CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
7/28/09
In Israel, no settlement deal for US envoy – just more settlers
During Mitchell's visit, activists set up 11 outposts. A report said the number of Israelis living in the West Bank has surpassed 300,000.
Ilene R. Prusher
JERUSALEM -- US Mideast envoy George Mitchell wrapped up three days of talks here on Tuesday, heralding "good progress" in his meetings with Israeli officials. But he made no mention of a much anticipated agreement on the most visible point of contention in recent weeks and a key issue for Arabs: freezing settlement construction in the West Bank.
One of the main goals of Mr. Mitchell's visit, part of a regional trip that includes stops in Arab Gulf states later this week, had been to get Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to stop the expansion of settlements – a move President Obama sees as a jumping-off point to getting Israeli and Palestinian leaders to agree on a two-state solution. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has said that he will not return to talks with Israel unless such a freeze is instituted.
Figures released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) this week indicate that settlements grew at a rate of 2.3 percent for the first half of this year, pushing the total number of Israelis living in West Bank settlements above 300,000 for the first time.
The Israeli media have been abuzz with reports that the IDF is preparing to implement a government order to evacuate 23 illegal settlement outposts to fulfill a long-standing promise to Washington.
But in the midst of Mitchell's three-day visit, right-wing activists set up 11 new outposts in defiance of Netanyahu's engagement with the Obama administration on the settlement issue.
NETANYAHU: 'WE ARE OPENING THE ROADS TO PEACE'
Netanyahu and Mitchell had their final meeting at the Allenby Crossing between the West Bank and Jordan, where Netanyahu touted having extended the hours per day that the passage is open as a sign of his easing restrictions on Palestinians. In recent weeks, Israel has removed dozens of army road blocks and has eased up on checkpoints around the West Bank in a goodwill gesture meant to help create an atmosphere for peace talks.
"We're continuing our efforts to make life easier for the Palestinians," Netanyahu said, "and this is part of the policy to work in parallel – top-down politically, bottom-up economically."
He agreed to open Allenby until midnight for the next two months, after which the demand will be reevaluated with an eye towards having the key passage point open 24 hours a day. Palestinians say the limited hours and long lines constrain economic growth and freedom of movement. "We are opening roadblocks, we are opening ties, we are opening the roads to peace," Netanyahu said.
OBAMA PAVED MITCHELL'S WAY WITH LETTERS TO ARAB LEADERS
Mitchell is now scheduled to continue his Middle East peacemaking mission in the Arab Gulf states, in sync with expectations that Obama administration officials are working to broker some kind of kick-off for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. In exchange for Israel showing it is serious about stopping settlement growth and reaching a two-state solution with the Palestinians, moderate Arab states that support the peace process would undertake steps toward "normalization" with Israel.
"President Obama's vision is of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, which includes peace between Israel and the Palestinians, between Syria and Israel, and between Israel and Lebanon, and also the full normalization between Israel and its neighbors in the region," Mitchell said in a press conference with Netanyahu on Tuesday. "That is our objective and it is that to which we have committed ourselves fully."
Mitchell's emphasis on normalization between Israel and its Arab neighbors comes amid US urging Arab states to do more to support the Arab Peace Initiative introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002. In short, it offers Israel peace and normalization of relations with a panoply of Arab states if it reaches a statehood deal with the Palestinians.
Keen to see progress, Obama has sent letters to several Arab leaders asking them to commit to steps toward Israel as well to live up to their economic pledges of support for the Palestinian Authority, according to several media outlets, including the BBC and Yediot Aharonoth, an Israeli newspaper.
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Wednesday, July 29, 2009
Odds Against Nuclear Disarmament
Odds Against Nuclear Disarmament
Charles Peña has some news you may not like
http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/
Charles Peña has some news you may not like
http://original.antiwar.com/pena/2009/07/28/nuclear-disarmament/
Tuesday, July 28, 2009
Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit A Conversation with Chas Freeman
SUSRIS
7/28/09
Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman
Pat Ryan
Editor's Note: In “Revisiting Obama's Riyadh Meeting,” on the Foreign Policy blog The Cable, Laura Rozen wrote on July 17 about the President's meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia early last month. From Obama's perspective the visit, according to sources cited by The Cable, did not “go well” in “persuading the King to be ready to show reciprocal gestures to Israel, which Washington has been pushing to halt settlements..” and that special assistant Dennis Ross said Obama was “upset [about the meeting] because he got nothing out of it..
Administration officials, Rozen wrote, “pushed back hard” on the allegations “disputing every aspect of the accounts.” She also talked with former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman who offered that he was not surprised there may have been different expectations for the meeting, but that he “spoke to the king's advisors on the topic not long after the meeting, and they thought it went extremely well."
Meanwhile, The Cable reported on July 26, 2009 that President Obama recently sent letters to leaders of seven Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, “seeking confidence building measures toward Israel which Washington has been pushing to agree to a freeze of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.”
To provide additional context to The Cable reports on the Obama visit and “reciprocal gestures,” SUSRIS talked with Ambassador Freeman about the President's June 3, 2009 meeting with King Abdullah. In addition to the views he shared on U.S.-Saudi relations vis a vis the peace process he asserted that President Obama's Middle East diplomatic efforts were being deliberately undermined in Washington -- including among some in his Administration -- with the goal of reducing American pressure on Israel over settlements in the Occupied Territories.
Ambassador Freeman shared his insights in this SUSRIS exclusive interview by phone from his office in Washington on July 22, 2009.
Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman
SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time to share your perspective on relations between American and Saudi leaders, particularly on the subject of Middle East peace. As you know The Cable recently reported on President Obama's June meeting with King Abdullah that some sources characterized as a failure to win “reciprocal gestures” from Riyadh for Israeli. The President, according to the report, made the trip which was an add-on leg to previously planned overseas travel, with the hopes of persuading Saudi leaders to “take steps toward Israel.” What's that all about?
Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr.: Here's the issue. In order to be disillusioned you have to have illusions. There's a long history of Americans having illusions as to what Saudis and other Arabs might be prepared to do in different contexts.
There was, for example, the effort by Secretary of State Alexander Haig at the outset of the Reagan administration to persuade the Arabs, and Saudis in particular, that they should join in a grand coalition with Israel against the Soviet Union. Haig convinced himself that this was possible, and he was very disillusioned when it turned out, not to the surprise of anybody who actually knew the Arabs or the Saudis, that it was not.
More recently we have seen illusions about the Saudis and other Arabs in the form of the assertion that somehow there could be a grand coalition of so-called Sunni conservative powers and the Israelis against Iran in order to facilitate an Israeli strike on Iran. That, frankly, just doesn't have much credibility. Certainly there is concern on the part of the Saudis and other Arabs with Iran's political prestige but this does not translate into a willingness to associate with Israel and it certainly doesn't translate into a willingness to facilitate an Israeli military strike on a fellow Muslim country, even if it's not Arab and even if the Arabs have their differences with it.
The biggest point of delusion, if you will, on the American side is that somehow or other if Israel could be persuaded to stop doing the self-destructive things that it has been doing – among them settlement building -- that this should evoke an Arab, particularly a Saudi, gesture intended to make it worth Israel's while. This is simply not reasonable from the perspective of the Arabs.
The fact that we, on the American side, could come up with such a notion says a great deal about our misunderstanding of the region and the dysfunctional biases of the people we have managing Middle East policy.
SUSRIS: Can you talk more about the idea of confidence building measures being expected?
Freeman: That is the point I tried to make in the brief response I had to what Laura Rozen reported at The Cable. The Saudis and others feel that they have been repeatedly subjected to blandishments from well-wishers of Israel. Some were sincere efforts toward peace in the Middle East; some were disingenuous. People have said if the Arabs do something nice for Israel this will somehow get you something in terms of an Israeli gesture -- progress towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
In fact absolutely none of the gestures that have been made, including the very important one of the Arab League's Beirut Declaration of 2002 -- the so-called Arab Peace Initiative -- has resulted in any positive response from the Israelis. They have been content to pocket whatever has been offered and to do nothing in return.
There is no predisposition whatsoever -- in fact a lot of predisposition to the contrary -- on the Arab side to pay for what Israel, in its own interest, ought to do. Moreover, the matter at issue is much less than Israel pulling settlements out of the Occupied Territories. The United States is now simply asking Israel to stop their expansion. While that would be a very useful first step in getting back into a dialogue or process that could lead to peace, in itself it doesn't produce peace. It doesn't undo the damage that Israel has done to the prospects for peace by building settlements all over the place.
It's also quite apparent from Prime Minister Netanyahu's comments, for example about Jerusalem, that the current Israeli government, and probably the majority of Israelis as well, do not accept the premises that the United States is putting forward.
In the case of the Saudis and Arabs, they have offered what they believe is a very reasonable quid pro quo for peace in the form of a bonus to Israel for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. They believe that it is in Israel's interest to do so. The Arabs are not prepared to make down payments, to bargain or to haggle over the details of what the Israeli and Palestinian peace is going to look like. That is something that Israel must do with its captive Palestinians, not the Arabs at large. I don't expect this position to change.
The Saudis in particular and the Arabs in general have already put a very generous offer on the table in the form of the Beirut Declaration. It is an incentive, a major incentive in their view, for Israel to reach agreement with the Palestinians. The Arabs believe that Israel ought to want to reach such an agreement. Their reward to Israel for such a self-interested agreement would be the normalization of Israel's relations with all the Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. This is a major gesture for the Saudis to have made. They neither asked for nor have they received any quid pro quo for it.
Nobody in the region outside Israel wants more “peace process;” they want an actual peace. So I think it's a basic misreading of Arab sentiment and the Saudi position to presume that somehow there are trade-offs to be done in return for some sort of Israeli inching toward a return to a “peace process.” But the possibility of such a trade-off seems to be the basic assumption in the Administration's policy. If that was the assumption of the president's staff and they went to Riyadh only to discover that this assumption was emphatically not shared by the Saudis, and was in fact rejected, that entirely predictable outcome would account for the reported sense on the part of some that things didn't go well. It is not, of course, that the United States cannot or should not ask help from the Saudis on peace in the Holy Land, it is that such requests have to be realistic. They have to take account of Saudi views if they are to have any chance of success.
The Saudis, for their part, in saying that things did go well, seem to have been referring to the fact that they were impressed by the President's sincerity and seriousness of purpose on this issue. They appear to accept that this is a man who understands the issues and is trying to find a way to deal with them. However, until the United States persuades Israel to accept and begin implementing the framework of peace -- the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the “road map” and other agreements which call for Israel's acceptance -- until that moment I don't think there's any prospect of a quid pro quo from the Arabs.
So you have a difference of opinion. The American side is thinking that any gesture by Israel, of any kind, should be paid for with some gesture from the Arabs. You have the Arabs saying no, we've made it clear that we're not paying anything until something concrete happens.
SUSRIS: How do you account for the variance between what the Administration thought it could achieve in Riyadh – if one were to accept the premise of “The Cable” report – and what the sentiment was in the Kingdom toward a reciprocal gesture.
Freeman: There are two broad issues. First, there's the question that many people have asked, "Can the same old people produce a new policy?" What you have is an amazing amount of continuity on this issue from one Administration to another in terms of people who are dealing with it. Dennis Ross has emerged as a symbol of this for all concerned.
Second there is frankly an issue of objectivity and effectiveness. Can a group of people, virtually all of whom have close personal ties to Israel and much empathy for the Israeli point of view but no such experience, ties, or feeling for the Arab world, can they accurately predict or gauge the political requirements of the Arab sides to this dispute as they do for the Israeli side? The evidence over the past twenty years is no, they cannot. That is to my mind part of the reason for the failure of the second Camp David process. The Bush Administration didn't even try until the very end and then it did so in a way that was almost farcically unrealistic.
We now seem to have another American diplomatic effort essentially focused on Israeli politics, and helping the Israelis make decisions that they ought to be able to make on their own, if they are really interested in achieving acceptance in the region. Acceptance is, of course, the issue. The State of Israel cannot presume that people in the region will accept or endorse its right to exist until they see that its existence is compatible with the cause of justice and consistent with their own interests.
Israel has certainly not recently been prepared to do anything to end that lack of acceptance by its neighbors. But Israel absolutely requires such acceptance to guarantee its existence as a state in the Middle East over the long term. So this is a major problem. It is pretty clear that the present government of Israel believes it doesn't need political acceptance from its Arab neighbors because it has the drop on them -- military superiority -- and a continuing blank check from the United States. So, in its view, it doesn't really have to compromise on the issue of a Palestinian state.
I would say the Netanyahu government has not just zero credibility on this in the region and more broadly in the international community, but it has actually less than zero credibility. That's because almost everybody believes it is acting insincerely and in a deceptive fashion. So in this context to ask the Arabs to do something for Israel just seems quite unrealistic.
SUSRIS: What role can the Saudis and other Arab leaders play to make progress?
Freeman: It isn't a quid pro quo for minor gestures by Israel. The real question is this. Are there measures that the Arabs can take that would be helpful in terms of rebuilding some capacity on the Palestinian side? The Palestinians are disunited. There is no longer an effective Palestinian national movement. Part of Palestine, Gaza, is ruled by an electorally endorsed movement which has, however, been rejected as an interlocutor by Israel. The other part of Palestine, the West Bank, is ruled by people with little or no credible political support, who lost an election, and who are increasingly seen as collaborators in the Israeli occupation.
The terms under which Israel seems to be willing to deal with the Arabs over whom it rules resemble those of a jailer dealing with prisoners more than they do a respectful dialogue between equal parties. This is a very bad context in which to ask others to come forward and do things helpful to Israel.
The question then is, what can one do to strengthen the hand of the prisoners -- to follow that analogy -- to give them both a reason to bargain more effectively and sincerely and to keep whatever bargains they strike with their jailer? And that is something that the Arabs might be asked to address to promote the prospect of peace.
In fact the Arabs, including Saudi Arabia, are afraid of Hamas -- don't like it -- and they are not impressed by Fatah and are not convinced that there is now anyone with the ability to make a deal on behalf of Palestinians that they would seriously keep. If the Arabs really want peace, they will have to address these issues, not leave them to Israel or the United States.
I come back to the thought that if you're going to persuade people to do things you want them to do, as we know and as we in fact do when we are dealing with the Israelis, you have to understand their hopes and fears and their attitudes and beliefs and convictions. And you have to craft something that deals with those political realities. We don't seem to be capable of doing that with the Arab side. That's reflected, as I said, in the fact that almost no one involved with this really has a strong set of ties to the Arabs or any empathy for their position.
The Obama Administration so far hasn't changed that.
SUSRIS: Among the points made in The Cable report we've been discussing was an observation of David Markovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He called Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's major address on U.S. foreign policythis month a recalibration of the Administration's approach and that Obama has expectations on both sides. What do you make of this position, as assessed by WINEP's Markovsky, that was put forward subsequent to Obama's hopes of a quid pro quo reportedly being rebuffed in Riyadh?
Freeman: I don't know whether the King had a tirade or not, as was stated by a source in The Cable piece, but I think the Arab perception is that interaction between the sides in the Holy Land resembles a dialogue between a jail keeper and his inmates; it's very one sided, and rather arbitrary and capricious on the Israeli side. On the Palestinian side it's not unified or authoritative. If that's the perception then it's hardly surprising that a proposal that the Arabs should reciprocate some slight correction of misbehavior on the part of the jail keeper with a gesture of their own would draw an angry response.
SUSRIS: We talked with Georgetown Professor Jean-Francois Seznec before Obama's June visit to Riyadh about the relationship between President and King. They had previously met at the G-20 meeting in April. He thought they showed good chemistry, that they have a similar philosophy in dealing with people – inclusiveness – and an understanding of other cultures and religions, that they have mutual respect. What are your impressions of the relationship between President Obama and King Abdullah?
Freeman: Well, I think it's actually pretty good for the reasons you state.
Let me add something more about the reporting on the Riyadh meeting. Let's not forget that this kind of story should be suspected to have a political motivation. It's clearly in the interest of the supporters of the Netanyahu government, or the attitude that it embodies, to demonstrate that it's not worth working with the Saudis. It's misguided and possibly injurious to do so, in their view. So why bother?
That's accompanied by the broader notion that there's no reason to pay attention to Arab opinion because the Arabs are unhelpful or they have a bad attitude or whatever. So it seems to me very likely that all of this was a story line contrived for effect and that it was intended precisely to undermine the Administration's effort to persuade Israel to address the issue of, the first step, of settlement expansion. What The Cable reported was in fact another aspect of the effort that was reflected in Ehud Olmert's op-ed in the Washington Post – “stop bothering us with this issue.” [“How to Achieve a Lasting Peace - Stop Focusing on the Settlements”]
The issue is pretty central because if you accept the position of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who insists that Jerusalem is not on the table and that there's no reason not to expand settlements elsewhere, then you clearly have nowhere to go in your diplomacy.
So I think this was part of a concerted effort to discredit the Obama diplomacy and I think it's coming from people in his own Administration as well as from people associated with AIPAC, like WINEP.
I was really struck by something in “The Cable” posting. I had responded that it wasn't surprising the Saudis -- given that they had made an offer in the form of a bonus -- were not prepared to haggle over the terms of the bonus when, in their view, there had been no step whatsoever to create the conditions in which the bonus would have to be awarded. An anonymous source was quoted as responding to this point by saying that we certainly don't need to accept the Saudi position on that, we should just keep haggling. Of course we don't have to accept the Saudi position but we cannot simply ignore it in formulating our own. It appears that we have a set of presumptions on which we are going to act regardless of whether they are realistic. That is, not surprisingly, a formula for accomplishing nothing.
The same people who dismiss the relevance of the Saudi position argue, in the case of Israel, that we have to start with Israeli positions and work backwards. There's something to that but we don't start with the Arab position and work backwards. This reflects the problem I was talking about, that is the lack of empathy, of real expertise on the Arab world or Saudi Arabia in particular, in official Washington. It reflects the essential one-sidedness of U.S. policy.
I don't think the President is one-sided. At Cairo he expressed a balanced view and made it clear that he would like to do something that is really good for both Israel and the Arabs. I just don't think he's getting a lot of effective support for the tactics of dealing with the Arabs from his own subordinates.
SUSRIS: Any last thoughts on these issues.
Freeman: What I found of interest in The Cable piece was not so much the views that it reported, which I think, indeed, are held. It was the glimpse it gave of the more general effort to discredit Obama's diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and to cause the administration to end the pressure it has begun to put on Israel to address the longstanding issue of the settlements.
So I think the complaints about Saudi Arabia are part of a wider campaign and need to be seen in that context. To my mind, this is not really a bilateral issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
7/28/09
Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman
Pat Ryan
Editor's Note: In “Revisiting Obama's Riyadh Meeting,” on the Foreign Policy blog The Cable, Laura Rozen wrote on July 17 about the President's meeting with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia early last month. From Obama's perspective the visit, according to sources cited by The Cable, did not “go well” in “persuading the King to be ready to show reciprocal gestures to Israel, which Washington has been pushing to halt settlements..” and that special assistant Dennis Ross said Obama was “upset [about the meeting] because he got nothing out of it..
Administration officials, Rozen wrote, “pushed back hard” on the allegations “disputing every aspect of the accounts.” She also talked with former U.S. Ambassador Chas Freeman who offered that he was not surprised there may have been different expectations for the meeting, but that he “spoke to the king's advisors on the topic not long after the meeting, and they thought it went extremely well."
Meanwhile, The Cable reported on July 26, 2009 that President Obama recently sent letters to leaders of seven Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, “seeking confidence building measures toward Israel which Washington has been pushing to agree to a freeze of Jewish settlements in the West Bank.”
To provide additional context to The Cable reports on the Obama visit and “reciprocal gestures,” SUSRIS talked with Ambassador Freeman about the President's June 3, 2009 meeting with King Abdullah. In addition to the views he shared on U.S.-Saudi relations vis a vis the peace process he asserted that President Obama's Middle East diplomatic efforts were being deliberately undermined in Washington -- including among some in his Administration -- with the goal of reducing American pressure on Israel over settlements in the Occupied Territories.
Ambassador Freeman shared his insights in this SUSRIS exclusive interview by phone from his office in Washington on July 22, 2009.
Gestures and Illusions: Assessing Obama's Riyadh Visit
A Conversation with Chas Freeman
SUSRIS: Thank you for taking time to share your perspective on relations between American and Saudi leaders, particularly on the subject of Middle East peace. As you know The Cable recently reported on President Obama's June meeting with King Abdullah that some sources characterized as a failure to win “reciprocal gestures” from Riyadh for Israeli. The President, according to the report, made the trip which was an add-on leg to previously planned overseas travel, with the hopes of persuading Saudi leaders to “take steps toward Israel.” What's that all about?
Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr.: Here's the issue. In order to be disillusioned you have to have illusions. There's a long history of Americans having illusions as to what Saudis and other Arabs might be prepared to do in different contexts.
There was, for example, the effort by Secretary of State Alexander Haig at the outset of the Reagan administration to persuade the Arabs, and Saudis in particular, that they should join in a grand coalition with Israel against the Soviet Union. Haig convinced himself that this was possible, and he was very disillusioned when it turned out, not to the surprise of anybody who actually knew the Arabs or the Saudis, that it was not.
More recently we have seen illusions about the Saudis and other Arabs in the form of the assertion that somehow there could be a grand coalition of so-called Sunni conservative powers and the Israelis against Iran in order to facilitate an Israeli strike on Iran. That, frankly, just doesn't have much credibility. Certainly there is concern on the part of the Saudis and other Arabs with Iran's political prestige but this does not translate into a willingness to associate with Israel and it certainly doesn't translate into a willingness to facilitate an Israeli military strike on a fellow Muslim country, even if it's not Arab and even if the Arabs have their differences with it.
The biggest point of delusion, if you will, on the American side is that somehow or other if Israel could be persuaded to stop doing the self-destructive things that it has been doing – among them settlement building -- that this should evoke an Arab, particularly a Saudi, gesture intended to make it worth Israel's while. This is simply not reasonable from the perspective of the Arabs.
The fact that we, on the American side, could come up with such a notion says a great deal about our misunderstanding of the region and the dysfunctional biases of the people we have managing Middle East policy.
SUSRIS: Can you talk more about the idea of confidence building measures being expected?
Freeman: That is the point I tried to make in the brief response I had to what Laura Rozen reported at The Cable. The Saudis and others feel that they have been repeatedly subjected to blandishments from well-wishers of Israel. Some were sincere efforts toward peace in the Middle East; some were disingenuous. People have said if the Arabs do something nice for Israel this will somehow get you something in terms of an Israeli gesture -- progress towards peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
In fact absolutely none of the gestures that have been made, including the very important one of the Arab League's Beirut Declaration of 2002 -- the so-called Arab Peace Initiative -- has resulted in any positive response from the Israelis. They have been content to pocket whatever has been offered and to do nothing in return.
There is no predisposition whatsoever -- in fact a lot of predisposition to the contrary -- on the Arab side to pay for what Israel, in its own interest, ought to do. Moreover, the matter at issue is much less than Israel pulling settlements out of the Occupied Territories. The United States is now simply asking Israel to stop their expansion. While that would be a very useful first step in getting back into a dialogue or process that could lead to peace, in itself it doesn't produce peace. It doesn't undo the damage that Israel has done to the prospects for peace by building settlements all over the place.
It's also quite apparent from Prime Minister Netanyahu's comments, for example about Jerusalem, that the current Israeli government, and probably the majority of Israelis as well, do not accept the premises that the United States is putting forward.
In the case of the Saudis and Arabs, they have offered what they believe is a very reasonable quid pro quo for peace in the form of a bonus to Israel for reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. They believe that it is in Israel's interest to do so. The Arabs are not prepared to make down payments, to bargain or to haggle over the details of what the Israeli and Palestinian peace is going to look like. That is something that Israel must do with its captive Palestinians, not the Arabs at large. I don't expect this position to change.
The Saudis in particular and the Arabs in general have already put a very generous offer on the table in the form of the Beirut Declaration. It is an incentive, a major incentive in their view, for Israel to reach agreement with the Palestinians. The Arabs believe that Israel ought to want to reach such an agreement. Their reward to Israel for such a self-interested agreement would be the normalization of Israel's relations with all the Arab countries including Saudi Arabia. This is a major gesture for the Saudis to have made. They neither asked for nor have they received any quid pro quo for it.
Nobody in the region outside Israel wants more “peace process;” they want an actual peace. So I think it's a basic misreading of Arab sentiment and the Saudi position to presume that somehow there are trade-offs to be done in return for some sort of Israeli inching toward a return to a “peace process.” But the possibility of such a trade-off seems to be the basic assumption in the Administration's policy. If that was the assumption of the president's staff and they went to Riyadh only to discover that this assumption was emphatically not shared by the Saudis, and was in fact rejected, that entirely predictable outcome would account for the reported sense on the part of some that things didn't go well. It is not, of course, that the United States cannot or should not ask help from the Saudis on peace in the Holy Land, it is that such requests have to be realistic. They have to take account of Saudi views if they are to have any chance of success.
The Saudis, for their part, in saying that things did go well, seem to have been referring to the fact that they were impressed by the President's sincerity and seriousness of purpose on this issue. They appear to accept that this is a man who understands the issues and is trying to find a way to deal with them. However, until the United States persuades Israel to accept and begin implementing the framework of peace -- the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, the “road map” and other agreements which call for Israel's acceptance -- until that moment I don't think there's any prospect of a quid pro quo from the Arabs.
So you have a difference of opinion. The American side is thinking that any gesture by Israel, of any kind, should be paid for with some gesture from the Arabs. You have the Arabs saying no, we've made it clear that we're not paying anything until something concrete happens.
SUSRIS: How do you account for the variance between what the Administration thought it could achieve in Riyadh – if one were to accept the premise of “The Cable” report – and what the sentiment was in the Kingdom toward a reciprocal gesture.
Freeman: There are two broad issues. First, there's the question that many people have asked, "Can the same old people produce a new policy?" What you have is an amazing amount of continuity on this issue from one Administration to another in terms of people who are dealing with it. Dennis Ross has emerged as a symbol of this for all concerned.
Second there is frankly an issue of objectivity and effectiveness. Can a group of people, virtually all of whom have close personal ties to Israel and much empathy for the Israeli point of view but no such experience, ties, or feeling for the Arab world, can they accurately predict or gauge the political requirements of the Arab sides to this dispute as they do for the Israeli side? The evidence over the past twenty years is no, they cannot. That is to my mind part of the reason for the failure of the second Camp David process. The Bush Administration didn't even try until the very end and then it did so in a way that was almost farcically unrealistic.
We now seem to have another American diplomatic effort essentially focused on Israeli politics, and helping the Israelis make decisions that they ought to be able to make on their own, if they are really interested in achieving acceptance in the region. Acceptance is, of course, the issue. The State of Israel cannot presume that people in the region will accept or endorse its right to exist until they see that its existence is compatible with the cause of justice and consistent with their own interests.
Israel has certainly not recently been prepared to do anything to end that lack of acceptance by its neighbors. But Israel absolutely requires such acceptance to guarantee its existence as a state in the Middle East over the long term. So this is a major problem. It is pretty clear that the present government of Israel believes it doesn't need political acceptance from its Arab neighbors because it has the drop on them -- military superiority -- and a continuing blank check from the United States. So, in its view, it doesn't really have to compromise on the issue of a Palestinian state.
I would say the Netanyahu government has not just zero credibility on this in the region and more broadly in the international community, but it has actually less than zero credibility. That's because almost everybody believes it is acting insincerely and in a deceptive fashion. So in this context to ask the Arabs to do something for Israel just seems quite unrealistic.
SUSRIS: What role can the Saudis and other Arab leaders play to make progress?
Freeman: It isn't a quid pro quo for minor gestures by Israel. The real question is this. Are there measures that the Arabs can take that would be helpful in terms of rebuilding some capacity on the Palestinian side? The Palestinians are disunited. There is no longer an effective Palestinian national movement. Part of Palestine, Gaza, is ruled by an electorally endorsed movement which has, however, been rejected as an interlocutor by Israel. The other part of Palestine, the West Bank, is ruled by people with little or no credible political support, who lost an election, and who are increasingly seen as collaborators in the Israeli occupation.
The terms under which Israel seems to be willing to deal with the Arabs over whom it rules resemble those of a jailer dealing with prisoners more than they do a respectful dialogue between equal parties. This is a very bad context in which to ask others to come forward and do things helpful to Israel.
The question then is, what can one do to strengthen the hand of the prisoners -- to follow that analogy -- to give them both a reason to bargain more effectively and sincerely and to keep whatever bargains they strike with their jailer? And that is something that the Arabs might be asked to address to promote the prospect of peace.
In fact the Arabs, including Saudi Arabia, are afraid of Hamas -- don't like it -- and they are not impressed by Fatah and are not convinced that there is now anyone with the ability to make a deal on behalf of Palestinians that they would seriously keep. If the Arabs really want peace, they will have to address these issues, not leave them to Israel or the United States.
I come back to the thought that if you're going to persuade people to do things you want them to do, as we know and as we in fact do when we are dealing with the Israelis, you have to understand their hopes and fears and their attitudes and beliefs and convictions. And you have to craft something that deals with those political realities. We don't seem to be capable of doing that with the Arab side. That's reflected, as I said, in the fact that almost no one involved with this really has a strong set of ties to the Arabs or any empathy for their position.
The Obama Administration so far hasn't changed that.
SUSRIS: Among the points made in The Cable report we've been discussing was an observation of David Markovsky, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He called Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's major address on U.S. foreign policythis month a recalibration of the Administration's approach and that Obama has expectations on both sides. What do you make of this position, as assessed by WINEP's Markovsky, that was put forward subsequent to Obama's hopes of a quid pro quo reportedly being rebuffed in Riyadh?
Freeman: I don't know whether the King had a tirade or not, as was stated by a source in The Cable piece, but I think the Arab perception is that interaction between the sides in the Holy Land resembles a dialogue between a jail keeper and his inmates; it's very one sided, and rather arbitrary and capricious on the Israeli side. On the Palestinian side it's not unified or authoritative. If that's the perception then it's hardly surprising that a proposal that the Arabs should reciprocate some slight correction of misbehavior on the part of the jail keeper with a gesture of their own would draw an angry response.
SUSRIS: We talked with Georgetown Professor Jean-Francois Seznec before Obama's June visit to Riyadh about the relationship between President and King. They had previously met at the G-20 meeting in April. He thought they showed good chemistry, that they have a similar philosophy in dealing with people – inclusiveness – and an understanding of other cultures and religions, that they have mutual respect. What are your impressions of the relationship between President Obama and King Abdullah?
Freeman: Well, I think it's actually pretty good for the reasons you state.
Let me add something more about the reporting on the Riyadh meeting. Let's not forget that this kind of story should be suspected to have a political motivation. It's clearly in the interest of the supporters of the Netanyahu government, or the attitude that it embodies, to demonstrate that it's not worth working with the Saudis. It's misguided and possibly injurious to do so, in their view. So why bother?
That's accompanied by the broader notion that there's no reason to pay attention to Arab opinion because the Arabs are unhelpful or they have a bad attitude or whatever. So it seems to me very likely that all of this was a story line contrived for effect and that it was intended precisely to undermine the Administration's effort to persuade Israel to address the issue of, the first step, of settlement expansion. What The Cable reported was in fact another aspect of the effort that was reflected in Ehud Olmert's op-ed in the Washington Post – “stop bothering us with this issue.” [“How to Achieve a Lasting Peace - Stop Focusing on the Settlements”]
The issue is pretty central because if you accept the position of Prime Minister Netanyahu, who insists that Jerusalem is not on the table and that there's no reason not to expand settlements elsewhere, then you clearly have nowhere to go in your diplomacy.
So I think this was part of a concerted effort to discredit the Obama diplomacy and I think it's coming from people in his own Administration as well as from people associated with AIPAC, like WINEP.
I was really struck by something in “The Cable” posting. I had responded that it wasn't surprising the Saudis -- given that they had made an offer in the form of a bonus -- were not prepared to haggle over the terms of the bonus when, in their view, there had been no step whatsoever to create the conditions in which the bonus would have to be awarded. An anonymous source was quoted as responding to this point by saying that we certainly don't need to accept the Saudi position on that, we should just keep haggling. Of course we don't have to accept the Saudi position but we cannot simply ignore it in formulating our own. It appears that we have a set of presumptions on which we are going to act regardless of whether they are realistic. That is, not surprisingly, a formula for accomplishing nothing.
The same people who dismiss the relevance of the Saudi position argue, in the case of Israel, that we have to start with Israeli positions and work backwards. There's something to that but we don't start with the Arab position and work backwards. This reflects the problem I was talking about, that is the lack of empathy, of real expertise on the Arab world or Saudi Arabia in particular, in official Washington. It reflects the essential one-sidedness of U.S. policy.
I don't think the President is one-sided. At Cairo he expressed a balanced view and made it clear that he would like to do something that is really good for both Israel and the Arabs. I just don't think he's getting a lot of effective support for the tactics of dealing with the Arabs from his own subordinates.
SUSRIS: Any last thoughts on these issues.
Freeman: What I found of interest in The Cable piece was not so much the views that it reported, which I think, indeed, are held. It was the glimpse it gave of the more general effort to discredit Obama's diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian issue and to cause the administration to end the pressure it has begun to put on Israel to address the longstanding issue of the settlements.
So I think the complaints about Saudi Arabia are part of a wider campaign and need to be seen in that context. To my mind, this is not really a bilateral issue between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home
There follows a memorandum from Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq
It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home
As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.
Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.
The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:
1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.
The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:
1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.
2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.
a) Corruption among officers is widespread
b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm
c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues
d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system
e) Laziness is endemic
f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm
g) Lack of initiative is legion
h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress
i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining
j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.
3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:
a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions
b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties
c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result
d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards
e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism
f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process
g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders
It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:
1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July
4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,
5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.
6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.
7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.
Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.
The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.
Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.
The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.
For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”
The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events – mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.
Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.
It’s Time for the US to Declare Victory and Go Home
As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed.
Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there.
The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:
1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.
The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are:
1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.
2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.
a) Corruption among officers is widespread
b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm
c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues
d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system
e) Laziness is endemic
f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm
g) Lack of initiative is legion
h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress
i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining
j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.
3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples:
a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions
b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties
c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result
d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards
e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism
f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process
g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders
It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:
1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA
3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July
4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,
5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.
6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.
7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.
Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond.
The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups.
Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq.
The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances.
For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable.”
The reality of Iraq in July 2009 has rendered the assumptions underlying the 2008 Security Agreement (SA) overcome by events – mostly good events actually. The SA outlines a series of gradual steps towards military withdrawal, analogous to a father teaching his kid to ride a bike without training wheels. If the GOI at the time the SA was signed thought it needed a long, gradual period of weaning. But the GOI now has left the nest (while continuing to breast feed as noted above). The strategic and tactical realities have changed far quicker than the provisions and timeline of the SA can accommodate. We now have an Iraqi government that has gained its balance and thinks it knows how to ride the bike in the race. And in fact they probably do know how to ride, at least well enough for the road they are on against their current competitors. Our hand on the back of the seat is holding them back and causing resentment. We need to let go before we both tumble to the ground.
Therefore, we should declare our intentions to withdraw all US military forces from Iraq by August 2010. This would not be a strategic paradigm shift, but an acceleration of existing US plans by some 15 months. We should end our combat operations now, save those for our own force protection, narrowly defined, as we withdraw. We should revise the force flow into Iraq accordingly. The emphasis should shift towards advising only and advising the ISF to prepare for our withdrawal. Advisors should probably be limited to Iraqi division level a higher. Our train and equip functions should begin the transition to Foreign Military Sales and related training programs. During the withdrawal period the USG and GOI should develop a new strategic framework agreement that would include some lasting military presence at 1-3 large training bases, airbases, or key headquarters locations. But it should not include the presence of any combat forces save those for force protection needs or the occasional exercise. These changes would not only align our actions with the reality of Iraq in 2009, it will remove the causes of increasing friction and reduce the cost of OIF in blood and treasure. Finally, it will set the conditions for a new relationship between the US and Iraq without the complications of the residual effects of the US invasion and occupation.
NKorean call for dialogue ‘fails to meet’ demands: US Agence France-Presse
NKorean call for dialogue ‘fails to meet’ demands: US
Agence France-Presse
North Korea's call Monday for a dialogue "fails to meet" demands it return to nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States and four other countries, a senior US official said Monday.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jvziVZoX7Lzz4ItSfYwsC_hVWysg
Agence France-Presse
North Korea's call Monday for a dialogue "fails to meet" demands it return to nuclear disarmament negotiations with the United States and four other countries, a senior US official said Monday.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jvziVZoX7Lzz4ItSfYwsC_hVWysg
Senate warns against concessions on nuclear treaty Jim Abrams, Associated Press
Senate warns against concessions on nuclear treaty Jim Abrams, Associated Press
The Senate is making it clear to the Obama administration that it will look askance at concessions, particularly on missile defense, that the United States might make to conclude a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iLxDjhE67P2IVhWnnDg9gLlTccawD99MM4T00
The Senate is making it clear to the Obama administration that it will look askance at concessions, particularly on missile defense, that the United States might make to conclude a new nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iLxDjhE67P2IVhWnnDg9gLlTccawD99MM4T00
McCain to consider support of nuclear test ban Desmond Butler, Associated Press
McCain to consider support of nuclear test ban
Desmond Butler, Associated Press
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, who helped vote down U.S. ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty ten years ago, said he would now consider supporting it.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hH4ImPwTL6SwKuYgCmKvIVyUZwRwD99L1TEO1
Desmond Butler, Associated Press
Republican Sen. John McCain of Arizona, who helped vote down U.S. ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty ten years ago, said he would now consider supporting it.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hH4ImPwTL6SwKuYgCmKvIVyUZwRwD99L1TEO1
India submarine 'threatens peace'
India submarine 'threatens peace'
BBC India's launch of a nuclear-powered submarine is a threat to regional peace and security, Pakistan has said. "Pakistan will take appropriate steps to safeguard its security without entering an arms race," foreign office spokesman Abdul Basit said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8171715.stm
BBC India's launch of a nuclear-powered submarine is a threat to regional peace and security, Pakistan has said. "Pakistan will take appropriate steps to safeguard its security without entering an arms race," foreign office spokesman Abdul Basit said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8171715.stm
Gates Says U.S. Overture To Iran Is ‘Not Open-Ended’ Elisabeth Bumiller, The New York Times
Gates Says U.S. Overture To Iran Is ‘Not Open-Ended’
Elisabeth Bumiller, The New York Times
Strains between the United States and Israel surfaced publicly in Jerusalem on Monday, as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tried to reassure Israelis that American overtures to Iran were not open-ended, and as Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel expressed impatience with the Americans for wanting to engage Iran at all.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/middleeast/28military.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper
Elisabeth Bumiller, The New York Times
Strains between the United States and Israel surfaced publicly in Jerusalem on Monday, as Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates tried to reassure Israelis that American overtures to Iran were not open-ended, and as Defense Minister Ehud Barak of Israel expressed impatience with the Americans for wanting to engage Iran at all.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/28/world/middleeast/28military.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper
U.S. nuclear warheads, 1945-2009 BY ROBERT S. NORRIS AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN
U.S. nuclear warheads, 1945-2009
BY ROBERT S. NORRIS AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN
Of 100 types of U.S. warheads developed since 1945, only 15 remain active. New warhead production ceased in 1992, but modified warheads continue to be introduced.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/213757w058n98374/?p=2f144bf6812d4757b51a0461916f45d1&pi=7
BY ROBERT S. NORRIS AND HANS M. KRISTENSEN
Of 100 types of U.S. warheads developed since 1945, only 15 remain active. New warhead production ceased in 1992, but modified warheads continue to be introduced.
http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/213757w058n98374/?p=2f144bf6812d4757b51a0461916f45d1&pi=7
Is North Korea's reprocessing facility operating? By Hui Zhang | 23 July 2009
Is North Korea's reprocessing facility operating?
BY HUI ZHANG
Just because air samples and satellite imagery haven't detected the telltale signs that Pyongyang is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel doesn't mean that it's not happening.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/north-koreas-reprocessing-facility-operating
BY HUI ZHANG
Just because air samples and satellite imagery haven't detected the telltale signs that Pyongyang is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel doesn't mean that it's not happening.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/north-koreas-reprocessing-facility-operating
Rebutting the standard arguments against disarmament BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND JAMES M. ACTON
Rebutting the standard arguments against disarmament
BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND JAMES M. ACTON
Opponents of a nuclear-weapon-free world tend to knock down the same old straw men. Here are five arguments nuclear abolitionists aren't making.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/rebutting-the-standard-arguments-against-disarmament
BY GEORGE PERKOVICH AND JAMES M. ACTON
Opponents of a nuclear-weapon-free world tend to knock down the same old straw men. Here are five arguments nuclear abolitionists aren't making.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/rebutting-the-standard-arguments-against-disarmament
KURT ZENZ HOUSE Putting the cost of going green in context
KURT ZENZ HOUSE
Putting the cost of going green in context
Plans to retool the country's energy infrastructure, from Al Gore to Google, are better understood when compared with the nation's past efforts to win World War II and build the Interstate Highway System.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kurt-zenz-house/putting-the-cost-of-going-green-context
Putting the cost of going green in context
Plans to retool the country's energy infrastructure, from Al Gore to Google, are better understood when compared with the nation's past efforts to win World War II and build the Interstate Highway System.
http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kurt-zenz-house/putting-the-cost-of-going-green-context
Monday, July 27, 2009
The Levy-Frum debate by Stephen Walt
FOREIGN POLICY – STEPHEN WALT
7/24/09
The Levy-Frum debate
Stephen Walt
The Economist magazine is performing a valuable public service this week, hosting an on-line debate between Daniel Levy of the New American Foundation and David Frum of the American Enterprise Institute. The motion they are debating is "This House Believes that Barack Obama's America is now an Honest Broker between Israel and the Arabs." Levy defends the motion; Frum opposes it. Consistent with their usual practice, the Economist also solicited outside commentary from a number of other experts -- Henry Siegman, John Mearsheimer, Aaron David Miller, and James Zogby -- who are adding their thoughts throughout the week.
The two opening statements and rebuttals by Levy and Frum are well-worth reading, as they nicely illuminate the divide over U.S. policy towards this issue. Defending the motion, Levy points out that the United States is still providing Israel with large amounts of material and diplomatic support, and takes the sensible view that the United States is a better friend to Israel when it uses its influence to get Israel to abandon policies (i.e., the settlements) that are harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike.
For his part, Frum claims that Obama is "tilted so far against Israel that even-handedness looks like up from down here." He claims the real threat is Iran, and chides Obama for placing too much weight on the Holocaust as a justification for Israel's existence and for ignoring the Jewish people's millennial claim to the land. Tellingly, Frum never says whether he thinks Israel's occupation is a bad thing or not, or whether he thinks a two-state solution would be desirable (though he seems to have his doubts). Indeed, Frum offers the bizarre claim that Israel's settlements "are the consequences of Palestinian and Arab intransigence, not the cause." He is in effect saying that Israel had no choice but to spend the past 41 years (two-thirds of its history) encouraging half of million people to colonize the lands seized in 1967, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. (If Frum wants to know how and why this really happened, he should read Zertal and Eldar's Lords of the Land, Gershom Gorenberg's Accidental Empire or former IDF general Shlomo Gazit's Trapped Fools).
The Levy-Frum debate really boils down to a simple question. On one side are those who believe that the continued attempt to hold onto "Greater Israel" poses the real existential threat to Israel's existence, because Jews will eventually be a minority in the lands they control and they will be forced to create a full-fledged apartheid state in order to preserve Israel’s Jewish character. Such fears are amplified by the growing influence of orthodox and ultra-Orthodox groups in Israel, by the signs that younger, more secular Israelis are living abroad in larger numbers, and by the overtly racist policies advocated by politicians like current Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. On the other side are those who either actively favor a "greater Israel" or who don't think the occupation poses a serious long-term problem. The former group wants the United States to use its power and influence to push both sides to a viable two-state solution before it is too late; the latter group wants the US to use its power and influence primarily against other states in the region and to maintain a "special relationship" that is defined as unconditional and uncritical support for just about anything Israel wants to do. The two groups see different threats, and therefore favor radically different American policies.
But don't take my word for it. Just read the exchange, and learn.
7/24/09
The Levy-Frum debate
Stephen Walt
The Economist magazine is performing a valuable public service this week, hosting an on-line debate between Daniel Levy of the New American Foundation and David Frum of the American Enterprise Institute. The motion they are debating is "This House Believes that Barack Obama's America is now an Honest Broker between Israel and the Arabs." Levy defends the motion; Frum opposes it. Consistent with their usual practice, the Economist also solicited outside commentary from a number of other experts -- Henry Siegman, John Mearsheimer, Aaron David Miller, and James Zogby -- who are adding their thoughts throughout the week.
The two opening statements and rebuttals by Levy and Frum are well-worth reading, as they nicely illuminate the divide over U.S. policy towards this issue. Defending the motion, Levy points out that the United States is still providing Israel with large amounts of material and diplomatic support, and takes the sensible view that the United States is a better friend to Israel when it uses its influence to get Israel to abandon policies (i.e., the settlements) that are harmful to U.S. and Israeli interests alike.
For his part, Frum claims that Obama is "tilted so far against Israel that even-handedness looks like up from down here." He claims the real threat is Iran, and chides Obama for placing too much weight on the Holocaust as a justification for Israel's existence and for ignoring the Jewish people's millennial claim to the land. Tellingly, Frum never says whether he thinks Israel's occupation is a bad thing or not, or whether he thinks a two-state solution would be desirable (though he seems to have his doubts). Indeed, Frum offers the bizarre claim that Israel's settlements "are the consequences of Palestinian and Arab intransigence, not the cause." He is in effect saying that Israel had no choice but to spend the past 41 years (two-thirds of its history) encouraging half of million people to colonize the lands seized in 1967, at a cost of billions of dollars and thousands of lives. (If Frum wants to know how and why this really happened, he should read Zertal and Eldar's Lords of the Land, Gershom Gorenberg's Accidental Empire or former IDF general Shlomo Gazit's Trapped Fools).
The Levy-Frum debate really boils down to a simple question. On one side are those who believe that the continued attempt to hold onto "Greater Israel" poses the real existential threat to Israel's existence, because Jews will eventually be a minority in the lands they control and they will be forced to create a full-fledged apartheid state in order to preserve Israel’s Jewish character. Such fears are amplified by the growing influence of orthodox and ultra-Orthodox groups in Israel, by the signs that younger, more secular Israelis are living abroad in larger numbers, and by the overtly racist policies advocated by politicians like current Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. On the other side are those who either actively favor a "greater Israel" or who don't think the occupation poses a serious long-term problem. The former group wants the United States to use its power and influence to push both sides to a viable two-state solution before it is too late; the latter group wants the US to use its power and influence primarily against other states in the region and to maintain a "special relationship" that is defined as unconditional and uncritical support for just about anything Israel wants to do. The two groups see different threats, and therefore favor radically different American policies.
But don't take my word for it. Just read the exchange, and learn.
India Launches Nuclear Powered Submarine for Trials - Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America.
India Launches Nuclear Powered Submarine for Trials - Anjana Pasricha, Voice of America.
India has launched its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles. The submarine, once in service, will give the country the capability to fire nuclear weapons from sea besides land and air. The Indian navy flooded a dry dock in the southern port city of Visakhapatnam to send out the nuclear-powered submarine named Arihant, for extensive sea trials in the Bay of Bengal. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who launched the submarine, called it a "historic milestone in the country's defense preparedness. It has taken India nearly two decades to develop the Arihant, which means "Destroyer of Enemies." It has been built with technical assistance from Russia. Defense officials say Arihant is powered by a nuclear reactor, and will be armed with ballistic missiles. It will carry a crew of about 100 men. New Delhi-based National Maritime Foundation director Uday Bhaskar says the launch is an important technological step putting India in a small group of nations capable of designing and building nuclear-powered submarines. But he stresses that it could be several years before the submarine is inducted into the Indian navy.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-07-26-voa13.cfm
India has launched its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles. The submarine, once in service, will give the country the capability to fire nuclear weapons from sea besides land and air. The Indian navy flooded a dry dock in the southern port city of Visakhapatnam to send out the nuclear-powered submarine named Arihant, for extensive sea trials in the Bay of Bengal. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who launched the submarine, called it a "historic milestone in the country's defense preparedness. It has taken India nearly two decades to develop the Arihant, which means "Destroyer of Enemies." It has been built with technical assistance from Russia. Defense officials say Arihant is powered by a nuclear reactor, and will be armed with ballistic missiles. It will carry a crew of about 100 men. New Delhi-based National Maritime Foundation director Uday Bhaskar says the launch is an important technological step putting India in a small group of nations capable of designing and building nuclear-powered submarines. But he stresses that it could be several years before the submarine is inducted into the Indian navy.
http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-07-26-voa13.cfm
Clinton’s leaky ‘defense umbrella’
Clinton’s leaky ‘defense umbrella’
Iran’s nuclear program is suddenly receiving a flurry of attention from top Obama administration officials. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Israel today to exchange views on the subject with Ehud Barak, his counterpart. National Security Advisor James Jones will soon arrive in Israel, presumably to discuss the same topic.
Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a U.S. “defense umbrella” over the entire Middle East should Iran fail to cease work on its nuclear complex. Other officials in the Obama administration soon attempted to repeal Clinton’s remarks, while simultaneously implying that some kind of U.S. security umbrella has always been over the Middle East.
Just as the Truman and Eisenhower administration officials figured out at the beginning of the Cold War, a “defense umbrella” or security guarantee presents itself as a seemingly painless solution to an intractable security challenge. At first glance, issuing a promise to use military force later seems to be a more attractive choice than committing to use military force now. In the case of Iran, sanctions won’t work before Iran has nuclear weapons. And a preventive air campaign is unappealing for a variety of reasons. Thus, a U.S. security guarantee for friends in the region seems like an easy solution.
But anyone who remembers the Cold War should recall that U.S. security guarantees for Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were not easy, cheap, or simple. A U.S. guarantee for the Middle East against Iranian aggression will be even more problematic than were America’s guarantees during the Cold War.
1) Will the supposed beneficiaries of the guarantee take the guarantee seriously? It is one thing to make a promise, it is another to deliver on it under stress. The credibility of a U.S. security guarantee would increase if there were visible presidential speeches on the subject, a Senate-ratified treaty, and permanent U.S. force structure commitments and deployments to back it up. Until these things happen, statesmen in Israel and the friendly Arab regimes will be rightfully skeptical.
2) Locking in a nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will shift the conflict onto the irregular warfare playing field. Iran will have the advantage on this field while the U.S. and its friends will most likely be stuck on defense. Here again there are parallels with the Cold War. With a nuclear standoff in place, the Soviet Union’s political and military subversions and proxy wars achieved success in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa and the Middle East. Quantitatively Iran is no Soviet Union. But qualitatively, Iran is organized for subversion and prolonged irregular and proxy warfare, just as was the Soviet Union. A U.S. security guarantee policy that accepts an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will have to prepare for another such “twilight struggle.”
3) Be ready to relearn some old Cold War terms such as “hair-trigger alert,” “launch on warning,” “second strike reserve,” “counter-force versus counter-value targeting,” etc. This time, the standoff will be three-sided (Israel vs. Iran vs. Saudi Arabia) just like the gunfight at the end of “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.” And Middle East nuclear strategists will look back to the Cold War with envy when ICBM flight times were a leisurely 25 minutes.
Secretary Clinton’s “defense umbrella” seems like an easy way out. But such comfort is an illusion. For today’s policymakers trying to figure out what to do about Iran, the lessons of the Cold War are very much alive.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/clintons-leaky-defense-umbrell/
Iran’s nuclear program is suddenly receiving a flurry of attention from top Obama administration officials. Defense Secretary Robert Gates visited Israel today to exchange views on the subject with Ehud Barak, his counterpart. National Security Advisor James Jones will soon arrive in Israel, presumably to discuss the same topic.
Last week, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed a U.S. “defense umbrella” over the entire Middle East should Iran fail to cease work on its nuclear complex. Other officials in the Obama administration soon attempted to repeal Clinton’s remarks, while simultaneously implying that some kind of U.S. security umbrella has always been over the Middle East.
Just as the Truman and Eisenhower administration officials figured out at the beginning of the Cold War, a “defense umbrella” or security guarantee presents itself as a seemingly painless solution to an intractable security challenge. At first glance, issuing a promise to use military force later seems to be a more attractive choice than committing to use military force now. In the case of Iran, sanctions won’t work before Iran has nuclear weapons. And a preventive air campaign is unappealing for a variety of reasons. Thus, a U.S. security guarantee for friends in the region seems like an easy solution.
But anyone who remembers the Cold War should recall that U.S. security guarantees for Western Europe, Japan, and South Korea were not easy, cheap, or simple. A U.S. guarantee for the Middle East against Iranian aggression will be even more problematic than were America’s guarantees during the Cold War.
1) Will the supposed beneficiaries of the guarantee take the guarantee seriously? It is one thing to make a promise, it is another to deliver on it under stress. The credibility of a U.S. security guarantee would increase if there were visible presidential speeches on the subject, a Senate-ratified treaty, and permanent U.S. force structure commitments and deployments to back it up. Until these things happen, statesmen in Israel and the friendly Arab regimes will be rightfully skeptical.
2) Locking in a nuclear standoff between Iran and the U.S. will shift the conflict onto the irregular warfare playing field. Iran will have the advantage on this field while the U.S. and its friends will most likely be stuck on defense. Here again there are parallels with the Cold War. With a nuclear standoff in place, the Soviet Union’s political and military subversions and proxy wars achieved success in Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and parts of Africa and the Middle East. Quantitatively Iran is no Soviet Union. But qualitatively, Iran is organized for subversion and prolonged irregular and proxy warfare, just as was the Soviet Union. A U.S. security guarantee policy that accepts an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will have to prepare for another such “twilight struggle.”
3) Be ready to relearn some old Cold War terms such as “hair-trigger alert,” “launch on warning,” “second strike reserve,” “counter-force versus counter-value targeting,” etc. This time, the standoff will be three-sided (Israel vs. Iran vs. Saudi Arabia) just like the gunfight at the end of “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.” And Middle East nuclear strategists will look back to the Cold War with envy when ICBM flight times were a leisurely 25 minutes.
Secretary Clinton’s “defense umbrella” seems like an easy way out. But such comfort is an illusion. For today’s policymakers trying to figure out what to do about Iran, the lessons of the Cold War are very much alive.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/clintons-leaky-defense-umbrell/
Sunday, July 26, 2009
End of an Era – Jim Puplava
End of an Era – Jim Puplava
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/update.html
http://www.financialsense.com/stormwatch/update.html
Animal Farm - 2009 – James Quinn
Animal Farm - 2009 – James Quinn
http://theburningplatform.com/economy/animal-farm-2009
http://theburningplatform.com/economy/animal-farm-2009
Attack on Iran: Israel Turns to Russia
Attack on Iran: Israel Turns to Russia
http://globalpolitician.com/25736-israel-russia-iran-nuclear-military
http://globalpolitician.com/25736-israel-russia-iran-nuclear-military
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