Reflections from news and commentary of the day
Subscribe To
Posts
All Comments
Friday, October 2, 2026
Atomic Prime - From Heatmap
Atomic Prime - micheletkearney@gmail.com - Gmail
Another hyperscaler invests in large existing nuclear
Almost exactly two years ago, nuclear energy had its Big Tech glow-up. Amazon took an equity stake in X-energy, a developer of helium-cooled small modular reactors. Google invested in Kairos Power, another fourth-generation SMR designer that uses molten salt as a coolant. Microsoft, meanwhile, agreed to pay $16 billion to restart the functioning reactor at Constellation Energy’s Crane Clean Energy Center, formerly known as Three Mile Island. With electricity demand now surging, however, hyperscalers are increasingly following the more conservative Microsoft playbook. Google, as I previously told you, backed plans to bring Iowa’s lone nuclear plant, NextEra Energy’s Duane Arnold station, online again. Facebook-owner Meta — in addition to investments in two next-generation reactor companies, Oklo and TerraPower — inked a deal to buy nuclear electricity from two of utility Vistra’s plants in Ohio and Pennsylvania for the next 20 years.
Now Amazon is securing itself a chunk of the nation’s existing nuclear fleet. This week, the retail and web-hosting giant signed its own 20-year deal to buy power from Constellation’s Calvert Cliffs Clean Energy Center in Maryland, committing more than $3 billion in investments to upgrade the two-reactor facility that will allow the operators to squeeze out another 190 megawatts of capacity on top of the existing 1.8 gigawatts. “This agreement demonstrates how private investment can strengthen critical energy infrastructure,” Constellation CEO Joe Dominguez said in a statement. “Amazon’s commitment supports the long-term operation of Calvert Cliffs for generations to come.”
Thursday, October 1, 2026
[Salon] Saudi Arabia’s ‘Suez Moment’ - ArabDigest.org Guest Post
Saudi Arabia’s ‘Suez Moment’
Summary: recent events have forced a recognition that the US hegemony in the Middle East is over. How the inevitable vacuum will be filled remains far from clear. But it is hard to be optimistic in the short to medium-term even though there is surely an opportunity for “a new beginning.”
We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today’s newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd. You can find Alastair’s latest AD podcast “Energy and a hard winter ahead” here.
I think this is a moment when Saudi and other Gulf countries will be looking at the United States and reconsidering just how much dependence and reliance they want to put in that country now.
Dr Elisabeth Kendall, Al Jazeera TV, 24 September 2026
In the 10 September Newsletter, I set out a scenario in which the US hegemony in the Middle East came to a rapid end. Thanks in significant part to Donald Trump’s refusal to join the Saudis in striking the Huthis in Yemen — the moment to which Dr Kendall was referring — that the end is nigh has suddenly become the conventional wisdom.
Leading the charge is the latest edition of The Economist, carrying a front cover which read "When America Walks Away" and a first leader which argued that, however the war with Iran ends, it will mark “…the moment when America pulls back from the region — in the sense that it relinquishes its hegemony there.”
In its Insider webinar released at the same time, Deputy Editor Edward Carr described this as “a bold prediction.” It is, of course, easy to be wise after the event but I would describe it as belated rather than bold. After all, the last time the US successfully intervened militarily in the region is 36 years ago. Since then, we have seen a succession of failures to achieve objectives or even, on occasion, to act at all (including in support of allies in the region.)
Thus, the writing has been on the wall at least since Barack Obama told Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak to step down (2011), formally announced the ‘pivot to Asia (2012) and, most signally, failed to enforce his ‘red line’ in Syria (2013). One might also point to Mr Trump’s not coming to Saudi Arabia’s aid after Huthis missiles struck the Abqaiq and Khurais refineries in 2019; or his failure to forewarn, let alone adequately forearm, Gulf allies in advance of the Israel/US attack on Iran earlier this year. However (and acknowledging that the ‘parallel’ is not exact), I think The Economist was correct to imply that the Saudis’ ‘Suez moment’ was the deal which the US struck with the Huthis behind Riyadh's back to protect its own ships, i.e. “…when a superpower does deals with an insurgent militia, everyone understands it wants to cut its commitments.”
Nevertheless, the realisation is one thing. Determining what best to do next is another altogether, as the divergent paths taken by France and the UK after the Suez crisis underline.
Riyadh's "Suez moment" arrives as Washington scales back its commitments, leaving the Gulf states to face regional rivals without an American shield.
If there is good-ish news it is that not only Riyadh but also the other GCC members have time to weigh options — individually if not (hopefully but improbably) collectively. Quite how long is far from clear. But we almost certainly will not see a retrenchment of US forces from bases in the Gulf before some sort of agreement has been reached between Washington and Tehran. And even then a complete pull-out in the short-term is unlikely, even though the experts at The Economist may be underestimating the possibility of the US seriously ratcheting back its support for Israel between now and the end of the decade irrespective of the outcome of the next US presidential election.
Related, Israel correspondent Anshel Pfeffer spoke very guardedly on the Insider webinar about prospects for the three non-Arab powers in the region — i.e. Iran, Israel and Türkiye — working together even though they had been “strategic allies” in the past. Middle East correspondent Greg Carlstrom added that Israel sees Türkiye and its increasing influence in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq as a major threat, strongly implying that even a change of prime minister in Israel was unlikely to see a major change of policy. And Middle East editor Josie Delap summed up as follows:
This is an opportunity for the region, America stepping back arguably giving the countries space…to take ownership of their region, of the security of their region, of the stability of their region. …but it feels like the triumph of hope over experience to imagine that they are going to do that anytime soon.”
Specifically on the GCC, Mr Carlstrom added as follows:
I wouldn’t bet on this being a moment of unity…. Take something foundational — integrating your defences…. They didn’t do it either because they didn’t take the threat seriously from Iran or because they didn’t trust each other…. They haven’t been able to do this most basic thing to ensure their security.
Reverting briefly to The Economist magazine its main article concluded as follows:
Even if Mr Trump had not rashly broken it, what America built over the past 35 years was not durable at all: too many of the region’s states were weak, divided or failed ones. Without their longtime guarantor to fall back on, perhaps they will now have to build something better themselves.
However, I agree with Ms Delap that, for starters, Saudi/UAE rivalry remains a huge barrier to overcome. As things stand it seems that, irrespective of what Riyadh does, Abu Dhabi is committed to a UK-like response of trying to hug the US — and Israel — ever closer, thereby potentially making an already bad situation even worse irrespective of how much, or little, substance there is to Saudi Arabia’s recently signed security pact with Pakistan and Türkiye.
After what The Economist’s leader described as the first time since the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire that “the Middle East’s overarching order will no longer be imposed from afar”, it is, perhaps, understandable that 50 percent of respondents to a survey thought that the end of the US hegemony would be ‘a good thing’. Maybe this will prove to be the case. But, to borrow Mr Carr’s words from the question he posed at the start of the webinar — and consistent with geopolitical theory around the end of a hegemony — a ‘best case’ scenario could all to easily be “an orgy of score-settling and violence” before we get to “a new beginning.”
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)