3&hpw
[']After Ms. McHale, the Obama administration’s new under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, gave her initial polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world, Mr. Abbasi thanked her politely for meeting with him. Then he told her that he hated her. 'You should know that we hate all Americans,'
Ms. McHale said Mr. Abbasi told her. 'From the bottom of our souls, we hate you.'['] According to a Pew poll,
http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&survey=10&response=Unfavorable&mode=chart
68% of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States. In fact, of the countries Pew surveyed, there are only four where the US is more hated. If our strategy in Pakistan depends on much of the Pakistani people being our 'friends and allies,' then we’re in deep trouble. (Don’t get me wrong, I’d like ordinary Pakistanis to be friends with America. But for the most part, they’re not.)"
http://www.global-perspectives.info/news/news.php?key1=2009-08-24%2008:16:00&key2=1
"The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project 2009 interviewed 26,397 people in 25 countries in the period May 18-June 18, 2009. Here's the Pew Project's snapshot of how the world views America in the time of Obama:
'The image of the United States has improved markedly in most parts of the world, reflecting global confidence in Barack Obama. In many countries opinions of the United States are now about as positive as they were at the beginning of the decade before George W. Bush took office.' … Pew Research Center President Andrew Kohut … pointed out … that Obama's popularity as recorded in a number of countries across the globe cannot be discounted. He felt that Obama's popularity would persuade foreign audiences to listen to what America has to say. This, one should add, is a great change from reactions across a wide swath of the world's population to US public diplomacy in most of the preceding years." Image from
The Pakistani People Are Our Friends? Really? - Ampersand, Alas, a blog!
http://www.amptoons.com/blog/archives/2009/08/25/the-pakistani-people-are-our-friends-really/
: "Back in February, Dave Kilcullen said this in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/crunch-time-in-afghanistanpaki/
[']All this suggests that the most appropriate diplomatic strategy is to identify, within Pakistan, our friends and allies (civilian democratic political leaders, some officials, and much of the Pakistani people) … ['] . Kilcullen is an actual expert who has been to the region, so it’s likely he knows something I don’t. But I find that claim more than a little odd. Contrast what Kilcullen is saying to this news story:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/world/asia/20holbrooke.html?_r=3&hpw
[']After Ms. McHale, the Obama administration’s new under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs, gave her initial polite presentation about building bridges between America and the Muslim world, Mr. Abbasi thanked her politely for meeting with him. Then he told her that he hated her. 'You should know that we hate all Americans,'
Ms. McHale said Mr. Abbasi told her. 'From the bottom of our souls, we hate you.'['] According to a Pew poll,
http://pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=1&survey=10&response=Unfavorable&mode=chart
68% of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States. In fact, of the countries Pew surveyed, there are only four where the US is more hated. If our strategy in Pakistan depends on much of the Pakistani people being our 'friends and allies,' then we’re in deep trouble. (Don’t get me wrong, I’d like ordinary Pakistanis to be friends with America. But for the most part, they’re not.)"
Tuesday, August 25, 2009
Pakistan's Nuclear Chronology
Pakistan's Nuclear Chronology
Allison Smith, The Stimson Center
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA200908182294
Allison Smith, The Stimson Center
http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA200908182294
Israel: A Stalemated Action of History By GABRIEL KOLKO
Israel: A Stalemated Action of History
By GABRIEL KOLKO
In late 1949 I worked on a boat taking Jews from Marseilles to Haifa, Israel. Jews from Arab nations were in the front of the boat, Europeans in the rear. I was regarded by many of the Europeans as some sort of freak because I had a United States passport and so could stay in the land of milk and honey. One man wanted me to marry his daughter – which meant he too could live in the land of milk and honey. My Hebrew became quite respectable but the experience was radicalizing or, I should say, kept me radical, and I have stayed that way.
Later I learned from someone who ran a displaced persons camp in Germany that the large majority of Jews wanted to go anywhere but Palestine. They were compelled to state Palestine or else risk receiving no aid. I understood very early that there was much amiss in the countless Arab villages and homes I saw destroyed, and that the entire Zionist project – regardless of the often venal nature of the Arab opposition to it – was a dangerous sham.
The result of the creation of a state called Israel was abysmal. Jews from Poland have nothing in common with Germans and neither has anything to do with those from the Arab world. It is nationality, not religion, that counts most. Jews in Israel, especially the Germans, largely ghettoized themselves by their place of origin during the first generation, when a militarized culture produced the mixed new breed called sabras – an essentially anti-intellectual personality far different from the one the early Zionists, who were mostly socialists who preached the nobility of labor, expected to emerge. The large majority of Israelis are not in the least Jewish in the cultural sense, are scarcely socialist in any sense, and daily life and the way people live is no different in Israel than it is in Chicago or Amsterdam. There is simply no rational reason that justifies the state’s creation.
The outcome is a small state with a military ethos that pervades all aspects of Israel’s culture, its politics and, above all, its response to the existence of Arabs in its midst and at its borders. From its inception, the ideology of the early Zionists – of Labor Zionism as well as the rightist Revisionism that Vladimir Jabotinsky produced – embodied a commitment to violence, erroneously called self-defense, and a virtual hysteria. As a transcendent idea, Zionism has no validity because the national differences between Jews are overwhelming.
What Zionism confirmed, if any confirmation were needed, is that accidents are more important in shaping history than is all too often allowed. Here was the intellectual caf̩, which existed in key cities РVienna at the turn of the twentieth century or the Lower East Side of New York before World War I Рfilled with immensely creative people full of ideas and longing for a golden era to come. Ideas Рgood, bad, and indifferent Рflourished. In this heady atmosphere, Zionism was born.
But Zionism has produced a Sparta that traumatized an already artificially divided region partitioned after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I led to the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the modern Middle East. The state of Israel has always relied on military solutions to political and sociological problems with the Arabs. The result is constant mobilization.
Even more troublesome for peace and stability in the vast Middle East, Zionism has always been symbiotic on some great power for the security of its national project, realized in a state called Israel. Before 1939 it was the British; during the 1950s it was France. Israel has survived since the late 1960s on the influx of US arms and money, and this has allowed it to encourage its fears of annihilation – a fate its possession of nuclear weapons makes most unlikely. But Israel also has an importance far beyond the fantasies of a few confused literati. Today its significance for American foreign policy is far greater because the Soviet Union no longer exists and the Middle East provokes the fear so essential to mobilizing Congress and the US public. “The best hopes and the worst fears of the planet are invested in that relatively small patch of earth” – as George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, put it in his memoir – and so understanding how and why that patch came into being, and the grave limits of the martial course it is following, has a very great, even transcendent value.
In July 2003 Foreign Minister Shalom predicted that Iran would have nuclear bomb capability by 2006. It did not have nuclear weapons in 2006, though in fact a successful strike by conventional missiles on Dimona, Israel’s nuclear facility, would radioactivate a good part of Israel – and both Iran and Syria have such missiles. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, during Vice-President Dick Cheney’s visit in late March 2008, stated that “Iran’s weapons program threatens not only the stability of the region, but of the whole world,” and he did not rule out a war with it. By spring 2008 Israel was also very concerned about the growing ascendancy of Hizbollah in Lebanon and its greatly increased firepower – mainly in the form of rockets capable of striking much of Israel. It regards Hizbollah as a tool of Iran, and its focus on Iran concerns its control over Hizbollah as well as its ability to challenge Israel’s nuclear monopoly. But there can be no doubt that Hizbollah’s strength has only grown since Israel attacked it in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Israel now has an enemy that can inflict immense damage on it, probably resulting in highly skilled Jews migrating far faster than they already are at present – even now, more Jews are leaving Israel than migrating to it.
The existence of Israel is scarcely the only reason American policy in the region is as bad as it is. After all, it did not take Zionism to encourage Washington to seek the elimination of British influence in the region, and today no one can tell how long the US will remain mired in the affairs of the Middle East. But Israel is now a vital factor. While the extent of its role can be debated, without it the politics of the entire Middle East would be different – troubled but very different.
At least equally nefarious in the long run, Israel’s existence has radicalized – but in a negative sense – the Arab world, distracting it from natural class differences that often overcome religious and tribal ties. It has fanned Arab nationalism abysmally and given it a transcendent negative identity.
I am very realistic – and pessimistic – about an eventual negotiated solution to the crisis that has surrounded Palestine and Israel. Given the magnitude of the changes needed, the present situation justifies the most dismal conclusions. After all, the Arabs that live under Israeli control will quite soon outnumber the Jewish population, leaving a de facto Jewish state in which Jews are a minority! This fact is becoming deeply troublesome within Israeli politics today, causing former expansionists to reverse their position and leading to more and more internal controversy. Nor will there ever be an administration in Washington ready to do diplomatically what none has ever dared do since 1947, namely compel Israel to make an equitable peace with the Arabs.
Neither a one- nor two-state solution will come to pass. But the Jewish population is very likely to decline, and if it falls sufficiently then demography may prove to be a crucial factor. The ratio of Jews to Arabs would then become highly significant. The Jews in Israel are highly skilled and many have gotten out, migrating abroad. The Israeli military is the most powerful in the region because it has been deluged with American equipment, which it has learned to service. But US forces need repairmen to service the very same equipment, more than ever because recruitment into the American military is now lower than it has been in a quarter-century (not to mention its astronomical suicide rate), and skilled Israelis can take jobs with America’s armed forces that they are eminently qualified to fill. Moreover, Iran and the other Arab states will eventually develop or acquire nuclear weapons, making Israel incredibly insecure for its highly mobile Jewish population – one exhausted by regular service in compulsory reserves. And as already suggested, destroying Dimona with conventional missiles or mortars would be a cheap way to radioactivate a good part of Israel. Even worse, Osama bin Laden, or someone like him, may acquire a nuclear device, and one nuclear bomb detonated in or near Israel will effectively destroy what is a tiny area. Whoever destroys Israel will be proclaimed a hero in the Arab world. To those with skills, the answer is clear: get out. And getting out they are.
There are also Orthodox Jews in Israel but Israeli mass culture is now virtually indistinguishable from consumerism anywhere – in many crucial respects, there is more Judaism in parts of Brooklyn or Toronto than in most of Israel. The Orthodox too may be ready to leave behind the insecurity and troubles confronting those who live in a nation that is, after all, a part of a highly unstable region.
Sober and quite rational Israelis exist, of course, and I cite them often enough, but American policy will be determined by factors having nothing to do with them. Unfortunately, rational Israelis are an all too small minority.
Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War? and The Age of War: the US Confronts the World and After Socialism. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is World in Crisis, from which this essay has been excerpted.
http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko08252009.html
By GABRIEL KOLKO
In late 1949 I worked on a boat taking Jews from Marseilles to Haifa, Israel. Jews from Arab nations were in the front of the boat, Europeans in the rear. I was regarded by many of the Europeans as some sort of freak because I had a United States passport and so could stay in the land of milk and honey. One man wanted me to marry his daughter – which meant he too could live in the land of milk and honey. My Hebrew became quite respectable but the experience was radicalizing or, I should say, kept me radical, and I have stayed that way.
Later I learned from someone who ran a displaced persons camp in Germany that the large majority of Jews wanted to go anywhere but Palestine. They were compelled to state Palestine or else risk receiving no aid. I understood very early that there was much amiss in the countless Arab villages and homes I saw destroyed, and that the entire Zionist project – regardless of the often venal nature of the Arab opposition to it – was a dangerous sham.
The result of the creation of a state called Israel was abysmal. Jews from Poland have nothing in common with Germans and neither has anything to do with those from the Arab world. It is nationality, not religion, that counts most. Jews in Israel, especially the Germans, largely ghettoized themselves by their place of origin during the first generation, when a militarized culture produced the mixed new breed called sabras – an essentially anti-intellectual personality far different from the one the early Zionists, who were mostly socialists who preached the nobility of labor, expected to emerge. The large majority of Israelis are not in the least Jewish in the cultural sense, are scarcely socialist in any sense, and daily life and the way people live is no different in Israel than it is in Chicago or Amsterdam. There is simply no rational reason that justifies the state’s creation.
The outcome is a small state with a military ethos that pervades all aspects of Israel’s culture, its politics and, above all, its response to the existence of Arabs in its midst and at its borders. From its inception, the ideology of the early Zionists – of Labor Zionism as well as the rightist Revisionism that Vladimir Jabotinsky produced – embodied a commitment to violence, erroneously called self-defense, and a virtual hysteria. As a transcendent idea, Zionism has no validity because the national differences between Jews are overwhelming.
What Zionism confirmed, if any confirmation were needed, is that accidents are more important in shaping history than is all too often allowed. Here was the intellectual caf̩, which existed in key cities РVienna at the turn of the twentieth century or the Lower East Side of New York before World War I Рfilled with immensely creative people full of ideas and longing for a golden era to come. Ideas Рgood, bad, and indifferent Рflourished. In this heady atmosphere, Zionism was born.
But Zionism has produced a Sparta that traumatized an already artificially divided region partitioned after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during World War I led to the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the modern Middle East. The state of Israel has always relied on military solutions to political and sociological problems with the Arabs. The result is constant mobilization.
Even more troublesome for peace and stability in the vast Middle East, Zionism has always been symbiotic on some great power for the security of its national project, realized in a state called Israel. Before 1939 it was the British; during the 1950s it was France. Israel has survived since the late 1960s on the influx of US arms and money, and this has allowed it to encourage its fears of annihilation – a fate its possession of nuclear weapons makes most unlikely. But Israel also has an importance far beyond the fantasies of a few confused literati. Today its significance for American foreign policy is far greater because the Soviet Union no longer exists and the Middle East provokes the fear so essential to mobilizing Congress and the US public. “The best hopes and the worst fears of the planet are invested in that relatively small patch of earth” – as George Tenet, the former head of the CIA, put it in his memoir – and so understanding how and why that patch came into being, and the grave limits of the martial course it is following, has a very great, even transcendent value.
In July 2003 Foreign Minister Shalom predicted that Iran would have nuclear bomb capability by 2006. It did not have nuclear weapons in 2006, though in fact a successful strike by conventional missiles on Dimona, Israel’s nuclear facility, would radioactivate a good part of Israel – and both Iran and Syria have such missiles. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, during Vice-President Dick Cheney’s visit in late March 2008, stated that “Iran’s weapons program threatens not only the stability of the region, but of the whole world,” and he did not rule out a war with it. By spring 2008 Israel was also very concerned about the growing ascendancy of Hizbollah in Lebanon and its greatly increased firepower – mainly in the form of rockets capable of striking much of Israel. It regards Hizbollah as a tool of Iran, and its focus on Iran concerns its control over Hizbollah as well as its ability to challenge Israel’s nuclear monopoly. But there can be no doubt that Hizbollah’s strength has only grown since Israel attacked it in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. Israel now has an enemy that can inflict immense damage on it, probably resulting in highly skilled Jews migrating far faster than they already are at present – even now, more Jews are leaving Israel than migrating to it.
The existence of Israel is scarcely the only reason American policy in the region is as bad as it is. After all, it did not take Zionism to encourage Washington to seek the elimination of British influence in the region, and today no one can tell how long the US will remain mired in the affairs of the Middle East. But Israel is now a vital factor. While the extent of its role can be debated, without it the politics of the entire Middle East would be different – troubled but very different.
At least equally nefarious in the long run, Israel’s existence has radicalized – but in a negative sense – the Arab world, distracting it from natural class differences that often overcome religious and tribal ties. It has fanned Arab nationalism abysmally and given it a transcendent negative identity.
I am very realistic – and pessimistic – about an eventual negotiated solution to the crisis that has surrounded Palestine and Israel. Given the magnitude of the changes needed, the present situation justifies the most dismal conclusions. After all, the Arabs that live under Israeli control will quite soon outnumber the Jewish population, leaving a de facto Jewish state in which Jews are a minority! This fact is becoming deeply troublesome within Israeli politics today, causing former expansionists to reverse their position and leading to more and more internal controversy. Nor will there ever be an administration in Washington ready to do diplomatically what none has ever dared do since 1947, namely compel Israel to make an equitable peace with the Arabs.
Neither a one- nor two-state solution will come to pass. But the Jewish population is very likely to decline, and if it falls sufficiently then demography may prove to be a crucial factor. The ratio of Jews to Arabs would then become highly significant. The Jews in Israel are highly skilled and many have gotten out, migrating abroad. The Israeli military is the most powerful in the region because it has been deluged with American equipment, which it has learned to service. But US forces need repairmen to service the very same equipment, more than ever because recruitment into the American military is now lower than it has been in a quarter-century (not to mention its astronomical suicide rate), and skilled Israelis can take jobs with America’s armed forces that they are eminently qualified to fill. Moreover, Iran and the other Arab states will eventually develop or acquire nuclear weapons, making Israel incredibly insecure for its highly mobile Jewish population – one exhausted by regular service in compulsory reserves. And as already suggested, destroying Dimona with conventional missiles or mortars would be a cheap way to radioactivate a good part of Israel. Even worse, Osama bin Laden, or someone like him, may acquire a nuclear device, and one nuclear bomb detonated in or near Israel will effectively destroy what is a tiny area. Whoever destroys Israel will be proclaimed a hero in the Arab world. To those with skills, the answer is clear: get out. And getting out they are.
There are also Orthodox Jews in Israel but Israeli mass culture is now virtually indistinguishable from consumerism anywhere – in many crucial respects, there is more Judaism in parts of Brooklyn or Toronto than in most of Israel. The Orthodox too may be ready to leave behind the insecurity and troubles confronting those who live in a nation that is, after all, a part of a highly unstable region.
Sober and quite rational Israelis exist, of course, and I cite them often enough, but American policy will be determined by factors having nothing to do with them. Unfortunately, rational Israelis are an all too small minority.
Gabriel Kolko is the leading historian of modern warfare. He is the author of the classic Century of War: Politics, Conflicts and Society Since 1914, Another Century of War? and The Age of War: the US Confronts the World and After Socialism. He has also written the best history of the Vietnam War, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the US and the Modern Historical Experience. His latest book is World in Crisis, from which this essay has been excerpted.
http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko08252009.html
US agonizes over Taiwan arms sales
US agonizes over Taiwan arms sales
United States lawmakers are pushing the Barack Obama administration to sell more advanced weapons to Taiwan. But the US's expanding ties with Beijing hang a question mark over such a move. Further, China's military has modernized so rapidly that new arms are unlikely to redress the imbalance across the strait. - Micah Springut (Aug 24, '09)
United States lawmakers are pushing the Barack Obama administration to sell more advanced weapons to Taiwan. But the US's expanding ties with Beijing hang a question mark over such a move. Further, China's military has modernized so rapidly that new arms are unlikely to redress the imbalance across the strait. - Micah Springut (Aug 24, '09)
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